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Summary
Tissue engineering is an emerging biomedical innovation surrounded by 
potentiality and risk. Based on documentary analysis and expert interviews, this 
study discusses different constructions of risk according to main constituencies 
(scientists, clinicians and manufacturers), the way they prioritise and balance 
these risks, and how issues are framed as problematic or not. Complexity and 
uncertainty are the main drivers in this exercise, interpreted in terms of boundary 
drawing around contested risk domains. This is followed by a discussion of the 
translation of risk into regulatory policy, by focusing on two recent legislative 
initiatives by the European Commission: one to control the quality and safety 
aspects of human tissues and cells (DG SANCO Directive) and the other to 
facilitate the marketing of tissue engineered products in the EU (DG Enterprise 
Regulation).
These two legislative initiatives aim to overcome the current regulatory lag in 
Europe, where tissue engineered applications are either unregulated or subject to 
a broad variety in national controls. This situation is problematic for manufacturers 
wanting to market their products in Europe, for regulators in evaluating the risks of 
these technologies and defining an appropriate approval route, and for patients in 
terms of unequal access to potentially beneficial therapies across the continent.
Firmly rooted in ambitions to make the EU a techno-scientific and bio-economic 
powerhouse, regulation of this domain is troubled by competing agendas of 
promoting trade versus protecting public health. Social and ethical considerations 
about the impact of tissue engineering technology allow a reconsideration of the 
bio-society as alternative model, taking into account the technological as well as 
social character of innovation.
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Introduction 
Biotechnology policies and sciences
This thesis is about science and politics, and about the political economy of 
medicine. More specifically I am concerned with the negotiated boundaries 
between domains of risk and regulation of an emerging technological 
innovation called tissue engineering. These themes are studied with reference 
to the European Union (EU). This chapter introduces the policy scene and 
gives a brief outline of techno-scientific factors in the development of tissue 
engineered applications.
The European context: On bio-economy and bio-society
The main context to consider the policy shaping and decision-making around 
tissue engineering is provided by a long EU tradition to promote trade and 
technological innovation. Only more recently health and safety regulation has 
entered the equation. The European Commission plays a peculiar double role 
in this constellation. First and foremost the Commission functions as promoter, 
sponsor and facilitator of biotechnology in Europe. At the same time the 
Commission, as main legislative body at this level, acts as regulator of this 
domain. This dual objective is significant for the shaping of a regulatory regime 
in tissue engineering, which is why this section discusses this context in more 
detail.
The bio-economy is one of the oldest economic sectors known to 
humanity, and the life sciences and biotechnology are transforming it 
into one of the newest (DG Research 2005: 2).
This wisdom sets the scene for a discussion on European policy objectives. 
During a high-level conference organised by the Commission’s DG Research in 
September 2005, some 400 delegates from across the world discussed the 
‘knowledge-based bio-economy’. Knowledge, it was argued, has become an
11
extremely valuable economic resource, which would put Europe at its most 
competitive edge. ‘In a global economy, knowledge is the best way to increase 
productivity and competitiveness and improve our quality of life, while 
protecting our environment and social model,’ in the words of EU Science and 
Research Commissioner Janez Potocnik (DG Research 2005: 1). The main 
drivers for this competitiveness and growth agenda are the life sciences and 
biotechnology, a sector estimated to be worth over 1.5 trillion euros a year.
With the United States, Japan and China already in the front seats of these bio­
economies, it was declared that Europe should redouble its efforts to not lose 
out on the competition, to pick the ‘fruits of a revolution’ and bring prosperity to 
the citizens of Europe.
While the concept of the knowledge-based bio-economy was presented as 
new, the rationale behind it was not.
From its early inception, the EU has always been largely conceived as an 
economic unit, with a longstanding tradition of promotion of trade in a single 
European market. The proclaimed significance of biotechnology in fostering 
competitiveness is not novel either, as it has been part of the EU’s long-term 
strategic challenge. Biotechnology has been conceived as a broad category in 
this respect, extending from the traditional focus on agriculture and food 
(‘green’ biotech, such as genetically modified crops) to also encompass ‘red’ 
biotechnological applications in biomedicine. Arguably this last category is 
becoming increasingly important for the bio-economy, where biotech 
applications in pharmaceuticals are joined by the ‘new frontiers of medicine’ 
such as gene therapy, therapeutic cloning and regenerative medicine including 
tissue engineering. This interest should be considered in the shadow of large 
controversy over genetically modified organisms (GMOs) as exemplar for green 
biotech - which the Commission typified as the weakest link in the biotech 
spectrum, as this controversy slowed down innovation and is held responsible 
for a brain drain of agricultural researchers to destinations outside the EU.
The term ‘bio-society’ was introduced by the ‘Forecasting and Assessment in 
Science and Technology’ programme, better known as FAST, which was 
initiated in 1978 to build a community method for planning and forecasting new
12
technologies (Abels 2002). This term emphasised the social as well as 
technological aspects of the applied life sciences (which included agro-food 
and healthcare), arguing the case for full awareness of ‘life in all its forms if we 
are to use and manage the biosphere in a productive and sustainable way’ 
(Green 1984: 9). Thus the bio-society was defined as:
A society based on the conscious management of self-organising
systems for the sustenance and enrichment of human life and purposes
(Green 1984: 9).
FAST was the first EU programme to address long-term R&D priorities in 
biotechnology with the formulation of a ‘Community strategy for European 
biotechnology’ (1982) laying down the basic principles for an integrated 
European policy in this domain. With the bio-society notion the FAST group 
presented a model in which ecological modernisation of the West had to be 
integrated with the needs of developing countries (Commandeur et al. 1996). 
With its orientation on stressing social demands, the impact of the FAST 
message was initially limited because it clashed with the general enthusiasm 
for biotech potential among conservative governments in the 1980s (Abels 
2002). It did have a significant influence though on the initiation of European 
biotech programmes over the next decades.
From these early developments the dominant frames of biotechnology became 
clearly visible. Biotech was seen as the driving force for innovation and a 
fundamental tool for socio-economic development. The economic base of 
contemporary society would be considerably boosted by the scale and potential 
of biotech applications, providing incentives for the new accumulation of 
investment capital to re-establish economic growth. It was also envisaged how 
biotechnology leads to increased competition between industries involved, both 
over expanding domestic markets in EU Member States and to capture export 
markets. The international division of labour was to be shifted within the 
Community and on a global scale. Finally biotechnology was presented as 
solution to global problems, where especially third world countries would 
benefit from the new applications to ease deficiencies in food production, 
health, energy and environmental problems (Green 1984: 10-12).
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This vision was also evident from another early initiative, a report on 
international trends in biotechnology compiled by a group of experts for the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). This report 
is drenched with statements on the future value of biotechnology to society and 
industry, where especially the financial benefit of biotech applications for the 
healthcare market is emphasised (OECD 1982). Furthermore the advantages 
for developing countries are exemplified, where ‘it should be pointed out that 
research and development in industrialised countries of the North can be 
applied mutatis mutandis in developing countries to confront the major strategic 
problems of energy, food, fertilizer and health’ (OECD 1982: 20-21).
The OECD report furthermore outlined the need for more R&D investment and 
for education and manpower in biotechnology, while substantial changes were 
predicted in industry-university relations and in the ways in which research is 
funded in the light of a growing venture capital market. Finally, and 
interestingly, the issue of safety regulation is addressed. The OECD states how 
‘public safety must be a prime concern, of course’ and how all countries should 
have regulations for health and safety at work and for the protection of the 
public and their environment. Typically, the economic and innovation objective 
should not be hampered in this endeavour:
Increasingly demanding legislation and excessively restrictive 
regulations must be avoided as these will impose major constraints on 
developments in biotechnology (OECD 1982: 55).
Thus the emergence of biotechnology was presented as of significant value to 
the global economy and world well-being. Some critics review this development 
in terms of ‘competing images of science’, most notably in relation to advances 
in genetics and biology which were expressed as a second industrial revolution 
that would transform economy and societal futures at large (Kearnes et al.
2006: 17). Projections of future imagined worlds, driven by both scientific and 
social imaginaries, were dominant -  and for that matter continue to shape new 
scientific fields. It was at a time, in the 1980s, when Monsanto was still going to 
provide environmental friendly solutions to world hunger and poverty, and the 
new genetics would overtake traditional modes of production. Signs of the early 
rise of technocapitalism were acknowledged later (Suarez-Villa 2001; Suarez- 
Villa 2003).
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It was in this context of an economy of hope (Helen 2004) that the European 
Commission kept faithful to its mission for biotech support. Since the early 
1980s the EU has invested heavily and increasingly in the promotion of biotech, 
with major research funds and European framework programmes put in place.1 
While the initial funding programmes focused on agricultural applications and 
food, in the late 1980s biomedical applications could count on increasing EU 
support. This coincided with an extended involvement and remit of the EU in 
public health research, which was previously largely based at individual 
Member State level. For example BIOMED 1 was launched in 1990 to provide 
Community support and training in human genome research, disease 
prevention and a range of therapeutic applications (including cancer, 
cardiovascular and mental disorders). With a budget of US$ 166 million this 
programme ran till 1994, when it was followed up by BIOMED 2 (1994-1998). In 
these years an important shift took place, reflected in the substantially 
increased budget to US$ 415 million under this research programme, where 
public health was considered a new market for the proliferation of European 
competence in biotech. Under BIOMED 2 more research activities were funded 
and new priority areas identified, including pharmaceutical research and 
biomedical technology and engineering (Commandeur et al. 1996).
Notwithstanding these ‘good intentions’ for EU biotechnology support and 
facilitation, the envisaged sustainable bio-economy was not a reality yet 
towards the turn of the century. Competition on a global level was more difficult 
to achieve than originally envisaged and ‘just delivering basic agricultural
1 For example the Biomolecular Engineering Programme (BEP) was established in 1982 as the 
first biotechnology programme, mostly focused on agriculture and food, with a budget of US$
20 million. This was considered low in comparison to budgets of individual governments in EU 
Member States, which totaled some US$ 200 million for biotech R&D over the years 1982- 
1983. Over the same period the USA invested US$ 335 million. The BEP was continued as the 
Biotechnology Action Programme (BAP). Implemented in 1985, with a four-year budget of US$ 
74 million, BAP was established to stimulate a European research network between 
universities, other publicly funded institutes and industry, and extended its research areas to 
enzyme engineering and bioinformatics. The BAP was unsuccessful due to limited funding and 
lack of industry involvement (largely due to conflict of interest on confidentiality rules). Next was 
the Biotechnology Research for Innovation, Development and Growth in Europe (BRIDGE), 
which ran from 1990-1994 with a total budget of US$ 123 million, focusing more on industrial 
applications. B IOTECH 1 (US$ 229 million) running between 1992-1994 as a supplement to 
BRIDGE, and B IOTECH 2 (US$ 681 million) as the follow-up for the period 1994-1998 were 
additional examples of specific programmes for biotech R&D funding (source: Commandeur et 
al 1996).
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commodities’ had to be complemented with ‘a sound institutional and financial 
framework’ (DG Research 2005: 3). A holistic approach was needed where the 
bioscience sector was supported with investment, while all stakeholders 
involved -  including industry, regulators and consumers -  were called upon to 
make the bio-economy work. The rise of counter-movements against nuclear 
energy and biotechnology in the 1980s had to be channelled towards the 
economic growth agenda. For a long time these critical voices were considered 
to be based on insufficient (if not lacking) knowledge about the benefits of 
biotechnology, and the EU’s technology policy was hardly touched by popular 
dissatisfaction in these days. This technocratic attitude changed significantly 
after the BSE crises, the controversy over GMOs and the discussion on 
biotechnology patents (Borras 2003). Only during the last decade the 
innovation agenda has opened up to include questions of risk and social 
sustainability. Social and ethical considerations became instrumental in 
creating a common vision; science had to deliver what ‘the people’ need in 
compliance with an acceptable ethical consensus.
The new millennium brought a new impetus to the competitive knowledge- 
based bio-economy. In March 2000 European leaders met in the Portuguese 
capital to set the goals of what became known as ‘the Lisbon Strategy’. The 
European Union set itself the ambitious strategic goal ‘to become the most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world’ by 2010 
(Commission of the European Communities (CEC) 2001: 3). As part of its aim 
to make the biotechnology sector in Europe more competitive and to foster 
research in this area the Commission adopted the ‘Life Sciences and 
Biotechnology Strategy’ in January 2002. By stressing the benefits of 
biotechnology the Commission hopes to promote a revival for European 
industry, arguing how prejudice against biotechnology could be contra- 
productive for Europe by missing out on jobs, growth and prosperity. While 
recognising public debate and ethical concerns in this domain -  the document 
speaks of the need for ‘responsible governance’ in harmony with societal 
values - the strategy is interlarded with actions that underline the commercial 
potential and need for economic growth.
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Because after Lisbon the EU was still lagging behind its major competitors in 
terms of R&D investment, EU leaders agreed in Barcelona in 2002 to increase 
the financial support from 2 to 3% of the EU’s collective gross domestic product 
by 2010. A few years later, in March 2005, a mid-term review of the Lisbon 
agenda led to a relaunch of the strategy where ’knowledge for growth’ became 
the focus of European research policy (DG Research 2005).
These developments accumulated in the latest European Framework 
Programme (FP7), the main EU programme for Research, Technological 
Development and Demonstration (RTD) which will run between 2007 and 2013 
with an overall proposed budget of 72.5 billion euros. The main aim of this 
programme is to contribute to sustainable development within the context of 
promoting high level research (CORDIS 2005). The EU’s annual research 
budget was proposed to be doubled in order to achieve the strategic goals for a 
knowledge-based bio-economy. As such, FP7 explicitly reflects the importance 
of biotech in the health domain.2 Once again the healthcare market was 
declared a strategic part of the bio-economy.
Against this background of a strong EU push for biotechnology and life 
sciences in order to make Europe a world-leading economic and scientific 
powerhouse, we can consider the other responsibility of the Commission, 
namely in controlling the safety and marketing requirements of the fruits of 
biotechnology. While chapter two provides the European regulatory context for 
tissue engineering, where tensions become visible between the long standing 
trade objectives and the more recent EU involvement in health and safety 
regulation, the next section discusses the scientific background of one 
particular exemplar of biotech: tissue engineering. The EU context is crucial for 
understanding both the development and regulation of tissue engineering, and 
is important for any discussion of biotechnological innovation. It flags up issues 
of risk and safety, of commercial endeavours and technological innovation, and 
relates to many of the social and ethical considerations that have become
2 The bulk of the funding goes to so called collaborative research, which is divided in thematic 
priority areas, the first two of which include health (€8.3 billion) and Food, Agriculture and 
Biotechnology (€2.4 billion). The health priority has as objective the improvement of health of 
European citizens as well as increasing the competitiveness of European health-related 
industries and businesses. Biotechnology is mentioned as first strand of research for project 
funding under this heading (C O R D IS  2005).
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central to discussions about European biotechnology. The focus of the next 
section is on ‘the science’ of tissue engineering, while also introducing broader 
issues of a socio-political nature to lay the groundwork for my further analysis.
Tissue engineering technologies
This section gives insight into the technological and scientific aspects of tissue 
engineering technology, which is relevant for understanding the issues around 
risk regulation and the expertise needed to evaluate the technology. Particular 
definitions of risk and safety, and the drawing of boundaries around criteria of 
efficacy and cost-effectiveness feed into the debate on regulatory policy 
formation in this domain. The expression of social and ethical concerns in this 
context is based on techno-scientific factors in the ongoing development of 
tissue engineering technology. To get to grips with these underlying issues, 
some understanding is needed of the making of tissue engineered applications, 
and the associated risks in the trajectory from cell sourcing and culturing in the 
lab to logistics and final implantation into the patient.
The basic premise of tissue engineering is to combine appropriate cells with a 
material under conditions that lead to tissue formation (Lavik and Langer 2004). 
The figure below shows the general principles of the technology (Stock and 
Vacanti 2001):
Cell Isolation + expansion
Cell seedingCell harvest from 
biopsy or stem cells
In vitro culturing
Scaffold
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Living cells are critical components of any tissue engineered application, and 
much ethical and social debate is driven by the cell sources used to build tissue 
engineered constructs. Cells sources for tissue engineering fall into three 
categories: autologous cells (patient own), allogeneic cells (from a human 
donor, but not immunologically identical) and xenogeneic cells (from a different 
species, e.g. animal). Applications currently in clinical use are mainly based on 
the first two sources, where cells are harvested by either taking a biopsy to 
obtain autologous organ-specific cells or by the isolation of stem cells. 
Experimental use also exists of the implantation of animal cells in humans, 
although debate is ongoing in how far this approach comes under the umbrella 
of tissue engineering. Chapter 10 discusses this issue in more detail.
Scientists are still struggling to define what exactly stem cells are (Lewis 2005), 
but they are generally considered to be the ‘master’ cells of the body, that have 
the capacity to multiply and differentiate into many different types of specialised 
cells and tissues. Stem cells exist at all stages of human development, from 
early embryos to foetuses to adults. In the context of regenerative medicine, 
two main categories of stem cells have attracted attention: adult and embryonic 
stem cells. Much research effort goes into finding ways to understand how a 
stem cell differentiates into a tissue-specific cell (Nerem 2000; Prelie et al.
2002; Sottile et al. 2003). On the clinical and safety level, the use of embryonic 
stem cells (ESCs) might be limited because of associated risks of developing 
tumours if the differentiation of the cells cannot be controlled appropriately (Ho 
et al. 2005). Also rejection of these cells by the immune system is a major 
scientific issue to overcome. The use of ESCs is also contested for socio­
political and ethical reasons, most notably over the fact that the harvesting of 
this material requires the use and destruction of the embryo, touching upon the 
ongoing debate about the legal status of the human embryo (Koh and Atala 
2004a; Young 2000). Considerations of moral controversy, safety, efficacy and 
resource allocation have fed the belief that tissue engineering is still a long way 
from being able to use embryonic stem cells (Cogle et al. 2003; Richards 2000; 
Royal Society 2000).
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But scientific and public debate continues. In tissue engineering the boundaries 
between embryonic and adult stem cells are of major relevance for marking out 
the regulatory domain. Because of the legal constraints and ethical objections 
in many countries towards human ESC research, the use of adult stem cells 
has gained revived interest, because it is seen as a less controversial option 
(Henon 2003; Moreno-Borchart 2004). Illustrative of this development is the 
political rhetoric used by George W. Bush, threatening his first veto in May 
2005 over the expansion of federally funded research on stem cells, where the 
US president announced: Tm a strong supporter of adult stem cell research, of 
course.’ (Jasanoff 2005: 147). In July 2006 the President did indeed deploy his 
first veto in moral rejection of federal funding for human embryonic stem cell 
research.
Thus the consideration of which cell source to be employed is of key concern 
for tissue engineering technologies. There needs to be a sufficient quantity of 
supply and one that needs to be free of pathogens and contamination. One of 
the technological factors inhibiting progress in tissue engineering research in 
the past was the difficulty of growing cells in culture in quantities that are 
sufficient for transplantation (Koh and Atala 2004a; Koh and Atala 2004b). 
Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that immune acceptance is a critical 
factor, together with the biocompatibility (not causing any harm to the bodily 
environment, such as an inflammatory response). Autologous cells have the 
advantage of being immune acceptable, but are not readily available (‘off-the- 
shelf) as the culturing of patient-own cells usually takes a few weeks. 
Allogeneic cells do not have this disadvantage, but may cause problems with 
immune acceptance. Also xenogeneic cells require engineering immune 
acceptance and carry a risk of transmitting animal viruses that needs to be 
overcome to provide a safe alternative -  not to mention the ethical sensitivities 
around the use of animal sources. Traditionally the biological materials in tissue 
engineering are limited to autologous and allogeneic cells, generally of adult 
origin, which take different processing routes. This research demonstrates that 
the distinction between allogeneic and autologous cells is of key importance in 
the debate on risk regulation of tissue engineering, and has implications for 
clinical use and commercialisation of the technology.
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Tissue engineering would provide an alternative for the treatment of end-stage 
organ failure and tissue loss (Langer and Vacanti 1999) and has been labelled 
‘second-generation organ transplantation’, although the theories and 
techniques behind it differ substantially (Hogle 2003: 63). As with many 
upcoming fields, the technology is surrounded by promises and future potential:
Tissue-engineered products open up a new way of treating diseases.
The hope is that they deliver superior treatments, improving the speed, 
extent and duration of healing compared to conventional treatments. The 
overall aim of on-going research is to improve the performance of tissue- 
engineered products and to enlarge application areas (European 
Commission (EC) 2004).
But while the principles of tissue engineering have been applied to virtually 
every organ system in the body, to date only a handful of products have 
actually reached the market (Atala 2004; Bonassar and Vacanti 1998). Most 
advanced applications include skin systems for wound care (burns and diabetic 
and venous ulcers), cartilage repair (sports injuries) and bone regeneration (for 
orthopaedic and dental applications). Examples of specific product categories 
and their associated risks are provided in the chapters to come. In the pipeline 
are more experimental applications that may provide clinical solutions for 
diseases which could not be treated in a satisfactory manner so far, such as 
cardiovascular diseases (tissue-engineered heart valves, vessel grafts and 
heart muscle tissue) or neurodegenerative diseases (e.g. Alzheimer's and 
Parkinson's) and damaged nerve fibres and spinal cord injury (European 
Commission (EC) 2004). Other potential applications include whole organ 
replacement, such as kidney, bladder and liver, although this is thought to be 
even further down the R&D line.
It should be noted that under the generic definition of tissue engineering a 
broad range of different applications are developed and marketed, from 
relatively simple constructs in skin and cartilage to more complex tissues and 
organs. This diverse product portfolio has far reaching implications in terms of 
risk and safety classifications and demands different ways of evaluating clinical 
efficacy. Furthermore this hierarchy of multiple outputs affects 
commercialisation strategies. Tissue engineered products with life-saving 
properties are still in early phases of development, while products currently 
available have to compete with alternative conventional treatments, many of
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which are more cost-effective and have already conquered a steady position in 
the market. Issues around clinical effectiveness of these applications have a 
direct link with the potential reimbursement of individual tissue engineered 
products, and are relevant for the broader discussion about regulation and 
governance of this technology.
Summary
This introduction has illustrated three main points. First of all, the EU has a 
longstanding tradition of promoting innovation and commercial development of 
biotech. Notions of the bio-economy and bio-society have become central to 
this understanding, illustrating emerging social demands for a sustainable 
future and the Commission’s aim to integrate these in ambitions to make the 
EU a global competitor in science and technology -  with the life sciences and 
biotechnology as main weapons in this combat. Finally, tissue engineering as 
one exemplar in this context allows the opening-up of this long-term discussion. 
This research shows how policy making in this domain is increasingly 
dominated by broader concerns about the appropriate tools for risk assessment 
and management, guiding expertise to evaluate this technology and in 
channelling the social and ethical implications of technology. The impact of 
biotech applications on society at large is renegotiated, while simultaneously 
the EU struggles with the inheritance of years of technocratic decision-making 
in this domain. The remainder of this thesis explains these processes and 
provides a context for considering tissue engineering as technological and 
social innovation.
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1 Product cycles, boundaries and 
regulatory science
The life cycle of a typical tissue engineered product constitutes the opening 
section of this chapter, in order to demonstrate the key issues of engagement 
in this thesis. The conceptual approach to these issues is discussed next, 
followed by a statement of my research questions and an overview of the 
structure of the thesis.
1.1 Apligraf ® a case study
After the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001, all available 
supplies of the living skin equivalent Apligraf® were donated to New York 
hospitals to treat the large number of burned and wounded victims (Mclntire et 
al. 2002: i).
Apligraf entered the healthcare market in April 1997, when the Canadian Health 
Products and Food Branch (HPFB) was the first major regulatory body to 
approve the human skin substitute for use in healing venous leg ulcers, which 
are wounds caused by poor circulation in the legs (Branwyn 1998). In the 
summer it was launched by Novartis Pharmaceuticals Canada (Persidis 1999). 
In May 1998 the product received marketing clearance by the US regulatory 
authority FDA as a medical device for the treatment of the same condition. In 
June 2000 the company got approval to use the product for treating diabetic 
foot ulcers; chronic wounds that can take years to heal and sometimes lead to 
amputation. Several countries in Europe followed. Currently Apligraf has been 
used in 100,000 patients in the US alone, for the treatment of both venous leg 
ulcers and diabetic foot ulcers, and is marketed in a number of countries 
worldwide. In 2004 the reimbursement for the product in the US almost 
doubled, and not much later that year the company announced large-scale 
clinical trials to get regulatory approval for an additional three indications, 
including the treatment of bed sores (pressure ulcers), the improvement of skin
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repair and reduced scarring in patients with deep second-degree burns and 
finally for cosmetic surgery (Organogenesis 2005a).
So what is new? Apligraf was the first mass-produced 
product containing living human cells and the first tissue 
engineered skin product commercially available for t
clinical application; a so called ‘off the shelf application 
for immediate use as a permanent dressing for non­
healing ulcers. It consists of artificially-grown skin developed by the biotech 
corporation Organogenesis based in Canton, Massachusetts - and until mid 
2003 licensed to marketing partner Novartis which also covered the European 
market. Also, Apligraf was the first mass-produced engineered body part to 
have been granted regulatory approval (Eaglstein and Falanga 1997, 1998; 
Trent and Kirsner 1998).
1.1.1 The lab
Years of research and development preceded the marketing approval. Apligraf, 
formerly known as Graftskin, is a bilayered living skin construct consisting of a 
dermis and an epidermis (Falanga 2000). The upper layer contains 
keratinocytes, the dominant cell type in the epidermis, which has protective 
properties and covers the dermis. The lower layer contains collagen and 
fibroblasts, the main constituents of the dermis, which is important for healing. 
Because the skin construct does not contain immunogenic cell types it is 
generally not rejected by the recipient (McCartney 1996).
i i
Source: Apligraf website 2005
n  i iii. < ■ - r  ‘'Z 2
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Apligraf is prepared from skin cells harvested from the foreskins of circumcised 
newborns (Waymack et al. 2000). A scientist involved in the development of 
Apligraf recalls how some hundred neonatal foreskins were collected from a 
Jewish hospital and how cell banks were set up in the US, with separate banks 
for the two skin type cells (fibroblasts and keratinocytes) that make up the 
bilayered human skin equivalent (M-EU6, 2003).
The baby’s foreskin is considered an ideal starting material as young skin 
grows better, and is a readily available source obtained during routine 
circumcision. A commercial provider explains the technological benefits as 
follows:
This starting material reduces variability by being derived from tissue 
that is the same age, sex, and anatomical location, and provides a 
fibroblast source with great proliferation potential, with one foreskin 
being able to produce starting cells for at least 250,000 feet of final 
tissue-engineered product (Naughton 2002: 374).
The amounts of skin to be produced in this way reach imaginary heights, 
although exact figures vary. According to manufacturer Organogenesis the 
cells from a single foreskin can produce 200,000 units of manufactured skin, 
enough to cover about 250 people (Branwyn 1998). Or translated into more 
marketable vocabulary:
[l]t turns out that a small, postage-stamp-size piece of foreskin is enough 
to actually expand out to seven football fields worth of skin.
(Brownlee 2001: 36; see also Van Valkenburgh 1996).
But the foreskin needs excessive processing before it can be used on the 
patient. First, the foreskin is decontaminated with antibiotics, antifungals, and 
an ethyl alcohol rinse. Next the cells are fed with nutrients and growth factors to 
enable them to grow and multiply. During this culturing process the cells are 
mixed with a solution of so-called type I bovine collagen, which is a material 
derived from foetal bovine (cow) placenta (Eaglstein et al. 1999). In about 20 
days the cells form a two-layer upper and lower dermis and the skin construct 
is ready for storage and later shipment (Branwyn 1998). Over time, the donor 
cells from infant foreskins are replaced by the patient's own cells, and after 
several months none of the original graft DNA should be present anymore 
(Drug information online PDR 2002).
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In order to provide an ‘off the shelf solution, the cell stocks 
are frozen in cryopreservation vials and stored in master cell 
banks for later use. After request by the physician Apligraf is 
packaged and sealed, and shipped via overnight courier for
final use as permanent dressing on the patient (Organogenesis 2003). Once 
the production of a batch begins it cannot easily be halted so timing of the 
process is critical and has to be determined by planned delivery dates. The 
shelf life of the product is limited; the manufacturer refers to a ‘7 day shipping 
window’, and advertises with a ‘new 10 day shelf life’ from the time of 
packaging. To maintain cell viability, Apligraf should be kept sealed and at the 
right temperature (20°C-23°C) until use. The manufacturer had to develop 
special ‘shipping technology’ to maintain the product quality; a small heavy 
gauge polyethylene bag with a heating plate to control the temperature in the 
container and to monitor the conditions during the transit of the product. The 
bag is sealed and comes with a so-called agarose nutrient medium, a gel-like 
solution that protects and nourishes the product, and a pH colour chart to check 
the pH of the nutrient medium upon arrival (‘if the pH is yellow, return the 
product in a biohazard bag via overnight delivery’). The final product is supplied 
as a circular disk of approximately 75 mm in diameter and 0.75 mm thick, and 
each disk is intended for single use. Each piece of Apligraf can cover an area 
between 44 and 66 square centimetre (Thuesen 2001).
1.1.2 The clinic
Clinical use of Apligraf requires precision. The physician has
to a clean wound bed with the dermal layer in direct contact with the wound 
surface. Air pockets or wrinkled edges have to be eliminated and extra product 
trimmed away. On top of that goes a dressing and gauzes as usual. Additional 
applications of Apligraf can be necessary, but should not be applied over areas 
of adherent product. As pointed out in the package insert, the safety and
to use a sterile instrument to remove the sheets from the
container, in which Apligraf is packaged with the epidermal 
layer (‘dull with a matt finish’) facing up and the dermal layer 
(‘glossy’) facing down on a membrane. It should be applied
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efficacy of Apligraf have not been established for patients receiving more than 
five applications (Organogenesis 2003, 2005b).
The envisaged benefits for the patient of this technology are that Apligraf is not 
rejected and does not trigger an immune response. Other available alternatives 
are to transplant the patient's own skin (autograft) or to use donated skin 
(allograft), usually from cadavers (donor organs and bodies donated for science 
upon death) or animals that are anatomically close to humans such as pigs 
(xenograft). But not all patients have enough intact skin for autografting, and 
despite immunosuppressant drugs donated skin sets off an immune reaction in 
the recipient, which means the donor skin has to be replaced at some point and 
is only a temporary solution.
Apligraf is not indicated for use in all chronic wounds though, and currently only 
approved for the treatment of venous leg ulcers and diabetic foot ulcers - 
although it is also available in some countries for experimental use as part of a 
clinical trial, for example for burn wounds. These indications are specified in 
much clinical detail. A handful of clinical studies show the clinical effectiveness 
of the product for these particular applications. In addition to being 
immunologically inert (not clinically rejected), Apligraf is said to be easily 
applicable, to induce rapid healing, be less painful to the patient and particularly 
effective in hard to heal wounds.3
Also several studies show the effectiveness of the treatment compared to other 
alternatives available: Apligraf combined with standard treatment heals more 
diabetic foot ulcers faster than standard treatment alone, and Apligraf 
combined with compression therapy, heals more venous leg ulcers faster than 
compression therapy alone (Apligraf website, 2005). On the economic level, it 
has been argued that the use of Apligraf for treating hard-to-heal venous leg 
ulcers resulted in lower overall treatment costs (Schonfeld et al. 2000) and that 
the skin substitute is increasingly cost-effective over a longer analytic horizon 
(Sibbald et al. 2001).
3 For reports on clinical effectiveness see amongst others: Alvarez et al. 1998; Banta and 
Kirsner2002; Curran and Plosker 2002; De et al. 2002; Eaglstein and Falanga 1998a, 1998b; 
Fahey 1998; Kirsner 1998; Shen and Falanga 2003; Streit and Braathen 2000; Trent and 
Kirsner 1998; W aym ack et al. 2000.
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Apligraf is thus seen as example par excellence of technological superiority, as 
‘one of the most advanced organ constructs developed to date’ and ‘the most 
advanced bioengineered skin product’ (Falanga 2000).
1.1.3 Outside the lab and clinic
So far the story of Apligraf has been a story of scientific endeavour and 
technological innovation. But there are also concerns, not the least in terms of 
risk and safety of products containing living cells. As one industrial scientist 
explains, who was involved in the development of Apligraf in the United States:
I think it’s because it’s all so new, there are certain things that... well I 
mean we can go through the sort of hurdles that we had with Apligraf, 
because it was brand new and the Drug Administration [FDA] had big 
difficulties with it. Their main issues are that these cells will be 
harbouring some pathogen. And another issue was that these cells, 
because they are living and can reproduce themselves, could reproduce 
themselves without control, you know become a tumour and go 
everywhere and grow without limits. And kind of related to the pathogen 
one, was the fact that you can’t sterilise these things, because you 
would kill them. So by definition you can’t terminally sterilise them. (...) 
So there were these inherent risks, which is kind of unique for living 
products. (Manufacturer in tissue engineering M1, 2003)
Apligraf works by the grace of its living cells. To maintain cell viability, the 
product is aseptically manufactured, but not terminally sterilised. According to 
the manufacturer, Apligraf is shipped following a preliminary sterility test with a 
48 hour incubation to determine the absence of microbial growth. The so-called 
USP sterility tests, which are considered the industry standard for final testing 
against contamination, are not performed on this product though because they 
require a 14-day incubation period - which is beyond the shelf life of the 
product. Thus the product is shipped just in time and implanted at a certain risk. 
For the same reason of time restraints, the testing on uniformity of the 
biochemical and biomechanical characteristics of the tissue from one lot to 
another often cannot be performed, which implies more rapid and less reliable 
testing than the standard.
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Another safety concern is related to the clinical effects. Tumour formation, and 
carcinogenicity more general, has been addressed as a risk for many tissue 
engineered products. Tests on Apligraf have not revealed a tumorigenic 
potential of the cells contained in the device, but at the same time the 
manufacturer warns that ‘the long term potential of skin cancers from these 
cells is unknown’ (Organogenesis 2005b).
Furthermore, because Apligraf is made from human neonatal foreskin tissue, 
the foreskin donor's mother needs to be tested for human viruses. Currently 
these tests include antibodies to human immunodeficiency virus type 1 and 2 
(HIV-1 and HIV-2), human T-lymphotropic virus type 1 (HTLV-1, which is 
associated with leukaemia cancer), hepatitis C virus (HCV), hepatitis B surface 
antigen (HbsAg), and syphilis. The screening of donors is to prevent 
microbiological contamination associated with the sourcing of the tissue, to 
control the possibility of viruses causing infectious diseases. But to prevent 
disease transmission, safety checks are also critical during the process of 
production and storage of the cells. The skin cell banks which are the source of 
the cells from which Apligraf is derived, are tested for human and animal 
viruses, retroviruses, bacteria, fungi, yeast, mycoplasma, karyology, 
isoenzymes, and tumorigenicity (Apligraf website, 2005). This is to make sure 
no contamination takes place during the production process, although the risk 
of this occurring is considered lower than associated with the source material. 
This mostly relates to personnel working in the laboratory handling and 
processing the cells, and the availability of a controlled environment with 
standard operating procedures and all kind of quality systems to prevent 
process-related contamination.
Next there is the safety control of the final product; according to the 
manufacturer, the final product is currently tested for ‘morphology, cell viability, 
epidermal coverage, sterility, mycoplasma, and physical container integrity’ 
before shipping (Organogenesis 2005b). This cannot rule out any adverse 
reactions at the receiver’s end though, which made the manufacturer send out 
the warning that Apligraf is contraindicated in patients with a known 
hypersensitivity to any of the components of the Apligraf shipping gel.
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As far as documented in the public domain, the company had at least one 
recall a year due to risk of contamination of Apligraf (Jette 2004).
One specific concern with Apligraf, and with tissue engineered products based 
on cell culturing more general, is the use of animal-derived material during the 
product manufacturing process. To create Apligraf, the human foreskin cells 
are mixed with a connective tissue protein derived from cow tendons (type I 
bovine collagen). All animal-derived products need to be tested for micro­
organisms, and the bovine material can only be obtained from countries free of 
bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE). Because of this specific animal 
component, Apligraf is contraindicated in patients with known allergies to 
bovine collagen. Adverse reactions associated with this material are considered 
‘patient specific responses’. Social and ethical sensitivities around the sourcing 
and donation of these cells have not been publicly addressed in this respect.
1.1.4 Onto the market
These social issues are paramount. One example is the trade in foreskin (‘the 
foreskin resale industry is a multi-billion dollar a year business!’) and ownership 
of human material. The manufacturer needs to obtain informed consent from 
patients, or in this case their parents, for the donation of neonatal foreskin to be 
used for the commercial production of Apligraf (Enoch et al. 2005). Concerns 
have been expressed over the fact that companies make profit on bodily 
material against the background of a long tradition of unpaid voluntary donation 
of tissues and organs in Europe. Interesting in this respect is that originally 
many commercial developers of these skin products classified the foreskins as 
clinical waste, while the ‘added value’ would lie in the processing and 
manufacturing process.
Also economic issues are important for understanding the development and 
use of tissue engineering technologies. On the broader horizon of the rise and 
fall of biotechnology, the business climate has not been favourable to the 
Apligraf producer, and Organogenesis gained bad press after negotiations 
failed with marketing partner Novartis about profits of Apligraf lagging behind. 
The company had to briefly stop the shipping of Apligraf in September 2002
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and filed bankruptcy under US chapter 11 not much later after debts had 
reached the amount of $32 million. Organogenesis made a new start in 2003 
and claims to be profitable now after further improving its ‘flagship product’ 
Apligraf.
1.1.5 Into the regulatory arena
But in Europe Apligraf is not widely available. Some point to the complex and 
uncertain regulatory climate in the European Union, with approval routes for 
‘hybrid’ products such as Apligraf differing per country. This seems a universal 
issue. Because Apligraf was the first in a range of novel therapeutic products, 
gaining regulatory approval by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for the 
US market proved difficult initially. The combination of different product 
characteristics and jurisdictional overlap between biologies, drugs and devices 
caused uneasiness about which existing regulatory route to follow. As one of 
the developers of the product explains:
Apligraf is a device, but because it is alive it also has biologic activity.
We therefore worked with FDA officials to determine the standards of 
approval, safety testing and manufacturing by which we would be judged 
(Parenteau 1999: 84).
After many negotiations Apligraf was labelled as a medical device in the States 
and in the end the only issue for the manufacturer was to prove that the product 
was not contaminated. Unlike approval procedures for medicinal products, 
there was no need to demonstrate safety, no toxicology testing was required 
nor evidence of efficacy (M-EU6, 2003).
But while the US and Canada approved Apligraf under their medical device 
regime, the European market remained unstable. Initially the only European 
markets where Apligraf was available were Ireland and Austria, because these 
countries did not have any regulation at the time, and therefore no product 
approval was deemed necessary. The product was also available in 
Switzerland for some time.
With EU-wide regulation still under development, currently great variability 
exists in approval routes across Europe. In the United Kingdom for example
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Apligraf is officially ‘unregulated’ but covered by a voluntary code of practice, 
Ireland has put the product under its medicinal product regulation, just like 
Germany and Austria, while Denmark takes a ‘case by case’ approach for 
tissue engineered products more generally, and in Switzerland Apligraf is 
classified under the transplantation regulation for products of human or animal 
origin, because it contains viable cells (TERG survey 2003).
At EU level tissue engineered products are excluded from the Medical Device 
Directive (Directive 93/42 EC article 1 par 5.f), which means they can not be 
classified as devices. In 2001 manufacturer Organogenesis, back then still in 
collaboration with Novartis, submitted an application at the European Agency 
for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products (EMEA) to get centralised approval for 
Apligraf as a drug in Europe. An industrial scientist involved in this regulatory 
procedure explains the difficult process of getting Apligraf on the market via this 
route (M-EU6, 2003). Against the background of the BSE crisis in 2001 and 
several other recent health scares, many European countries expressed 
concerns about the dangers of disease transmission. Pressure was put on the 
evaluation agency EMEA to consider Apligraf as a medicinal product -  mainly 
because of the more stringent controls for drugs in comparison to medical 
devices. The pharmaceutical dossier for Apligraf was thus submitted to the 
centralised procedure of the EMEA, and two European member states (the UK 
and Denmark) had to act as rapporteur in the expert meetings of the 
Committee for Proprietary Medicinal Products (CPMP) that is responsible for 
approval of new medicinal products. The EMEA could not decide initially what 
to do because Apligraf was such a different ‘unusual’ product.
The product is complex because it has three active ingredients - two types of 
human skin cells and the bovine extract - and in preparing the pharmaceutical 
dossier the company got assistance from external reviewers. One of the key 
issues was batch control, as explained by another scientist involved in the 
approval process for Apligraf:
Other issues they [the regulatory agency] had were from a definition 
point of view, of defining the composition of what a batch was. These 
really weren’t safety issues, but more regulatory issues. The composition 
they had a big issue with because it changes all the time, because of the 
use of living cells made into a product. But these cells were responding
32
to their environment, and what they made changed, so what you actually 
put on the patient from a clinical point of view is different. I mean you 
have to explain to them what it is, the recipe that we put together. And 
also the batch size, because the amount of testing you would need to do 
on a batch of biologies for example - you couldn’t do on this because the 
batch size is too small. So there was this specific thing that they had to 
change the definitions of, and regulations for, but those were more 
bureaucratic rather than safety or quality issues (M1, 2003).
In addition to problems with the analysis of different batches, and the batch 
size, tests had to be defined and applied, for example for cell mutation and to 
show that Apligraf was not carcinogenic. In other words the requirements for 
the pharmaceutical approval procedure had to be interpreted in a way to fit a 
complicated combination product such as Apligraf. Organogenesis got the 
green light for submitting its application during a pre-submission meeting with 
the EMEA in September 2000. Over 200 questions were asked, many more 
than usual for a pharmaceutical product, mainly addressing quality control and 
viral safety of Apligraf. The company had to be able to test for all human 
viruses, which was not considered undoable but an expensive and time- 
consuming process -  especially as it had to be done within the six months as 
dictated under the approval procedure. According to a company insider the 
safety testing was not problematic from a technical point of view, but more 
funding and equipment were needed to conduct the tests. But at the 
background another struggle took place. During the regulatory approval stage 
the professional relationship between producer Organogenesis and marketing 
partner Novartis broke down. The company landed in a financially precarious 
situation; restructuring in an attempt to survive the organisational crisis led to 
many redundancies and considerable downsizing (M-EU6, 2003). The 
bankruptcy of the company was claimed to be partly due to this ‘unproductive 
relationship’ (Jette 2004). Organogenesis pulled out of the negotiations and 
failed to get centralised regulatory approval for Apligraf on the European 
market.
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1.1.6 To the exodus
The lack of a clear regulatory approval scheme resonances in the 
reimbursement of the product by national healthcare systems. Contrary to the 
US, which has a healthcare insurance system in place which covers Apligraf 
(CIGNA 2005), in Europe problems persist in obtaining reimbursement 
authorisation. According to some critics this is a direct effect of the unbalanced 
cost-effective ness of the product. The price of human skin equivalent ranges 
between under a few hundred US dollars to over a thousand dollars per square 
foot -  and depending on the wound more than one application is needed. 
Apligraf costs about US$1000 per unit, which comes in a circular disk of 75 mm 
(Thuesen 2001). In comparison, cadaver skin costs only a little over $2 per 
square inch (and usually comes in much larger sheets). Especially with the 
limited shelf life of Apligraf, there is a risk of wasting the product after the expiry 
date has gone.
But high product cost is just one issue. Others point out the limited clinical 
evidence available for the long-term evaluation of tissue engineered products 
such as Apligraf. Clinical trials would be needed to provide information on the 
cost-effectiveness of the treatment compared to conventional alternatives, and 
it is exactly the lack of cost-effectiveness data which makes insurance 
companies reluctant to reimburse treatment with tissue engineered products.
Currently Apligraf is no longer available anywhere in Europe, except as a 
special request by a surgeon for a named patient on compassionate grounds 
(M-EU6, 2003). According to Organogenesis, the reason for withdrawing from 
the European market in 2001 was ‘not related to lack of reimbursement or 
regulatory hurdles’. Rather, it was the animal-derived component of Apligraf in 
the aftermath of the BSE crisis in Europe that triggered the exodus:
The European Commission doesn’t want anything with bovine collagen
on the market, so we stopped shipping it over there.
(Customer relations officer Apligraf helpline M4, 2005)
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1.1.7 Why Apligraf matters
Apligraf is a good product example, as it demonstrates many of the underlying 
issues in tissue engineering that are relevant in a social scientific analysis of 
the technology. The sourcing and handling of cells, their culturing and 
processing in the lab, the subsequent preservation and storage in cell banks, 
the testing, the distribution of the product and the final implantation into the 
patient are all associated with risk and safety issues. The donation of tissue 
covers a broad area of safety concerns including the suitability of donors, the 
screening of donated substances, and the traceability from donor to patient and 
vice versa. Also the ethical and health implications of the use of human tissues 
and cells have provoked debate, for example about voluntary unpaid donation 
versus commercial use of human material, gaining true informed consent in a 
highly uncertain application, and not the least about the tissue and cell sources, 
including the use of animal derived material. These issues are of transnational 
importance when human tissues and cells are imported and exported within the 
European Union and beyond.
In addition to risk and safety issues during the development of a tissue 
engineered product, the example of Apligraf also highlights the concerns 
related to marketing of the product. Here, issues to do with regulation, 
reimbursement and clinical evidence for these therapies come to the fore, and 
the expertise needed to assess clinical and scientific data as part of a broader 
risk management approach. With the proceeding commercialisation of the 
technology, also issues of an ethical and social nature become relevant and 
justify a social scientific analysis. As such, Apligraf is a case study example of a 
technological innovation that raises a range of social and ethical questions in a 
globalised society.
These developments are analysed in the context of boundary-work, where 
different sets of actors define and articulate perceptions of risk in order to 
demarcate what becomes part of the regulatory domain. The next section 
provides the underlying analytical framework for my research, followed by the 
main research questions. The last section is a general overview of the structure 
and argument in this thesis.
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1.2 Negotiating boundaries of science and regulation
This section outlines my conceptual approach in terms of boundary work and 
regulatory science, drawing on strands of theory developed in social studies of 
science and technology (STS) and the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK).
1.2.1 Boundary issues
‘Science’ is no single thing: its boundaries are drawn and redrawn in
flexible, historically changing and sometimes ambiguous ways (Gieryn
1983: 781).
For some time, sociologists of science have struggled with the question how to 
identify unique characteristics of science that distinguish it from other activities. 
The demarcation of science from non-science is rooted in a long-term tradition 
of reasoning and thought -  from Popper’s falsifiability via Mertonian ideas of 
certified knowledge and social norms to Kuhn’s paradigmatic consensus 
(Gieryn 1995; Guston 1999). In 1983 Thomas F. Gieryn introduced the notion 
of ‘boundary-work’ as one way of dealing with this dichotomy. The process of 
constituting a boundary concerns in the first place attempts by scientists, where 
boundary-work is described as the ‘attribution of selected characteristics to the 
institution of science (i.e., to its practitioners, methods, stock of knowledge, 
values and work organization) for purposes of constructing a social boundary 
that distinguishes some intellectual activity as non-science’ (Gieryn 1983: 782). 
Furthermore, ‘boundary-work occurs as people contend for, legitimate, or 
challenge the cognitive authority of science -  and the credibility, prestige, 
power, and material resources that attend such a privileged position. Pragmatic 
demarcations of science from non-science are driven by a social interest in 
claiming, expanding, protecting, monopolizing, usurping, denying, or restricting 
the cognitive authority of science’ (Gieryn 1995: 405). The notion o f ‘science’ 
here is that of a kind of spatial marker for cognitive authority, a space with 
flexible and contextually contingent borders and territories that are continuously 
negotiated. In other words the boundaries of science are themselves 
ambiguous.
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In previous work on the development of tissue engineering as an 
interdisciplinary research field (Geesink 1998), I have demonstrated the 
discursive strategies of boundary-work in which tissue engineering is 
considered as a specialised field which can be separated from other 
specialised areas. The drawing of boundaries around a professional field can 
be interpreted as means of a professional community to gain legitimacy and 
credibility for its activities and to get access to the privileges that are connected 
to this demarcated domain (see also: Gieryn 1983, 1995). By defining what 
tissue engineering is and is not about, different groups with varying (scientific, 
clinical, commercial etc) stakes in the technology claim a particular professional 
domain for reasons of expansion, monopoly, expulsion and protection.
This research takes this boundary-work concept one step further by analysing 
more recent attempts within the tissue engineering field to discriminate science 
from such non-sciences as technology, policy, politics and regulation. My aim is 
not to determine if tissue engineering is a science, or what kind of science.4 
Rather, I am concerned with the perceptions of professional actors (the 
‘inhabitants’ of the social world of tissue engineering, see also later) on 
demarcating the domain over several important issues including risk, 
regulation, expertise and ethical concerns. I demonstrate how ‘the science’ of 
tissue engineering constitutes many differentiated boundaries within and across 
each of these domains, most notably in relation to ambiguous definitions of risk, 
negotiated boundaries of uncertainty and in carving out what is considered the 
regulatable domain. The boundaries of tissue engineering are not just 
ambiguous, flexible and dynamic -  as argued in Gieryn’s original account -  but 
also continuously reconstructed by different actors, often inconsistent and 
heavily contested.
Useful additional concepts for my analysis -  all easily identifiable by the prefix 
‘boundary’ - are those of boundary objects and boundary concepts, boundary 
organisations, boundary ordering devices, and finally boundary evolution and
4 Although, admittedly, in earlier work I argued how tissue engineering has some interesting 
‘mode-2’ characteristics of knowledge production, such as transdisciplinary work in a market- 
driven environment (see for more detail also Gibbons et al 1994).
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transgression (see for other categories, such as boundary talk, also: Glasner 
1998). These are discussed in some detail next.
‘Boundary objects’ were introduced in 1989 by Star and Griesemer as ‘objects 
which are both plastic enough to adapt to local needs and constraints of the 
several parties employing them, yet robust enough to maintain a common 
identity across sites... They have different meanings in different social worlds 
but their structure is common enough to more than one world to make them 
recognisable, a means of translation’ (Star and Griesemer 1989: 393). 
Boundary objects travel between different social worlds, previously defined by 
Strauss (1978) as groups and organisations committed to a particular activity, 
and thereby building up certain shared ideologies. The use of boundary objects 
between various social worlds is an important notion for this research, as it 
underlines the different organised interests between domains and the ways in 
which its inhabitants engage with the objects and each other. Firmly rooted in 
traditions of symbolic interactionism, social worlds have been interpreted in the 
literature in terms of different academic disciplines or specialties (see for 
example: Amsterdamska 2005; Duncker 2001), while Gieryn, in later work, has 
argued how ‘science itself may be a social world, made up of many social 
worlds, or part of a more encompassing social world’ (Gieryn 1995: 412). 
However defined,5 all social worlds share three main characteristics: 
segmentation (division into subworlds), intersection (where social worlds meet) 
and legitimation (defining and enforcing the boundaries of the social world).
As such, the notion of a social world can also be adapted to analyse 
professional spheres that are not wrapped up in traditional disciplinary 
boundaries (which is of major relevance for an interdisciplinary and hybrid 
science domain such as tissue engineering), but also it does not have to be 
limited to ‘pure’ science in itself. In this research a social world can be 
understood in terms of practices and shared beliefs between actors within and 
between different stages of innovation. For example R&D actors constitute one 
such social world, further differentiated in technological, clinical and commercial
5 For example Gerson (1983) discriminates between three kinds of social worlds: production 
worlds that m ake something (science produces facts); communal worlds that pursue 
community values; and social movements that compete for change in society (see in Gieryn 
1995).
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‘subworlds’, while regulatory policy activity can be conceived as another 
dominant social world, where technical and ethical frames represent different 
ideologies and activities that it is made up of. The boundaries of these social 
worlds are set by temporary and thus fluent or hybrid understandings of the 
issues at stake, and are negotiated and at many times contested. This is where 
the concept of boundary objects proves useful.
Boundary objects organise shared but also distributed cognition among these 
various heterogeneous groups, which do not necessarily fully share the 
definition of an object. Boundary objects are concrete or conceptual objects 
which are flexible enough for different social worlds to read their own specific 
meaning in them (and manipulate them at hand), while at the same time they 
are robust enough to allow for a common identity across sites to maintain unity 
and to give the different actors the opportunity to share some interpretations 
across social worlds (Lowy 1992; Star and Griesemer 1989). They can be 
anything from people and ideas to projects, texts and maps -  as long as these 
objects are relatively stable to facilitate articulation between different actors and 
social worlds (Shackley and Wynne 1996). These objects have an important 
task in understanding how the heterogeneous interactions may be efficient; 
how ‘work can be done’ across different viewpoints and goals.
The metaphor of boundary objects was adopted and adapted by several other 
sociologists of science, liana Lowy for example developed a typology of 
boundary objects and boundary concepts, the latter of which are ideal-typical 
and loosely defined concepts, the vagueness of which makes them adaptable 
to local sites in order to facilitate communication and cooperation (Lowy 1992). 
Both types are multifunctional in that they make interaction of distinct scientific 
cultures easier on the cognitive level, while at the social level specific social 
interests are advanced via the development of inter-group alliances. In her 
study on immunology, Lowy demonstrates the relevance of loosely defined 
boundary concepts in the construction of scientific knowledge and their 
effectiveness in forging professional inter-group alliances. Interesting parallels 
with tissue engineering can be drawn here in terms of the ability of these 
boundary concepts as tools which further the development of so called ‘trading 
zones’ or ‘pidgin zones’ between different and distinct professional groups.
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While Lowy praises the strength of loose and rather vague concepts for easier 
interaction between social worlds, Fujimura underlines the need for more stable 
means of establishing the same goal. By bringing together several boundary 
objects with common methods into a ‘standardised package’ Joan Fujimura 
presents researchers a tool which is ‘less abstract, less ill-structured, less 
ambiguous and less amorphous’ to get their work done (Fujimura 1992). In this 
way interfaces are created between multiple social worlds where actors can 
cooperate but still maintain their integrity in their respective social worlds 
(Guston 1999).
These interpretations of boundary objects limp between flexibility and 
robustness, or between ‘looseness’ and stability of the objects that travel 
between different social worlds. This is an important notion for the demarcation 
of these domains and the ways in which the participants of the defined spaces 
interact which each other and their broader environment. At the same time it 
has been argued how not only objects are subject to boundary work. This is 
where the notion of the ‘boundary organisation’ entered the equation. It has 
been described how organisations can become boundary objects, reconfiguring 
the relation between science and politics. David Guston presents the boundary 
organisation as one route to stabilisation of ‘the potential chaos of the 
science/politics boundary’ by internalising its contingent character (Guston 
1999: 90). These contingencies are continuously being negotiated but within 
the confines of the boundary organisation. This provides a relevant insight for 
our case of tissue engineering, but not for reasons of reaching stability (see 
also below). In this study I argue how the European Commission can be 
considered a boundary organisation which mirrors the division between 
politicians and scientists. At the same time this division is more complicated 
and only unproblematic as long as science and politics do not act in ‘co- 
production’. Guston speaks of a ‘combined scientific and social order’ in this 
respect, where cooperation across domains is required to achieve a shared 
objective, and with the boundary organisation as organised space for the 
creation and use of boundary objects (1999: 105). Organisations enrol actors in 
certain routinised processes and create sets of rules that stabilise social 
relations within and beyond these organisations (Kelly 2003).
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The relevance of this approach, then, lies in the institutionalised context of 
boundary work, where consensus over boundary objects (which according to 
the original contribution by Star and Griesemer is a matter of local agreement) 
becomes subject to a slightly more complex set of dynamics. However, the 
preoccupation of several critics with reaching stability is -  though 
understandable in the practical world - rather unproductive in the case of tissue 
engineering. This is for the following reason.
Tissue engineering represents a domain, call it a social world in itself, which is 
surrounded by technological, political and social uncertainty. This uncertainty is 
reflected in the boundary-work exercises taking place across the multiple social 
worlds. Simon Shackley and Brian Wynne modified the boundary object notion 
to describe ‘boundary-ordering devices’ that allow actors to negotiate 
uncertainty across many domains (see in this respect also their concept of 
‘anchoring devices’ in: Van der Sluijs et al. 1998). While these boundary- 
ordering devices are less durable and reproducible than boundary objects, they 
point towards the important issue of uncertainty which also features largely in 
tissue engineering. Furthermore, these authors focus on the authority of 
scientists as policy advisors, which is another important strain in this research. 
Advisory scientists are faced with negotiating uncertainty both within their 
scientific domain (with their scientific peer groups) and with policy actors -  in 
other words across different heterogeneous groups with their own institutional 
affiliations, practices and ambitions. Where science and policy meet, advisory 
scientists perform boundary-work on the dominant representation of uncertainty 
to sustain the authority of science but to allow for negotiation of uncertainty, 
thereby spanning the boundary between science and policy, to define a 
common discourse and culture. As the authors explain:
Compared to boundary objects, which emerge over an extended period 
of focused interaction... uncertainty discourses are a quicker, more 
appropriate means to reconcile heterogeneity and cohesion; they are 
‘shorthands’ for achieving some understanding among actors involved in 
highly fluid institutional and epistemic sets of relations. They allow the 
actors to define their interests, build alliances, map out futures, and 
construct identities rapidly and across many domains. We suggest the 
term ‘boundary-ordering device’ to describe discourses that have these 
sorts of effects (Shackley and Wynne 1996: 280).
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We return to this notion of uncertainty and of expert knowledge for policy 
purposes later. It should be noted here that the discourse of uncertainty is an 
important underlying frame for assessing and managing risks of tissue 
engineered applications. As discussed in more detail later, the social 
construction and definition of risk constitutes the drawing of boundaries around 
particular risk domains and vis-a-vis the social world of regulation. Of 
significance in this respect is that boundaries evolve over time and can be 
transgressed. As described by several authors, the introduction of new 
technologies into society represents a particular relevant development where, 
for example, the boundaries between public and private are not simply given; 
‘rather, we might speak of evolving boundaries that are created, maintained, 
and changed during the process of introduction and development’ (Stemerding 
1996 in: Glasner 1998). The involvement of different interest groups gives 
boundaries a ‘temporal’ dimension, where boundary objects go through an 
elaborate process of articulation, translation, negotiation, triangulation, debating 
and, sometimes, coercion (Fujimura 1992; Fujimura 1996). Furthermore the 
risks associated with boundary transgression are a feature of society in late 
modernity (Beck 1992; Giddens 1990). New knowledge coupled with new 
reflexivity reconsiders the authority of science, and the role of expert 
knowledge in fields of science and medicine. As also pointed out by Glasner, 
the boundary between laboratory and society is necessarily transgressed when 
the risks of new technologies only become knowable in the future, with the new 
genetics being an example in place (Glasner 1998).
Tissue engineering science and the politics of regulation are shaped by 
boundaries and demarcations between science and ‘non-science’ (e.g. policy), 
between risk and safety, risk and uncertainty, public health protection and 
promoting trade and innovation, and between techno-scientific and moral 
concerns... The identification of the appropriate boundary objects that are 
translated and articulated between different social worlds of R&D and 
regulatory policy (and all its subworlds) is of major relevance in this study. 
Definitions of risk as one way of boundary drawing are a dominant framework 
for the main analytical chapters in this thesis across the R&D domains of 
techno-science, clinical practice and market respectively, while the 
reconstruction and renegotiation of these risk boundary objects takes place in
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the regulatory world with its own measures of protection and expansion. Within 
and across these worlds the sort of biological material on which tissue 
engineered applications are based becomes an important boundary marker. 
Furthermore, tissue engineering can be considered a boundary concept in 
itself, allowing a range of conflicting interests (between different professional 
groups, developers and regulators, states and industry, experts and 
bureaucrats, national Member States and the EU, DGs within the Commission, 
technical and ethical frames etc) to enrol each other and work towards a 
desired outcome. One set of boundary objects here refers to the need for 
regulation, which unites the various agendas of regulators and commercial 
developers to some extent, while another set of interests is expressed over risk 
and safety issues, and over the inclusion of socio-political and ethical concerns 
versus techno-scientific approaches to regulation. Thus not the aim but the 
scope of regulation serves as contested domain and explicit opportunity for 
boundary-work by various actors.
The margins of crossing or transgressing the boundaries become interesting in 
this respect, because at these intersections concerns are expressed and 
possible controversies arise. It is also here that boundaries can become 
permeable rather than fixed.
Social and ethical concerns are especially ‘vulnerable’ for operations at these 
crossroads. The boundary conditions are defined by the social negotiations of 
different interested parties over, amongst others, which risks start to establish 
the regulatory envelope around the boundary objects. In the political debate on 
the articulation and translation of (particular forms of) risk into regulatory policy, 
boundaries of ‘legitimatisation’ are raised to ‘solve’ ethical disputes.
Gieryn considers scientists’ attempts to demarcate their field as strategy to 
assert or reclaim contested authority. This is mainly present when implicit social 
consensus breaks down and conventional distinctions or divisions become 
challenged, which are then forced to be made more explicit. Thus boundary- 
work is activated where credibility is contested and ‘where regnant assumptions 
about boundaries suddenly appear murky or inapplicable’ (Gieryn 1999: 24). 
Gieryn places a strong link here between boundary-work and the long tradition
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in the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) of studying controversies. During 
controversies scientists have to articulate and reconstruct assumptions about 
the unique characteristics of science and the distinction with other institutions. 
While my research is not a controversy study as such, the element of conflict in 
boundary-work is important. Furthermore, several diverging interpretations from 
Gieryn’s contribution need to be discussed here.
First, the author sees boundary-work as motivated by territorial ambition over 
authority and credibility, where scientists demarcate their field. My study 
acknowledges the role of conflict in this endeavour, but is not based on the 
assumption that an (external or actual) enemy or competitor needs to be in 
sight in order to revive the demarcation exercise. Second, scientists (but also 
other actors, see later) may have other motivations for their boundary-work 
than expansion, monopoly, expulsion or protection of autonomy. The complex 
configuration of tissue engineering regulation, with many different agendas 
across domains, necessarily constitutes very pragmatic boundary objects, 
where not the authority of the field or its diverse ‘subworlds’ are at stake, but 
the need ‘to get work done’ in a situation of conflict over how this work needs to 
get done. Furthermore, as also demonstrated by Kelly in her study on public 
bioethics bodies, when science controversies are framed as a moral dispute, 
rather than merely technical or political, the boundaries between science and 
politics are subject to different forms of boundary-work: ‘where disputes critical 
to science lie outside its domain of authority, scientists may seek to blur rather 
than demarcate boundaries among political, ethical and scientific spaces’ (Kelly 
2003: 344). The claiming of territories and conflict over boundaries between 
most notably technical versus ethical stances are important drivers for the 
debate on tissue engineering regulation. The question of blurring rather than 
demarcating these boundaries is an empirical one addressed in this research.
Boundary-work theorists have argued how scientists have a significant stake in 
maintaining exclusive control over expert knowledge and autonomy, employing 
different tools in their boundary struggles (Kelly 2003). As demonstrated in this 
section, these tools include objects and concepts, organisations and devices. 
However, boundary-work is not the exclusive domain of scientists, but can be 
extended to analyse the activities of other groups. In this research I am
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concerned with the ‘narrow’ techno-scientific actors, but also with clinicians, 
manufacturers, regulators, politicians, patient groups, advisors and other 
experts with a stake in tissue engineering. This means I move away from 
Gieryn (and other)’s exclusive focus on science as domain of demarcation. A 
particularly relevant expression of boundary-work takes place in the interaction 
between what I label the social world of R&D actors (broadly conceived as 
scientists, clinical professionals and commercial developers) and the social 
world of regulation (including the former and the rest). The notion of regulatory 
science is of major significance in this respect, and is discussed next.
1.2.2 Regulatory science
During boundary-work, actors struggle over defining the contested boundaries 
that separate science from policy. The domains of science and policy are 
defined and distinguished, while at the same time the interaction between these 
social worlds is negotiated. The boundaries between these domains are 
important because whether a question is classified as scientific or political 
shapes judgements about who should resolve it (Hilgartner 2000).
Regulatory science refers to ‘forms of knowledge and understanding developed 
in response to the requirements of government and industry in the context of 
the regulatory process’ (Irwin and Michael 2003: 45). As such, regulatory 
science brings together the relation between regulatory policy and scientific 
expertise, and the role of scientific evidence and uncertainty in decision 
making. It also highlights, according to some interpretations (see for example 
Jasanoff 1987 and 1990), the boundaries between science and politics, of 
academic science as opposed to regulatory science. Also the relation between 
innovation and regulation, and the operation of science in ‘separate’ areas 
(academic, government, industry -  see also Leydesdorff (2001) in this respect) 
are implications of regulatory science.
As pointed out in an authoritative account on regulatory science (Irwin et al. 
1997), many terms are used to discriminate between academic science and 
such things as ‘trans-science’, ‘mandated science’ (Salter 1988) and ‘regulatory 
science’ (Jasanoff 1990). Jasanoff draws a particular contrast between what
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she calls research science, with the aim of seeking ‘truths’ of originality and 
conducted by universities, and regulatory science which is driven by policy 
relevance and usually takes place in an industrial or government setting. This 
stresses the significance of scientific advice for the policy process.
Scientists are prominent actors in providing knowledge and input into the policy 
process. Given the complexity and range of scientific uncertainties of tissue 
engineering technology,6 scientists necessarily get engaged in wider debates 
about policy and regulation and are called upon to provide advice or an expert 
opinion in all kinds of committees or commissions. The role of scientific experts 
is sometimes seen as a fifth branch of government (Jasanoff 1990).
Regulatory agencies are a pool of (scientific and technical) expertise and much 
decision-making is left to these regulatory bodies. The relevance of these 
agencies for politicians lies in their continuous concern over a set of issues, 
whereas politicians usually do not have the time or knowledge to build up and 
maintain specialised skills and expertise. The complexity of technological and 
scientific changes has led to an expansion of regulatory agencies. This has 
created a situation where an increasing part of government is conducted by 
technical experts, who are contrary to their political executives not elected. This 
in turn has raised issues of accountability and credibility, especially when it 
concerns supranational regulatory institutions in the EU that operate on an 
even more distant level of democratic participation (Abraham and Lewis 2000: 
18). While recognising the importance of expert knowledge in policymaking, 
especially in complex science domains, at the same time these bodies have 
been criticised for their ‘closedness’ and being shielded off from external 
scrutiny (Irwin and Michael 2003).
Issues of legitimacy of expertise are considered more pressing when the 
products being regulated are science-based. Examples include the regulation 
of pharmaceuticals, GMOs, chemicals, nuclear waste and, of course, tissue 
engineering. Here a strong link exists between expertise and risk. Potential 
risks and benefits of a product are assessed by experts for the purpose of
6 This also applies to biotechnology in a broader sense - see for example Scoones (2001), 
Salter and Jones (2002), Irwin et al (1997) and Jasanoff (1995a, b).
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decision and policy making. This also includes industrial scientific practices that 
aim to comply with regulatory requirements (risk-benefit assessment, testing), 
which has led some to believe that political decisions about risk in society are 
increasingly dominated by networks of scientists in industry, government and 
industry-funded academic experts (Abraham and Lewis 2000)7
But the notion of expertise is also problematic for other reasons. First,
‘objective science’ has gone bankrupt. Images of objective, policy-free 
expertise have been undermined by several public health crises, culminating in 
the 1996 BSE disaster (Levidow and Carr 2005). It is considered common 
knowledge that scientists do not limit their judgements to purely scientific 
matter. Expert knowledge is not value-free but conditioned by the social context 
of research that gives limitations in their technical assessment (Krimsky and 
Golding 1992). Especially biotechnology has raised moral and ethical issues 
which call for more than purely scientific understanding. Controversy and 
disagreement amongst scientists have demonstrated not just the contested 
nature of objective science, but also the normative assessment in which 
scientists engage. Under the influence of social, political and professional 
considerations expert advice is coloured and not necessarily free of interests. 
This is increased by uncertainty and controversy where lack of sufficient 
knowledge or contested advice brings the assessment of risk into the political 
domain. For regulators and decision-makers this means that they have to judge 
the acceptability of risk based on conditions in which it is not always clear how 
to interpret scientific data and risk assessments. This has led some to argue 
that scientific risk assessment cannot be done independently of policy 
judgements or political agendas (Levidow and Carr 2000).
7 An interesting take on this is provided by Frank Fischer, who analysed the relations between 
technocracy and the politics of expertise. According to this author, technocracy is about the 
adaptation of expertise to the tasks of governance, with a decision-making system that is 
designed to promote technical solutions to political problems. In order words a different kind of 
expertise is referred to here, that of technocrats as experts in public and private organisations 
with important decision-making functions. Especially in modern bureaucratic states this form of 
expertise is strong and increasing, as many decisions are left to policy experts within the 
administration. Experts, according to this theory, are thus at the heart of political power. This 
poses broader questions about the relation between expertise and democratic politics. 
Technical experts might not be in political control themselves, but their information becomes an 
important resource in the governance of modern society (Fischer 1990: 28).
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This is especially pressing in the health and safety domain, where experts are 
increasingly and more explicitly uncertain about the model on which to base 
regulatory action -  or this uncertainly is reflected by the variety of expert 
opinions on the subject. This uncertainty is also evident from the increasing 
recourse to precaution.8 The precautionary approach has become one of the 
central principles that guide decision-making involving the protection of human 
health and safety, where risk and uncertainty (and uncertain risks) are key 
notions. This influence is also felt in the regulatory domain of tissue 
engineering. Where Community legislation for the safety of human tissue was 
science-based, the decisions on specific applications were based upon the 
precautionary principle.
Regulatory initiatives can thus no longer be taken as once and for all political 
decisions based on expert advice, but must take into account expert and social 
judgement, with an understanding of the dynamics and complex interdependent 
problems of the issues faced. This would also imply a blurring of the classical 
separation of powers between actors (or institutions more specifically), 
highlighting the need for a new approach to regulation in and by the EU 
(Lebessis and Paterson 1997). As also pointed out by Salter and Jones:
The traditional reliance of that [EU governance policy] community on 
technocratic networks as the mainstay of policy formation and 
implementation is no longer a sufficient mechanism for maintaining the 
legitimacy of the process. New policy networks imbued with different 
value systems are rapidly making inroads into the previously 
impermeable policy community of EU governance. Recognising the 
limitations of the existing means for securing agreement to regulatory 
change, the institutions of the EU are adapting their stance, or stances, 
and seeking new methods of engagement... (Salter and Jones 2002b: 
325).
8 One of the key principles shaping the regulatory context is the precautionary principle, which 
relates to the managem ent of risk. The precautionary principle covers ‘those specific 
circumstances where scientific evidence is insufficient, inconclusive or uncertain and there are 
indications through preliminary objective scientific evaluation that there are reasonable grounds 
for concern that the potentially dangerous effects on the environment, human, animal or plant 
health may be inconsistent with the chosen level of protection’ (CEC 2000: 9-10). Although 
originally only mentioned in relation to environmental issues in the Treaty, the precautionary 
principle covers a broader range of circumstances to be covered by EU policy. According to the 
Commission, recourse to the precautionary principle presupposes that potentially dangerous 
effects deriving from a phenomenon, product or process have been identified, and that 
scientific evaluation does not allow the risk to be determined with sufficient certainty.
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Studying human genetics, the authors speak of an increasingly recognised 
need to broaden the circle of participants in European governance, such as 
NGOs and ‘the public at large’, in order to accommodate the not always 
compatible demands of different interest groups (including science, industry 
and civil society). An important observation in this respect concerns the role of 
ethical advisory bodies in the EU regulatory process, where bioethicists 
become the new regulatory ‘experts’ (Salter and Jones 2002b: 330). Thus 
expert advice is not limited to techno-scientific actors, which the case of tissue 
engineering will also demonstrate.
But risk regulation via the EU expert system also raises more complicated 
issues. In the context of calls for ‘more than just technical advice’, and the 
proclaimed need to also take normative, political and ethical considerations into 
account when deciding on the social acceptability of risks, the EU expert 
system is put in a difficult position. Given that social acceptability is not a 
straightforward European notion, but rather negotiated at national level, it is 
unlikely that one single expert body at EU level will be able to come up with 
uniform decisions that are acceptable within the whole Community. Therefore, 
if risk assessment is to include normative and political considerations, the EU 
committee system has to balance between universal European-wide agreed 
criteria and national concerns (Joerges and Neyer 1997). We return to the 
specifics of this EU committee system in chapter 2.
As such, the EU has an institutionalised and organisational structure in place to 
canalise expertise, to ‘make it work' in regulatory decision shaping and making. 
Certain routines and procedures are developed to guide this process, with 
standardised ways and protocols which shape the division of labour between 
science and policy. It has been suggested that by embedding boundary-work in 
organisational structures, the demarcation between policy and science, and 
between different fields of expertise, lead as such to institutionalised 
boundaries (Halffman 2003: 3). The notion of the boundary organisation, as 
discussed before, covers this process.
Thus expertise plays a significant role in regulatory science, and the strategies 
used by experts to influence regulatory policy making. The division of expert
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labour, in defining what counts as expertise in one field and not another, is of 
key concern. Regulatory expertise, then, is about competed science and policy 
domains over different regulatory and institutionalised settings.
The notion of regulatory science is relevant for the analysis of tissue 
engineering regulation, as it highlights the significance of scientific advice for 
the policy process. Moreover, it makes explicit the division of labour between 
scientific experts and policy makers, and the ways in which they negotiate the 
conditions of their interactions (Halffman 2003; Jasanoff 1990). In addition, the 
kind of knowledge that is relevant in regulatory activity is being discussed and 
demarcated. This concerns the question of expertise as such, but also the kind 
of expertise that is relevant for regulatory decision-making. It includes 
knowledge claims about what applies to the particular domain or activity subject 
to regulation, about what is in and out. In tissue engineering these claims are 
being contested on a ‘multi-governance level’, where knowledge has different 
meanings and interpretations on national and EU policy-making level.
An important observation in this respect is the increasingly global character of 
regulation and innovation (Irwin and Michael 2003). Regulatory requirements 
are not limited to national boundaries, and as also demonstrated in the case of 
tissue engineering, national governments have to harmonise their frameworks 
in line with EU level regulation. With companies targeting global rather than 
local markets for their products, national governments become part of a larger 
and international network of trade and exchange, which means that also 
regulatory systems become globalised. This also affects the content and level 
of expertise needed, and the scientific evidence to underpin regulatory 
decisions.
This is a useful starting point for analysing tissue engineering regulation, given 
the prominent role of scientific experts in this complex domain that is 
surrounded by uncertainty, to gain insight into the strategies used to influence 
regulatory policy-making. First of all, the definition of what needs to be 
regulated and what is considered problematic in tissue engineering (for 
example in terms of risk) is structured along the lines of what knowledge is 
relevant for decision-making in this particular area. To analyse and understand
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in what way tissue engineering is regulated in Europe implies an insight into 
what ‘the problem’ is and how this is framed and defined within the different 
domains of science and policy (but also in its diverse subworlds). It is about 
which arguments and what information is used in the process of regulatory 
decision-making, what is included and excluded, which assumptions are made 
and how these are translated into policy. In short, this is about defining what is 
problematic and what is relevant for policy.
This boundary drawing in competing fields of knowledge also has 
consequences for the way in which policymakers and experts interact with each 
other and what value is assigned to the scientific knowledge that is catapulted 
into the decision-making. With policymakers looking for practical advice and 
juggling with uncertainty of scientific knowledge (Levidow et al. 1997), 
boundaries of regulatory science dictate the structure of this encounter. The 
way expertise is used can become political by for example presenting uncertain 
scientific information as objective claims in policy, or by referring to the expert 
status of knowledge in controversial or contested political decision making. 
Another implication of boundaries in regulatory science is the question of who 
has access to the regulatory decision-making process. In their study on the 
control of agrochemicals, Rothstein and colleagues demonstrate how 
regulatory science is a restricted domain, where wider public groups are 
effectively excluded from discussion (Rothstein et al. 1999).9 Most regulatory
9 A vast body of knowledge has focused on the role of laypersons as experts and the 
participation of citizens in regulatory science. Irwin developed the democratic concept of ‘citizen 
science’ (Irwin 1995) and ‘scientific citizenship’ while looking at the relationship between 
science policy and public engagem ent (Irwin 2001). He argues for more contextual forms of 
knowledge and understanding. Other critics in this tradition have studied ‘lay expertise’ as 
authoritative source for decision-making and the role of laypersons as experts in defining risk 
(Wynne, 1995, 1996). Moreover, ‘social movement’ theorists have pointed towards the role of 
for example consumer groups and environmental organisations in recruiting their own scientific 
experts to challenge the established regulatory regime. An example of this perspective includes 
the much cited study by Steve Epstein on lay activist pressure groups in H IV/AIDS becoming 
experts themselves, and as such reaching the heart of regulatory science with their direct 
involvement in drug testing for this particular medical condition (Epstein 1995).
The ‘intrusion’ of lay people into the expert system has led some commentators to argue that 
technical policy decisions need not necessarily be left to professional experts as the sole 
source of technical specialist knowledge, and that regulatory agencies should be more open to 
citizen participation (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993). The relevance of these perspectives, then, 
lies in drawing attention to the role of other than the ‘usual suspects’ (i.e. professional experts 
or technocrats) in regulatory science. The notion of democratic regulatory science usually 
underlines the benefits of direct public participation in regulatory activity, especially where it 
concerns public health issues or technologies of which the risks and benefits directly affect the 
population.
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science is conducted in the private sector, and with limited peer review also 
external scrutiny becomes restricted. Furthermore, without the appropriate 
skills and expertise, the significance of participating in this domain is limited 
(Irwin and Michael 2003). Thus different actors have uneven access to the 
domain which is restricted to ‘experts only’, and excluding those without the 
needed resources or credentials to take part in the activity of regulatory 
decision-making. (Halffman 2003: 4). For example in tissue engineering this 
refers directly to the role of commercial providers and industrial lobby groups 
who have the (technical, scientific and financial) resources to become part of 
the policy shaping and making process, while on the other hand clinicians and 
perhaps more so consumer and patient groups might lack these means. In this 
way the shaping of distinctions between the science and policy domain leads to 
inclusion and exclusion of particular stakeholders in the regulatory setting.
My research does not involve ‘a public’ though and is not concerned with ‘citizen science’ (Irwin 
1995), citizen-consumer participation or ‘active citizenship’ (Abraham and Lewis 2000), nor with 
the role of what one could call non-professional experts. Hereby it moves away from the 
literature on public understanding of science and social movements. In this way, my analysis is 
limited to small groups of techno-scientific, commercial, clinical and regulatory actors in the 
inner circle of tissue engineering regulation. As such I have a narrow take on regulatory 
science.
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1.3 Research questions
From the key issues described in the case study and conceptual elaboration, 
four critical research questions emerge that inform the rest of my analysis. The 
first of these concerns the context of studying tissue engineering as exemplar 
for biotechnological innovation, with the shaping of a regulatory regime in this 
techno-scientific area as explicit focus of attention. This context is drawn from 
understandings in the political economy of medicine, and analyses implications 
for conceptual discussion within science and technology studies (STS). I adopt 
these approaches as initial orientation for the analysis of my empirical data, 
while I am also interested in the significance of my tissue engineering case 
study in reconfiguring understandings within the STS literature, i.e. in terms of 
boundary issues across domains and notions of regulatory science. This leads 
to the following over-arching set of research questions:
• How can the shaping of a regulatory regime in tissue engineering 
be understood from perspectives in the political economy of 
medicine? And what is the significance of this approach for the 
reconfiguration of notions of boundary work and regulatory 
science as tradition within the STS literature?
From this broader context, this research is concerned with, firstly, perceptions 
of risk and, secondly, the transition from risk to regulatory policy. These 
developments are analysed in terms of boundary drawing and the articulation 
between differentiated domains of risk and uncertainty, expertise and 
regulatory policy making. More specific research questions drawn from this 
overall concern include:
• How and to what extent are risks articulated in tissue engineering 
R&D and in which ways are they framed and differentiated?
Insight into these issues is needed to analyse how different risk discourses 
translate into regulatory policy making in this area. In particular I am interested 
in how the boundaries between these domains are drawn and reconstructed,
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what the role and interest representation of participants is in these activities, 
and finally what the implications are for the shaping of a regulatory regime in 
tissue engineering, which brings us back to the broader concern of this thesis 
Thus two follow-up research questions are:
• How and to what extent are risk perceptions reproduced in EU 
regulatory policy of tissue engineering?
• Who are the participants in regulatory science of tissue 
engineering and what are the implications of a possible shift 
between the boundaries of techno-science and socio-politics in 
this particular domain?
These questions are fuller elaborated and answered in this thesis.
1.4 Brief chapter by chapter overview
Chapter 2 introduces the EU policy context of tissue engineering regulation, 
from national differentiation in regulatory pathways to tensions at Community 
level between public health protection and the promotion of trade. Key policy 
concepts are presented that inform my analysis of the two legislative initiatives 
discussed from chapter 8 onwards.
Chapter 3 contains my analytical approach to risk, the empirical focus and 
boundaries of my research, and an account of the research process and 
methods used.
The following chapters discuss the main empirical data and analysis of my 
research. Adopting a tripartite analytical model for the classification of risk 
perceptions, domains are explored of technological risk (chapter 4), clinical risk 
(chapter 5) and commercial risk (chapter 6). The last section of this part draws 
these together and analyses perceptions in terms of a risk hierarchy and risk 
balance (chapter 7). The framing of risk perceptions is the main starting point 
for my discussion. From a social constructivist perspective I analyse how risk
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discourses in tissue engineering are framed by different constituencies involved 
in the front-end of tissue engineering R&D: scientists, clinicians and 
manufacturers.
Chapter 8 makes the transition from risk to the social world of regulation. Here 
a new set of actors is introduced: policy makers, expert advisors, 
manufacturers and other groups involved in EU policy shaping. I consider this 
in terms of boundary drawing and the articulation of particular powerful or 
dominant risk discourses, where certain arguments are fore grounded and 
others ‘boxed out’ in favour of what is perceived to be belonging to the 
‘regulatable’ domain.
This chapter also introduces the two main regulatory initiatives that are 
explored more fully next: the SANCO Directive on quality and safety aspects of 
human tissues and cells (chapter 9) and the DG Enterprise Regulation for the 
marketing of these products in the Community (chapter 10). These chapters 
discuss the role of ethical concerns in EU regulation and how this relates to 
broader stakeholder participation in regulatory science.
Chapter 11 briefly reflects on current and future regulatory developments, 
followed by a general conclusion.
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2 EU regulatory structures
This chapter provides the context for EU policy making in tissue engineering by 
analysing the main drivers for regulation and pointing out the problematic 
nature of current structures to manage the increased need for regulatory policy 
in this domain. I do this by, first, focusing on national regulatory pathways, 
while then shifting attention to attempts at European level to develop 
Community-wide regulatory policy. This leads into a broader discussion about 
legitimacy of Community action and the specific structures put in place to 
govern complex biotechnologies such as tissue engineering.
The regulatory climate for tissue engineering is shaped by three main and 
interrelated developments. First is the observation that until very recently no 
EU-wide controls were in place to cover products based on human tissues and 
cells, effectively creating a regulatory lag. One effect is that individual Member 
States have started adopting their own interim solutions, leading to a regulatory 
patchwork of approval routes and a confusing situation for manufactures and 
regulators in how to deal with complex tissue engineered products. Patients are 
subject to different systems for controlling the risks of these products, while 
availability of tissue engineering therapies differs per country. A second main 
development is the ‘quest for equivalence’ at European level for existing 
Community legislation (e.g. for medical devices and pharmaceuticals) to 
incorporate tissue engineering. For years the EU has sought to extend the 
scope of these legislations, which was accompanied by heated and still 
ongoing debate over the appropriate ways for risk regulation of tissue 
engineering. When this deemed unsuccessful, the development of a specific 
Community-wide framework for tissue engineering was the main focus of effort 
and attention. My research is concerned with these policy developments. A 
third main observation though is that specific legislation is bound by years of 
EU struggles to integrate the original aims of competition and trade with more 
recent involvement in Community health and safety regulation. The introduction 
to this thesis has illustrated the EU context of biotechnological innovation, with 
key understandings of bio-economy and bio-society. This chapter focuses on 
the role of the Commission as regulator in this context, demonstrating how
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continuous boundary drawing takes place between conflicting aims and 
institutional ambitions. Furthermore technocratic versus democratic stances 
provide the background for considering the role of expertise in the EU decision­
making system, where ‘government by committee’ has become a dominant but 
problematic means for gaining legitimacy for Community actions.
2.1 A patchwork of policies and a regulatory lag
One main driver for the development of Community wide legislation for tissue 
engineering is the current diversity in regulatory pathways at individual Member 
State level. Bio-economies in the United States, Canada, Australia and Japan 
have some regulatory classification system in place (Lloyd-Evans 2004). In 
contrast, the current control situation for tissue engineered products in Europe 
is diffuse and diverse. The EU situation has been referred to as a ‘regulatory 
vacuum’ (Faulkner et al. 2003) and a ‘regulatory gap’ (DG Enterprise 2005a) 
and is discussed in terms of ‘regulatory barriers’ for product marketing (Schutte 
2002). This situation can be understood as caused by a ‘regulatory lag’, 
referring to the delay between technological, economic and political change 
and the response of regulators. Although often used in an economic context, 
this term is an appropriate depiction of the European situation for tissue 
engineering, as it takes into account the ‘developing’ character of regulatory 
activity.
None of the existing European regulatory frameworks covers tissue engineered 
products adequately (Bock et al. 2003). There is wide variation amongst 
product developers and national regulatory bodies as to the appropriate 
approach for a given product type. Tissue engineered products are considered 
hybrid or combination products at the borderline of existing regulation of 
medical devices, medicinal products and biologies. With the first tissue 
engineered products on the market already, and in the absence of European- 
wide regulation, some EU Member States have started developing their own 
regulatory framework, resulting in a patchwork of regulatory systems and 
routes.
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The following overview is copied from a study conducted by one of the 
Commission’s research centres (IPTS-JRC), and gives a good impression of 
the regulatory status in different countries. The green dots (on the left) 
represent autologous applications, while the red dots (right) are for allogeneic 
products.
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As also became clear from a project survey carried out in 2003 (TERG 2003), 
in some countries tissue engineered products can only be imported via 
authorised tissue banks (Belgium, France, Spain), while in other countries 
pharmaceutical regulation must be followed (Austria, Finland, Germany). In a 
third category of countries (Italy, the Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland) tissue 
engineered products are considered outside the scope of either medicinal 
product or medical device legislation, and are as such considered 
unregulatable. Formally this is also the case in the United Kingdom, but this 
country has issued voluntary codes of practice for quality management in the 
processing and storage of human tissue (Department of Health (DoH) 2001) 
and for the safety and quality of human tissue and cell-derived products (DoH 
Medical Devices Agency (MDA) 2002). The lack of a specific framework for 
tissue engineered or combination products does not imply that products are not 
available on national markets. Some countries work on a case by case basis. 
For example Ireland and Italy have applied the medicinal product legislation for 
a small number of products to enter their respective home markets (Kent et al.
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2006). Finally, some countries have ‘partial’ controls or standards. Austria and 
Germany require Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) for all cell based 
products, while the Netherlands has developed legislation for procurement and 
quality (Lloyd-Evans 2004). Often these controls are not complementary 
though. For example the lack of a mandate to inspect production sites by the 
Dutch government has resulted in a trade barrier with Germany and Austria 
that both request GMP compliance certificates (Schutte 2002). Finally, some 
countries ask for clinical trials.
The tissue banking route has been particular influential in Europe. It implies 
licensing tissue or cell banks, and imposing quality and safety measures for the 
sourcing and donation on the banks, which then function as gatekeepers to the 
market. In France accredited tissue banks manage medical devices that 
contain human tissue, while in Spain the starting materials for tissue 
engineered products have to be sourced from approved tissue and cell banks 
which see to quality control. Thus manufacturers have to liaise with authorised 
banks, which often charge fees for their services, in order to access the 
national market. This system is similar to that of medical device regulation, 
where decentralised notified bodies control market authorisation on national 
level. But while commercial developers have long been in support of a 
decentralised system a la medical devices as a possible route for tissue 
engineered products, the monopoly of tissue banks in some countries has been 
highly criticised. Because of their gate-keeping and intermediate role, these 
tissue banks protect the domestic market from outsiders by requiring contracts 
with tissue banks, whereby only imported products are subject to regulation 
and not those manufactured in the home country. Furthermore, while 
manufacturers have to comply with more or less strict quality and safety 
controls, many hospitals and university laboratories are exempt from regulatory 
oversight for their cell culturing activities taking place at a small scale. This 
illuminates tensions between profit and non-profit activities, and between 
institutional actors representing these stances, while also the level of activity 
from local to global is of key concern.
Thus tissue engineered products are either uncontrolled or regulated via 
different tracks in Europe and a regulatory space exists between different types
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of existing legislation (Kent et al. 2006; Kleijwegt 2003). In the absence of 
national regulatory oversight, manufacturers can freely market their products 
without any form of approval, apart from import licences (Brown et al. 2001). 
Although this has been perceived as favourable by some, overall the strongest 
drive for harmonised regulation has come from industry. This has several 
reasons, most of them related to perceived negative effects on 
commercialisation of products, as ‘the process of obtaining marketing approval 
can appear to be inconsistent or uncertain’ (Smith and Heilman 2003). 
According to one regulator, industry is currently in a vulnerable position and in 
support of measures to overcome the current regulatory vacuum:
The industry equally abhors a vacuum. Industry likes to have certainty, 
likes to know where it’s going to. I think the industry prefers in a way to 
have some framework within which to operate. It’s always rather 
uncomfortable when there’s no framework on there. Equally if you’re 
bringing forward a product, you worry that suddenly two years down the 
track new regulations come in and you’ll get caught by them. So I think 
they do like certainty, they do like framework... they would welcome a 
regime. On the other hand they don’t want a regime which is unhelpful to 
them; they want something which is balanced and proportionate in there. 
(Regulatory professional in national government agency R2, 2003)
Furthermore, there is also an argument of ‘fairness’ in good practice towards 
different developers currently trying to market their products. As described in 
the excerpt below, patient safety has to rely on responsible behaviour from 
companies as long as no formal control mechanisms are in place:
Complicating this whole equation in Europe are the products that have 
been marketed and sold for a number of years in the current pan- 
European 'regulatory vacuum’... Responsible companies pursue a 
course, allowing for sufficient development data to be generated, that 
will ensure public safety and health, while also looking at the ethical 
issues at stake. Furthermore, these companies clearly respect the need 
for regulation in this area, and make every reasonable attempt to 
discuss issues with the relevant regulatory authorities. Presently, without 
legislation, there is the potential for less responsible players to abuse the 
regulatory vacuum. (Brown et al. 2001: 296)
This argument also relates to unequal competition between companies that 
have good intentions in commercialising their products and developers that 
merely take advantage of the situation, for example by only targeting ‘easy’ 
unregulated markets. But the main imperative for a commercial push towards 
regulation lies in the harmonised nature of controls. The current market for
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tissue engineered products is very heterogeneous and highly segmented. This 
means that companies operating outside their home market have to meet a 
wide spectrum of regulatory requirements for bringing their product to the 
market, as the single market concept does not apply. It also means that the 
same product is subject to different controls across Europe. Multinational 
industries would benefit from uniformity in the ’25 different legislations’ that are 
currently dominating the EU landscape (Veulemans 2005), as their activities 
are typically not limited to national markets. But also the many smaller and 
medium sized enterprises (SMEs) that dominate this field are helped by 
harmonisation. The current regulatory uncertainty affects these companies’ 
investors’ confidence and cash flow:
Given that there’s a lack of clarity in the law you have to take a case by 
case approach. And that is wonderful for the regulatory authorities, to 
take a case by case approach, but the unfortunate thing is that 
companies who are relying on - most of them are small start-up 
companies, whatever they’re doing will have to satisfy the investors. 
They can’t take a view based on a regime which has no clarity, no 
certainty.
(Legal professional in regulation of biotechnology 02, 2003)
This also relates to the lack of expertise and experience of many of these small 
companies. As repeated by many officials, EU-wide regulation would mean 
clarity for industry as it becomes known which criteria and rules to comply with. 
While larger companies have the manpower, expertise and resources ‘to do 
whatever is necessary’ to wiggle their products into any of the existing 
legislative frameworks, the various smaller companies do not (A-EU3, 2003).
One influential European trade body in this domain has pointed out how the 
current regulatory impasse negatively affects innovation and patient access:
The regulatory vacuum that exists today in the European Union leaves 
the door open to inconsistent practices in the field of human tissue 
technologies and an uncertain environment for manufacturers and 
regulators. At the same time, it has a negative impact on R&D 
investment and availability of innovative technologies, and ultimately, 
prevents patients in a critical condition from acceding to life-saving 
treatments. (EUCOMED 2002)
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As a major commercial developer explains, manufacturers are faced with the 
effects on lacking regulation on commercialisation of their products, while 
according to the same discourse patients are put at risk:
The lack of pan-European regulation is making the commercialisation of 
tissue products very complex, as no centralized approval or marketing 
strategy can be developed. This results in either delay in availability of 
such products to patients, or puts their safety at risk, where no 
regulations are applicable. The picture is made even more complicated 
by the requests for evidence of cost-effective ness by some 
reimbursement authorities: 'unregulatable' does not exclude a review 
from a pharmaco-economics perspective (Brown et al. 2001: 289)
The lack of regulatory product approval has a negative effect on 
considerations, by national health systems and insurance companies, for 
potential reimbursement of treatments and products. While manufacturers and 
commercial developers conceive the regulatory lag as problematic for 
commercialisation purposes, regulators and government bodies point out the 
effects for (access to) public health and patient safety. In the absence of unified 
controls patients are subject to different treatment regimes, which implies they 
do not have equal access to potential beneficial treatments. It also means 
patients in different Member States are exposed to varying degrees of risk. 
Thus both benefits and risks are diffuse and unequally divided between 
countries. Furthermore, issues of public trust in these technologies are put to 
the test, and public confidence might be undermined when the same product is 
subject to different degrees of risk and safety control. Thus one reason for 
regulation is to build or maintain trust in products irrespective of their country of 
origin. As one official in a national regulatory body explains, several European 
Member States have developed their own legislation for just this purpose:
Everybody’s afraid that if something happens and this type of products 
are unregulated then we create public interest and for not saying public 
criticism why a national authority has waited too long. If something 
comes up in one country nobody can point or will point the finger to the 
Commission. It will only be a national problem. So everybody’s 
interested to have something settled and its own territory to show to his 
minister and to the public that it’s a little bit controlled. It’s better 
controlled than nothing.
(Regulatory affairs professional in government R-EU5, 2003)
With more and more tissue engineered products being developed and entering 
the European market, and increasing diversity in national systems with Member
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States developing their own regulatory (interim) solutions, the EU has 
recognised the need for some form of pan-European legislation to cover this 
new category of products. The details of this legislation are the subject of the 
final chapters of this thesis. The first question though was what this new 
regulation should look like.
2.2 The quest for equivalence
In good EU tradition, the initial impulse was to look at the possibility of 
extending existing Community legislation. Resembling the quest for ‘substantial 
equivalence’ as found in environmental regulation, the idea was to use 
‘experience from elsewhere’ and ‘analogues as predictors of future risk’ 
(Scoones 2001). Substantial equivalence refers to the similarity or likeliness 
with conventional products with the same end use, even though different 
means of production and processing were used to create these products. The 
special or unique status of products (their ‘novelty’), and of specific types of risk 
assessment to evaluate these products, is thus of main concern.
In tissue engineering we observe a quest for equivalence in terms of both 
defining the technology (what is a tissue engineered product?) and in 
identifying which legislative options are available to fit this definition. As such, 
substantial equivalence has been sought in technological and regulatory 
frameworks for medical devices and pharmaceuticals, also known as the two 
regulatory pillars of the EU health domain, while also national tissue banking 
regulations were taken into account. Efforts to identify and adjust relevant 
legislative measures at European and Member State level can be considered in 
the light of demarcation and boundary drawing, which has led to the conclusion 
that a unique regulatory space had to be created for tissue engineering 
regulation in the EU.
A traditional starting point for regulation of any healthcare product in Europe is 
the existing framework for medicinal products and medical devices. Of most 
relevance in this respect are the Directives on Medicinal Products (2001/83/EC) 
and the Directives on Medical Devices (93/42/EEC), which together constitute a
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well-established framework of the European regulatory system to cover the 
safety, quality and performance or efficacy of many healthcare products.
The general Medical Devices Directive (MDD 93/42/EEC) was implemented in 
Member States in 1998 (European Commission (EC) 1993). This Directive 
defines the ‘essential requirements’ that devices must meet before being 
placed on the EU market. Conformity to these requirements is needed before 
market approval is granted, when the device gets a CE-mark.
Overall, the medical device regime is considered less stringent than that for 
pharmaceuticals. This relates amongst others to the testing of devices, and 
more specific to the need to perform clinical trials. An important distinction is 
that for medical devices, unlike for pharmaceuticals, demonstration of 
performance is required rather than efficacy. Clinical trials are seldom 
performed in the medical device world.
The question whether quality and safety demonstration should be 
supplemented by data on clinical effectiveness has divided parties in the tissue 
engineering debate. Where the medical device regime mostly relies on pre- 
clinical data collection and the monitoring of devices after marketing, the 
pharmaceuticals legislation has more specific and stricter requirements for 
clinical testing.
Indeed, medicines regulation was one of the earliest areas of Community 
control in the health domain, with the first Directives on pharmaceuticals being 
introduced in 1965.10 From its early inception, the aim of the EU medicines 
legislation lies in the dual purpose to protect public health and support free 
movement of products, the principles of which underlie the entire harmonisation 
process in Europe (EMEA 2006).
10 This was Directive 65/65/EEC . The current relevant legislation is covered in the Medicinal 
Products Directives (2001/83/E C ) or MPD, where criteria of quality, safety and efficacy are laid 
down for medicinal products for human use (European Commission (EC) 2001a). This Directive 
governs the market authorisation, manufacture and distribution of medicinal products in the 
Community. In October 2001 a review of the Medicines regulation was announced. Directive 
2001/83/EC  was amended by Directives 2002/98/EC , 2003/63/EC , 2004/24 /EC  
and 2004/27 /EC . See for earlier developments of the EU medicines legislation Abraham and 
Lewis (2000).
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Since 1995 a pivotal role in this legislation is played by the European Medicines 
Agency (EMEA), an EU regulatory body headquartered in London. The EMEA 
is part of a centralised system, supported by a mutual agreement procedure, 
where all medicines in Europe are subject to a single evaluation. Companies 
submit their request for marketing authorisation to the EMEA, which then goes 
to one of the scientific expert committees dealing with either human or 
veterinary use. For application in humans this concerns the Committee for 
Medicinal Products for Human Use (CHMP). This Committee has also been 
influential in advising on tissue engineering regulatory pathways. After a 
positive opinion from this expert Committee on criteria of quality, safety and 
efficacy, the Commission gives single market authorisation valid throughout the 
EU (Abraham and Lewis 2000: 113). The EU medicines regulation has been 
described as very complex, and the Europeanisation process as shifting from a 
weak to a strong regulatory state in the pharmaceuticals sector since 1995 
(Elmalem 2002).
In the context of tissue engineering regulation it is relevant to point out some of 
the difficulties in defining products under particular regulatory regimes. The 
technology and its diverse applications are novel and largely experimental, and 
complexity and uncertainty around risks and benefits make it difficult to predict 
the impact and outcomes of the technology. This puts regulators in a difficult 
position, but at the same time this phenomenon is rather typical for 
technological innovations entering the regulatory domain. In the first place, this 
is a matter of contested definitions, and in boundary drawing around including 
or excluding products in a certain technological and legislative domain. The 
demarcation between drugs and devices is relevant in the light of many new 
products being developed that do not easily fit in either of these categories. In 
order to institutionally and legally deal with controversy around these new so 
called borderline or combination products (such as drug-device or device- 
biologics combinations) the European Commission published guidelines (DG 
Enterprise 2001). As a general rule it was stated that products are regulated by 
either the Medical Devices or Medicinal Products Directive, and that the 
procedures of both Directives do not apply cumulatively.
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Generally borderline issues are discussed between manufacturers and 
regulators during the approval stage, which means a lot of informal discussion 
takes place before the actual approval is granted. This also implies room for 
negotiation. Originally many commercial developers of tissue engineered 
products have a background in medical devices. Classification of a borderline 
product as medical device serves their interest, as they have the necessary 
expertise and experience in gaining marketing approval for these types of 
products. Moreover, the medical device regime is less strict in terms of 
demonstrating clinical efficacy, while this process is much more complex and 
lengthy when a product falls under the medicinal product regime. More clinical 
trials and more elaborate clinical evidence is needed on not just performance 
but also effectiveness of a product, with longer review times, higher fees and 
more documentation required upon submission of a dossier to the EMEA. 
Gradually more borderline products are being developed by pharmaceutical 
companies now. In the US this has led to inter-institutional tensions between 
the different centres of the regulatory body FDA that are dealing with medical 
devices, medicinal products and also biologies (Altenstetter 2004). While there 
is one European regulatory agency for pharmaceuticals, the responsibility for 
medical devices at European level lies with two EU bureaucracies, namely DG 
SANCO and DG Enterprise. In the literature tensions have been described 
between different goals and institutional aims of public health and industrial 
policy. Sources of conflicts, economic interests, and a ‘clash in cultures’ have 
been found in the different policy sectors (Williams 2003: 10-11). As 
demonstrated later, these tensions are also real for tissue engineering.
Thus borderline products pose specific problems to manufacturers and 
regulators alike. Especially in the light of the different safety criteria attached to 
medical devices and medicinal products regimes, the specific risk assessment 
process for tissue engineering becomes important in determining the effects for 
public health. The main issue with tissue engineering is the fact that many of 
these products contain human tissues or cells of some form. Even though part 
of these products could be classified as medical device, the final product 
excludes them from the classical definition of a device and as such from the 
Medical Devices Directives. Equally, the mode of action of some of these 
products resembles a pharmaceuticals approach, but the Medicinal Product
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Directives do not (fully) apply. As also pointed out in the following fragment, this 
has created a regulatory lag:
The uncertainties and risks associated with tissue engineering...have 
caused regulators to delay the introduction of clear pathways to 
regulatory approval, since they have been used to dealing with drugs or 
devices, and tissue engineering products are neither, but do involve both 
(Lloyd-Evans 2004).
For a while, it looked like the pharmaceuticals framework would be the most 
appropriate solution to cover tissue engineering. Gene and cell therapy 
products were already covered under the Medicinal Products Directive (MPD), 
since 1998, and the scope of this Directive could be extended to also include 
tissue engineering (European Commission (EC) 1998). This was indeed the 
purport of an important document adopted in May 2001, which suggested that 
all Member States should regulate human tissue products as a medicinal 
product via the centralised procedure (EMEA: CPMP 2001: 3).
Industry was not undivided in its enthusiasm: definitions in this document were 
vague, and it was unclear whether products for orthopaedic and wound care 
applications, in other words the skin and cartilage products closest to the 
market, would be covered under this legislation. Also autologous applications 
would not fit the definition of medicinal product, and manufacturers were 
concerned about strict and inappropriate requirements of preclinical safety and 
clinical effectiveness. Furthermore, with a background in the medical device 
sector, most companies were uneasy about the application of pharmaceutical 
legislation. Especially smaller companies would become victim of this 
approach:
I think any pharma-like legislation is survivable for some of the big 
companies because they have a whole organisation in place because if 
they are big pharmaceutical companies, all their products go through 
that process so for them it’s not a big issue but for the smaller 
companies it is... I mean this is biotech, people from biotech fields, it’s 
an innovative field, you’re speaking about high technology and so one 
would be stopping innovation if there is just no proper legislation that 
would take into account all these elements.
(Corporate affairs manager in multinational company M-EU5, 2003)
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But the first steps towards filling the regulatory lag in tissue engineering were 
made. As also discussed in the Apligraf case study, early experiences from a 
company actually following this track were negative though.
Discussions about the exact requirements and definitions continued, and not 
much later the Medicinal Product Directive was updated to accommodate a 
more restricted definition. This was an important legislative move, as it directly 
concerned certain tissue engineered products. Moreover, under the influence of 
a growing number of products on the borderline between medicinal products 
and other frameworks, in the new EU medicines legislation of 2004 (Dir 
2004/27) also the very definition of a medicinal product was expanded. The 
status of borderline products was clarified: it was decided that when a product’s 
status is unclear or when in doubt, regulators will default to medicinal products 
status to protect public health (Article 2.2. Dir 2004/27).
To sum up, both the medical device and medicinal product Directives have 
been influential in discussions how to regulate products containing human 
tissues or cells. The scope and potential extension of the borders between 
these different legislative bases has been debated extensively over the last 
decade or so, in order to find substantial equivalence, at least in legislative 
terms, to fit tissue engineering. While several attempts have been made to 
include tissue engineering under either of these existing regulatory pillars in the 
EU health domain, these frameworks could not be stretched. One underlying 
motivation was that tissue engineered products were considered to pose 
substantially higher risks than medicinal products and the highest risk class III 
medical devices (European Commission: EESC 2002: C 85/46).
In the meantime more products were entering the fragmented European 
market, which meant that manufacturers had to fall back on national 
legislations and frameworks, if any. It also meant that patients throughout the 
Community were subjected to different levels of risk (Indech 2000).
One effect of the absence of appropriate European controls was that national 
legislations became more influential. Most notably tissue banking provisions, 
and perhaps more so the tissue banks that act as institutional gatekeepers to 
home markets in several influential Member States, have become dominant
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players in the EU domain. Tensions exist between these national provisions 
vis-a-vis EU level initiatives. But also cultural differences were influential. Most 
tissue banks operate on a not-for-profit basis, which has led to conflicting views 
with commercial developers over the nature of donation and commodification of 
human tissues and cells. Also important in this respect is that formal regulation 
of these tissue banks, both at national and at European level, is by and large 
lacking. This is perceived as problematic because of associated health risks, 
especially given the growing market for human tissues. At European level this 
led to several initiatives and calls for action. In the summer of 1998 the 
European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies (EGE), an 
authoritative Commission advisory group, published an Opinion on the ethical 
aspects of human tissue banking. EGE speaks of an ‘urgent need to regulate 
the conditions under which human tissues circulate within the European 
market’ (EGE 1998: 7).
These developments provide the context for developing a specific Community 
framework for tissue engineering, which became considered the third pillar in 
the EU health domain (Bock et al. 2003), taking into account the complexity 
and uncertainty around the technology, its evolutionary or developing 
character, and the differentiated risks of its diverse applications. Gradually but 
with increasing urgency the suggestion arose that because of the specific 
nature of tissue engineered products, a separate framework had to be 
developed. Of major significance was the EU experience with mad cow disease 
(BSE) and several food and blood contamination scandals, which provided a 
push for stricter health and safety requirements.
This thesis is concerned with the specific legislations that have been developed 
for tissue engineering most recently. What can be considered as the 
emergence of a regulatory regime, two main tracks dominate the EU regulatory 
landscape. One of these concerns the European regulation of human tissues, 
and mostly covers tissue banking activities such as the donation, procurement, 
testing, processing, storage and distribution of human tissues and cells. In this 
research I refer to this as the SANCO Directive, by its initiator DG SANCO, the 
Health and Consumer Protection Directorate General of the European 
Commission. The SANCO Directive covers all tissues and cells of human origin
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intended for application in the human body, and introduces quality and safety 
standards across the EU. In addition to this process based approach a second 
track covers the marketing requirements for tissue engineered products. For 
this a proposal for a specific Regulation has been developed by DG Enterprise, 
responsible for the promotion of trade in a single European market, which is 
currently still going through the legislative cycle. In this study I refer to this as 
the Enterprise Regulation.
Before discussing these two regulatory tracks in more detail, it is important to 
consider the legal basis of these initiatives, as they are rooted in different value 
systems underlying Community action. The next section looks at the context 
and tradition of health regulation at EU level, and the scope of Community 
intervention more generally, pointing out implicit discrepancies arising from the 
very aims of EU controls. Background is provided into the gradual shift of 
Community action from an exclusive focus on economic imperatives towards 
broader concerns with health and safety of its citizens. It is argued how this 
extended involvement has been influential in considerations of the particular 
ways and legislative means to control tissue engineering technology, and 
provides insight into the current conflicts between public health and 
competitiveness agendas in this domain.
2.3 Risk regulation in the Community
Regulation is often understood as a fundamentally political-economic concept, 
interpreted as a way in which governments attempt to manage the tension 
between protecting the public and allowing producers to trade and make their 
products profitable.11 They do so by issuing rules to control the manner in 
which these enterprises behave and conduct their operations. From this 
normative perspective regulation is seen as a state intervention to correct 
‘market failure’ (such as monopoly power or inadequate provision of public 
goods) and is justified out of the neoclassical economic argument that an
11 A much cited definition refers to regulation as ‘a sustained and focused control exercised by 
a public agency, on the basis of a legislative mandate, over activities that are valued by society’ 
(Selznick 1985 in Majone, 1996: 3). I am not so much concerned with the etymological 
development of the term regulation and the historical conceptual roots. For an account of this 
see Jessop (1995). See Ogus (1994, chapter 1) on historical development of regulation.
70
unregulated market is inadequate and undesirable (Abraham and Lewis 2000; 
Hancherand Moran 1989a; Majone 1996).
A broad but for this research useful distinction that is often made, concerns the 
difference between economic and social regulation (Ogus 1994). Economic 
regulation is concerned with controlling the terms of entry to a particular 
market, and primarily applies to monopolist positions in industry that need 
counterweight. This understanding is too narrow in focus for this research. 
Social regulation has a wider range and aim, and is not about regulating a 
specific industry or sector, but tries to protect whole populations against social 
discrimination and risk (Moran 2001). As such it covers issues of health and 
safety, environmental and consumer protection.
Although originally the Union was primarily seen as an economic community, 
with free movement of goods within the internal market as its main aim, it has 
gradually become more involved in health and safety regulation -  so much so, 
that consumer health and safety protection has been widely recognised as an 
independent community objective in its own right (Vos 1999). As is also evident 
from the case of tissue engineering, the Community is now one of the key 
actors in European health and safety regulation.
To understand the underlying dynamics of this involvement, we need to discuss 
the legal basis of Community action. The Treaties represent the constitutional 
law of the European Union, laying down the basic policies and institutional 
structures and covering the legislative procedures. Of this primary legislation 
the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) is the most important one for tissue 
engineering, as it is in this piece that the need for community wide legislation 
on human tissues and cells was first made explicit. Also, it was in this Treaty 
that the dual objective of the Community became clearly visible, in trying to 
unite the aim of creating a single European market with considerations of public 
health and safety. Two Treaty articles are of particular relevance in this respect, 
namely the one on public health (art 152) and the one covering completion of a 
single European market (art 95). These different articles are discussed next.
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Increasing involvement in public health protection
In addition to securing free movement within the European Union, which has 
been covered in Community law since its early inception, the Amsterdam 
Treaty was the first piece of communal legislation that made public health 
protection a formal Community objective. With the new article 152 (ex Article 
129) of this Treaty the EU became able to adopt strategies to ensure ‘a high 
level of human health protection in the definition and implementation of all 
Community policies and activities’, rather than just supporting the efforts of 
Member States (Article 152, al 1).12 Of particular significance in this respect is 
the explicit statement in this article that the Community will adopt legislation on 
human tissues and cells:
The Council... shall contribute to the achievement of the objectives 
referred to in this article through adopting: measures setting high 
standards of quality and safety of organs and substances of human 
origin, blood and blood derivatives; these measures shall not prevent 
any Member State from maintaining or introducing more stringent 
protective measures. (European Commission (EC) 1997: art 152, al 
4(a))
The development of quality and safety measures for human tissues and cells 
can be considered the first formal reference to an explicit Community obligation 
in the public health domain. Following this Treaty, which entered into force in 
May 1999, action was initiated to control human tissue and cells. This was one 
the one hand born out of concerns with increasingly globalised trade and 
exchange of human body parts within and outside the Community, and safety 
threats this would pose in terms of cross-border disease transmission and 
equal access to scarce goods. In other words, the Community felt a need to 
develop quality and safety measures on a European scale rather than leaving 
this to Member State level. On the other hand this article was addressing a 
current regulatory gap in that no EU wide regulatory controls were in place to 
cover these human body parts. Out of similar safety concerns, and in addition
12 Covered by this article is cooperation between Member States in fighting disease and more 
general causes of danger to human health, while also objectives of improving health are listed. 
Importantly, am endm ent of this particular Article was driven by a strong lobby from Member 
States and EU institutions alike to not repeat the errors that were made during the BSE crisis, 
where the Commission was accused of following a too strong market-influenced policy. The  
health and safety of persons in relation to products featured large in this debate. Thus a high 
level of consumer health and safety protection has become a widely recognised aspect of 
Community activity, and a legitimate goal in itself.
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to public pressure and concern after contaminated blood scandals in one 
influential Member State (France), for blood products a separate track was 
followed which led to Directive 2002/98/EC, and which falls beyond the scope 
of this research (European Commission (EC) 2003b).
It is also here that tensions become visible between two dominant guiding 
principles of EU action, namely public health protection and promoting trade. A 
more original aim of the Community refers to the marketing of products based 
on human tissue and cells: ‘to guarantee patient safety and to ensure that 
tissue engineered products can be marketed without obstacles throughout the 
European Union to those who need the innovative therapies’ (European 
Commission (EC) 2004).
Promoting trade and a single European market
As discussed in the introduction to this thesis, the EU has a long tradition of 
promoting trade and stimulating biotechnology innovation to make the 
European bio-economy a global competitor. This objective is reflected in 
discussions on the regulation of tissue engineering as one promising exponent 
of the life sciences and biotechnology sector.
Economic goals of Community action are covered by several Treaty articles 
(e.g. Articles 28-30). The most influential one is Article 95 of the Amsterdam 
Treaty, which has as objective the establishment and functioning of the internal 
market, including the adoption of harmonisation measures in the EU. The 
majority of secondary community legislation for the placing of biotechnology 
products on the market is based on this Article (Sheridan 2001). Important 
exceptions to the rule apply though in how far Member States have the ‘right’ 
not to follow the harmonised approach of the Community, as the possibility was 
created for Member States to adopt more stringent measures than those laid 
down in Article 95 to protect the health of their public, as long as these are 
compatible with the Treaty (and in particular are not used as a trading barrier). 
As furthermore expressed in this article, its objective is not to replace the public 
health goals:
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The Commission, in its proposals... concerning health, safety, 
environmental protection and consumer protection, will take as a base a 
high level of protection, taking account in particular of any new 
development based on scientific facts (European Commission (EC)
1997: art 95, al 3).
In other words the health and safety agenda cannot be compromised with 
completion of the single European market. This does not prevent ongoing 
itchiness though between the public health and trade objectives. Community 
structures for risk regulation have a dual basis, where on the one hand tensions 
arise from the opening up of markets, while on the other regulatory concerns of 
consumer health and safety need to be addressed. Moreover, it has been 
argued how the internal market objective led to an increased involvement of the 
Community in health and safety regulation, and as such the implementation of 
a greater number of rules at this level, because of the trade barriers on these 
issues that have been created at national Member State level. Some speak of a 
‘spill-over’ effect in this respect, arguing how the Community involvement in 
public health was an accidental consequence of the market integration 
objective (Vos 1999).
To sum up, it is argued that although the Community’s involvement in 
regulation of health and safety can be mainly understood as stemming from its 
commitment to achieving an internal market, after the BSE crisis a specific 
legal basis and commitment was provided for the protection of human health 
and safety. Two Articles of the Treaty of Amsterdam are of particular relevance 
to tissue engineering; one on public health (Art 152) and the other on 
completion of a single European market (Art 95). These dual objectives provide 
the basis for secondary legislation of tissue engineered products, which are 
discussed later on in this research.
With this observation the last of three main developments has been illustrated, 
leading to the need for specific Community wide regulation of tissue 
engineering. With large diversity in national regulatory pathways, and failing 
efforts in stretching existing EU frameworks in the health domain, the current 
development of tissue engineering policy needs to be understood in the context 
of tensions between health and trade objectives, which is also visible in the 
institutional arrangements and structures in place to obtain this goal.
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Furthermore, as also described in the introduction, a strong economic and 
innovation-driven framework forms the backbone for these regulatory efforts.
As integral part of the EU ambition to establish a solid knowledge-based bio­
economy, the Commission plays a double role of both promoting and regulation 
biotechnology. The implications of this complex constellation determine the 
process of regulatory decision making in this domain, and with that the impact 
of tissue engineering on the bio-society.
With the increasingly dominant role of the EU in regulating biotechnology, also 
other tensions arise. The next section describes issues of legitimacy in 
Community policies and the complicated and technocratic system of expertise 
originally developed to make EU governance processes more transparent and 
democratic.
2.4 More responsibilities and more complex configurations
The scale and scope of regulation covering the European community has 
grown substantially over the last decade, in some cases outnumbering the 
legislation with domestic origin in Member States.13 According to some, the EU 
can be characterised as a ‘European regulatory state’ (Majone 1996). One of 
the practical problems of the extended involvement in Community regulation is 
that the European Commission, as the most important executive agency of the 
Union, is not equipped to take on the massive task of collecting and evaluating 
scientific data for regulatory purposes, as it is lacking expertise and manpower 
to carry out these tasks.14 Therefore the incorporation of scientific expertise into 
decision-making has become extensive part of many of the regulatory initiatives
13 For an indication of the number of Regulations and Directives produced in Brussels over the 
last years, see Majone (1996: 56-59). Especially in European environmental law a fair number 
of regulatory instruments have been produced, with a shift from initial Directives concerned with 
product regulation to more and more legislation covering processes (Sheridan, 2001).
As described extensively by Majone (1994, 1996, 2003), unlike nation states, the EU does 
not have a large bureaucracy at its disposal to implement its policies, nor a large budget for 
redistribution. The European Commission only has indirect means of exercising power and 
influencing M em ber States, and regulation is one such means. The EU can promulgate 
regulations, while the costs in terms of money and staffing are borne on the national level: 
‘constitutional ideologies such as subsidiarity allow institutions like the Commission to expand 
ruling domains while pushing the responsibility, and the cost, of regulation down to national and 
sub-national levels’ (Moran, 2003: 17). Thus by expanding the scope of its regulatory activities, 
the Commission can increase influence over its Member States.
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of the Commission, including those on tissue engineering. It is also in the 
Treaty of Amsterdam where the Commission has explicitly inserted the 
obligation to base its internal market proposals on new scientific evidence, thus 
underlining the importance of scientific expertise. The implications of this 
construction have been outlined elsewhere (see under regulatory science in 
chapter 1).
The regulation of tissue engineered products can be situated in the context of a 
larger discussion about the position and methods of the EU, and the 
effectiveness and legitimacy of European policy. Several principles have been 
adopted to deal with the increasingly complex problems the EU faces, 
especially in the face of further enlargement. Proportionality, subsidiarity, 
transparency and flexibility reflect a concern to respect a certain autonomy at 
Member State level, to leave scope for national decision-making and 
legislation, to only act insofar as needed for achieving Treaty objectives, to 
keep the consultation and decision making process open and accessible to the 
citizen, and to recognise diversity in arrangements between different Member 
States (Lebessis and Paterson 1997: 5).
With the increased interference in health and safety regulation on Community 
level, EU institutions are faced with conducting risk assessment and risk 
management tasks that were previously decided upon in the national context. 
This poses several regulatory difficulties, most notably in the relationship with 
individual Member States, as also addressed in the White Paper on European 
Governance (European Commission (EC) 2001b). One such issue concerns 
the impact of regulation in the light of the transfer of powers from national to 
European level, and the Community competence in dealing with risk and safety 
of innovative technologies. This includes legal questions about rule 
implementation and highlights most notably the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality, which have been particularly influential in tissue engineering 
regulation.15 The subsidiarity principle was introduced in the Maastricht Treaty,
15 In Community speak proportionality and subsidiarity are described as follows: From the 
conception of policy to its implementation, the choice of the level at which action is taken (from 
EU to local) and the selection of the instruments used must be in proportion to the objectives 
pursued. This means that before launching an initiative, it is essential to check systematically 
(a) if public action is really necessary, (b) if the European level is the most appropriate one, and 
(c) if the measures chosen are proportionate to those objectives (EC, 2001a: 10-11).
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reflecting the Member States’ reluctance to accept the Community’s 
assumption of greater powers (Vos 1999). By limiting its powers and 
competence to Treaty objectives, room is left for national decision-making and 
legislation, where subsidiarity dictates that Community action is only possible if 
the objectives of the proposed action cannot be achieved sufficiently by the 
Member States and for reasons of scale or effects can thus be better achieved 
by the Community (European Commission (EC) 2001b).
Given the closely tied links between health protection and market integration, 
Community action is generally required for issues of health and safety, which 
would provide the subsidiarity principle with a straightforward approach. As 
demonstrated later though, in the case of tissue engineering particular retreat is 
done on this principle, most notably to prevent contested ethical issues from 
entering the Community legislation.
With this context in mind we will return to Community policies in chapter 8. The 
next chapter outlines my analytical framework and includes a methodological 
account.
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3 Analytical and methodological approach
The purpose of this chapter is threefold. First it serves as conceptual 
introduction to my understanding of risk, which is a key theme of engagement 
in this thesis. I discuss risk perceptions as socially constructed and hence 
contingent notions, and give insight into the way in which I have organised my 
data and structured my argument. I provide a model for discussing different 
perceptions of risk across three distinct but interrelated domains, structured 
along different phases of the innovation process. This provides the background 
for chapters 4 till 7 in which these domains are further explored and interpreted. 
A second aim of this chapter is to introduce the main players, while also setting 
the empirical boundaries of my research. This is relevant for the transition into 
the third part of this chapter, which includes my methodological engagement. It 
contains a description of the research process and methods used to unravel 
perceptions of risk and dimensions of tissue engineering regulation in the EU.
3.1 Perceptions of risk and boundaries of risk domains
Risk is a hot topic of political debate in the EU, and represents in many ways 
the much wider political and social concern about the governance of science in 
the EU (Borras 2003). Risk technologies have become a key strategy over the 
last decades, exemplified by developments in genetics and the creation of the 
human genome project, where the human body has been redefined as a field of 
risk (see also: Gabe 1995; Rose 2001). Political discourse has focused on risks 
associated with new biomedical technologies, with various strategies 
developed to control risk, where regulatory efforts were targeted at tackling 
potential hazards while at the same time problems arose of lack of scientific 
knowledge about these new sciences and technologies.
Risk is a way of ordering reality, of rendering it into a calculable form. 
Risks come into existence through complex and multiple processes of 
inscription, interpretation and boundary work carried out by a variety of 
actors. Risk is a strategy of making events and situations governable 
and introduces a calculative rationality for governing the conduct of 
individuals, populations and collectivities (Gottweis 2005: 183).
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Risk is presented here as a ‘strategy’ for governance, and particular definitions 
of risk determined by technology have led to a regulatory system. Importantly, 
the very existence of risk is considered part of a complex process where 
different actors negotiate the boundaries of the notion of risk and its diverse 
appearances. This is an important underlying assumption in my research.
3.1.1 Constructing, framing and categorising risk
One conceptual notion of risk departs from the politics of risk definition, based 
on the assumption that ‘whoever controls the definition of risk controls the 
rational solution to the problem at hand ’(Slovic 1999: 689). In tissue 
engineering there is no such thing as ‘the definition of risk’ though, as broad 
variability exists between different professional groups on how to frame risk 
issues, highlighting ‘the contested nature of who is defining what as risk and 
how’ (Adam et al. 2000: 4).
My study discusses different interpretations of risk as frames as a means of 
‘shaping, focusing and organising the world around us’ (Lewicki et al. 2003:
11). Framing, then, is the activity and process of creating and representing 
frames; of interpreting and making sense of what is going on. These frames are 
no static entities and not permanent, but are fed by new experiences and 
information which can lead to ‘reframing’. I prefer to label this process in terms 
of ‘reconstructing’ frames and boundaries, to denote my interpretation of 
frames as social constructions as a meaningful way of discussing different 
interpretations of risk (see also later). Furthermore, and typically, frames are 
used to 1) define issues as problematic or not, 2) shape what actions should be 
taken and by whom, 3) protect oneself by recourse to legal or other rights, 4) 
justify a stance taken on an issue, and 5) mobilise people to take or refrain from 
action on issues (Lewicki et al. 2003: 15-19). Risk frames in this case stem 
from differences in how various stakeholders view the type and level of risk 
associated with a particular phenomenon.
As such, frames become most explicit in situations of conflict and controversy. 
Risk controversies have been described extensively in the literature, where 
Vaughan & Seifert (1992) take the stance that disagreements about risk can be
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traced back to substantial variation in underlying belief and value systems. The 
authors present three themes that dominate debates about public health and 
environmental risks, which are of particular relevance to tissue engineering: the 
definition of risk (and related concepts), the weight or value attached to 
different dimensions of risk, and the issue of framing or structuring the decision 
or policy problem (Vaughan and Seifert 1992: 120-121).
The first one relates to the issue of how to define risk. For example, the 
concept of risk tends to embrace broader dimensions for lay populations than 
for experts. However, this study demonstrates how the debate on risk also 
reveals broad variability in perception and assessment of risk within and 
between different professional groups involved in R&D in this technological 
domain. In my research I use a typology of risk assessment over three distinct 
but interrelated dimensions, based on scientific risk (safety), clinical risk 
(efficacy) and commercial risk (marketability). A model depicting this 
classification is described later on in this section.
Furthermore, interested parties disagree about the factors that determine the 
(un)acceptability of risk, most notably regarding the value of health 
considerations relative to economic benefits or technological advances, but 
also in how to weight the amount of uncertainty in scientific risk estimates or 
the importance of immediate versus long-term consequences. I argue how risk 
debates in tissue engineering are driven by a broad range of considerations, 
extending the health versus economic nexus and also including more 
differentiated concerns. In my research I demonstrate how a hierarchy of risk is 
constructed based on two dimensions: first in terms of risk domains (safety, 
efficacy, marketability), but across sections based on the particular engineering 
route and cell source used in tissue engineered applications (autologous 
versus allogeneic).
Finally ongoing debate exists over how to conceptualise or frame risk issues. 
One important question addressed under this heading is whether the 
management of (public health) risks is about fairness regarding the distribution 
of risk and benefit in society, or belongs to scientific and economic domains. 
Another question is about the population affected, and if risk estimates should
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be targeted at particular vulnerable groups (such as children) or expressed in 
terms of average risk to the entire population. Finally the levels of aggregation 
and the time-scale involved are critical. In my research I use the concept of 
‘balance of risk’ to demonstrate different perceptions of (levels of) acceptable 
risk in a given context at one point in time and for particular groups affected. 
Thus the balance of risk determines the level (e.g. in terms of individual versus 
collective) of risk management approaches, but also takes into account 
acceptability overtime (‘inter-generational risk’).
These different frameworks of risk are important because they dictate which 
‘solutions’ are constructed in the policy process, e.g. which risk management 
strategies are considered valuable and feasible, and what information is 
needed and useful in reaching a decision. It also has implications for the 
legitimacy of different viewpoints in the policy process. By analysing the key 
dimensions of the construction of risk in tissue engineering, and the different 
dimensions and values attached to variations in risk, risk framing is linked to 
policy implications. The construction of risk discourses is tied in with the 
expression of a technological, political or social acceptable solution. Thus the 
definition of risk is at the same time the definition of a solution.
A main concern for the conceptual use of the term ‘risk’ in my study relates to 
the understanding of risk perception as a socially constructed concept,16 but it 
also includes an interest in the policy implications of (differing) conceptual 
approaches to risk. By adopting a social constructivist perspective on risk, I 
move away from the view that scientific knowledge is composed of objective 
facts that can be explained, predicted and controlled, and as such provide the 
basis for decision-making.17 A technical approach of risk does not take into
16 As advocated by amongst others Tom Horlick-Jones (1998). Also other authors have pointed 
out how risks are necessarily socially constructed, with ‘risk construction as a practice of 
manufacturing particular uncertainties that may have harmful consequences to ‘life’ in the 
broadest sense of the term ’ (Adam et al. 2000: 2).
17 At the same time the limitations of this approach should be noted here. Social constructivists 
deny the existence of an objective material world and as such problematise the notion of 
objective truth. Instead they emphasise the contingent basis of social reality, where social facts 
are contested and subject to diversity of interpretation. The strength of this approach is its focus 
on broader social processes and the importance of the social, political and economic context. 
One criticism though is that social constructivism still involves objectivism because it assumes 
that the processes through which social problems are constructed are themselves objective 
facts which can be studied as such. Also social constructivism has been criticised for its
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account the complex and socio-political nature of phenomena, including 
political dimensions (such as conflict or discrepancy over definition of what 
risks are and how they should be managed) or ethical concerns (including 
values in judgement of risk). By focusing on underlying values in risk 
assessment and risk decisions, the starting point of analysis is a concern with 
the perceiver of risk, rather than with risk as a phenomenon in itself (which, in 
technical terms, is usually expressed as probability in one way or another). 
Perceptions of risk, as has been argued, differ over place and time and per 
social setting, depending on the frame of reference or the social and cultural 
context is which risk is assessed and managed. While acknowledging that the 
notion of objective facts versus more subjective concepts of risk are in practice 
often blurred, and as such represent extremes in the ideal-typical spectrum, by 
understanding risks as value-based entities that cannot be separated from the 
policy-related science context, the door is open to analysing diverse belief 
systems that underpin different notions of risk. This provides a context for the 
shaping of a risk regulation regime, which is the focus of later chapters.
Against this conceptual background of framing of risk, the purpose of chapters 
4 till 7 is to analyse the socially constructed or framed nature of risk in tissue 
engineering, including the various plural rationalities involved (compare Gabe 
1995). As such, my study is not concerned with determining the accuracy of 
risk assessments or the success of communicating risk to the public, but rather 
with analysing how concepts of risk are constructed and agreed on in a broader 
arena. Risks are defined in particular ways that reflect the social and political 
setting or order, and with particular consequences for the public. Thus this 
research also aims to take into account the ways in which the constructions of 
risk shape the political debate in particular ways.
To this effect, my research analyses the wide-ranging accounts provided by 
professional groups involved in the front-end of tissue engineering research 
and development, namely scientists, clinicians and manufacturers. My focus is 
on how and to which extent risks are articulated in the different domains of 
tissue engineering R&D and in which ways they are framed and differentiated.
selective skepticism, where W oolgar and Pawluch speak of 'ontological gerrymandering’ 
(1985). With thanks here to Tom Horlick-Jones for pointing out these limitations.
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To conceptually approach these different perceptions of risk, I adopt the 
demarcation approach as described in chapter 1. I analyse these perceptions in 
terms of boundary drawing around particular risk domains and identify the 
boundary objects that move within and between the different risk domains (and 
beyond, which is of concern for regulation as discussed subsequently). The 
next section provides a classification model to engage with the three dominant 
social worlds of risk perceptions.
3.1.2 Perceptions of risk in tissue engineering R&D: a classification
Social scientific perspectives on risk are divers, and risk typologies abundant 
(see for useful overviews: Horlick-Jones and Sime 2004; Renn 1992; Slovic 
2000). Categorisation of risk is not novel either (see for one attempt: Sarangi 
and Candlin 2003).
From expert interviews (see later) different notions emerged of ‘the risks’ of 
tissue engineering, and more particular articulation and differentiation of these 
risks over specific spheres. I have called these risk domains. As such, a rather 
grounded approach was adopted where dynamic and varying interpretations of 
risk seemed to emerge as an important theme during the fieldwork. Initial 
inspiration to analytically engage with this variation came from a risk typology 
developed by Douglas and Wildavsky in their work ‘Risk and Culture’ (Douglas 
and Wildavsky 1982). This model is concerned with risk perception, and 
classifies how different social groups select risk based on their cultural 
characteristics. The authors define three general areas of concern with risk: 
Socio-political risks include dangers to social structure, usually stemming from 
human violence such as crime or war; economic risks are threats to the 
economy or risks of economic failure; and what they label natural risks includes 
ecological threats to nature and the body, which covers risk from technology 
(Lash 2000).
Douglas and Wildavsky use this typology not to provide a classification of ‘real’ 
risk but as a tool to link particular risk perceptions with separate risk cultures. 
This provided a good starting point for discriminating between different risk 
perceptions in tissue engineering. In my research I translate this model to 
different stages of the innovation process of biomedical technology, and as
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such have a narrow take on risk perception as defined by actors in research 
and development (R&D) of this technology. The structure of this underlying 
innovation framework is discussed next.
My classification of risk perceptions follows the early stages of the innovation 
cycle of (biomedical) technologies, where innovation is simply considered as 
‘introducing something new’ (Loughlin 2002). The innovation development 
process has typically been described as a linear model consisting of six 
phases, starting with problem or need definition which stimulates research and 
development, towards commercialisation, diffusion and adoption of the 
innovation by users to finally its consequences (Rogers 1995). My model for 
categorising risk perceptions is only concerned with a fraction of this process, 
namely the R&D and commercialisation phase, where scientific knowledge and 
insights of basic and applied research are further developed and converted into 
products or services for sale in the marketplace. Commercialisation, then, is the 
final station of interest in my study, where innovations are conversed into 
production, manufacturing, marketing and distribution of products. With respect 
to domains of innovation, this research speaks in simplified terms of lab, clinic 
and marketplace, which are each connected to certain practices and value 
systems. Perceptions of risk of tissue engineering technology are discussed in 
relation to these three domains. This leads to the following alternative risk 
typology:
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A taxonomy of risk:
Risk domains and a safety bar based on cell source
Cell source
ClinicalTechnoloc
Autologous
Allogeneic
Xenogeneic
In this model the three social worlds of lab, clinic and marketplace are visible as 
main domains, corresponding with the following categories of risk:
• Technological risk (safety)
• Clinical risk (efficacy)
• Commercial risk (marketability)
Technological risk covers concerns related to the processing and 
manufacturing of human tissue and cells, and reflects an overall concern with 
safety. Clinical risk is about perceptions of risk related to clinical evidence 
available for these products, with efficacy as key word. Commercial risk refers 
to concerns about the market and business climate for tissue engineering, and 
includes factors to do with cost and marketability of tissue engineered products.
Thus this typology is a reflection of the innovation process from lab to clinic to 
market. It covers the different phases in the R&D process with a focus on 
primary scientific work and basic research in the lab (technological risk, 
discussed in chapter 4), to the clinical phase in which the constructs are 
translated into initial clinical testing in humans (clinical risk, chapter 5), as a first 
transition into the market place, where the products enter the commercial cycle 
(commercial risk, chapter 6).
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It should be noted though that these phases of innovation do not necessarily 
take place in a linear sequence, nor that these are distinct (a more dynamic 
stance is provided by: Blume 1992). The proclaimed ‘biotech revolution’ is one 
example. Instead of bringing revolutionary changes biotech has followed a well- 
established pattern of slow and incremental technology diffusion, where the 
translation of basic knowledge into new technology has been argued to be 
more difficult, costly and time-consuming. In other words the linear model of 
innovation is being questioned, and policymakers need to take into account the 
‘uncertain, systemic nature of technical change and the very long time scales 
between advances in basic knowledge and productivity improvements’ 
(Nightingale and Martin 2004: 568).
This uncertainty has been described as notable characteristic of medical 
innovation. Policy debates are often based on the assumption of innovation as 
a homogeneous activity that follows the linear model as discussed above. But 
processes of innovation differ per sector and per economy, with extreme 
diversity of background conditions underlying the innovation process (Gelijns 
and Rosenberg 1995). For example technological innovation in the 
semiconductor industry does not resemble the process as found in fields such 
as tissue engineering. Even within the medical domain the conditions for 
successful innovation differ substantially per sector and sub-sector (e.g. 
compare pharmaceuticals and medical devices). In the case of tissue 
engineering this could be extended to even larger diversity because of the 
broad range of clinical applications, from relatively simple woundcare products 
to highly manipulated and complex constructions for whole organ replacement - 
that also constitute different risks.
Highlighting these limitations serves to illustrate the danger of crude 
reductionism in my classification of risk across three domains of lab, clinic and 
market. Therefore I also demonstrate the dynamic interactions between 
inhabitants of these domains, and the ways in which risk perceptions serve as 
boundary objects in negotiating what belongs to the social worlds of risk and/or 
regulation, and how the conditions of these boundaries are contested and 
negotiated. Here I rely on social constructivist notions of how ‘relevant social
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groups’ help to shape technological innovation, acknowledging the relevance of 
interest groups and networks of social interaction around technical, scientific 
and medical innovation (Pinch and Bijker 1987). With this approach the distinct 
linear stage model of technological development is questioned, adopting a 
more dynamic view on the spread of innovative technologies (see also: 
Nicholson 2002). Eliciting different risk perceptions in transcending boundaries 
(rather than assuming these are fixed) is one way of illustrating this point.
Furthermore, the model also contains a ‘safety bar’ which runs across the 
different risk domains. This bar is based on interviewees’ perceptions of the 
‘riskyness’ of the different biological materials which form the starting materials 
for tissue engineered applications. Here it becomes clear how many of these 
risks are related to each other, but also constitute different values across risk 
domains. Therefore, in chapter 7 alternative dimensions are discussed in the 
perception of risk. One of those I have labelled the ‘risk hierarchy’, which is a 
reclassification of risk in terms of the particular source material used for tissue 
engineered construct. Autologous applications are generally considered ‘less 
risky’ than products based on allogeneic material. As demonstrated though, this 
perception clashes with another concern high on the risk list, namely the use of 
xenogeneic material in the cell culturing process for both the autologous and 
allogeneic engineering routes. Furthermore I argue how the particular cell 
source determines not only scientific endeavours but also drives clinical 
concerns and commercial strategies. It is here that the risk hierarchy becomes 
a more dynamic model, where risk in techno-scientific terms takes on a 
different meaning and value in clinical and commercial domains.
Another dimension of risk described in this chapter is what I have called the 
‘risk balance’, which is about acceptability of risk, where perceived risks of 
tissue engineering are differentiated into levels and degrees of risk for 
particular applications (life-saving versus cosmetic, availability of alternatives), 
subsets of populations (e.g. children), and overtime (‘intergenerational risk’). 
The content of the balance of risk and the hierarchy of risk provide the context 
for risk management approaches, making the transition to the social world of 
regulation as discussed in subsequent chapters. The next section discusses 
the implications and limitations of this research.
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3.2 Empirical focus and boundaries
In this section I draw the boundaries of what this thesis will include and what is 
excluded. The main players are briefly introduced, the timeframe and 
geographical limitations, and my conceptual approach to the regulatory domain. 
Also a note on terminology is presented, which is important for understanding 
the contested scope of tissue engineering regulation as discussed later.
3.2.1 Relevant actors
Community level policy development is characterised by frequently opposing 
views, powerful commercial interests, and social and political pressures. Tissue 
engineering is exemplar for an emerging innovative technology which involves 
a broad and growing network of actors with wide ranging interests. In the 
context of an increasingly urgent need for specific Community regulation for 
tissue engineered technologies, my main focus in this research is on two broad 
categories of actors. First I am concerned with interest groups in the R&D 
phase of tissue engineering, and their specific concerns with demarcating 
domains of risk. This includes discourses of technological risk and safety, 
clinical efficacy and marketability of products as employed by scientists, 
clinicians and manufacturers. Second, I describe the politicised nature of these 
risk domains when entering the regulatory world. Here I analyse the 
participation of diverse stakeholders involved in EU regulatory policy shaping 
and making. This entails a complex network of EU bodies and regulatory 
agencies, national governments, manufacturers and trade bodies, scientific 
experts and policy advisors, and to a lesser extent clinicians and patient 
groups. Of the diverse EU bodies in this domain, I limit my empirical 
engagement to the role of the European Commission and Parliament (and to 
some extent the Council). These institutions are assisted by staff at 
bureaucratic departments called Directorates-General (DGs) that take on 
specific tasks or policy areas. Two DGs are of particular relevance to tissue 
engineering regulation. DG Health and Consumer Protection (DG SANCO) has 
as goal the promotion of a better quality of life and is in charge of the public
88
health agenda, and proposes regulation that addresses these issues by 
imposing rules that assure a minimal level of quality and safety of medical 
products throughout the EU. DG Enterprise is mainly responsible for trade and 
the free circulation of products within the internal market, and its legislation is 
targeted at removing trade barriers. In terms of specific policy analysis a further 
breakdown of focus is on the regulatory efforts of these two dominant DGs, 
where I analyse the SANCO Directive on quality and safety of human tissues 
and cells, and the Enterprise Regulation in development for the marketing of 
tissue engineered products.
These specific regulatory initiatives are used as a vehicle to discuss the EU 
committee system and the role of expertise in regulatory science. Here the 
main participants are scientific (and other) experts engaging in policy debates, 
where sometimes strong links exist with industry. This adds another dimension 
to the circle of interest groups, as the intertwining relations and boundaries 
between science and policy, science and industry, and more explicit the 
interlinkages between science, regulatory policy and industrial practice are 
redefined in the arena of tissue engineering regulation.
3.2.2 Timelines and locations
One implication of my focus on these regulatory initiatives concerns the 
timeframe in which the specific regulatory activity in tissue engineering takes 
place. The phase of development of the SANCO Directive started in summer 
2002 with the initial proposal, and with the final Directive being adopted in 
March 2004. The implementation phase for Member States is 2 years, with 
transposition into national legislation by 7 April 2006. The preparations for the 
DG Enterprise regulation date back to the same period of time, with a final 
proposal for a Regulation presented in November 2005. Thus the 
implementation phase and any weaknesses this may reveal lies beyond the 
scope of this thesis, which will however provide a definite account of what is 
being regulated, including an initial analysis of the regulatory closure achieved 
in the face of the tensions between market and safety central to this thesis.
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A note on my use of the concept ‘European Union (EU)’ is needed in the 
context of the recent enlargement. EU is used in two ways in this thesis: when 
it concerns EU wide regulation the new EU-25 including accession states 
applies. However, the majority of the fieldwork (e.g. interviews) carried out for 
this research dates from the period of time (May 2004) before the enlargement. 
This means that in the analysis of developing regulation for tissue engineering 
mainly the ‘old’ EU-15 applies.
Furthermore, this study is a case study of tissue engineering regulation in the 
EU and as such limits its scope to debates and stakeholders at this level. This 
is not to suggest that an analysis of national stances is excluded, nor that input 
of Member States into the European debate or national positions towards 
European regulation is being ignored. In effect, a lot of discussion and agenda 
setting within the Commission can be traced back to national differences in 
aims and approach to tissue engineering regulation, and this thesis includes 
and unravels these interactions. Also in the discussion on expert systems, and 
more specific on comitology, the input of national Member States and their 
representatives is paramount. However, this thesis does not contain specific 
case studies of national legislation, and is not concerned with local policies, but 
is limited to the effects of national regulatory provisions on EU policy shaping.
Finally within several comparative studies of regulation of science-based 
products (such as pharmaceuticals, medical devices, agricultural biotechnology 
and nuclear power plants) reference is made to the role of the United States, or 
more specific that of the Food & Drug Administration (FDA). In my research the 
importance of the role of the US is acknowledged and explored via policy texts 
and literature, but data collection from fieldwork is beyond the scope of the 
present study.
3.2.3 Regulatory regimes of tissue engineering?
My concern with regulatory policy development is contextualised as the 
shaping of a regulatory regime in tissue engineering at EU level. According to 
Hood and colleagues, who have written extensively on the governance of risk 
and variety in systems of regulation over different policy settings, an analytical
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distinction can be made between the ‘context’ and ‘content’ of such a regulatory 
regime:
Regime context means the backdrop or setting in which regulation takes 
place, such as the different types and levels of risk being tackled, the 
nature of public preferences and attitudes over risk, and the way the 
various actors who produce or are affected by the hazard are organized. 
Regime content means the policy settings, the configuration of state and 
other organizations directly engaged in regulating the risk, and the 
attitudes, beliefs, and operating conventions of the regulators (Hood et 
al. 2001: 21).
In short a regulatory regime can be seen as driven by three broad features: 
type and level of risk, public preferences and attitudes towards risk and 
organised interests around those risks. The authors argue that by separating 
risk regulation into diverse dimensions of control and different elements of 
regime content, the shaping of regulation can be understood better than by 
analysing regulatory regimes in aggregated form (Hood et al. 2001: 139-40).
The notion of a regulatory regime is a useful starting point for my analysis, 
whereas I will also demonstrate the weaknesses in this approach, most notably 
over the assumption of a direct relationship between risk and regulation, crude 
reductionism to a by now infamous three-tier classification and thereby 
marginalising the more complex and dynamic character of the social 
construction of risk and the ways in which these risks are negotiated to become 
adopted (or not) for purposes of regulatory policy.
One relevant element of this model, then, lies in the notion of interest 
representation in regulatory policy shaping. This is also further developed by 
Hancher and Moran (1989a) with the concept of ‘regulatory space’, in which 
they identify a dominant role for large firms. This concept proves useful in the 
analysis of stakeholder participation in tissue engineering regulation, as it 
focuses on the ‘inhabitants’ of what the authors conceive as common 
regulatory space. The dimensions of this regulatory space can be understood 
by looking at national regulatory settings, including their specific political, legal 
and cultural attributes (Hancher and Moran 1989b: 277). The boundaries of this 
regulatory space are defined by a range of regulatory issues (such as safety), 
that are contested by different groups in the arena. In their empirical
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investigation of the pharmaceutical industry, the rules of inclusion and 
exclusion are set by large and complex organisations: big firms and regulatory 
agencies decide who is in and who is out of the regulatory space. The way 
these large organisations work (via administrative hierarchies applying 
standard operating procedures, or simply routine) defines the content of the 
regulatory space, while the same goes for the organisation and prioritisation of 
issues (of what is ‘regulatable’). The relation between large organisations is 
perceived to be key in understanding the shape of the regulatory space, and 
the characteristics of the organisations (such as cultural environment, 
resources available, standard operating procedures) define the conditions 
under which these organisations can enter the regulatory space and maintain 
their position.
The value of the regulatory space approach is not so much situated in the 
authors’ plea for an analysis of the dimensions of regulatory space by studying 
national regulatory settings and their specific political, legal and cultural 
attributes. Although my research is concerned with national differences in the 
regulation of tissue engineering products, the main goal is not to explain 
different styles and outputs, but rather the effects of national divergence in the 
context of EU policy shaping. The concept of exploring regulatory space is 
useful in identifying the role of large organisations (regulatory bodies at national 
and supranational level and the multinational industry) and their 
interdependence, plus the institutional setting in which regulatory space is 
organised. Also the definition of regulatory issues by the different competing 
groups proves useful in the case of tissue engineering, as also discussed under 
notions of boundary-work and the European Commission as boundary 
organisation.
Furthermore, the notion of a regulatory space has been conceptualised in 
alternative but overlapping terms. For example, the notion of the ‘agora’ has 
been coined in this respect (Nowotny et al. 2001), while also an ‘arena’ would 
refer to the politicised nature of interest representation in regulatory activity. 
Some authors refer to a ‘regulatory order’ in an attempt to describe the different 
interlinked regulations and laws that govern certain technologies (Faulkner et 
al, 2006) as an alternative to the term ‘regulatory regime’ which has been used
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for formal regulatory activity as a more rationally designed and systematic 
process.
Rhodes developed the idea of ‘policy networks’ for explaining variations in 
power distribution and dominant interests in networks (Rhodes 1997). 
According to this perspective, policy networks are important tools in public 
policy analysis as they give insight into the manner in which powerful 
individuals, located in the maze of public and private organisations that govern 
a policy domain, connect with each other (John 1999). Key features of policy 
networks are that they limit participation in the policy process, define the role of 
actors, decide which issues are included and excluded from the policy agenda, 
determine behaviour of actors by defining the rules of the game, privilege 
certain interests and substitute private government for public accountability 
(Rhodes 1997: 9-10). Simply put, policy networks reflect who rules, how, and in 
whose interest. This is a useful notion to depict the complex configurations of 
R&D and policy actors involved in domains of risk and regulation in tissue 
engineering, as also touched upon earlier in this section.
My understanding of notions of risk and regulation is thus informed by several 
concepts that define the boundaries of these domains, while also 
acknowledging the importance of different interest groups and their negotiated 
interactions over what counts as risk, and what shapes the context of regulation 
- although I prefer a less static and systematic approach to these concepts as 
found by many authors in this field. Mere ‘politics’ (or, as it happens, mandated 
bureaucracy) is not sufficient to engage with these themes though, and earlier 
in this chapter I have given insight into my understanding of the social 
dynamics in approaches to risk.
The next section contains my final empirical limitation, which concerns the 
notion of tissue engineering.
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3.2.4 Definitions in the construction of a technology
In order to define what is subject to control, a clear picture is needed of the 
scope of the domain under regulation. For tissue engineering this is 
problematic, as there are many different definitions and terms to refer to the 
technology, and the various technological aspects of tissue engineering show 
overlap with other existing treatments and therapies. Because of the fast 
developments in the field, with tissue engineering as such still emerging, 
definitions of the technology tend to be flexible and open to debate. Many more 
definitions of the technology exist than there are tissue engineered products 
currently on the market.
As previously described, boundary-work is one way of demarcating a 
professional domain. Early efforts in boundary-work become visible if we make 
an inventory of the range of definitions of the technology that have been coined 
since the early development of the field (see for more detail: Geesink 1998).18 
Some of these focus on the techno-scientific possibilities of regenerating 
human bodily functions (DG SANCO: SCMPMD 2001), while others point out 
the therapeutic promises and interdisciplinary character of the emerging sector 
(European Commission (EC) 2004).
For regulatory purposes the need has been expressed to produce a 
‘scientifically valid and legally sustainable definition’ of tissue engineering, 
because this provides the basis for demarcation between tissue engineered 
products on the one hand and adjacent categories such as medical devices, 
pharmaceutical products and cell therapy on the other (DG SANCO: SCMPMD 
2001: 2). Thus the lack of stable definitions of tissue engineering is relevant in 
the light of controlling the technology, as it draws the boundaries between
18 Tissue engineering as a technology was born long before it had a name. According to 
several reviewers, the debut of the term ‘tissue engineering’ can be traced back to a set of 
meetings organised by the US National Science Foundation (NSF) during the Spring of 1987, 
where tissue engineering was identified as emerging technology and funding priority. In a 
subsequent meeting on the topic, held 26-29 February 1988 in Lake Tahoe, California, the 
following definition was developed: “Tissue engineering is the application of principles and 
methods of engineering and life sciences toward fundamental understanding of structure- 
function relationships in normal and pathological mammalian tissues and the development of 
biological substitutes to restore, maintain, or improve tissue functions.” (Skalak and Fox, 1988). 
For a more elaborate account on the social-historical development of tissue engineering as a 
research field in the United States, including the early origins of the technology, see Viola et al 
(2003).
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techno-scientific domains. Determining the scope of tissue engineering is then 
of key importance in terms of the inclusion and exclusion of different facets of 
the technology in the regulatory domain, based on different or similar risks that 
can be associated with a particular application.
It has been argued that the absence of agreed terminology within the policy 
arena indicates both the discursive construction of these objects and their 
‘instability’ (Bijker et al. 1987; in Kent et al. 2006). The stabilisation of 
technological artefacts, according to this approach, is bound up with their 
adoption by relevant social groups as an acceptable solution to their problems 
(Pinch and Bijker 1987). Coming from a similar tradition of social construction 
of technology (see also MacKenzie and Wajcman 1999), an interesting account 
is provided by Adam Hedgecoe in his exploration of the way in which social 
explanations and commercial interest underpin the names of particular 
disciplines, in this case pharmacogenomics (2003). Hedgecoe argues how 
pharmacogenomics, as opposed to the term pharmacogenetics used 
previously, not just represents a research area, but can also be seen ‘as a 
rhetorical device used to gain support among policy makers and funders for 
particular research topics and technologies’ (Hedgecoe 2003: 513-14). In this 
way a future view or vision is created which leads to the production of new 
technologies, and to other developments such as regulatory changes and 
social attitudes (2003: 530-531). This analysis resembles efforts in the tissue 
engineering field to present the technology as ‘new and exciting’ enough to 
attract funding and special enough from adjacent technological domains to 
warrant specific regulatory controls, while at the same time demarcations take 
place where tissue engineering is singled out from more controversial 
applications in embryonic stem cell therapy. The details of these dynamics are 
discussed elsewhere in this thesis. The next paragraph contains a note on 
usage of my understanding of tissue engineering is this study.
Terminology
With this context in mind, for the purposes of this research I follow the 
European Commission in its definition of the term ‘tissue engineering’ as a field 
and ‘tissue engineered products’ for the (commercial) results of its scientific
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activities. With due notion of ongoing debate in this area (DG Enterprise 
2004a), tissue engineering means for now:
Any autologous or allogeneic product which: contains, consists of, or 
results in engineered human cells or tissues; and has properties for, or is 
presented as having properties for, the regeneration, repair or 
replacement of a human tissue or human cells, where the new tissue or 
the new cells, in whole or in part, are structurally and functionally 
analogous to the tissue or the cells that are being regenerated, repaired 
or replaced (DG Enterprise 2004b).
An important notion for regulatory purposes is the degree of manipulation of the 
tissues or cells, i.e. to determine whether tissue engineering applications are 
categorised as ‘basic’ cells or tissues or whether their degree of manipulation 
requires specific tissue engineering regulation. For this reason a definition is 
required of what ‘engineered’ means in this context:
Engineering means any process whereby cells and tissues removed 
from a human donor (source materials) are substantially manipulated, so 
that their normal physiological functions are affected (DG Enterprise 
2004b).
Finally of major relevance for regulatory control of tissue engineered products 
is the origin of the cells or tissues used. The following two definitions are 
adopted for the purposes of this thesis (DG Enterprise 2004b):
An autologous product is a product derived from cells and tissues 
removed from one person and used in or on the same person. An 
autograft is a tissue or an organ transplanted into a new position within 
or on the same individual.
An allogeneic product is a product derived from cells or tissues removed 
from one person and used in or on another person. An allograft or 
homograft is a tissue or an organ transplant between individuals of the 
same species, but genetically non-identical.
This distinction in cell sources is key to understanding risk and regulation 
regimes in tissue engineering. Interestingly in this respect is that xenogeneic 
products (of animal origin) are not explicitly defined by the European 
Commission in relation to tissue engineering. Initially the Commission 
considered these still in ‘the infant phase of development’ and because of the 
complex safety and ethical issues difficult to regulate in this early stage. 
Gradually this perception changed, as this research demonstrates.
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Summary
The first section of this chapter has focused on notions of risk and presented a 
classification of risk domains that structure and inform my analysis. In this 
section the second main theme of my research, regulation, was further 
explored. While chapter 2 has explained the policy context in order to 
understand the current regulatory efforts in tissue engineering regulation, this 
section has set the empirical focus and boundaries of my research. The 
relevant actors of my research were introduced, the time limits and 
geographical scope of my engagement with EU regulatory policy development, 
my understanding of the shaping of a regulatory regime for tissue engineering 
in this context, and finally my adoption of a definition of tissue engineering 
technology for this research. Discussed next are the methods used to inform 
my analysis.
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3.3 Methodological discussion
The previous sections focused on my understanding of risk and regulation as 
key themes in my research. In this section I demonstrate my methodological 
engagement with these themes, and review and reflect upon the research 
process and specific methods used to capture these data.
3.3.1 On projects and PhDs
My interest in tissue engineering dates back from early 1997, when I read an 
article in a Dutch opinion magazine about this new medical technology that 
promised to restore all kind of bodily functions and provide spare body parts ‘off 
the shelf. The culture-your-own approach was fascinating, especially to a 
sociologist looking for a suitable subject for her Master’s thesis in Science 
Studies. So tissue engineering it was. As part of my degree I interviewed 
scientists and clinicians to get an idea of their impression of this new 
developing field and about the interaction between lab and clinic. I spent some 
time at IsoTis, a tissue engineering company based in the Netherlands, which 
gave a useful insight into what was actually happening in these clean rooms, 
and how to present the technology to investors and ‘the public’.
A couple of years later, on 24 May 2002 to be more precise, I came across a 
vacancy for a position at Cardiff University to study regulation of tissue 
engineering products in the UK and EU. It all looked very interesting, especially 
to a sociologist looking for a suitable subject for her PhD thesis.
In the summer of 2002 I moved to Cardiff, to conduct research on a project 
called Tissue Engineering Regulation and Governance (TERG). This project 
was funded under the ESRC/MRC programme on Innovative Health 
Technologies (IHT), running from June 2002 till October 2004. I worked as a 
Research Associate on this project for two years, between September 2002 
and the end of August 2004.
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When I took on this role, it was agreed I could study for a PhD degree 
alongside the project, based on data gathered during the project. This gave the 
obvious advantage of being able to collect the majority of the data for my PhD 
during project time and on project resources. Because of the empirical overlap 
between the ESRC project and PhD, it is important to make a distinction 
between the work carried out by the project team, including myself, and the 
work more exclusively dedicated to my PhD thesis. In this chapter I present and 
clarify these differences, and explain how, when and where the empirical data 
in this thesis rely on those collected for the ESRC project, while maintaining an 
‘original contribution’ for the doctoral.
Before getting to the specific methodology used, the next section provides a 
reflexive account of the research process and my position as researcher in the 
field.
3.3.2 A note on the research process: the sociologist in science
Below I give a reflection on the research process, driven by considerations that 
qualitative research raises more than purely technical issues about data 
collection (Atkinson et al. 2003). Issues discussed include engagement with 
complex data and power and inequality relations in conducting interviews - 
which constitutes the heart of my fieldwork.
One issue that was prominent during the entire research process concerns the 
technical nature of the topic and data. Although earlier research had made me 
familiar with the ‘science’ behind tissue engineering, the amount and 
complexity of techno-scientific and clinical data was at times daunting. Even, or 
perhaps exactly in order to provide a socio-political analysis of tissue 
engineering, I had to know the basics. This meant updating my technical 
knowledge by consulting tissue engineering handbooks, scientific articles and 
online resources explaining the ins and outs of the technology. Especially 
during my interactions with scientists, but also with manufacturers and 
clinicians, I informed the respondent of my technical naivety. None of the 
interviewees seemed reluctant to meet my request for more explanation or 
elaboration.
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This position does have repercussions though for the ‘authority of the 
researcher’ and affects the kind of data and possibly their validity in a given 
context. As documented in several methodological studies about conducting 
fieldwork, the researcher is engaged in practical activities that are not neutral, 
nor result in ‘an unmediated representation of an independently truthful 
representation of the social world’ (Atkinson et al. 2003: 13).
Another aspect that affected the relationship and interactions with my ‘research 
subjects’ concerns my position as non-UK junior female researcher in a social 
science discipline. Most interviewees were senior professionals and male, and 
experts in their respective fields. In political terms this had the advantage there 
was no ‘competition’ or tension as generated from a power relation. This could 
lead to the conclusion that the interviewee is ‘in control’ of the situation, simply 
based on this unequal distribution of power from the outset (Gilbert 1993). 
Indeed, some respondents were not always or necessarily directly guided by 
the interviewer. Several interviewees, especially those familiar with 
communicating information outside their own field of expertise, had a story 
ready to be told, being less inclined to follow the order of topics suggested by 
the researcher (or, in rare occasions, the topics brought up at all). I like to think 
this is more a matter of dealing with experienced communicators than reflecting 
lack of control of the situation on behalf of the researcher. Also, even ‘losing 
control’ over my topic list has generally brought up interesting additional 
insights. Furthermore, it has been suggested that for ‘the perfect match’ 
between interviewer and interviewee it is not always meaningful to think in 
terms of similarity, and that ‘it may be easier to confide in a stranger, that 
female interviewers may be less threatening to both female and male 
respondents and that deference may encourage rather than inhibit response’ 
(Fielding 1993: 145).
But there were also other forces at play. For example the fact that English is 
not my mother tongue, while interviews were conducted in this language, 
meant on the positive note that I could use my language inability, sometimes as 
an excuse, to prompt the respondent to further clarification. Secondly the fact 
that a number of interviewees at EU level or on the continent did not speak
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English as their first language either was an advantage in terms of (in)equality; 
my impression is that these interviewees felt probably more at ease knowing 
that there was more than one person in the equation trying to express 
themselves in a foreign language. Which is not to suggest that language 
barriers were overall non-existent or not problematic. Especially with the phone 
interviews, where it is obviously harder to communicate non-verbal language, I 
felt I had to more strictly stick to the literal questions written out in the interview 
guide. Overall my impression is that the face-to-face interactions provided more 
rich material than telephone (or, for that matter, email) conversations.
These issues all more or less relate to general communication (strategies) 
during the interviews. It has been argued that two principles should inform 
interviews: the questioning should be as open-ended as possible to gain 
spontaneous information, and the questioning techniques should encourage 
the informant to communicate underlying attitudes and belief rather than trying 
to get away with easy answers. The idea, then, is to have an as frankly 
discussion as possible. But reality bites, and for centuries researchers have 
been warned for the effects the interviewer has on the respondent’s 
statements. It is acknowledged widely that respondents may attempt to 
rationalise their behaviour by trying to give logical answers rather than 
emotional reasons which may gain more insight. Also lack of awareness and 
lack of information have been reported. Over-politeness towards the interviewer 
is another issue which can hamper frank discussion, for example when 
respondents give answer they anticipate the interviewer wants to hear. Several 
suggestions have been made to alleviate these communication problems, 
many of which come down to putting the respondent at ease, and being 
experienced in the interviewing technique and familiar with your interview 
guides (Fielding 1993). These suggestions were only in so far helpful for my 
research, in that the most crucial and high-level interviews, for example those 
at the European Commission, were saved till last to benefit from the insights 
and experience gathered during earlier data collection and to feel more at ease 
with both the interviewing guides and overall process. This on the pragmatic 
level. As a more conceptual issue it is interesting to notice how much of the 
literature on ‘how to conduct a proper interview’ has a very technical 
understanding of what the interview procedure should look like. Much of the
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guidance is about controlling the process to maximise the flow of valid and 
reliable information. The simple assumption is that if the interviewer asks 
questions properly, the respondent will come up with the desired information. 
Without wanting to address a more philosophical discussion here of positivist 
versus constructivist realities in interviewing,19 or even general quests for the 
truth out there, this does connect to a related issue, namely validity and 
reliability of data.
The next section discusses my methods for data collection, followed by a 
section on data management and analysis.
3.3.3 Research methods: data collection
A preferred line in the social sciences is the use of triangulation: the application 
and combination of several research methodologies in the study of the same 
phenomenon. By combining multiple observers, theories, methods, and 
empirical materials, researchers attempt to overcome the weakness or intrinsic 
biases and the problems that come from single method, single-observer, 
single-theory studies. Stemming from work by Denzin (1970, 1978) and further 
described by many researchers (this account comes from Macdonald and 
Tipton (1993: 199)) there are four basic types of triangulation:
• Data triangulation, involving time, space, and persons. This means that 
data should be collected at different times, in changing locations and 
from a range of persons.
• Investigator triangulation, which consist of the use of multiple, rather 
than single observers in studying the same object
• Theory triangulation, which consists of using more than one theoretical 
scheme in the interpretation of the phenomenon to generate categories 
of analysis
• Methodological triangulation, which involves using more than one 
method and may consist of within-method or the more important 
between-method strategies.
Then there is this thing called ‘multiple triangulation’, when the researcher 
combines in one investigation multiple observers, theoretical perspectives, 
sources of data, and methodologies. My research is a modest attempt in this
19 A rather comprehensive account on this is provided by Miller and Glassner (in Atkinson, 
2003: chapter 5).
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direction. In terms of data collection the research for this thesis can broadly be 
characterised as a combination of documentary study and analysis, a small- 
scale postal survey, participation in field conferences and expert meetings, and 
extensive semi-structured interviews. What follows in the next few paragraphs 
is a more detailed account of the data collection methods, with a focus on the 
interviews as most dominant source of information.
3.3.3.1 Documents and databases
Out of the toolbox available to the qualitative researcher,20 interviewing was 
chosen as most appropriate technique to the specific research subject. This 
choice was mainly driven by the lack of sources available on social-scientific 
aspects of tissue engineering technology. The plus side of this observation is 
that my research adds to knowledge development in a domain not previously 
explored in any detail by social scientists. The drawback of my specific concern 
with issues of risk and regulation as guiding themes informing my analysis is 
the limited amount of documentary data in the public domain.21 For example 
risk assessment studies are scarce, and overall of a narrow techno-scientific 
nature. While the clinical and scientific literature on tissue engineering is 
abundant and growing,22 these sources only functioned to inform the research 
design and sampling before the interviews took place, and for further 
refinement and comparative analysis during and after this process of data 
collection. I kept record of all documents in an EndNote database, which also 
served as bibliographical tool for other literature.
20 This thesis mostly draws on accounts by Atkinson et al. (2003a); Coffey and Atkinson (1996); 
Crabtree and Miller (1992); Flick (1998); Gilbert (1993); and Silverman (1997).
21 The following documentary sources have been included: Clinical evaluation and technology 
assessment literature; Trade journals dealing with regulatory affairs (RAPS) and commercial 
magazines covering medical and biotechnology in Europe (MDT); Labelling information and 
protocols for existing products; Information about EU regulatory activity; Information about 
national regulatory activity across Europe and, to a lesser extent, in the US; Official publications 
of the Commission and EU legislation and policy documents; Limited media reports and 
comments in EU countries, on regulatory issues and new products; National and EU-level 
working papers and some risk assessment reports; Selected national government policy 
documents; and manufacturers’ annual reports and product advertising material.
22 For example a Medline search on ‘tissue engineering’ conducted in May 2006 brings up 6720  
records (of which 1400 reviews). In comparison, the same search terms for publications up till 
May 2000 results in 587 hits (including 194 reviews). To inform my research more specific 
searches were conducted. These included combinations of search terms: tissue, engineering, 
regeneration, repair, bio-organ, artificial organ; and/or combinations with specific clinical 
application areas such as skin, cartilage, bone, ACI, vascular; and/or combinations with specific 
product names.
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Documentary sources on regulatory policy in tissue engineering were equally 
limited (with the exception of online legislative databases as discussed below), 
reflecting the developing character of this endeavour. A small-scale postal 
survey was undertaken early on during the research, addressed at regulatory 
authorities in Europe, to get an impression of the variation in national regulatory 
policies and stances (TERG 2003). The results of this survey were fed into the 
interviews conducted subsequently.23
While my data chapters on risk are mainly based on interview material (as also 
discussed later), my analysis of regulatory policy was aided by a number of 
online sources. Websites starting with ‘europa.eu.int’ in the URL listed general 
background information on EU policy processes and structures, such as 
glossaries of key terms, bulletins and fact sheets, while specific unit websites 
(such as those of DG SANCO and DG Enterprise) provided keynote speeches, 
press releases and official legislative documents. Of most relevance was the 
OEIL Legislative Observatory of the European Parliament.24 This web tool 
allows one to track the legislative cycle of Directives and Regulations after the 
initial proposal by the European Commission has been adopted (which is at the 
same time its limitation, as only the ‘democratic’ part of the legislation is 
covered). EUR-Lex25 is a free-access service by the European Commission for 
legislative information, but only includes official full-text versions of legislative 
documents such as EU Treaties, proposed and adopted legislation and 
publications in the Official Journal of the European Community. Pre-Lex,26 also 
from the European Commission, is a good alternative for tracing progress in 
legislative initiatives. It is presented as tool for monitoring of the decision­
making process between institutions (European Commission, Council, 
Parliament) but again only contains official or final versions and mostly refers to 
other databases such as EUR-Lex. In addition to these legislative sources,
23 Altogether 38 questionnaires were distributed between November 2002 and March 2003 to 
regulatory authorities and experts in 17 countries: all EU Member States (pre-enlargement), 
plus Norway and Switzerland. 12 countries responded. The questionnaire consisted of 28 
questions; a combination of structured items, with little leeway in answering, and open-ended 
items. Most questions gave an opportunity for the respondents to make comments, which was 
useful for further exploration via other methods (documentary analysis, interviews etc). The 
most relevant results for my research included the information on national legislation and 
variation, products currently on the market and under clinical trial, future plans for regulation 
and possible involvement in EU regulatory activity.
24 See http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/index.jsp
25 See http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/
26 See http://prelex.europa.eu
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online press releases from EurActiv27 (‘EU news & policy positions’) were 
particularly interesting for the way in which the EU presents the ‘summary 
points’ of policy discussions to the public.
These sources can be considered ‘raw data’ informing my socio-political 
analysis of regulatory policy. In all their limitations (only official and final 
documents, purely legislative, often tedious and time-consuming to find your 
way through the databases) at least these sources were freely available with an 
online connection. Furthermore the European Documentation Centre, one of 
the Cardiff University libraries, has an extensive collection of publications on 
European policy, plus a password to an online database called ‘European 
Sources Online’. This added amongst others access to media coverage on 
European policy topics. For reasons of time-restraints and sanity I decided to 
not include any of these media sources, and focus on the material available 
from the interviews. These are discussed next.
3.3.3.2 Interviewing experts
Interviews constitute the core of my fieldwork, and my engagement with themes 
of risk and regulation draws heavily on these data. A total of 69 semi-structured 
interviews was conducted, 63 of which took place as part of the data collection 
for the ESRC project. These included expert interviews (see: Flick 1998: 91-92) 
with stakeholders and key informants involved in scientific, clinical, regulatory 
and commercial activity in tissue engineering.
The aim of the interviews was to find out the views and experiences of a 
diverse group of stakeholders in the tissue engineering field, mostly in Europe 
and at EU level, and to a lesser extent specifically focused on the UK. Initially 
six primary constituencies were identified: regulators, manufacturers, clinicians, 
scientists, consumers/patient groups, and EU advisory groups. Furthermore 
this sample aimed to reflect product types representing ‘adopted’ (skin systems 
and knee cartilage processes), ‘emerging’ (bone) or ‘experimental’ (e.g. 
vascular prostheses) positions. Also a good balance was sought in the different 
implications of ‘autologous’ and ‘allogeneic’ products or processes, which
27 See http://www.euractiv.com/en/
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seemed to be emerging as important in regulatory policy statements and in the 
identification of different levels of risk.
Topic lists and interview guides were developed, based on initial understanding 
of what was problematic and interesting about tissue engineering regulation, 
that were adjusted during the piloting phase of interviewing (one interview in 
each category). Most interviews took place face-to-face in the work 
environment of the interviewee, and some over the phone. The vast majority of 
these interviews was conducted between December 2002 and March 2004 for 
the first phase of data collection, while follow-up interviews and email 
exchanges were undertaken in 2005 specifically for the PhD research (see later 
under phase 2).
The tables below demonstrate the number of interviews (63) conducted under 
the ESCR project at UK and EU level per stakeholder category (table 1), the 
distribution over telephone and face-to-face contacts (table 2), and the 
geographical distribution (table 3).
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TABLE 1:
Overview UK and EU and total number of interviews, per category
Regulators 3 6 9
Manufacturers 3 11 14
Clinicians 6 6 12
Scientists 8 2 10
Consumers 5 0 5
EU advisory 0 9 9
Other 4 0 4
TOTAL 29 34 63
TABLE 2:
Distribution telephone interviews and face-to-face discussions:
Regulators 3 0 5 1 9
Manufacturers 3 0 6 5 14
Clinicians 5 1 4 2 12
Scientists 8 0 0 2 10
Consumers 4 1 0 0 5
EU advisory 0 0 7 2 9
Other 4 0 0 0 4
TOTAL 27 2 22 12 63
TABLE 3:
Distribution per country for UK and EU interviews
Austria 0
Belgium 1 2 1 1 5
Denmark 1 1
France 1 1 2 4
Germany 4 1 5
Italy 1 1 2
Luxembourg 1 1
Netherlands 1 2 2 5
Spain 1 1
Sweden 2 1 3
Switzerland 1 1
UK (EU)
i—
1 5 6
TOTAL 6 11 6 2 0 9 0 34
UK (UK) 3 3 6 8 5 0 4 29
TOTAL 9 14 12 10 7 9 4 63
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Response rates
Overall the response rate was high, although precise figures are difficult to 
estimate. A ‘long-list’ of names was created of potential interviewees per 
category, with some key figures but also many ‘reserves’. Names were added 
along the interview process, based on recommendations by interviewees and 
from documentary sources. Invitation letters were sent out to some 80 people. 
About 30 of these did not participate personally (out of time restraints, 
unwillingness, unavailability during data collection period of the project, illness 
and leave etc) but most people did pass the interview request on to colleagues 
in the organisation or other professionals in the field. In this way the response 
rate was only marginally affected, although in some cases it can be argued that 
the specific expertise or status of the respondent was not equalled. Especially 
EU officials and patient organisations were difficult to get involved, for different 
reasons. Also a large proportion of manufacturers did not respond to the 
request for interview, or found more or less valid excuses not to participate. 
Given this category was over-represented in the research sample, the absolute 
number of commercial providers participating was high.
Accountability and additional interviews
The interviews as described in this section were all conducted within the 
framework of the ESRC project. I was responsible for arranging most of the 
fieldwork (making appointments and organise travel), but the interviews were 
carried out by different team members, and some interviews (especially the 
pilot and EU level ones) were carried out by two members of the team. Below is 
an overview of the interviews that I conducted myself or together with another 
member of the team. Out of a total of 63 interviews, 34 were (co-)conducted by 
myself (IG).
Regulators 1 2 3 3 4 5 9
Manufacturers 2 1 6 5 8 6 14
Clinicians 2 4 6 0 8 4 12
Scientists 5 3 1 1 6 4 10
Consumers 2 3 0 0 2 3 5
EU advisory 0 0 5 4 5 4 9
Other 1 3 0 0 1 3 4
TOTAL 13 16 21 13 34 29 63
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Beyond the scope and timeframe of the ESRC project, additional interviews 
took place. This included a round of follow-up telephone conversations with two 
key informants at EU level, taking place over the course of 2005, mainly to get 
an update on regulatory developments in the field and more specific guidance 
on EU procedures. Also three commercial informants in the field were 
contacted again to keep abreast with regulatory developments, and one new 
one. The richest source of additional data collection took place during a 
stakeholders meeting in Brussels organised by trade association EuropaBio, as 
also discussed later (under phase 2).
Characteristics of interviewees
While it was helpful to make an initial classification of different stakeholder 
groups, it should be noted that this interview sample is affected by the 
observation that many respondents occupy different roles. The tissue 
engineering field is very interdisciplinary, and professionals move between 
different settings with different hats on. For example, scientists work in 
academic labs, in clinical settings and in industry, and regulatory affairs 
professionals in industry are often trained in the life sciences and/or have had 
previous careers in government agencies (or vice versa). Clinicians in this 
sample are based in hospitals and academic labs, but do not always practise 
as physician. Furthermore, many scientists have close links with industrial 
partners, if they are not heading university spin-offs themselves. The revolving 
door between academia, industry and government is a fast moving one.
This does have repercussions for the representation of these stakeholder 
groups, and makes a typology based on just professional background or 
affiliation problematic.
I have organised my interview quotes in a manner to reflect the professional 
background of respondents as accurate as possible and meaningful for the 
given context. The appendix gives a full list of descriptions and codes of my 
interviewees.
In terms of boundary objects, the interviewees in this sample have multiple 
memberships of many social worlds simultaneously. Interviewees occupy a 
number of roles and positions, associated with a variety of institutional and 
organisational settings in academia, science, government, and industry.
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Because of these hybrid careers and identities (Geesink 1998) these actors are 
able to translate and exchange their work and ambitions across different 
settings. In other words, these actors can be seen as ‘boundary people’ 
between the different social worlds of tissue engineering.
Unstructured interviews and participant observation
In addition to these semi-structured and previously arranged interviews, some 
unstructured interviewing took place as part of participant observation 
exercises and my attendance at expert meetings and fieldwork conferences. 
These included a regulatory affairs workshop during an industry-sponsored 
scientific conference,28 engagement in the local tissue engineering community 
via several meetings and annual conferences of the Cardiff Institute for Tissue 
Engineering and Repair (CITER), and attendance of an industrial stakeholders 
meeting in Brussels where the Commission presented the final proposal for a 
Regulation on tissue engineering products.29 In addition I had access to 
fieldwork data collected by my fellow-researchers of the ESRC project.30
Extensive field notes were produced based on observation and participation in 
these meetings and conferences, and documents collected in the form of 
speakers’ presentations, papers and associated materials. This generated a 
large and complex amount of data in relation to tissue engineering science, 
industry activities, regulatory issues, and ethical debates in the development of 
regulatory policy. In this way I had access to information that was not otherwise 
available; some of this was commercial or scientific information not in the public
28 Tissue Engineering Regulatory Affairs Workshop. Organiser Smith & Nephew, at Georgia 
Tech, Atlanta, USA, October 2002.
29 EuropaBio Industry Hearing: Tissue engineering and advanced therapies. Radisson SAS 
Brussels, 9 November 2005. In order to get access to this meeting without having to pay a 
substantial fee I agreed with the organisers to produce a written report of the meeting. I audio 
recorded and fully transcribed the presentations and discussions of this meeting, and provided 
a summary report which is published on the website of trade organisation EuropaBio: 
www.europabio.org/events/lndustryHearing/ REPORT% 20of% 20Hearing-051206.doc
30 European level sources included a Public Hearing on Quality and Safety of Human Tissues 
and Cells (European Parliament, January 2003, Brussels) and a multi-stakeholder meeting at 
the European Commission DG Enterprise to discuss proposed new Tissue Engineering 
Products/Approval Directive (Brussels, 16 April 2004). A national level source included: UK 
Medical Devices Agency Annual Stakeholders Meeting (October 2002, London). Conferences 
included: ‘Discussion Forum: Development and Regulation of Cell-based and related 
Therapies,’ organised by Regulatory Affairs Professional Society (March 2003, London); and 
T h e  Commercialisation of Tissue Engineering and Regenerative Medicine,’ organised by 
Marcus Evans Conferences, supported by the International Society for Cellular Therapy (April 
2003, London).
110
domain yet, but quite often these meetings were excellent opportunities for an 
analysis of stakeholders’ networks (who knows who), and for extending my own 
contacts database. Thus the more ‘hidden’ processes and relationships 
between actors in regulatory decision making were revealed by observation of 
the context in which they engage as part of their professional roles. This also 
informed the analysis of interviews and key documents, as discussed next.
3.3.4 Data management and analysis
All but two interviews were audio-recorded and verbatim transcribed. Because 
of the possibly sensitive issues coming up during the discussions, and to 
demonstrate awareness of ethical and legal implications of the research carried 
out, informed consent was sought from all participants.31 The transcripts were 
anonymised by replacing full names by abbreviations and date by a code (in 
the format of for example: S1-SMI 120303, for a scientist called Smith being 
interviewed on 12 March 2003). In this thesis only the prefix code and year of 
interview are used (S1, 2003) with a short description of the respondents 
background and affiliation.
The data analysis for this research is a combination of basic and ethnographic 
content analysis (Miller and Crabtree 1992: 17-23). A codebook was developed 
based on dominant pre-structured themes which were organised in different 
categories (including ‘families’ of codes). A specific analysis took place with an 
exclusive focus on themes for the PhD research, following a more intuitive and 
interpretative approach to the data. The coding frame developed for the ESRC 
project was refined and revised during the process of data collection, which 
enabled me to engage with ‘upcoming’ themes, also informed by theoretical 
perspectives and other data sources. For example one dominant theme 
emerging from the data concerned different perceptions of interviewees on risk, 
where I developed several ‘subcategories’ to capture this variety. On the other
31 In line with the ethical guidelines issued by the British Sociological Association (BSA, 2002) 
the consent form stated that interviewees: have received a copy of the information leaflet about 
the aims of the project; are willing to be interviewed for this research and for the interview to be 
tape recorded; understand that the interview is confidential and the data are anonymised; and 
finally that they understand that taking part in the research is voluntary and that they may 
withdraw at any time. Each interviewee is given assurances of anonymity and confidentiality, 
and they were told that the tapes are kept secure and would be destroyed after the project.
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hand not all project material was useful for my specific focus. For example I 
limited my data presentation of risk perceptions to R&D actors, thereby 
excluding such groups as consumer organisations, regulators and advisory 
groups (although their perceptions did inform my analysis).
Thus a specific code-book was designed to cover themes for the PhD 
research.32 These codes followed on the one hand a more ‘grounded’ 
approach, with a fair degree of ‘intuitive crystallisation’ as some would call it 
(Coffey and Atkinson 1996), and in an almost editing style of engaging with the 
text, while on the other hand a selection of pre-existing codes specifically 
targeted at my PhD research were part of this additional coding frame. In this 
way meaningful parts of the text could be identified that relate to the purpose of 
my study, but also ones with a ‘stand alone’ value that could be organised into 
categories and additional codes.
The coding procedure simplified and reduced the data and enabled segments 
(‘chunks’) of data to be easily retrieved, which helped my analysis and 
interpretation of the data for drawing conclusions. This data analysis mainly 
concerns the interview material, most notably the transcripts, and the field 
notes from observations and less structured interviews. Also the documents 
were analysed with a particular coding frame in mind, but in much less detail 
(for example there was no codebook for the documentary analysis) and without 
the aid of a computer programme for coding.
The interview transcripts where stored in an electronic database set up for the 
analysis. I used the software package Atlas-ti, which is designed to assist with 
management and analysis of qualitative data. Initial coding of the data was 
carried out in 2004, and more detailed coding and analysis took place over 
2005 and early 2006 to cover additional data collection and interpretation for 
the PhD. During the writing up of the research these codes, in electronic
32 Additional codes were developed for a more specific analysis for certain parts of the PhD. 
These focused on expertise and EU advise structures, comitology, more specific sub-codes for 
'risk' (scientific/technical, commercial, clinical risk; risk assessment; precaution, risk versus 
safety; etc), and codes that cover the more detailed analysis of EU regulatory procedures. To 
elicit the tensions between market and safety, also a subset of codes was created covering 
issues such as commercialisation, business climate, commodification, globalisation, and more 
extensive combinations of codes for interactions between specific key players, such as DG 
Enterprise and DG SANCO.
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format, proved useful as a first selection tool in analysis. As it turned out that 
many (combinations of) codes retrieved too much data - which reflects both the 
overall amount of data and the fact that codes were still too general - 1 
performed a ‘sub coding’ exercise on paper aided by highlighters and ballpoint.
3.3.5 Phase 2: follow-up data collection and analysis
This section summarises the distinction between ESRC and PhD focus. The 
majority of the empirical data on which this thesis draws are collected as part of 
my involvement in the ESRC project. Additional data collection consists of 
documentary research (amongst others in the European Documentation Centre 
and of several online legislation tracking tools) and 6 follow-up phone 
interviews with key informants. Also informal email exchanges gained 
additional insights and updates. Finally a significant source of fieldwork 
information was collected during my attendance at an industrial stakeholders 
meeting in Brussels, where the Commission presented the final proposal for the 
Enterprise Regulation on tissue engineering products. This meeting took place 
in November 2005, and marked my final data collection.
I audio recorded and fully transcribed the formal presentations and discussions 
during this meeting, and turned these into a report for the organising trade 
body, which published it on their website and disseminated to speakers 
(Geesink 2005). In addition I gained access to an expert meeting of industry 
representatives which took place before the formal presentations. This gave the 
opportunity to listen to the discussion of strategies, and to ask some questions. 
Most valuably it provided me with contacts that I followed up after the meeting 
over email and phone for clarification and updates.
This phase 2 research is based on a ‘grounded’ approach, where emerging 
themes from the existing data are further explored and linked to additional 
fieldwork. These additional empirical data and the analysis focus on issues of 
risk, regulation and expertise in policymaking on tissue engineering, which are 
interpreted from a conceptual concern with boundary drawing around these 
respective domains.
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In terms of ‘original contribution’ then, the chapters 4, 5 and 6 of this thesis on 
risk perceptions by R&D actors in tissue engineering are based on data 
collected during the ESRC project. This includes interviews with scientists, 
clinicians and manufactures involved in tissue engineering technology. Part of 
the analysis on risk perceptions of these actors is currently under review for 
publication in a social scientific journal. The last chapter of this risk part (7), 
where I analyse these data in terms of risk hierarchy and risk balance, is an 
additional contribution exclusively part of the PhD research.
The following chapters on regulatory policy development reflect more recent 
data collection and analysis, beyond the project. This part is a combination of 
interview data, partly collected during the ESRC project and followed up after 
my involvement in this project had finished, and of analysis of policy 
documents. Given the timeframe of data collection under the ESRC project, 
with most interviews conducted in 2003, the PhD research phase was a good 
opportunity for updating regulatory developments and adding new insights. 
Chapters 8, 9, 10 and 11 of this thesis reflect this additional data input.
In terms of conceptual framework and inspiration the research presented in this 
thesis follows an alternative route. My concern with boundary work and 
regulatory science is an exclusive focus of the PhD research. The PhD 
research goes beyond project work in that it links risk perceptions with 
regulatory discourses, where one of the main questions addressed is the extent 
to which risk frames translate into EU regulatory policy.
What is next
This chapter has explained my conceptual understanding of risk, the empirical 
focus of my study in relation to risk and regulation, and the methods used for 
my research. Discussed next are three main empirical chapters (4-6) on risk 
perceptions by interviewees, where I follow the structure of the risk 
classification outlined earlier. Chapter 7 draws these different risk domains 
together by analysing cross-cutting themes and reflecting on these risk 
perceptions. Key markers in this chapter lead into a discussion of the next part 
of this thesis, focusing on risk regulation (chapter 8 onwards).
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4 Technological risk
The last chapter outlined a tripartite model for the classification of risk 
perceptions by R&D actors in tissue engineering. This chapter discusses the 
first tier of this model: technological risk. This includes risk perceptions related 
to the creation of tissue engineered applications in the lab or manufacturing 
unit. The main boundary objects in this domain are biological materials that 
form the basis for processed tissue engineered products. R&D actors perform 
particular ways of boundary drawing around these materials, where notions of 
risk and safety are attached to particular cell sources and defined in terms of 
‘zero’ to low to high risk. These boundaries are not fixed, and remain open for 
negotiating and reconstruction. As demonstrated in later chapters, biological 
materials have a different function as boundary objects outside the techno- 
scientific domain.
4.1 A dominant frame of technological risk
One of the key issues of concern and controversy in tissue engineering relates 
to the quality and safety of products containing human tissue or cells. Asked 
about the risks associated with this technology in general, the first and foremost 
set of issues brought up in this sample of interviewees concerns risks related to 
the donation, processing and manufacturing of human tissues and cells. This 
refers to processes such as the sourcing of tissues and cells, their handling 
during production of a tissue engineered product, including the culturing in the 
laboratory, the preservation and storage of products and the logistical process 
on the way to final (re-) implantation into the patient. This category covers a 
broad and diverse range of concerns -  from transmitting infectious diseases to 
contamination and toxicity - which are here discussed under the heading of 
technological risk. The main concern here is with safety, and most risks as 
described in this category affect the patient, although some reference is made 
to exposure to risk of staff working in tissue engineering labs or in the clinic.
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What follows below is a selection of interview data with scientists, clinicians and 
manufacturers in tissue engineering R&D that demonstrate their view and 
perception on what I have labelled technological risk. The perceptions of risk as 
discussed in this section are organised under two general subheadings. In 
short, the first category looks at where the cells come from and what this 
implies for their further use, while the second one is about the engineering and 
processing of these cells, and what safety concerns are related to this process.
The first main heading concerns risks related to cell sourcing and handling, 
including disease transmission, contamination and infection. Disease 
transmission refers to the transmission of (infectious) diseases between 
humans (such as HIV and hepatitis), but also potential transgenic transfer and 
the introduction of novel human and animal viruses (zoonoses) into the human 
population. Contamination and infection of the tissues and cells can take place 
during the production and manufacturing process, and can include 
contamination of the source material.
A broad second category of concerns is related to the cell behaviour during the 
processing and manufacturing of tissue engineered constructs, and after 
implantation in the human body. This includes (immune) rejection by the body, 
but also problems with controlling the cell growth (unwanted cells, cell 
modification, uncontrolled cell proliferation and differentiation) to prevent 
tumour formation or other unwanted effects such as the ‘travelling’ of cells 
through the body to places where they can cause harm. Also the interplay 
between cells and their supporting materials, so-called cell-scaffold 
interactions, and bio-incompatibility are issues addressed under this heading. 
Furthermore there are concerns with the limited shelf-life of many of these 
products and both the quality and quantity of cells needed to be effective, so to 
produce a sufficient amount of quality living cells for transplantation into the 
patient (cell viability). Other factors include toxicity of processing materials, 
such as growth factors and antibiotics added during the culturing process and 
to support the cells during transport, and problems with the sterility and final 
testing of the product.
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For analytical purposes it is useful to discriminate between concerns related to 
cell sourcing and cell behaviour, and the data presented in this chapter are 
initially grouped around these subcategories. It is important to note though that 
interviewees have used an alternative set of criteria that cut through these 
categories, based on the starting material or types of cells and tissues used in 
the manufacturing of tissue engineered constructs, to express what they 
consider ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ risk. Thus risks are perceived different depending 
on the source material used. The distinction between autologous and 
allogeneic material is considered key in the eyes of these interviewees. The 
use of animal derived material is a category much more boxed out, with 
particular boundary negotiations taking place over the level or degree of risk.
4.2 Constructions of technological risk and safety
There are a huge number of issues. In terms of cells -  if you have a 
product with cells within them, there are issues about infection transfer, 
so you’re talking about donation and proof of that. Depending on the 
source of cells, for instance if it’s a xenograft type cell that you’re 
generating this cross species... There’s concern about tumour 
generation if you’re using stem or a cell that is highly proliferative. 
Concerns about migration of cells away from the site where they were 
due to act, so a cell that could be very good, if it was implanted into the 
brain could be damaging if it went to another part of the brain or it went 
to another part of the [body]... Rejection and immune responses to the 
cells... It would impose a course of immunosuppressive drugs on the 
patient for a long period of time... that’s about actually what does a cell 
do when it’s in the body, but then there’s a whole range of manufacture 
issues about how do you quality assure with a product based on living 
tissue. (Academic research scientist in tissue engineering lab S7, 2003)
4.2.1 On donors and diseases
Disease transmission is the most commonly perceived risk by interviewees in 
this sample. Most of them explain this in the first place as the transfer of 
infectious diseases between human donors, which applies to allogeneic tissue 
engineering applications. As the extract from a clinical scientist below 
demonstrates, these risks are considered similar to those of organ and blood- 
donors, while at the same time there is a strong suggestion that in the case of 
tissue engineering these risks can be ‘for life’ due to the permanent character 
of the implantation of cells into the body:
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Obviously if we’re going down donor cells then you have to think about 
infection risks from the donor, immuno-rejection and those sorts of 
issues. (...) I think we have to err on the side of caution and assume that 
an adult donor cell from another person has to be at least well matched 
in terms of HLA status, in terms of the sort of cell matching that goes on 
with blood donor and so on and I’m not sure that’s a risk we should be 
taking for chronic implantation. I mean we’re talking about people who 
may have these cells for years implanted in their bodies. (Academic 
research scientist in clinical care S4, 2003)
Thus many interviewees stress the need for donor screening and testing in 
order to control the transfer of infectious disease from donor to recipient and to 
prevent microbiological contamination associated with the sourcing of the 
tissue. In this way a particular subworld of technological risk is created, which 
makes these issues ‘controllable’ (see also later). The donation of tissue covers 
a broad area of safety concerns including the suitability of donors, the 
screening of donated substances, and the traceability from donor to patient and 
vice versa. At the moment, donors are usually screened on infectious diseases 
such as HIV, hepatitis B and C, and syphilis. One example of such extensive 
screening is the skin product Apligraf. Because this product is made from 
human neonatal foreskin tissue, the foreskin donor's mother needs to be tested 
for human viruses that can cause infectious diseases.33
However, this controllable domain is troubled by uncertain risk. Here the main 
concern is not just with the transfer of serious health-threatening but known and 
‘testable’ diseases, but also with introducing and spreading as yet unidentified 
diseases:
The problem which comes when you think about donor cells, is that you 
have to find the donors and then you must be sure that the donor, you 
know, is in good health and this is the big problem because we are 
always afraid, that maybe the donor can have something that we still do 
not know. You remember that when the AIDS virus, you know, come out, 
the HIV virus, you know, because it, nobody knew that this virus was 
present in some patients and maybe this is another, the problem to use 
donor cells. (Academic research scientist S-EU1, 2003)
33 Currently these tests include antibodies to human immunodeficiency virus type 1 and 2 (HIV- 
1 and HIV-2), human T-lymphotropic virus type 1 (HTLV-1, which is associated with leukaemia 
cancer), hepatitis C virus (HCV), hepatitis B surface antigen (HbsAg), and syphilis.
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Available tests are not always satisfactory, and new disease threats continue to 
appear -  with severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) being a specific 
example in place (Bronson 2003).
As also illustrated by this quote, tissue engineering is surrounded by 
uncertainty about both specific risks to take into consideration, and how to 
manage those risks. This relates to issues of disease transfer and donor 
screening, but also to for example cell behaviour after implantation of the cells:
With the allogeneic [donor] cell source there could be, and I guess the 
cells have to be screened, but there could always be risks of viral 
transfer, whether the cells will differentiate, de-differentiate back to 
something else, I don’t think we know. So I think there are risks and I 
don’t know whether the potential of those risks is being evaluated 
because of the time scale involved.
(Academic research scientist in UK tissue engineering lab S1, 2003)
This remark covers concerns with cell sourcing and cell behaviour during the 
processing of tissue engineered constructs, and after implantation in the human 
body. Differentiation of the cells refers to a process where cells, in their natural 
environment, develop into certain structures (for example cartilage cells or 
neurons). All cells other than stem cells are differentiated and have specific 
specialised functions in the body. During the culturing process the cells age, 
and often lose their specific characteristics (dedifferentiation), which makes it 
hard to maintain the differentiated phenotype. As another scientist explains, 
one of the main techno-scientific concerns is making sure that the cultured cells 
keep their specific beneficial functions:
Maintaining the specialised functions, called differentiation, after the 
cells have been cultured, is a formidable requirement for tissue 
engineering constructs. That the cells in culture tend almost universally 
to lose some of the characteristics of the in vivo environment because 
they do not have all of the cells signalling the environment around them 
and they don’t have the same nutrient environment that the living cells, 
the in vivo cells, do. Because the patient own cells that have a certain 
characteristic inside the patient, lose those characteristics outside the 
patient. That is one of the reasons that there are very few successful 
tissue engineering products available now.
(Academic research scientist in UK S6, 2003)
Thus this remark is about controlling the cell growth and cell behaviour in order 
to prevent the creation of unwanted cells and cell modification, or uncontrolled
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cell proliferation and differentiation that can lead to tumour formation or other 
unwanted effects such as the ‘travelling’ of cells through the body to places 
where they do not belong. At the same time, this narrow scientific frame refers 
to the possibility to produce a sufficient amount of quality living cells for 
transplantation into the patient (cell viability) to be effective. Sometimes the 
quality and quantity of living cells is so poor, that they do not have any 
therapeutic effect at all (discussed more fully in the next chapter).
4.2.2 Quality and safety controls
Many interviewees have stressed the need for donor screening and testing in 
order to control the transfer of infectious disease from donor to recipient, which 
could affect the individual patient or the population at large. Although 
uncertainty exists about specific safety factors in relation to donation, screening 
and testing, especially amongst manufacturers an optimistic scenario exists 
about the ability to control these risks:
Well the risk is just, well if you’re doing tissue engineering and cellular 
work you have to make sure like in terms of infection, that kind of thing, 
so you’re not transferring to patients, or other cellular work not getting 
mixed up, maybe putting the patient wrong. You control those matters. 
(Academic research scientist in UK hospital S8, 2003)
This is quite simple, the risk I can just tell you from our products. The 
risk with our products is really minimal because due to the qualitatively 
high production standards there is nearly no risk of any infection, any 
cross-contamination. There is no risk because there is nothing that is 
infected, unclean, whatever is used on our production site. No risk here. 
(European manufacturer M-EU3, 2003)
As also hinted at by the last respondent, disease transfer or infection is not 
always caused by the source material used (in this case the donor of the 
tissues or cells) and safety checks are also critical during the process of 
production and storage of the cells:
Well tissues should be screened for HIV and Hepatitis and should 
obviously be stored well, bagged up and away from any material that 
might be put into patients.
(Academic research scientist in UK tissue engineering lab S1, 2003)
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Donor cells and tissues that are used to produce tissue engineered products 
are usually stored in tissue banks or master cell banks. These banks have to 
be screened as well for human and animal viruses, retroviruses, bacteria, fungi 
et cetera to make sure no contamination takes place during the production 
process. This is needed from a patient safety point of view, but also to protect 
personnel working in the laboratory handling and processing the cells. Thus 
these respondents rely on a frame constituting a controlled environment with 
standard operating procedures and quality systems as an important measure to 
prevent process-related contamination and to help ensure product safety and 
quality.
Thus a second technological risk frame is related to cell and product behaviour 
during the processing and manufacturing phase. This can include so called 
cell-scaffold interactions and issues of bio-incompatibility, but also for example 
making sure that processing materials (such as growth factors and antibiotics) 
used during the culturing process are not toxic. Tissue engineering products 
can consist of a combination of living cells, natural or synthetic materials and 
biomolecules. Because of the combination of different components, the 
identification of hazards is considered to be more complex for these products. 
Here not only the final product should be taken into account, but also the 
different components - cells, materials, molecules - of it, and their interaction 
(Tienhoven et al. 2001).
The following clinician sums up the issues as follows:
I don’t suppose you can maintain sterility with a living product, but as 
clean as is possible from the point of view of having any [contamination] 
within them... something which will not be damaging to the tissue itself... 
you have to be sure that you are not just supplying dead tissue. ... to be 
able to prove that a certain quantity of the tissue will have survived... it’s 
usually a freeze process and a de-frost process to give you some viable 
tissue there so that they are going to be efficacious. ... obviously the 
production things sort of maintaining the purity of the cell culture and, 
you know, being sure that you’re not introducing cells that are 
themselves abnormal. And then proving that you will get a quantity of 
living cells from that and that you’re not producing, providing something 
that has been contaminated on the way from the manufacturer to the 
clinician.
(UK clinician in wound healing Co2, 2003)
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One specific concern for these products, as also described in more detail by 
the scientist below, is the sterilisation of tissue engineered products. Whereas 
for some other implant materials sterilisation is maintained during the whole 
manufacturing process, for living biological constructs such as tissue 
engineered products this is problematic, because the sterilisation processes will 
kill the human cells:
Another problem... is the need to obtain and maintain sterilisation 
throughout the whole pathway or at some point. The process that is 
typically used to sterilise implant materials will kill the cells that are 
present in the scaffold... Almost a restriction imposed right from the very 
beginning that the scaffolds going into a tissue engineering production 
must go into the cell stage as sterile products; then sterility maintains 
throughout all of the subsequent handling, seeding, growth, proliferation, 
differentiation, storage, transport, handling and implantation. So that’s a 
sequence of probably ten different steps. It is not known at the present 
time how to make all the steps in sterile conditions at low cost. 
(Academic research scientist in UK centre tissue engineering S6, 2003)
So far the technological risks associated with tissue engineering products, 
according to these interviewees, range from infectious disease transfer and 
infection to biocompatibility issues such as immuno-rejection, toxicity, 
uncontrolled cell proliferation and differentiation, while also quality and safety 
concerns during the manufacturing and final product testing stage have been 
expressed. Some of these risks are almost exclusively related to the use of 
donor material in tissue engineered constructs, with the potential to affect the 
larger population. This also has implications for testing and risk management 
strategies:
If allogeneic cells are enormously expanded in number and if it is the 
intention that the cells are used in many recipients, then the 
microbiological testing should reflect the increased size of the population 
at risk. Whilst cells are in culture, there is the opportunity for 
microbiological contamination and also for expansion of microbiological 
agents. When cells are cultured in vitro, the relevant processes must be 
monitored. This should include the demonstration of lack of malignant 
transformation and that the relevant biological properties of the cells are 
maintained. In the case of tissue engineering, these principles also apply 
including in any commercial environment. (Warwick and Kearney 2002: 
381-2)
Allogeneic and autologous cell sources, and the distinction between the two, 
serve as important boundary objects for the ways in which interviewees attach
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value and weight to particular risks. Furthermore, another main technological 
and social concern that features largely in these accounts relates to the effects 
of including animal-derived material in tissue engineered products. In terms of 
disease transfer, this concerns risk of transmission between human donors, but 
also between human and non-human populations (transgenic) and potentially 
over generations. As part of what is later referred to as the ‘risk hierarchy’, 
interviewees construct and reconstruct the level of risk in terms of cell source.
4.3 Reconstructing risk depending on cell source
As discussed so far, specific but also not always ‘known’ risks are connected to 
the sourcing of cells and tissues, their handling during production of tissue 
engineered products, the preservation or storage of the product, and the 
implantation process -  issues which are framed in techno-scientific terms by 
these interviewees. This section demonstrates how interviewees make a 
distinction and ranking between different cell sources in their constructions of 
risk, where the perceived level of risk also dictates their acceptability.
4.3.1 Autologous versus allogeneic applications
The distinction between the use of autologous and allogeneic cells is important 
in interviewees’ perceptions of risk. In relation to autologous material, there are 
two interesting and interrelated risk frames: one of them is based on the 
assumption that the technology of culturing patient-own cells is simple and 
straightforward, or ‘not rocket science’ as one interviewee put it (M-EU9, 2003). 
As such the technology is considered uncontroversial, and moreover there are 
no risks involved. The other frame compares autologous treatments to those 
based on allogeneic cell sources, arguing how the former are less risky. The 
fragments below illustrate this.
One clinician calls upon a broader framework by making a comparison with 
more controversial but also much more complex biotechnologies:
I don’t think it’s like using genetic manipulation on the food we eat or 
whatever, you’re just taking the patient’s own cells.
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(UK clinician working in orthopaedics CI2, 2003)
A clinical scientist working on the culturing of autologous skin cells for diabetic 
ulcers explains the simple and routine nature of the technology as follows:
All we are doing is poking at the cells in the lab and then pulling them 
back on the wound bed - week in, week out.
(Academic research scientist in clinical setting S5, 2003)
As also the following research scientist explains, this is pretty straightforward in 
comparison to donor cells:
The only thing you’re doing is taking patients’ cells out, growing a few 
more and putting them back in. I think that’s very different from a patient 
coming along and being given a product which has got somebody else’s 
cells in it or another source of cells.
(Academic research scientist in UK tissue engineering lab S1, 2003)
This interviewee continues to argue that this also implies the ‘less likely’ risks 
associated with autologous treatments, because of the level of risk involved 
(individual versus a collective/public health risk frame):
I think we have to be careful that we divide this into the use of a patient’s 
own cells that get put back into the patient’s own body, as opposed to 
the use of some kind of third party, universal [stem cell] that could be 
used to treat a huge population of patients. Now my own feeling is that 
we’re going to see advances in tissue engineering for patients by using 
the autologous cell routes, using a patients’ own cell treating 
somewhere, putting them back into their body and there, I think, the risks 
probably are less likely than with the other [allogeneic] route because we 
just don’t, because we just don’t know.
(Academic research scientist in UK tissue engineering lab S1, 2003)
The following manufacturer has a similar understanding of the ‘inherently safer’ 
nature of autologous applications:
I think it would generally be seen that autologous tissue would be 
inherently safer because it’s come from the patients themselves and the 
patient is getting their own tissue back. So there’s not the potential risk 
of introducing something from a source of tissue elsewhere.
(Scientific manager corporate product safety assurance for multinational 
company M2, 2003)
The following scientist, at an academic tissue engineering lab, goes further and 
speaks of ‘no risk’, even in the case of infectious diseases being present in the 
tissues or cells:
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I would say that our strategy was the use of the cells of the same 
patients, so we do not have risks... so even in some case we are also 
using the cells of the people who have infected diseases like, you know, 
hepatitis. By using the same cells of the patients you are, you know, in 
the best situation because you have to return to the patient, his own 
cells, so without any problems.
(Academic research scientist in connective tissue research S-EU1,
2003)
Possibly the most extreme perception comes from this scientist who speaks of 
‘zero risk’ in relation to possible contamination in the case of autologous 
treatment, but a ‘very difficult’ issue when it concerns donor cells:
Now we're talking about cell sourcing and the cells which is something 
else, which is much more important. If you take cells from a patient and 
you're talking about cell therapy, it's easy to implant back and the risk of 
viral contamination is zero, at least. The patient has no infection from the 
beginning. If you start taking cells from one patient to another, then it’s a 
completely different story. This is difficult, very difficult.
(Academic research scientist S-EU2, 2004)
Thus there is a strong understanding amongst interviewees that autologous 
cells do not pose any risks, or that the risks are marginal compared to 
allogeneic applications - when it comes to transferring infection and disease, 
but also for example in terms of immune rejection by the body. As such 
autologous sources are part of a ‘safety frame’ which is presented as 
unproblematic. But as underlined by the following scientist, also autologous 
cells undergo an often complex trajectory of processing and handling, from the 
moment the cells are sampled from the patient to the culturing and 
multiplication in the lab to transport and logistics on the way back to the 
clinician for final re-implantation in the patient. According to the scientist below, 
the extensive handling of cells is ‘always a risk’ irrespective of the cell source:
You might say the least risk might be in almost like autologous taking 
cells and minimally handling them and putting them back in... So, you 
might envisage that being the least risk. And probably not without risk as 
things are handled and that’s maybe always a risk.
(Academic research scientist in UK tissue engineering centre S3, 2003)
Also autologous tissues and cells require careful handling to minimise risk of 
infection (also to lab personnel) or contamination. Furthermore, a specific risk 
in the case of handling autologous applications, where cells from one patient
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have to be returned to that same patient, is the ‘mixing up’ of cell samples and 
re-implantation in the wrong patient.
Well this is one of the reasons why we decided to work with autologous 
tissues only, so basically there is no risk. No risk in terms of disease 
transmission, HIV, hepatitis, and so on so on. So from this point of view 
there is no risk and we never had a case. There is maybe one risk, if for 
example, if we would exchange the cells in our production and send the 
wrong cells to the wrong patient for example, you understand? 
(European manufacturer of autologous applications M-EU10, 2003)
As this extract demonstrates, the ‘choice’ for a particular engineering route -  
again with the understanding of autologous being safer - also has commercial 
implications, with the underlying liability issues that could be associated with ‘a 
case’ where products pose safety threats. At the same time emphasis is placed 
on working under controlled conditions in the labs and manufacturing units to 
avoid mixing up cells and to ensure general quality and safety of the products 
before implantation. Thus quality control and standards such as Good 
Laboratory Practice (GLP) and Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) are 
important tools in protecting public and occupational health. As this scientist 
demonstrates, safety measures are strict:
When we culture cells from the patient to go back on the [same] patient, 
we deliberately do not test whether they are HIV positive or negative.
We have thought this through. We treat every sample that we get from 
the patient as though it was HIV infected. So from the operating point of 
view we assume the worst.
(Academic research scientist in clinical setting S5, 2003)
But as this scientist continues to argue, the current production of tissue 
engineered constructs takes place on a small scale, where cells of only a 
limited number of patients are being cultured at a time. This would mean that 
for example the chances of mixing up human cells would be ‘almost negligible’:
Part of it is logistics. We are not culturing for many patients at one time. 
So we have not got vast numbers. The other is we segregate as far as 
we are able in terms of space. Now I know the standard to which I would 
like to be working, and I know the standard that we are currently working 
at. I would like to be able to say that we only ever handle one lot of cells 
in the hood at one time. I would love to have more space and more 
hoods and to be able to segregate things further than we do. But we 
make sure that we only have one operator handling one set of cells, 
from one patient, at one time. And then it’s a case really of maintaining a 
trail of labelling that goes all the way through.
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(Academic research scientist in clinical setting S5, 2003)
As the manufacturer below explains, the small production scale of many 
providers, where the handling of tissues and cells is limited in location and time, 
also has implications for what can be produced within the safety margins. In 
this case precaution is pushed to the point where patients may be denied 
treatment in case of an infection:
If we get the cells into our laboratory we go first through the quality 
control, which means there are several tests first before we start 
manufacturing or culturing these tissues. So one of the tests for example 
is a test on the hepatitis or HIV and so on so on; so if the test is positive 
then we do not produce. We could produce but we would have to set up 
an extra laboratory to be a hundred percent sure that there is no risk of 
transmission because right now these cultures are made in the same 
laboratory. So this is the only risk, but we limit it because we say: if there 
is HIV or hepatitis or other transmission diseases we do not produce.
We inform the patient, we inform the doctor and so we do not even start. 
(Director of European company producing autologous tissue engineering 
applications M-EU10, 2003)
Here the initial processing and manipulation process in the lab is not seen as 
overly problematic for autologous applications. More weight is attached to 
proper manufacturing processes and quality systems to control the facilities 
and to make sure there is some tracking or labelling system in place which 
prevents cells and patients getting mixed up. Furthermore, as has been 
demonstrated throughout this section, there is an important technological risk 
discourse based on the level of risk and safety. Autologous applications, 
because of their individual and customised nature, are considered to affect 
‘just’ the respective patient receiving the treatment, and quality control systems 
have a main function in protecting staff in laboratories and manufacturing units 
dealing with these tissues and cells. This brings us back to the distinction 
outlined at the beginning of this section, about the relative safety of autologous 
applications over allogeneic products. It has been argued that these different 
engineering routes should be covered by different risk assessment strategies. 
With disease transfer being the main concern, the interviewee below explains 
how the risks of allogeneic products would have a larger health impact -  
transcending the level of the individual patient and potentially posing public 
health threats:
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One of the most important points is a clear evaluation of the different 
risks involved in autologous versus allogeneic. They cannot be 
considered products with the same class of risks... Allogeneic products 
must be controlled very carefully because you are able to infect many, 
many people.
(Quality controller in multinational tissue engineering company M-EU3,
2004)
So risk frames include a certain level of risk, where risk has been individualised 
for autologous tissue engineering applications, and a comparative risk factor, 
where autologous tissue is thought to be less risky than allogeneic products. 
With donor products being considered problematic in terms of their potential for 
virus transfer, infection and rejection of the cells -  which their autologous 
counterparts are thought to stay clear off -  the safety impacts take place on a 
much larger scale. But as also demonstrated in this section, the extensive 
handling of these cells can produce hazards for individual patients (e.g. 
implantation in the wrong patient) and staff alike (e.g. biohazards; 
contamination and infection during handling). However, when looking closer at 
the actual culturing and engineering process of autologous cells, a much more 
problematic scenario arises.
4.3.2 The inclusion of animal derived material
The preceding section has focused on the relatively unproblematic nature of 
autologous applications, in the eyes of most interviewees. The demarcation 
between different cell sources is driven by perceptions of differing degrees of 
risk. This section questions these boundaries by analysing the more complex 
process of culturing cells for constructing tissue engineered products of both 
autologous and allogeneic origin.
After a cell sample is taken from the patient (via biopsy), the cells are 
manipulated as part of the culturing process in the laboratory, before 
implantation back into the same patient. One concern refers to the culture 
media used to grow and differentiate the cells (so called in vitro cell 
proliferation). Several substances are added to the culture medium, including 
growth factors to stimulate cell growth, antibiotics against infection, and foetal 
calf serum to support cell growth. It has been documented how residues from 
these components or contaminations, like endotoxins, could remain associated
128
with cells and ‘could induce an unwanted immunogenic or toxic response after 
implantation’ (Tienhoven et al. 2001: 14).
A product example can demonstrate the underlying safety issues and 
implications for patients. Epicel is a tissue engineered skin product which was 
developed by Genzyme Tissue Repair (USA) and first introduced in the market 
in 1987 as a permanent skin replacement for patients with severe burns. Epicel 
is a so-called cultured epidermal autograft: grown from a patient's own skin 
cells. The cells are harvested via a biopsy of healthy skin and in a good two 
weeks enough skin is cultured to cover a patient's entire body surface. The 
sheets of tissue are attached to a dressing material for easier use by the burns 
surgeon. Over 700 patients have been treated with Epicel, and the product is 
marketed in the US, France and Greece and has been used in other European 
countries, Japan, and Canada (Genzyme 2002).
But the product comes with a safety warning:
Important Safety Information
Epicel is contraindicated in patients with known hypersensitivity to agents used in the 
manufacture of Epicel. Epicel should not be used in patients with a known history of 
anaphylaxis to vancomycin or amikacin. Epicel is cultured in media containing 
vancomycin and amikacin. Trace quantities of these antibiotics may adhere to the 
Epicel autograft.
Epicel should not be used in patients with known sensitivities to materials of bovine 
origin. The cell culture medium used in the culture of Epicel contains bovine serum. 
The medium used to package and transport Epicel does not contain serum; however, 
trace quantities of bovine derived proteins may be present. This tissue is intended for 
autologous use and has not been tested for biohazards. Health care providers should 
handle this product as if infectious agents are present.
During the Epicel manufacturing, patient's cells are co-cultured with mouse cells. 
Although the mouse cells have been tested and found to be free of bacteria, fungi and 
virus, an infection can not be excluded. As a safety measure, the Epicel treated 
patients are precluded from donation of blood or blood parts, tissue, breast milk, egg, 
sperm, or other body parts for use in humans.
Source: Genzym e Epical website (2006)
The cell culture medium used in the culture of Epicel contains bovine serum, 
while during manufacturing patients’ cells are co-cultured with mouse cells 
(murine 3T3 cell feeder layer) to support the growth. The company’s safety 
information leaflet issues contraindications for patients who are allergic to
129
material of bovine origin, and also those with sensitivities to the antibiotics used 
in the culture. Although the mouse cells have been tested, an infection can not 
be excluded, and patients are precluded from donation.
Several other tissue engineered products make use of bovine serum for their 
cell culture or production process, or of other xenogeneic materials. These 
materials can be classified in different categories: those that include 
components that are extracted from xenogeneic tissues, animal serum to use 
as cell growth supplement and animal cells (Warwick and Kearney 2002). An 
example of an animal extract is bovine collagen that is used in a variety of 
tissue engineered products including several skin replacements for burns and 
plastic surgery. Also porcine (pig) dermal collagen is used. For example 
TransCyte, developed by US company Advanced Tissue Sciences (ATS) for 
burn patients is produced from dermal cells isolated from newborn foreskins 
that are seeded in a polymer scaffold, which is coated with porcine dermal 
collagen and cultured with the use of bovine serum. Because of the use of 
animal material during the manufacturing process, the product comes with the 
following precaution:
TransCyte is contraindicated in those patients with known 
hypersensitivity to porcine dermal collagen or bovine serum 
albumin. TransCyte may contain trace amounts of animal proteins due to 
exposure in the manufacturing process and the pre-coating of the nylon 
mesh with porcine dermal collagen (Smith&Nephew 2005).
In terms of animal serum, foetal calf serum is the most commonly used 
supplement that is added to the culture medium, although also normal calf 
serum and serum from other animals such as horses is used. In tissue 
engineering this serum has been used for several decades by laboratories and 
commercial developers, and for a wide variety of applications, including the cell 
culturing for skin supplements for burns and diabetic ulcers (e.g. Apligraf, 
Dermagraft, TransCyte) and for autologous cartilage repair applications (e.g. 
Carticel). For some time, before foetal calf serum came in widespread use in 
the 1980s, so called bovine pituitary extract was added to cell cultures (typically 
for skin cells) as an alternative growth supplement. This extract can be sourced 
from the bovine pituitary gland, which is based in the lower part of the brain and 
which produces (growth) hormones. In an attempt to remove the xenogeneic
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elements from the cell culture, many laboratories culture their skin grafts in a 
medium without serum towards the end of the processing stage, ‘but the 
efficacy of this step is not clear’ (Warwick and Kearney 2002: 387). Several 
developers of tissue engineered products that include bovine serum in their 
culture media have issued claims that traces of the serum can stay behind in 
the final product. As one commercial developer of autologous cartilage cells 
explains:
Now although those bovine materials are washed from the 
manufacturing process before shipping there is always a minute 
potential that you could end up with trace amounts of bovine material or 
bovine serum out of that material in your final product.
(Regulatory affairs professional in multinational industry M-EU9, 2003)
A safety warning that comes with these products is related to the exclusive 
autologous use. One manufacturer points out that because of this customised 
treatment, patients are ‘not routinely tested for transmissible infectious 
diseases’, which poses potential risks to the healthcare provider handling the 
cells and product (Genzyme 2004)
Finally, animal cells can be part of the cell culturing process for tissue 
engineered products, most notably with human skin cells (keratinocytes) such 
as discussed above with Epicel. These are typically needed to form a layer of 
feeder cells, and the most commonly used source are so called mouse 3T3 
fibroblasts. Before implantation in the human body, these cells undergo a 
process of irradiation or they are treated with antibiotic agents (such as 
Mitomycin C) to prevent tumour formation due to uncontrolled cell proliferation 
-  although, again, there is no guarantee that this is successful.
Although debatable in how far xeno-constructs are part of the definition of 
tissue engineering technology (we return to this discussion later), based on 
their material composition some of these products can be classified as 
xenotransplants (Brown et al. 2006).
Thus several safety concerns are associated with the inclusion of animal 
derived material in tissue engineering applications, irrespective of the cell 
sources used as starting material. Many autologous skin and cartilage products
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consist of some xenogeneic element. So far these applications have been 
considered in terms of individualised risk (for the patient), and many developers 
of these products have pointed out the potential risk of hypersensitivity and 
allergy to bovine components (or of the antibiotics used during cell culturing). 
But as the product examples demonstrate, in addition to potential rejection and 
other immune responses or side effects that affect the patient, there is a 
broader concern with biohazards, infection and disease transmission, with the 
potential introduction of novel viruses (zoonoses) in the human population -  
one of the reasons for excluding these patients from the donation pool. This 
concern transcends the level of the individual patient. Furthermore, and 
interestingly, many of these concerns are framed in narrow scientific terms, 
where close boundaries are maintained around the techno-scientific domain. 
But one of the major drawbacks of using animal-derived material lies in the 
potential of introducing (unknown) infectious agents such as viruses and 
mycoplasma in the human population. These developments are set in a context 
of growing public concern and controversy, with the BSE crisis being one 
example that has affected both the scientific and commercial development of 
tissue engineering technology.
As the following interviewee from a UK tissue engineering lab explains:
So safety issues are that bovine material might pass on bovine 
spongiform encephalopathy (BSE). Depending where you get your 
material from, so some people culture in media that contains bovine 
pituitary extract which I find totally and utterly unacceptable. We use it 
experimentally but never clinically. All of us culture using foetal calf 
serum which is bovine which we currently source usually from New 
Zealand. The culture groups, we all feel OK-ish about that. We don’t feel 
totally confident about that because we are aware of the sleight of hand 
that can happen with paperwork. Commercially we pay about four to five 
times the price if we buy a bottle of serum from New Zealand than if we 
get whatever’s cheapest from the UK or whatever. What we are actually 
paying for is the piece of paper saying that it came from New Zealand 
from a herd that is never known to have had BSE.
(Academic research scientist in clinical setting for wound healing S5, 
2003)
Since the BSE outbreak limitations are set on the purchase of bovine serum to 
‘BSE free’ places such as Canada, New Zealand, Australia and, originally, also 
the USA. As this scientist continues, both scientists and regulators are
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concerned about the use of these animal derived materials in the cell culturing 
process, but not to the same degree:
Another driver for innovation is the regulatory issues concerning use of 
mouse fibroblasts in the culture of cells and the safety issue with the 
respect of using bovine products in tissue engineering. Now I guess, I 
guess the bovine products has been an issue... for a while. It is 
something that we are very concerned about and we are very keen to 
develop a methodology that doesn’t use any bovine materials... 
Personally I’m more concerned about using bovine products than about 
using mouse fibroblast as a feeder layer. But the regulatory authority are 
more concerned about - this is where things get more crazy - the [UK] 
Xenotransplantation Authority are very concerned with our groups using 
mouse fibroblasts, but when I ask them ‘aren’t you concerned about 
bovine material?’, they say that’s not part of our remit because the cells 
are not alive. At which point you put your head in your hands and cry. 
(Academic research scientist in clinical setting for wound healing S5, 
2003)
Several cell culturing groups in universities and the commercial sector are 
working on alternatives to the use of bovine extracts and serum. One option 
being explored is using ‘serum free’ culture media, to take patient own cells 
(skin cells such as fibroblasts) as a substitute for the serum. The performance 
and clinical effectiveness of this medium is not yet up to standard though, as 
the quality and stability varies. Furthermore there are logistical and social 
issues connected to using patient own cells for the serum; one is that a deeper 
biopsy has to be taken, implying more discomfort for the patient, and two that 
the culturing process takes longer than usual and is more unpredictable. This 
complicates the logistical process of these living cells, which after culturing 
have to be shipped or otherwise transported to the clinician for the scheduled 
re-implantation into the patient (M-EU9).
Thus scientific attempts have been undertaken to develop a less controversial 
version of the bovine serum for cell culture, steering the field towards more 
acceptable applications in both technological and social terms. But the fear for 
disease transfer or other unwanted side effects from animal based material in 
tissue engineering applications is not shared by all R&D actors in this field. 
Thus also in technological terms, different constructions of risk are called upon.
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One scientist points out the reluctance by patients to have animal derived 
components (such as scaffold that are used to support the living cells) 
implanted into their bodies:
In terms of producing scaffolds, only the origin of the scaffold when there 
are animal derived or human derived materials, I think there is always 
going to be concern. And this is going to be a hurdle for introduction... 
Because it's always a reluctance and the risk that there will be some 
viral contamination.
(Academic research scientist in biomaterials and tissue engineering S- 
EU2, 2004)
In contrast, a scientist with experience in a clinical setting for wound healing, 
points out how usually patients are not too bothered about these constructs:
We find that if we are culturing autologous keratinocytes [patient own 
skin cells] to heal a patients’ ulcer, the patients are very happy with that. 
It’s their cells being used to heal their problem... So the patients don’t 
have any concern with that. We can tell them about the bovine serum 
and the mouse fibroblasts, but they are not actually that interested to be 
frank. They’re not. No. Will this heal my ulcer? That’s what they want to 
know.
(Academic research scientist in wound healing and clinical management 
S5, 2003)
While patients might perceive these risks, according to this scientist, as 
‘acceptable’ in the light of overall treatment benefits, there is also the issue of 
full information about longer term effects. Although this interview excerpt 
suggests informed consent about the inclusion of animal-derived material in the 
tissue engineered construct, a recent study conducted upon medical 
professionals delivering skin treatments, concluded that many clinicians are not 
aware of the exact composition of tissue engineered products they offer to their 
patients (Enoch et al. 2005). A survey on healthcare professionals 
demonstrated that only a small percentage of respondents was aware that 
some of these products contain human donor or animal derived material 
(including bovine contents). This would suggest that knowledge about the 
material composition of tissue engineered products should precede full 
informed consent.
Also other constructions of downplaying these risks are put forward. The 
following scientist feels that tissue engineering technology in the future will not
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rely too much on ‘non-human cells’, most notably in the context of the promise 
of stem cell therapies, while furthermore arguing that most risks take place on 
individual rather than collective level:
The one [risk] that springs to mind that could have a big effect would be 
use of non-human cells and risk of introducing new viruses into the 
human population. But the way the field is moving it seems that it’s less 
and less likely that there’ll be a lot of products based on non-human 
cells. Our sources of human cells are improving, we’re finding new stem 
cells so there’s probably less of a reason for it. Apart from that I think 
most of the risks are borne by the patients themselves.
(Academic research scientist in UK tissue engineering lab S7, 2003)
And even if animal derived materials are part of tissue engineered constructs, 
the potential harmful effects to the patient would be minimal, according to the 
following scientist:
If you compare it in general terms it's like either you die or you take it. 
And there is not many people that take it that's going to die from it, from 
viral infection. So the risk is very small when you talk about these 
scaffolds that are animal derived, that are carefully handled.
(Academic research scientist in biomaterials and tissue engineering S- 
EU2, 2004)
Finally, there is a techno-scientific discourse acknowledging the potential risk of 
in particular bovine serum, but as these interviewees demonstrate, this needs 
to be considered in the context of an overall therapeutic balance of risks and 
benefits and gradation of risk - thus creating acceptability to some degree.
I think that people have been overshooting a little bit. The whole BSE 
story and so on... you just eat a piece of cake and you take more 
potential BSE material in your body than growing a cell in foetal bovine 
serum, you know... all the gelatine we have in our cakes are all coming 
from bovine you know. So what I am saying is obviously you take all 
precautions in order to make sure that things are brought to the lowest 
level of toxicity one can anticipate. But again, every treatment has the 
efficacy toxicity ratio issue. You always have to look at what I call the 
therapeutic index.
(European clinician involved in start-up company CL-EU5, 2003)
While this interviewee responds to public concerns about BSE, thus including 
socio-political factors in the risk equation, at the same time this concern is 
marginalised by pointing out the low degree of risk attached to bovine serum. 
The following interviewee uses a similar frame by referring to a risk ranking that 
makes bovine serum, in the big scheme of things, not such an unacceptable
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solution after all -  while at the same time referring to the commercial potential 
of a more social acceptable solution:
Now, bovine serum, if you look at the WHO classifications for health 
risks, bovine serum [is] one of the lowest risk bovine products. You have 
a spinal cord and eyes and all that sort of stuff as being particularly high 
risk of TSE transmission whereas serum is pretty low down on the list.
So although there is a minute chance that you could have that some 
people are known to be allergic to those materials so again, it’s a liability 
risk that you have to put in. (...)
You can only apply sound scientific principles to the way that you 
manufacture the product. You can do the best you can to eliminate those 
materials. You can make sure that the materials that you use if they are 
of that source come from credible documentary sources and that you 
include those particular statements within your risk assessments. 
Unfortunately at this moment in time there’s no real alternative for 
adding things like bovine serum to growth media because your cells 
won’t grow otherwise. And the first company who develops a serum free 
media will be a very rich company.
(Regulatory affairs professional in multinational industry M-EU9, 2003)
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4.4 Drawing boundaries of technological risk
In this chapter I discussed the differentiated views of scientists, clinicians and 
manufacturers on technological dimensions of tissue engineering risk. Asked 
about their views on risks of tissue engineering applications, interviewees make 
an implicit but sometimes inconsistent ranking of risk as related to the particular 
cell source of the application. Especially the distinction between autologous 
and allogeneic material is considered key in the eyes of these interviewees, 
where these biological materials serve as boundary objects in defining the 
‘riskyness’ of the product. The main concerns mentioned are disease 
transmission and infection, especially, and initially, in relation to the use of 
donor material. Autologous applications, on the other hand, are seen as 
relatively safe and ‘risk-free’ and as such unproblematic from both a 
technological and patient perspective. But closer inspection of the cell culturing 
process reveals how autologous cell sources also inhibit a problematic frame.
Thus risks are perceived different depending on the source material used. The 
use of animal derived material, for example during the culturing process or as 
part of the transport and logistical system to deliver the cells to the patient, is a 
demarcated category generally singled out of the equation in these accounts. 
Furthermore particular boundary negotiations take place over the level or 
degree of risk: interviewees have downplayed the issue of animal-derived 
material, especially with reference to the use of bovine serum, pointing out how 
this is ‘relatively safe’ and low down on the list of potential risk of transferring 
TSE, thus stressing the comparative unproblematic character in technologic 
terms - even in the face of public concern after health scares such as BSE.
Interviewees have constructed and reconstructed risks in particular frames, 
with specific perceptions and differentiated values attached to different 
applications, based on cell source, while also taking into account the level of 
risk (individual versus collective) and the degree of risk (high to low), plus an 
overall balance of risks versus benefits in what is perceived as acceptable risk.
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Generally speaking, and so far, these different frames are of a techno-scientific 
nature, and there is a strong belief that these risks can be controlled in the right 
(e.g. quality controlled) environment. Furthermore, many technological risks 
have implications for clinical development and market performance of tissue 
engineered products and services. The following chapters describe the next 
steps in the innovation cycle of respectively therapeutic effectiveness and 
commercial potential, demonstrating how the different risk perceptions are 
interlinked both between categories of the risk trilogy (technological -  clinical -  
commercial) and with respect to the level and degree of risk - later in this study 
referred to as the risk hierarchy and the risk balance.
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5 Clinical risk
A particular framing of perceptions of risk of tissue engineered applications 
relates to the long-term clinical effects of these products in the patient. I have 
labelled this category ‘clinical risk’. The main issues under this heading are the 
question of efficacy of tissue engineered applications (if they actually ‘work’), 
what clinical evidence is available and how to interpret this, and what tools are 
needed to evaluate the efficacy and safety of the technology on the long-term.
Clinical risk is the intermediate step between concerns related to the 
development and manufacturing of tissue engineering constructs (discussed 
under technological risk) and the introduction of these products in the 
marketplace (commercial risk, to be discussed next). Whereas technological 
risk is mainly concerned with safety of tissue engineered products, clinical risk 
considers safety as part of a more complex and elaborate trajectory of 
performance testing, taking into account the efficacy of these products over a 
longer period of time.
Demonstrated in this chapter is how participants in the clinical domain create 
very mechanical and narrowly defined boundaries around what is perceived as 
‘proper’ clinical evidence, while subsequently arguing how the unique status of 
(particular) tissue engineered applications warrants exclusion from this frame. 
Demarcation, then, takes place by referring to ‘traditional’ clinical models for 
evaluating medical technology. The notion of efficacy of tissue engineering 
technology is furthermore related to another dominant framework, where the 
worlds of clinic and market meet.
5.1 Framing clinical risk
The starting point of this chapter is the perceived lack of evidence of efficacy 
for tissue engineered products. The efficacy of a treatment is usually defined as 
the ability to produce a result, or in other words the question whether the
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therapy works for the particular treatment for which it is tested.34 This efficacy is 
being questioned by many interviewees. As one scientist expresses his 
concern:
I think perhaps the biggest risk is, whether they [tissue engineering 
products] actually work or not, as opposed to whether there’s any risk to 
the patient. (Academic research scientist in UK lab S1, 2003)
A commercial producer of a variety of tissue engineered products explains:
The risks to my mind are in efficacy. They run the risk of not doing 
anything. (Manufacturer in tissue engineering M1, 2003)
And as a clinician admits in a similar vein:
So sometimes, yes, it doesn’t work. The cells just... don’t do any better 
job than the normal healing. (Clinician in academic hospital CI2, 2003)
Thus in addition to safety concerns, there is a risk of lacking efficacy of tissue 
engineered applications. This expression of clinical risk relates in the first place 
to an anxiety that the treatment or product does not work, in that the 
therapeutic effects are minimal or absent. While the clinician of the last quote 
compares the performance of the product to the normal healing process, this 
concern has led to a broader discussion about the best ways of finding out if a 
particular treatment has any effect or not, and compared to what potential 
alternative treatments.
This discussion has focused on two of the most advanced tissue engineering 
applications that have been available on the market for some years, namely 
skin systems and autologous cartilage repair constructs. Tissue engineered 
skin products have mainly provoked questions about efficacy in relation to cost 
of applications, as part of a broader debate on the cost-benefit ratio of these 
products -  which also links into the commercial risk category as discussed
34 There is some discussion about terminology here in relation to the terms efficacy and 
effectiveness. Effectiveness usually describes how well an approved treatment (or drug) works 
during regular use and in a regular clinical setting, while efficacy is used to describe how well a 
treatment works under optimum conditions, such as during a closely monitored clinical trial. 
Efficacy is measured by evaluating the clinical and statistical results of clinical tests. Thus 
efficacy and effectiveness are not the same, and a treatment is effective if it works in ‘real life’ 
under non-ideal circumstances. Effectiveness cannot be measured in controlled trials, because 
of the inclusion criteria that reflect a distortion of usual practice. For my research I use the term 
‘efficacy’ in relation to clinical testing, as the ability of a treatment to bring about its intended 
effect under ideal (controlled) circumstances.
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later. The cartilage case is interesting because it flags up methodological 
questions that are specific for autologous applications, and that could 
potentially conflict with existing models of clinical evaluation.
A main transition phase in the research and development process of tissue 
engineering, and biomedical innovation more general, is translating findings 
from basic research into clinical practice and, finally, marketable products. In 
clinical trials new therapies are tested on humans to determine safety and 
efficacy, usually following the pre-clinical stage where the therapy is tested in 
the lab (in-vitro) and on animal models. This model is used for many different 
medical therapies, but has mostly been applied to testing of novel 
pharmaceuticals (Medical Research Council (MRC) 2001, 2005). Here the so- 
called randomised controlled trial (RCT) - in which participants are randomly 
assigned to one of two or more treatment arms of a clinical trial - is considered 
the ‘golden standard’ and the safest, fastest and most scientific way of 
gathering evidence that a particular treatment or drug is safe and effective.
For tissue engineering this model proves more problematic though, as the 
‘usual’ ways of collecting data on safety and efficacy, both in animal studies 
and in clinical trials, are not considered the most appropriate in this particular 
domain. As summed up by a commercial developer:
Many of these [tissue engineered] products cannot undergo a traditional 
double-blinded, placebo-controlled clinical study, and animal models 
have not been shown to reliably predict the human outcomes. Few 
animal disease models truly mimic the human condition, and long-term 
follow-up studies may be required, both in the preclinical and clinical 
setting, before regulatory approval is granted. (Naughton 2002: 382).
In this chapter data are presented that demonstrate how the relevance and 
methodology of these classical models of clinical evaluation and testing are 
debated and found controversial for the assessment of efficacy in tissue 
engineered products. By using a case study of one particular tissue 
engineering application, cartilage repair (ACI), I discuss the underlying issues 
in demonstrating clinical efficacy and safety in this domain. I then place these 
issues in the broader context of the search for clinical evidence, to analyse in 
how far this particular application is exemplar for tissue engineering technology 
more general. This will lead to the concluding remarks, in which I emphasise
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how clinical risks have implications for the way tissue engineered products are 
controlled and regulated, and that there is a direct link between the question of 
efficacy of these products and their marketability.
5.2 Pre-clinical testing
The need for clinical efficacy is to be considered as an intermediate phase and 
intrinsic part of the broader innovation process. Efficacy is relevant in the final 
stages, in getting marketing approval or reimbursement for products, but also 
earlier in the trajectory. Assessment of tissue engineered products is 
problematic already in the pre-clinical stage, where new therapies are tested in 
the laboratory and in animal studies to determine their safety (and toxicology) 
before entering human trials. Especially the relevance of animal models has 
been questioned, because of the dependence of tissue engineering technology 
on the performance of cells and tissues in the human body.
In order to interpreted clinical risk in tissue engineering, we need to look at this 
earlier step in the innovation process, where uncertainty exists about the value 
of pre-clinical data. Several interviewees have expressed concerns with finding 
appropriate animal models for tissue engineered applications to test efficacy 
measures before the step to testing in human populations can be made. As one 
scientist, heading one of the UK national tissue engineering centres answers, 
when asked about his view on the sorts of evidence that are needed to 
evaluate these technologies:
I don’t think we know as yet. It’s obviously something I’ve thought of an 
awful lot. I don’t know how effective pre-clinical data, i.e. animal testing, 
is going to be in terms of predicting how things will happen in humans 
and I think that’s a big problem. (Academic scientist and policy advisor 
A-EU6, 2003)
A manufacturer of a diverse range of tissue engineered applications in 
development and on the market, expresses a similar concern:
It's difficult with cell products, they could get infected, how do you 
guarantee that there is no safety concerns, and how do you make it 
effective so that it works for a human being? And that's what you see, a 
lot of companies are struggling with... the theoretical part is nice, but
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then proving it in humans or proving it in animals is already being 
difficult. Because a human cell, you can’t just put that in an animal. (...) I 
mean what does a goat say, when you put in goat cells, if the product 
that you have is human cells? It probably doesn’t say as much. (...)
So how do you test that, and what are appropriate test models? So you 
see companies struggle with that.
(QA and regulatory affairs manager in multinational tissue engineering 
company M-EU4, 2003)
A scientist working in a technology assessment unit explains that, indeed, pre- 
clinical testing is not applicable, as ‘you get into problems if you want to test 
human tissue in an animal’ (R-EU3, 2003). This concern has been mentioned 
in relation to different application areas, including cartilage repair and wound 
healing, but also more experimental work in for example vascular applications. 
A scientist working on tissue engineered blood vessels explains the limited use 
of animal models in this particular area, because animal cells behave differently 
from human cells:
It has only been possible to do some animal testing before, and since we 
are working with human cells, so we are producing vessels with human 
cells, there we have a problem: how shall we test those in animals? (...)
I mean the real test is done in the clinical study and the ethical dilemma 
is to find a suitable model in human studies.
(Academic clinician in vascular surgery CL-EU2, 2003)
In addition to appropriate animal models, this scientist also expresses concern 
with finding an appropriate model in human testing. For high-risk and potentially 
life-saving treatments in cardiovascular surgery, high levels of safety and 
efficacy have to be established before the transition to clinical trials can be 
made; the application simply ‘has to work’ as failure could be lethal for patients. 
This puts particular pressure on selecting the first human volunteers entering 
clinical trials, also posing ethical difficulties in terms of risks and benefits to 
patients taking part in this trial, against a background of uncertainty that only a 
certain level of efficacy can be tested in the pre-clinical stage.
Efficacy standards differ per clinical application area in tissue engineering, with 
‘irreversible’ and life-saving treatments in the cardiovascular area reflecting one 
extreme, while more ‘low-risk’ applications in for example wound healing and 
cartilage repair, for which alternative treatment exists and which do not pose 
direct safety risks to the patient in case of failure, towards the other end of the 
spectrum.
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To sum up, respondents frame pre-clinical studies of diverse tissue engineering 
applications, most notably the testing of cells in animal models, as particularly 
problematic in estimating the levels of efficacy and safety needed to proceed 
into clinical studies in humans. This might put extra pressure on producing valid 
data from clinical evaluation and testing, with ‘the big test’ taking place in 
clinical studies in humans.
In the next section one particular tissue engineering application in cartilage 
repair, known as ACI, serves as example to demonstrate underlying issues in 
clinical testing, and why also in this phase of the innovation process efficacy as 
gathered in a clinical setting is controversial and debated. Also for this cartilage 
application concerns have been expressed regarding pre-clinical testing. As the 
extract below from a commercial provider of ACI confirms:
[W]e had a little bit of pre-clinical data but not a lot of pre-clinical data 
because to be honest it was autologous tissue, there’s not a lot of safety 
you can develop around that, maybe more on the risk analysis side as to 
whether or not tissue will bind in with surrounding tissue of and re­
model. But you can only really assess that by looking at the human 
experience because if you do that in a dog or a rat or whatever then they 
all behave differently and stresses on the joints are very different so 
therefore you can really only test it in the human experience.
(Regulatory affairs manager of multinational company producing 
autologous cartilage product M-EU9, 2003)
5.3 A search for clinical efficacy -  the case of ACI
In addressing the question of clinical evidence, most interviewees refer to 
autologous chondrocyte implantation (ACI) as an example of a tissue 
engineered application that has provoked debate on efficacy and safety testing. 
This technique, also known as Autologous Chondrocyte Transplantation, 
involves a procedure whereby the surgeon takes a small amount of healthy 
cartilage cells (a biopsy) from the patient’s damaged knee, ‘about the size of 
two pencil erasers’ (Genzyme 2005), which are then manipulated and 
multiplied in cell culture. After a few weeks the cells are implanted back into the 
same patient in a second surgical procedure. After this intervention, a recovery
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time of between two and six months is needed for full regeneration of the 
cartilage (Harrison et al. 2000).35 The ACI process can be pictured as follows:
r
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Source: A. Biggs from Oscell (Hospital 2005)
The technique was developed in the 1980s in Sweden and more widespread 
clinical experience has been gained over the last decade in Europe and the US 
(Brittberg et al. 1994). Currently a handful of commercial cartilage products are 
available on the European market, while local hospitals also offer this service to 
patients in need of articular cartilage repair, usually for (sports) injuries in the 
knee. The prices of the ACI services differ per provider, and also depend on 
local arrangements, with commercial agencies charging from £3200 (Verigen) 
up to £5000 (Genzyme) per procedure, while a UK hospital based service 
working under the NHS Trust estimates cost of its in-house cell culture service 
at about £2000 per patient (NICE 2005). The use of ACI requires special 
training of hospital staff, which is provided by the commercial developers of 
cartilage repair products.
The next sections go into the underlying issues in gathering the evidence 
needed of safety and efficacy in ACI, which has been subject to extensive 
debate and has stirred some controversy in the field. Main issues relate to the 
concept of clinical efficacy, including its relevance for ACI, and to the best tools 
of gaining insight into efficacy for this procedure.
35 The procedure of ACI and its results are well documented, see for example key reviews by 
Harrison (2000);Hardingham (2002); Sittinger (1999);Temenoff (2000); Bentley (2000); 
Brittberg (2001, 2003); Lindahl (2003); and Peterson (1996, 2002a, 2002b)
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5.3.1 Defining efficacy
Wide variation exists in estimations of how effective particular tissue 
engineering applications are, ACI not being an exception. According to one 
scientist, working in an industrial setting, the clinical results for the cartilage 
product in his company are good to satisfactory, with success ranges from 60 
to 70%, while the remaining cases show no benefit to the patient at all (S-EU1, 
2003). Other interviewees talk of 60% up to 80% success (CI2) adding how 
‘you can never have 100% success in surgery, so 80% is very good’ (CI5). 
These figures are backed in some of the clinical literature and in annual reports 
issued by manufacturers in this field. The International Cartilage Repair 
Society, a professional body that keeps a record of several European studies 
on ACI treatment, reports that most studies have shown up to 80% clinical 
success rate. But both these success scores and the measurements of 
evidence are contested. An academic clinician involved in health services 
research on arthritis and joint replacement is critical of the current ACI 
treatment:
I think the problem is that what we’re looking at here is a procedure [ACI] 
for which there is no good evidence of efficacy or effectiveness. Now no 
good evidence doesn’t mean that it doesn’t work, it means there’s no 
good evidence that it works. (UK academic clinician C1, 2003)
Precise success rates are difficult to estimate, and uncertainty and 
disagreement exists about what precise outcome counts as successful, and 
how to evaluate the efficacy on the long term. A scientist involved in basic and 
clinical research in cartilage repair phrases this concern as follows:
I’m not that concerned about safety regulations, they have to be as high 
as you can make them within reason and I don’t have any problems with 
that. I have real problems over the current lack of efficacy outcome data 
and real problems with whether a realistic view will be taken on how to 
acquire that data, and how to measure it. (UK academic research 
scientist in clinical care and cartilage repair S4, 2003)
5.3.2 Finding the right tools
There are different means of acquiring data on performance and longer-term 
efficacy of medical interventions, for example based on experience of medical 
professionals using the particular technique, or on patient satisfaction and
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perception. In ACI both these data sources are available, with an emphasis on 
‘sharing experiences’ between academic centres working on this procedure.
When asked about their views on evidence available for ACI, many 
interviewees refer to scientific and medical experience with this procedure, also 
labelled as ‘experiential evidence’ (May 2005). Most clinical experience exists 
in a specialised centre for cartilage repair in Gothenburg, Sweden, where the 
ACI procedure was originally developed in the 1980s, with the first clinical 
results reported in 1994 (CI-EU3, 2003). Many scientists, clinicians and 
manufacturers involved in cartilage repair mention ‘the Swedish study’ when 
asked about the clinical evidence on which their cartilage services and products 
are based.
As part of this experiential evidence, also systems have been developed for 
following patients after treatment to monitor long-term effects of the procedure. 
A clinician in a specialised centre for ACI in a UK hospital, which has 
developed its own in-house methods for chondrocyte culture, describes how 
their treatment is modelled on the Swedish procedure, and how a lot of 
exchange of data of the technique and its evaluation takes place between the 
academic centres (‘they came and taught us how to do the operation, how to 
grow the cells’ CI2, 2003). In this UK hospital a patient monitoring system was 
developed (‘a database for life’) for which patients fill out self assessment 
questionnaires before and at set times after the surgical intervention, in addition 
to the biopsy samples that are used to gain longer term insight into the 
performance of ACI (CI2, 2003). Similar means of evaluation and patient follow- 
up take place in other academic centres across Europe, for example via a 
collaboration of specialist orthopaedic centres working on ACI called EURO­
CELL.
5.3.3 More robust evidence: running trials
But experiential evidence and patient follow-up are not sufficient, and it has 
been argued that large scale clinical trials are needed to gain more ‘valid’ and 
robust evidence of experimental clinical efficacy. A model used for many 
medical therapies, though mostly applied in the testing of experimental drugs,
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is that of the randomised controlled trial which is considered the ‘golden 
standard’ and most scientific way of gathering evidence that a particular 
treatment or drug is safe and effective.
At the time of fieldwork for this research36 interviewees put great emphasis on 
the need for more (randomised) controlled trials that compare ACI in large 
numbers of patients, potentially from different settings (multi-centre), with 
alternative treatments to assess safety and efficacy. The main problem with 
clinical studies has been the lack of numbers (patients) involved in the 
experimental design, and the localised nature of many of these studies:
People are doing small case series still.... so I mean, they’re not even 
comparative studies, they’re just a few cases. ‘I did these half dozen 
people and they got better. Isn’t it wonderful?’ (...) I think almost 
inadmissible evidence, let alone poor evidence. (UK academic clinician 
in health service research on arthritis and joint replacement C1, 2003)
According to this clinician the design of current clinical studies does not provide 
the data needed for long-term evaluation of safety and efficacy of ACI. A similar 
view was expressed by the UK National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE), 
an organisation that provides guidance on the use of new and existing 
treatments within the NHS in England and Wales. The NICE appraisal 
Committee did a review on ACI in the year 2000, and concluded that its use is 
not recommended for ‘routine primary treatment of articular cartilage defects on 
the knee joint in the NHS’ (NICE 2000), which is the main application area.37 
Another review and re-appraisal of the procedure38 was conducted in 2005, 
which more strongly underlined the experimental status of ACI:
36 In ACI several clinical studies have been set up over the last few years but only more 
recently results have been published from five randomised or quasi-randomised controlled trials 
(see for more details on these studies NICE 2005). The results of these studies where not yet 
known during the time of interviewing.
37 In Germany a similar decision was made by the Bundesausschuss der Arzte und 
Krankenkassen (Husing et al. 2003). The Blue Cross Technology Evaluation Centre in the US 
did a product review of ACI product Carticel in 2003, and concluded that it did not meet the 
criteria, mainly due to lack of (public) data on clinical effectiveness (TEC, 2003). Manufacturer 
Genzyme warded off this critique by pointing out the ethical problems of doing a placebo- 
controlled study, which was one of the requirements of the Evaluation Center, due to the 
customised nature of the surgery (Genzyme, 2005).
38 For its appraisal N ICE looked at the results of five randomised controlled trials, published 
over the two most recent years, the largest of which included 100 patients. In its summary the 
appraisal committee stated that ‘these trials provide inconsistent evidence of the clinical 
effectiveness of A C I’ and that ‘the studies were heterogeneous in terms of the patients 
recruited, the ACI technique used and the measures used to assess outcome.’ (NICE 2005 13).
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Autologous chondrocyte implantation (ACI) is not recommended for the 
treatment of articular cartilage defects of the knee joint except in the 
context of ongoing or new clinical studies that are designed to generate 
robust and relevant outcome data, including the measurement of health- 
related quality of life and long-term follow-up. Patients should be fully 
informed of the uncertainties about the long-term effectiveness and the 
potential adverse effects of this procedure (NICE 2005).
The recommendation means that ACI is only available as part of a clinical trial 
in the UK. In addition to the earlier guidance, the need was articulated for 
explicitly informing patients about possible adverse effects of the procedure 
(such as ‘joint locking’ and infections) and of the fact that due to lack of long­
term outcome data, not a lot is known about effects over time.
The clinical literature reporting on the results and efficacy of ACI is growing 
(Brittberg et al. 2003; Lindahl et al. 2001, 2003), but it has been stressed that 
more detailed studies are needed in support of this particular technique 
(Peterson 2002; Peterson et al. 2003). Only most recently a number of multi­
centre randomised controlled trials have been set up in Europe, including in 
Germany and the UK. One of these studies compares ACI with non-ACI 
surgical treatment as part of regulatory requirements by the US authorities 
FDA, which also asked the commercial provider involved, Genzyme, to collect 
post-marketing data (phase IV clinical trials).
But setting up large scale clinical trials has proven problematic in this field. For 
example, clinicians have reported problems in securing funding from national 
research councils (such as the MRC in the UK) and from European funding 
agencies (for example under the EC framework programmes) to organise multi­
centre randomised trials of ACI (CI2, 2003).
It’s a bit of a chicken and egg particularly with surgical techniques. How 
do you prove your technique is beneficial if you can’t invest in treating 
large enough numbers of patients over a long enough period of time, but 
no one’s willing to pay for that many patients over that long a time to do 
the work when its not been proven, so how do you get there? There are 
ways around that to do with companies funding trials and multi centre 
trials and so on but it’s going to take time.
(UK academic research scientist in cartilage repair S4, 2003)
In contrast, commercial providers of tissue engineered products are relatively 
small, and do not have the financial means to fund large trials or personnel to
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organise them. Also, as explained by a clinical scientist with a commercial 
background, some companies are reluctant to take part in clinical trials, 
because in most countries products are not reimbursed by national health or 
insurance systems as long as they are offered in an experimental setting, which 
means no profit can be made over these products.
Whenever you’re talking cells you really need long term studies to show 
safety, real safety, because these are unpredictable, are you going to 
get something growing from those cells that you didn’t anticipate? And 
that’s going to be long term clinical studies. And companies can’t afford 
and don’t like long term studies, because the way companies work is 
that you’ve got to get your product onto the market to get revenue. And if 
you’re a start-up company and somebody says do a 15 year study, 
yeh.... So for a lot of technologies evidence of safety is accumulated 
along with use. So products are launched before people have got all the 
information they’d really like but that has to be.
(Clinical scientist in multinational industrial setting M-EU1, 2003)
Furthermore it has been argued that clinicians lack the expertise and means, 
and sometimes the willingness, to become involved in these experimental 
treatments. One clinician involved in ACI work stresses the need for specialised 
knowledge to set-up large scale trials, and the lack of such expertise in most 
clinical settings (CI5, 2003). Another clinician is pessimistic about the feasibility 
of these trials because of different ‘mindsets’ of most orthopaedic surgeons, 
who are the ones usually performing the ACI procedure. He reports on a 
workshop organised to discuss the need for clinical trials in ACI, where...
... It became completely clear that they [orthopaedic surgeons] don’t 
understand trials, don’t believe in them and never heard of issues like 
equipoise and just think it’s a lot of nonsense. ‘Let’s get on and cure the 
customers,’ was the kind of feedback we were getting. So with all the 
proponents being of that mind set, difficulties in designing the trials, of 
ethics of the trials and in deciding what the appropriate outcomes and 
the length of time of the study, I think it probably won’t happen. It’s all 
very depressing, isn’t it?
(UK academic clinician in health service research on arthritis and joint 
replacement C1, 2003)
In addition to problems in setting up and running clinical trials, ACI highlights 
more fundamental concerns with the particular design and methodology of 
these experimental studies. As touched upon before, there are particular 
models and standards for clinical evaluation which are used for a range of 
medical interventions, and controversy exists over the question in how far ACI
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fits into these. With customised treatments such as ACI, where cells from one 
patient have to be re-implanted into the same patient, the often used standard 
of single or double blinded clinical trial (where it is not known which patient is 
receiving experimental treatment) is not applicable. Also placebo-controlled 
studies that are often used for pharmaceuticals - in which an inactive substance 
(the placebo) which mimics the effect is given to one group of participants, 
while the experimental treatment is being tested in another group - is not 
considered an option in ACI, or in any tissue engineered application 
irrespective of whether it is autologous or allogeneic. Several manufacturers 
have reported issues with the trial format and which experimental format to 
follow. Most current trials are based on a model that is used for 
pharmaceuticals or medical devices.
I mean the product, yes of course: it’s cells and they’re modified 
whatever way they modify it and then you have the product. It sounds 
simple. I think everyone who’s been to a manufacturing plant of cell 
therapy products realises there are lots of clinical trials. It’s very different 
from medical devices and pharma. And so they are very specific both in 
clinical trials and in producing them, manufacturing them. (...) First of all, 
to give an example, let’s say you’re doing a double blind study for 
example. How are you going to do that when you inject cells in a 
person? So forget about them. I think the double blind was one of the 
main [issues], and finding a large patient population or a patients centre. 
Repeating a trial, how are you going to do that? So it’s a very specific 
field that demands very specific knowledge.
(Corporate affairs manager in multinational company M-EU5, 2003)
Another manufacturer described in a similar way how the company was 
struggling with the trial format for their ACI product, trying to fit in their clinical 
studies into the more accepted standard of pharmaceutical trials:
It was at that point I think that we realised that trying to match for 
example pharmaceutical clinical trials around orthopaedic studies is nigh 
on impossible. First of all you have numbers of patients. You can’t do a 
thousand patients in a medical device type trial. You can’t really blind the 
study which means you can’t necessarily randomise it.
(Regulatory affairs manager of multinational company producing 
autologous cartilage product, M-EU9, 2003)
As one scientist in a national government agency simply put it:
You cannot do a double-blinded trial because you don’t want to implant 
cells just for fun into a healthy person (R-EU5, 2003).
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Another underlying issue in the design of randomised clinical trials is the need 
for a control group that receives alternative treatment. For one clinician this is a 
reason to not take part in this format of clinical research:
I cannot persuade my patients into doing a randomised study here. It’s 
impossible. Because they come to me because they want to have 
Autologous Chondrocyte Transplantation, you understand? So that has 
to be done by others, universities in England, or Sweden, or... 
(Orthopaedic surgeon and director of specialist medical centre for ACI, 
CI-EU3, 2003)
Furthermore, controlled clinical trials are often based on measuring effects of 
an experimental therapy compared to a standard therapy. In the case of ACI it 
is difficult to find a comparative treatment for cartilage repair that is based on a 
similar technique, namely cell culture. In the few studies that have been 
published, cell culturing techniques have been compared to surgical techniques 
including microfracture and mosaicplasty.39 One study compared different sorts 
of ACI. There has been some debate in the ACI field as to what counts as 
proper comparative treatment. Most clinicians and scientists in this study feel 
that a cell culturing technique such as ACI is considerably different from more 
conventional surgical procedures. At the same time it has been stressed that 
for many (other) clinical applications in the field outcome data are lacking 
altogether:
I think you should have of course evidence based studies, and 
randomised control studies to compare the effect, or the efficiency, of 
this treatment to other treatments. But I think they [the NICE appraisal 
committee] made a great mistake because there is no other treatment 
that has been proven in the way they want Autologous Chondrocyte 
Transplantation [ACI] to be proved. (...) What treatment is proven for 
cartilage repair? Is there any treatment? (...)
If you look into orthopaedics then you see very few treatments have 
been established on a five year follow up, on randomised control 
studies. Very few. But I think that if you get too scientific you may stop 
the development of new treatments. So you have to give some 
treatments a period of time... (...) If an independent clinic, or university, 
can repeat the results, I think that is a confirmation of that this is 
working. And data is coming off now... that it’s not a disaster in any way. 
It’s better than what we have in most studies.
(Orthopaedic surgeon and director of specialist medical centre for ACI, 
CI-EU3, 2003)
39 Respectively the shaving and drilling of bone to promote growth and the grafting of healthy 
cartilage from within the joint also known as osteochondral transplantation.
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So far, clinicians, scientists and manufacturers in this sample have adopted 
different frames about the use of evidence based studies to produce data on 
efficacy, but also on the means of gathering these data, where the need for 
randomised controlled trials is contrasted with long-term clinical experience.
But two more underlying issues have arisen here that are specific to ACI 
therapy; one relating to an ‘uncontrollable’ factor determining clinical outcome, 
namely professional skills of the person performing the procedure, and the 
other related to clinical effects and patient safety when the ACI product or 
service does not ‘work’.
5.3.4 Clinical expertise and demarcating safety
A specific issue determining clinical outcome in ACI is that the procedure 
requires special training. Most commercial providers in Europe offer training 
courses to physicians in surgical techniques and in how to select the 
appropriate patient population (while in the US this training is part of the FDA 
requirements to get marketing approval for ACI products). So in addition to the 
quality of the product and the efficacy of the cartilage cells that constitute it, the 
specific skills of the surgeon conducting the procedure determine the efficacy of 
the final product. As a representative of a multinational company offering ACI 
products explains:
Tied in with that of course is that as a surgical technique it is quite 
complicated, so clinical efficacy can sometimes be combined with 
surgical training and the abilities of the surgeon. So you could have 
exactly the same product, exactly the same patient. For example if he 
has lesions in the left knee and then another one in the right knee he 
can go and have exactly the same technique applied to him but with one 
surgeon and then go to another surgeon and have the same procedure, 
and the effectiveness will be different simply because of the abilities of 
the surgeon.
(Regulatory affairs manager of multinational company producing 
autologous cartilage product M-EU9, 2003)
This poses questions about the specialist expertise needed to conduct the 
procedure, and about larger availability and marketability of products, as the 
‘average’ surgeon is not able to perform the complicated re-implantation of the 
ACI construct -  or even allowed to diverge from the protocol and detailed
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guidance that comes with these products, as another commercial provider 
explains:
So the last risk which remains, is that these pieces of cartilage or bone 
would from the operating point of view, come off or not stay in place. 
That is why we have been using a teaching centre to allow the doctors 
using one technique, which we tested in a clinical trial and of which we 
are a hundred percent sure that it works. So if a doctor uses another 
technique for example, he doesn’t want to fix it as we suggest, it is his 
problem but we do not allow it. This is written in the conditions when we 
distribute this product.
(Director of multinational company for ACI, M-EU10, 2003)
The second factor relating to clinical efficacy is the issue of adverse effects and 
patient safety. In contrast to concerns about the role of the clinical professional 
carrying out the surgical procedure of ACI, which affects clinical outcome, the 
effects of an ‘ineffective’ and as such failing treatment on the patient are 
defined as minimal. Several interviewees stress that lack of efficacy does not 
necessarily mean that the patient is in a worse clinical condition than before the 
intervention. With ACI the lack of ‘working cells’ to heal the defect does not 
pose safety threats to the patient:
Well the other problem is, of course, some patients don’t get better; 
about twenty per cent who don’t get better. I think it’s fair to say we’ve 
never really made anyone worse. (UK academic clinician in ACI CI5,
2003)
An industrial scientist working in a multinational company offering cartilage 
repair services, explains in a similar way how the wound site is not affected ‘so 
if you have failure of the treatment, you can do something else, (...) you do not 
ruin the site’ (S-EU1, 2003).
It has to be noted that this argument of ‘no gain, no pain’ might apply to ACI as 
a particular exponent of tissue engineering technology, but may not translate to 
other clinical application areas. Cartilage repair has a range of alternative 
treatment options beyond cell culture - and this also goes for relatively simple 
applications for non-life threatening conditions such as skin constructs for 
diabetic ulcers. More irreversible treatments such as heart valve replacement 
pose more severe safety concerns, and the demands for efficacy for these 
therapies are considered higher.
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Thus ACI is illustrative of some of the issues underlying the clinical risks 
associated with tissue engineering technology more general, such as a concern 
with clinical efficacy, what counts as evidence and how one should go about 
collecting and interpreting this evidence of efficacy and safety.
Many ‘classical’ ways of gathering efficacy and safety data, most notably the 
golden standard of the RCT, have been singled out of the domain, while 
respondents also refer to practical considerations in demarcating what the 
appropriate objects are for inclusion. The lack of possibilities for randomisation, 
placebo-controlled or blinded studies in ACI is intrinsically linked with the 
customised nature of the treatment, which, it can be argued, applies to other 
autologous cell therapies as well. For example, there can not be a control 
group of healthy volunteers to compare cell implants with, as it is not possible 
to implant cells into healthy people. Single or double blinded studies40 are no 
solution in a therapy which efficacy and safety for most part relies on implanting 
the same cells back into the same patient. Also the comparative nature of 
randomisation, where an experimental treatment is compared with (usually) 
standard therapies available poses dilemmas in the case of ACI, where 
selecting an appropriate ‘alternative treatment’ with a shown track record of 
clinical efficacy has proven contentious. Finally the skills of the surgeon 
performing the ACI procedure are a determining factor in establishing clinical 
efficacy of the final product after implantation, which is a variable that is hard to 
control in an experimental setting.
5.4 Extending boundaries: From clinicai efficacy to cost- 
effectiveness
In terms of the broader framework of clinical risk of tissue engineering, ACI is 
one example which clearly demonstrates concerns about clinical outcome and 
the search for clinical efficacy. But what about other clinical application areas 
and why is clinical efficacy so important? The purpose of this section is twofold. 
First, it discusses ACI in the light of other tissue engineered applications, most 
notably in wound healing, to point out that ACI is not a unique or isolated case.
40 W here neither the participating individuals nor the study-staff knows which participants are 
receiving the experimental treatment and which are receiving a placebo or another therapy.
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Second, it demonstrates the broader relevance of the need for clinical efficacy, 
arguing how this not only relates to patient safety, but also provides a 
mechanism for controlling commercial risk.
First, ACI should be compared to other tissue engineered applications in order 
to assess the broader meaning of the search for clinical efficacy. As 
demonstrated in this section, many of the clinical risks and concerns regarding 
efficacy of ACI are echoed in wound healing as another example of a more 
advanced tissue engineered therapy. Here too practical concerns in setting up 
clinical trials have been mentioned as a heavy burden by scientists, clinicians 
and manufacturers alike. As the following extract illustrates from a clinician with 
both an academic and commercial background:
Well the well known methods, like clinical research, multi centre 
research, experimental research... Nowadays everything has to be 
evidence based but evidence based is... that's not difficult but it needs 
so much effort that in my position if I want to make all my experiments in 
animals evidence based that's impossible because I lack time, I lack 
money, I lack personnel.... And it's the same in the clinical situation 
because in the clinical situation people are too busy to set something up 
in such a way... At least in [this country] with the burn centres, they can 
never manage those things evidence based. If you want to use the skin 
substitute and you want evidence based controlled studies of the skin 
substitute, to prove that the quality of the healed skin is superior to the 
method that exists, that will cost at least five years and I think ten years 
or more is more reasonable to say that the product is working. But 
what’s going on in those ten years with other engineered tissues which 
are coming? So you can only make one selection and that selection is 
not based on evidence but on emotion.
(European clinician in wound care CL-EU4, 2003)
In addition to these rather pragmatic concerns, the assessment of efficacy in a 
clinical trial setting for wound healing products comes with a range of 
‘uncontrollable’ factors that are borne with the individuals taking part in the 
study, and which makes comparison across settings (for example in multiple 
centre trials) problematic. The interview fragments below by a clinician and a 
manufacturer involved in clinical trials for tissue engineered skin products 
demonstrate the difficulty of assessing the clinical efficacy in these 
experimental settings:
Any trial of a wound healing product is very difficult to assess because 
there are so many factors that you can’t control for: the patients’
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systemic health, patients’ level of activity, the size of the wound, you 
know, the infection of the wound, the duration of the wound. It’s hugely 
difficult to actually see a weighing up, you know, risk against benefit. 
(Clinician and professional member of consumer organisation in wound 
healing Co2, 2003)
Normally you’re taking what’s seen as either the best conventional 
practice or the most typical type of treatment and looking for a 
statistically significant benefit in some aspect, wound healing for 
instance, to demonstrate that. (...) It’s probably more complicated than 
in treating some of the more medicinal product type of treatments, partly 
because of the nature of the technology involved and the design of trials. 
I guess that’s developing all the time. And identifying the right number of 
patients. ‘Cos obviously if you’re targeting things like hard to heal 
wounds or chronic wound areas, you’re often dealing with patients who 
are significantly compromised and they have a lot of other ailments 
associated with them as well. It’d just be the fact that they’ve got an 
ulcer that’s not healing. (...) You might find that general health issues, 
yeah, can have other effects, kidney damage all kinds of aspects. And 
so it would greatly complicate I guess the analysis of some of the studies 
in trying to, having enough patients controlled in a certain way that you 
would get the best statistical analysis. And I think that’s something that a 
lot of companies are still struggling with.
(Scientific manager corporate product safety assurance for UK based 
multinational company M2, 2003)
Thus some of the clinical risks as expressed in relation to ACI are comparable. 
Here too people talk of lacking resources, time and expertise, difficulties in 
running large scale clinical trials and the selection of appropriate patient 
populations to gather evidence based data. In contrast though with ACI 
treatment, the area of wound healing highlights another important issue which 
places clinical efficacy in a broader framework, namely the cost-efficacy of 
these therapies.
Interestingly, the issue of cost-efficacy of ACI in relation to clinical efficacy has 
only been marginally addressed by interviewees in this sample. As the clinician 
below stresses, ACI is an expensive technology (of up to several thousands 
pounds per procedure), and from an cost-economic perspective this puts 
pressure on the long-term performance of the procedure as compared to other 
treatments that are potentially cheaper, safer or less experimental.
If it’s cheap it’s accepted. If it’s expensive, it’s not accepted. Then you 
have to have randomised studies. (...) I think because it’s expensive it’s 
been a nightmare for most of the payers (...). So I understand that, but 
after sixteen years of clinical experience and twenty thousand patients
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treated and no real serious side effects shown, and repeated results 
from other independent clinics, I think it’s more proven with this 
technique than in any other cartilage repair technique.
(Orthopaedic surgeon and director of specialist medical centre for ACI, 
CI-EU3, 2003)
Thus cost-efficacy is an important factor in the broader discussion on efficacy 
of ACI treatment, and of other tissue engineered applications that have entered 
the market place in recent years. This is also what NICE took into account in 
their appraisal of ACI, where in addition to clinical efficacy also the cost 
effectiveness of ACI was studied -  based on factors of the cost of the cell 
culture and treatment costs including those of surgery, days as an in-patient, 
and follow-up physiotherapy. With the need for effective use of NHS resources 
in mind, ACI was compared with two other surgical procedures for cartilage 
repair and a model was developed to assess cost effectiveness and quality of 
life improvement in different stages.41
Whereas a concern with cost of ACI is relatively underplayed by interviewees in 
this sample, this is of key concern in the wound healing market. In the case of 
ACI only a limited number of alternative treatments are available, which are all 
surgical procedures of some kind, and with some more established therapies 
than others (for example microfracture and the still relatively experimental 
mosaicplasty technique). This is not the case in wound healing, where a range 
of dressings and other therapies with varying wound healing capacities enter 
and exit the clinic over shorter or longer periods of time (one interviewee spoke 
of ‘the current fashion’ in this respect; Co2, 2003). In other words tissue 
engineered applications in wound care, for example for the treatment of 
diabetic ulcers or burns, have to compete with a variety of clinical alternatives, 
some of which have an established safety profile, and most of which are 
generally cheaper or easier in use. This does not mean these alternatives are 
more effective in healing wounds, but cost-efficacy plays a more prominent role 
in the evaluation of this particular technology. The extract below is from a 
clinical professional with experience in the use of many different therapies for 
healing ulcers:
41 Based on short-term data it was argued that a slightly higher success rate of ACI compared 
to alternative treatments would not justify additional cost, but because of lack of (consistent) 
data over a longer period of time the relative effectiveness of ACI compared to other treatments 
could not be assessed, nor the quality of life gain from treating with ACI (NICE 2005: 15).
158
I think money is a big limiting factor and I think it is getting enough 
evidence of efficacy. There is not enough hard evidence of efficacy. And 
at some stage you’ve got to go with the faith and think: well, I don’t think 
I’m going to do any harm using this product so I’m going to monitor it 
very, very carefully and see if it is beneficial. That’s definitely the big 
restriction. If this was brought out and was costing 50p an application, it 
would be used universally up and down the country. But I think definitely 
the cost is a big, big, factor.
(Clinician and professional member of consumer organisation in wound 
healing Co2, 2003)
Thus cost is an ‘added’ factor in not just the introduction of these products into 
the clinic and marketplace, but also in gaining long-term experience and 
gathering outcome data on the clinical efficacy. As such, the example of wound 
healing illustrates a strong correlation between clinical efficacy and cost- 
effectiveness, which turns the discussion on clinical risk to questions about the 
need for clinical efficacy as related to both safety and commercialisation of the 
technology.
To conclude, this chapter has focused on clinical risk, defined in terms of 
evidence of efficacy of tissue engineered applications. The starting point for this 
search for clinical efficacy is the perceived inadequacy of animal models for the 
pre-clinical testing of tissue engineered applications, where experimental 
studies in humans are seen as ‘the big test’ for assessing safety and efficacy of 
these products. The need for clinical efficacy is driven by the limitations of other 
means of assessing efficacy, in the light of uncertainty of predictability in pre- 
clinical research, i.e. in finding an appropriate animal model for initial testing on 
safety and efficacy, before entering in the human trial population. But the case 
study example of ACI has shown how particular boundaries are articulated, 
where the ‘classical’ ways of collecting data on safety and efficacy, most 
notably via randomised controlled trials, are not considered the most 
appropriate ways of gaining the desired information. Thus one of the concerns 
as expressed by scientists and clinicians in this study, and with a more 
commercial agenda in mind brought up by the manufacturers in this sample, 
relates to the kind of evidence that is needed to gain insight into efficacy and 
safety of (particular) tissue engineering applications, the methods to collect this 
evidence and the tools to evaluate the technology more general.
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The second reason why clinical efficacy is important relates to the trajectory 
after the clinical study phase, more specifically the need of efficacy data for 
cost-benefit studies, for regulatory approval of tissue engineered applications, 
and for reimbursement of these products by national insurance and healthcare 
providers. The medical profession needs to get convinced of clinical efficacy 
and safety to make the transition from lab to clinic, whereas regulators need 
evidence of efficacy and safety for the smooth transition to the market and to 
wider applications in search for commercial success. How clinical risk is linked 
with commercial risk is described in more detail in the next chapter.
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6 Commercial risk
This chapter starts by demonstrating how clinical risk is linked with commercial 
risk, which is the last tier of the risk classification as outlined before.
Commercial risk covers the economic implications and hurdles for introducing 
novel therapies and products in the market place. This is first discussed in 
relation to cost and cost effectiveness for tissue engineered products. These 
issues are referred to as the ‘fourth hurdle’, representing the increasing need 
for manufacturers to demonstrate the economic value of their product before 
they are able to obtain marketing approval and reimbursement. But commercial 
risk also has a broader connotation. These developments are set in an 
unstable commercial environment of start-up biotech companies that do not 
have the means or expertise to successfully commercialise and launch 
products in a climate of fading investors’ confidence and lack of unified 
regulatory controls, taking place against a socio-political background of 
diminishing public confidence in biotechnology more general after health scares 
such as BSE and public controversies such as those over genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs). The second part of this chapter considers the commercial 
climate and setting in which tissue engineered applications are developed, 
which poses additional barriers to product marketing.
In this domain new social worlds are created and alternative boundaries drawn. 
The risks of biological starting materials, identified as strong boundary objects 
in technological risk, are in this context reconstructed: where autologous 
sources were considered ‘safe’ in the initial R&D phases, these become part of 
a considerably more risky frame when entering the commercial cycle. 
Furthermore, the value of clinical risk changes when efficacy does not just 
affect the patient but also the taxpayer. These considerations lead to a more 
dynamic model to get to grips with categorising interviewees’ risk perceptions, 
which is discussed in the subsequent chapter.
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6.1 The fourth hurdle
A dominant issue impacting on the commercial development and marketing 
success of tissue engineered applications concerns the cost effectiveness and 
reimbursement of the treatment. Demonstration of efficacy is needed in some 
countries to get marketing approval for tissue engineered applications, 
depending on the regulatory framework. But marketing authorisation is not 
enough:
Because it's not only regulation, that's point one, if you get the regulation 
at least the reimbursement agency will recognise it, like okay it's a 
medical product, but then we're still not there and we still need to solve 
how do we get the reimbursement? The problem with small companies 
is of course that... everybody knows these products are expensive, 
more expensive than maybe other products out there, but we know they 
bring much more value to the patients. But when do you prove that with 
hard data? If you have 5 -6-7 years follow-up data... you cannot wait for 
that amount of data. So that's the difficulty. That's the difficulty and that's 
why you see all the small companies, they just cannot afford to be in this 
business anymore because you are not getting paid for these products. 
(Regulatory affairs specialist in European tissue engineering company 
M-EU4, 2003)
Many products are not reimbursed by national health services and insurance 
systems in absence of long-term data to show the superiority of these products 
in terms of clinical efficacy and cost-effectiveness. Thus therapeutic 
effectiveness is also relevant in lifting experimental therapies from the clinic to 
the market place. However, as pointed out by the European Commission:
Many of the tissue-engineered products are still in early stages of 
development. The small biotech companies involved do not have the 
resources for large, long-term clinical trials to provide information on the 
cost-effectiveness of the treatment compared to conventional 
alternatives. Lack of cost-effective ness data is the main reason for which 
insurance companies are reluctant to reimburse treatment with tissue- 
engineered products. (European Commission (EC) 2004).
Until recently, the usual procedure for reimbursement and market access for 
many innovative health technologies included ensuring the safety, efficacy and 
quality of the manufacturing process of the product -  also known as the three 
regulatory hurdles. With the increased availability of novel medical 
technologies, rising patient expectations and changing demographics in recent
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years, healthcare systems have come under extensive pressure to work 
towards more efficient ways of providing care. Thus in addition to safety, 
efficacy and quality, the clinical cost and cost-effective ness of medical 
interventions are increasingly taken into consideration for purposes of 
regulation and reimbursement (Kanavos et al. 2000)42
Critics have argued how this development is part of a broader trend which has 
driven policy reform in the healthcare sector. Globalisation, the crisis of the 
welfare state and the neoliberal narrative in health policy have called for 
increasing standardisation with more significant pressure for free market 
solutions, alongside an acceleration of techno-scientific innovation in medicine 
(Gottweis 2005). The more efficient organisation and provision of healthcare is 
exemplar for the rise of the healthcare market (Moran 1998, 1999), where 
healthcare systems have recognised how a technical or medical frame of 
reference is no longer sufficient (Drummond 1980).
Against this background economic evaluation has become more central. 
Several countries have now made economic evaluation part of the formal 
authorisation procedure as part of their national reimbursement strategies, 
particularly in Europe, while in some other countries the submission of 
economic evidence is voluntary. National agencies have been set up to 
conduct health technology assessments (HTA) to review new and existing 
healthcare interventions and to provide recommendations to funding and
42 A note should be added here about the use of terminology and meaning. Cost-effectiveness 
in the economic sense of the word is a comparison of the relative expenditure (costs) and 
outcomes (effects). In health care a variety of models has been developed to assess the 
comparative impacts of expenditures on different health interventions, which have provoked 
extensive debate on both the appropriate methodology and the role of these studies in 
decision-making about medical treatments and therapies. Some of these models use monetary 
units to measure outcomes or benefits (cost-benefit analysis) while others express benefit in 
quality adjusted life years (cost-utility analysis). Cost-benefit analysis usually compares 
different health interventions by using a ratio where the denominator is the gain in health (such 
as adverse reactions avoided) and the numerator is the incremental cost of obtaining benefits. 
The denominator may be expressed in years of lives saved or undesirable outcomes averted. 
One of the criticisms of this cost effectiveness approach is that it does not take into account 
other benefit factors of a clinical intervention such as quality of life, satisfaction, different 
preferences and values et cetera.
The purpose of this chapter is not to provide a cost-effectiveness analysis of tissue engineered 
products, nor to revisit the debate on the use of these different economic evaluation models. 
Cost-effectiveness is part of a broader consideration of commercial factors and risks that affect 
the marketing of tissue engineered products as expressed by interviewees in my research 
sample. This chapter provides an analysis and some explanation of the increasing need for 
cost-effectiveness studies in gaining regulatory approval and reimbursement, rather than 
attempting to provide such a study.
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reimbursement bodies (see for an overview Paul and Trueman (2001) and 
Drummond (2003)).43 Critical sociologists have described the use of rhetorical 
discourse in the construction of a ‘need’ for health technology assessment, 
arguing how the cost-containment justification for HTA has been used as 
rhetorical device in boundary setting (Faulkner 1997). Concern of expenditure 
might have been an original cause, but assessment of healthcare technologies 
is also - and arguably increasingly - driven by other concerns, such as health 
benefits and risks of technology and its social implications.
The introduction of this fourth hurdle affects the development and 
commercialisation of innovative health technologies. Although it has now 
become a familiar concept in the licensing process for pharmaceuticals and to 
a lesser extent medical devices and biotech products, the fourth hurdle has 
also gained ground in tissue engineering. As the clinician below explains, with 
an expensive technology such as tissue engineering the collection of economic 
outcome data in this field is becoming inevitable:
We need science behind that [tissue engineering technology] and we 
need proper prospective studies because after all it’s going to be more 
expensive, so we will have to validate this not only for efficacy but then 
also the second wave, the cost effectiveness of what we are doing here. 
(...) Like any other treatment, we will have to make sure that we can get 
the proper treatment to the proper patient. And for that you will need 
reimbursement. And the reimbursement will only be obtained if you have 
reasonable efficacy studies and prospective randomised trials, if you 
follow the evidence based medicine and the rules and the regulations 
and if you can come up with some cost effectiveness studies.
(Clinician involved in European start-up company CL-EU5, 2003)
Thus beyond the need for clinical efficacy, as discussed in the last chapter, 
also in tissue engineering an arguably upcoming trend can be witnessed of 
including cost effectiveness parameters in assessing the comparative health 
gains of a treatment or product. A manufacturer of autologous cartilage 
applications described this fourth hurdle procedure in a European country as 
follows:
43 The work of the technology appraisal committees under the UK National Institute for Clinical 
Excellence (N ICE) is a well-documented example, while other countries with similar 
arrangements include the Netherlands, Belgium, Finland, Portugal, Norway, Sweden and more 
recently Hungary. Australia has been reported to be the first healthcare system to make these 
requirements part of the formal authorisation procedure in 1993. See for national examples 
Taylor et al (2004).
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If you want to be reimbursed you have to submit a dossier. (...) This 
authority basically needs to know two things, first of all: what is the 
clinical efficacy of your product, which you have to prove providing them 
with clinical data. Describe what type of studies, good clinical practices, 
how many patients, the statistics etc and this is with precision. And so 
the clinical efficacy, that is what they ask for first, and secondly they ask 
for the commercial efficiency, which means: is it cheaper, is it a cheaper 
treatment compared to the other treatments, existing treatments or is it 
more expensive? Because before they say that they will reimburse it 
they have to know what impact it will have on the insurance companies. 
(...) You understand this problem, if you have a new product which is 
fantastic clinically but costs too much, they can not put it on the list 
because they will say that this is good for the patients but who is going 
to pay for this?
(Director of multinational company in Europe producing autologous 
tissue engineering applications including cartilage M-EU10, 2003)
This section starts with a focus on these economic aspects of the marketing 
process, including a concern with both cost and cost effectiveness of the 
technology, while the second part provides more detail about reimbursement 
policies in Europe.
6.1.1 Cost and cost effectiveness
Tissue engineered products are expensive, which is a potential limitation in 
bringing these products to the (public) market and gain profit. The costs of 
individual applications in tissue engineering are high compared to older, more 
established treatments. As one scientist explains, over the last years many 
products have benefited from modern biotechnological developments in which 
much has been invested, ‘so as you are growing in sophistication you are also 
growing in cost’ (A-EU8, 2003).
Interviewees have given several reasons for the high cost of tissue engineered 
applications. The most important factor relates to the production process of cell 
culturing, which is a very labour intense activity that takes time (CL-EU3, 2003; 
CI6, 2003). Special facilities are needed, such as clean rooms, to control the 
culturing process and to guarantee a sufficient amount of quality cells that are 
viable and effective. Cell culturing of this kind also requires high-skilled and 
specialised staff working in the laboratories and manufacturing units. In 
addition, some products undergo a complicated logistic process, where cells
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are transported under monitored and controlled conditions over different sites, 
often operating in short time windows. This is of particular importance for 
autologous products, which are extra vulnerable because the timing of use is 
more difficult to manage compared to donor products that are ready from stock 
on ordering by the clinician.
Cost is an especially pressing issue in woundcare management, which is one 
of the most developed areas of tissue engineering technology with several 
products already on the US and European markets. As such these have the 
longest ‘track record’. Major differences in application area exist, some more 
acute than others, and alternative treatments are available. Most skin 
equivalents currently approved are based on human donor material, which 
means they are available ‘off the shelf; less time is lost in planning of the 
culturing process while transport and delivery is more flexible compared to 
autologous applications. Thus most woundcare products are available on a 
mass-produced basis rather than as customised treatment. From a commercial 
perspective tissue engineered applications for woundcare are the most 
advanced applications of its kind. But they are also more expensive, difficult to 
attach to a specific target market, their therapeutic effectiveness is debated and 
none of these products are in widespread or routine clinical use, as illustrated 
below.
The price of human skin equivalents ranges between under a few hundred US 
dollars to over a thousand dollars per unit, which can on average cover a 
square foot of skin. Depending on the wound more than one application is 
needed. Apligraf costs about US$1000 per unit, which comes in a circular disk 
of 75 mm, while similar products for treating venous leg ulcers and diabetic foot 
ulcers are available for around the same unit cost (Hanft et al. 2003; Thuesen 
2001). In comparison, cadaver skin costs only a little over $2 per square 
inch (and usually comes in much larger sheets). Also simple dressings are 
relatively cheap, from a few cents to usually not exceeding the $5.
Especially with the limited shelf life of many tissue engineered products, there 
is an inherent risk of having to discard the product after the expiry date has 
gone. Also practitioners’ unfamiliarity with these relatively novel products in 
routine practice can lead to misuse and waste.
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With increasing importance of cost-effectiveness of innovative therapies, these 
tissue engineered applications have to compete with usually cheaper and often 
more ‘proven’ effective therapeutic alternatives. This means that, to justify the 
cost, the product needs to compensate in other areas, such as efficacy or ease 
of use. As a research scientist put it, a small improvement over current 
therapeutic possibilities is not enough to convince clinicians: ‘So the major limit 
is that what we do is going to have to be fantastically better than what is 
already out there on the market’ (S7, 2003). But as another scientist explains, 
the treatment regime for many tissue engineered products is long and 
complicated, adding to cost and hesitation by clinicians and insurance 
companies alike:
And then there’s the cost implication which has been identified, that 
some of these tissue engineering products are so expensive or they are 
so fiddly to apply that they’re not as easy as giving, you know, a little old 
lady a pill to pop once a day. You know, these are people who might 
need to go into clinics a couple of times a week to have aftercare, and 
that’s expensive... unless there’s a real reason to, for the extra expense 
and tissue engineering product, then there’s not going to be approval 
by... the insurance companies. And so the markets for some of these 
products are a lot, lot more smaller than people originally thought. 
(Academic research scientist in UK tissue engineering lab S1, 2003)
Issues to do with ease of use in the clinic and familiarity with how the product 
performs are thus, in combination with high cost, one limitation. Although the 
potential market for woundcare products has been estimated to be large and 
growing, it has been argued that the precise market size and the specific target 
population of patients who would potentially benefit from this technology are as 
yet unknown:
The current population of patients that require repair of chronic 
wounds... there are many hundred thousand patients; one fraction of 
those could be helped with a minimally invasive type of treatment? We 
don’t know.
(Academic research scientist in UK S6, 2003)
This uncertainty around actual market size is further complicated by the effect 
that many clinicians do not consider tissue engineering to be a ‘first line 
treatment’ or preference out of a range of possible therapeutic interventions:
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I guess recognising that the high cost and high tech aspect of tissue 
engineering at the present time... you won’t use it as first line treatment 
for all the patients, that... is to say, well let’s use simple things for the 
patients first but if the simple things don’t work then ah, select the 
appropriate tissue engineered or other biologically based therapy, that 
might correct the abnormality as stage two.
(Clinician in wound healing in UK university hospital CI3, 2003)
The adagio to ‘keep things simple’ is pervasive in many medical 
specialisations, as also illustrated by another clinician who argues that there is 
a tradition to ‘find simple solutions, and even if it takes longer for the patient to 
get back to work or even if it’s not as good, it’s acceptable on the basis that it’s 
cheaper.’ (CI2, 2003).
Thus commercial risk is framed in terms of high initial cost of high-tech 
individual applications, that are furthermore targeted at only a specific but as 
yet unknown sub-population of patients that could potentially benefit from the 
intervention, and for which long-term evidence of therapeutic effectiveness is in 
most cases limited or absent. Especially in wound management an overall 
scepticism exists towards tissue engineered skin products, as there are 
alternative treatment options that are cheaper and with a stronger medical- 
scientific basis (CI4, 2003).
The difficulties that, I think, the commercial things have, is that they see 
the total picture of that wound problem and say: that’s the business 
which we should be chasing. And the business is huge if they see the 
whole and total number of patients there with wounds. But my view 
would be, be more realistic and carve a sub group of that total 
population and make sure your products are being used efficiently and 
effectively and then you’re going to have an even bigger argument that 
you are actually using it appropriately. Because the other problem we 
have is this concept that wounds equals dressing equals fifty p a go and 
even if that fifty p a go goes on for months or years it doesn’t matter 
because a unit cost the dressing is fifty p. If you suddenly come in now 
and say: I want to put a five hundred pound piece of something on there, 
they see that as a huge increase... we’re talking about a huge 
differential in cost and even if the five hundred pound was expensive as 
a unit cost, if I could heal more patients within a shorter period of time, 
that should be much better.
(Clinician in wound healing in UK university hospital CI3, 2003)
But as this quote illustrates there is also an underlying alternative scenario of 
explaining economic cost in a more differential manner, which is especially 
dominant amongst manufacturers and some clinicians. While the initial high
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product cost is being recognised and criticised, the economic add-up should 
also include overall treatment costs as part of a broader cost-benefit analysis. 
As several clinicians underline, the ‘true cost’ of treatment in woundcare is 
determined by staffing and hospitalisation at least as much as the unit cost for 
individual products. Measuring these costs is complicated in some countries, 
such as the UK, due to separate budget management strategies in hospitals. 
Thus reductions in for example the costs of nursing staff are not visible in the 
supply department, and different budgets are not linked or matched. This is 
also the experience of another healthcare professional in woundcare 
management:
As with any specialist wound dressing off-loading treatment method, if it 
doesn’t involve the patient becoming an in-patient, it is a different 
budget. So it’s cheaper to have them in bed, in the hospital ward for one 
budget, for our budget, than for us to actually be treating them as out­
patients, keeping them out of hospital where they are healthier, happier 
and probably cheaper to treat unless they become an in-patient with the 
added risks of that and then coming off someone else’s budget. This is 
the problem; it’s a budget situation definitely.
(UK clinician in wound healing Co2, 2003)
Many interviewees stress how the current way of assessing cost and benefit is 
a difficult model to apply to tissue engineering, mainly pointing out the longer 
term benefits for both economy and patients. Furthermore, and this is an 
interesting shift compared to promises in the early days of tissue engineering, 
they argue that tissue engineering has an added value in improving quality of 
life rather than providing life saving treatments, and as such cannot compete on 
a direct cost basis:
Let me take say skin used for diabetic wound healing. This may be more 
expensive treatment but the results and prognosis for the patient is 
much better and the result is much quicker. Now this is going to make 
some interesting questions about comparing that more expensive initial 
treatment against something that seems to be cheaper but in fact 
requires a revision and constant returns to the hospital, and this is where 
health care technology assessment is going to be very difficult I think for 
some of these products.
(Representative European industry association M-EU2, 2003)
And as a consultant for a multinational agrees, ‘it requires almost a reappraisal 
of how the costs are managed within health systems... health evaluation in a 
bigger picture sort of way’ (M2, 2003). Healthcare assessment models should
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take into account longer term benefits to patients and healthcare budgets as 
well as more broad definitions of cost.
Interviewees frame this in terms of a tension between short term costs of 
purchasing individual applications and longer term cost-benefit solutions in 
terms of hospitalisation. But also less narrow economic parameters such as 
quality of life for patients, improved health outcomes, and less side effects are 
mentioned as important factors in the overall balance. As an official in supply 
and purchase explains, the element of cost has diverse dimensions:
When you’re looking at wound care products, you’re not just looking at 
cost factors, you’re also looking at cost in use of the product, as for how 
long, if it’s a dressing, how long does it stay in place for that patient -  is 
it five days, is it seven days? You’re looking at total cost. You’re also 
looking at how it conforms to the individual patients in that, maybe the 
adhesive can be aggressive on your skin (...) What I’m saying is more 
than one type, you can’t just look at cost in that respect.
(Policy advisor in purchase and supply office of national healthcare 
provider 01, 2003)
Thus cost-cost comparisons have only limited value, and are part of a bigger 
frame in which to assess the costs and benefits of these treatments. In a similar 
vein, the following clinician in woundcare feels there are different outcome 
measures for improved health, beyond the question whether a wound is healed 
or not:
If I could measure an improvement in quality of life or... reduction of 
hospital in-patient days or reduction of district nurse visits, that is 
another way of measuring success... When we’re looking at healing as 
the only measure but, as I say, if I can reduce the pain, if I can reduce 
the frequency of visits and I can get the patient back out and about going 
to the shops, that for a patient may be just as important as healing them. 
(Clinician in wound healing in UK university hospital CI3, 2003)
According to these interviewees cost is not just a narrow economic factor which 
is a simple add-up of initial product cost and linked to an exclusive desired 
clinical outcome. Furthermore, commercial risk is to a certain extent 
acceptable, also depending on the specific application area. As has been 
discussed before in relation to quality and safety aspects, also in framing 
commercial risk interviewees make a distinction between potentially life-saving 
treatments and those interventions aimed at improvement of quality of life. In 
woundcare management this differentiation is most visible in treatment
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strategies for clinical interventions of burns and (diabetic) ulcers -  the most 
common treatment areas where tissue engineered products have been used so 
far. It has been argued that product cost is less of a barrier for introduction and 
use in the clinic when the condition to be treated is more expensive and 
‘serious’:
The difference between burns and a chronic leg ulcer is if somebody 
comes in with a burn, if I don’t give them what they need, they’re going 
to die. Somebody like an old lady with a leg ulcer, she ain’t going to die 
from a leg ulcer but she will just become socially more and more isolated 
and smelly and, you know, more and more dependent on others. The 
other thing within the cost of treating somebody with a severe burn, the 
cost of my tissue engineered product is minuscule compared to the cost 
of the overall treatment of that patient, in terms of intensive care time 
and drugs, surgical interventions, the repeated trips back to the theatre. 
So all of those things would say that burns are expensive conditions to 
treat, therefore an expensive piece of tissue engineered product is, the 
nap of the backside of the total treatment cost of that. Whereas, because 
the vast majority of these chronic wounds go on for months or years and 
a vast majority of those costs are actually borne in the community by 
district nurses who quite fairly and understandably at the moment, can 
go and see a patient every day for months or years with no measure of 
success. You know, how many minutes, how many hours, how much 
travelling time, how much petrol allowance, how much of all of those 
other things will actually add to the total treatment cost of that patient in 
their own home. (...) I think that at this moment in time nobody 
conceptualises the contribution of staff costs to total treatment costs of 
chronic wounds.
(Clinician in wound healing in UK university hospital CI3, 2003)
But costly development of a technology shows only one side of the coin. More 
problematic, as underlined by commercial developers in this field, is the current 
scarcity and fragmentation of reimbursement policies for these products in 
Europe. Clinicians have some autonomy in deciding which products are used in 
individual treatment plans for patients, but these decisions have to be cleared 
by health authorities for reimbursement. This is especially pressing when more 
expensive therapies are used, whereby limited budgets prohibit large-scale 
use. The interviewee below has experience in a national purchase and supply 
agency, explaining how only a small selection of patients can benefit from 
tissue engineered technology under a national health scheme:
It would be down to the clinicians actually to using it, to actually decide 
all that, how cost effective it would be at the end. Because they’ve got 
their budgets, to be honest, and these [tissue engineered] products, you
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know, you’d be struggling to actually maybe get one person per year 
actually on these products because of their tight budget.
(Policy advisor in purchase and supply office of national healthcare 
provider 01, 2003)
6.1.2 Reimbursement
Reimbursement of tissue engineering technologies is problematic in Europe as 
long as many products are still in early development stages, with the current 
commercial set-up of mainly small start-up companies and the scarcity of long­
term clinical data, and limited cost-effectiveness of the treatment compared to 
conventional alternatives. Currently no public health system or private health 
insurance in any of the EU Member States offers general coverage for tissue 
engineering treatments.
Many interviewees construct a direct link between the current absence of a 
pan-European system for marketing approval of tissue engineered products 
and the lack of reimbursement of these treatments. A spokesperson of an 
influential European trade association explains:
The other thing that is a little bit of a disincentive at the moment is the 
absence of a unified regulatory system. People are becoming wary 
about investing a lot of money in research and development and without 
let’s say the stability that a regulatory system will give - and not just that; 
without a regulatory system there is likely to be an absence of 
reimbursement system and if you’re going to invest a lot of money into 
developing products you reasonably want to be reimbursed for them. But 
without a regulatory system there is no real ground rules for that either. 
(Representative of European industry association for medical devices M- 
EU2, 2003)
The current confusion around the proper regulatory pathways for tissue 
engineering is reflected in reimbursement strategies. A regulatory affairs 
consultant for a multinational company argues how a fragmented regulatory 
system can have short term benefits for companies wanting to target 
unregulated markets - until the reimbursement issue comes in:
Basically they [tissue engineered products] are unregulated. That might 
be seen initially as an advantage in some countries until you realise that 
the reimbursement system through health services etc require some 
kind of regulatory approval. So you may be able to sell but much of your 
reimbursement, a lot of your market, will disappear. (...)
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So that’s why industry has really been in the unusual position of really 
pushing very much for a pan-European regulatory structure.
(Scientific manager corporate product safety assurance for multinational 
company M2, 2003)
Although regulatory measures as such do not have a direct impact on 
reimbursement policies in individual countries, the negotiation position of 
companies might improve once regulatory controls are in place to cover these 
products in Europe (Bock et al. 2005).
While regulatory initiatives can be set and negotiated at European level, the 
health insurance system in Europe is not standardised. Individual EU Member 
States have separate national arrangements for their respective health care 
systems, whether public or private, leading to a wide array of care and 
reimbursement options:
I think it’s up to companies to make the case for people to use their 
products, and healthcare providers to decide whether that case is 
convincing, that’s the market. I mean healthcare is a sort of controlled 
market and you get national bodies like NICE [the UK National Institute 
for Health and Clinical Excellence] making recommendations. I mean it’s 
up to society to determine how monolithic it wants that choice to be. Do 
you have national reimbursement, local reimbursement, whatever.
That’s a major societal choice, a health-care funding choice. (...) 
Funding of healthcare is one area where you can’t say there is a 
European approach.
(Clinical scientist in multinational industrial setting M-EU1, 2003)
Reimbursement is generally left to the (sub)national level, creating wide variety 
and fragmentation in healthcare funding and reimbursement policies. 
Reimbursement issues are discussed as part of a broader concern with 
regulation and marketing approval for tissue engineered products in Europe, 
but is left outside the scope of any European legislation, based on Treaty 
agreements that place healthcare arrangements under autonomy of Member 
States. In these circumstances manufacturers have an interest in some 
standard or ‘high level principles’, as a representative of a multinational 
company put it during an industrial stakeholders meeting:
First of all, it’s not whether you have a good product or a bad product 
which decides if you will have success on the market; if you don’t have 
the right regulatory framework, there is no chance. But it’s not only the 
regulatory framework as such.... There needs to be some level of 
harmonisation for reimbursement. This is one of the very sticky points. It
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is unconceivable that there are ways out of this dilemma by agreeing on 
some high level principles without dictating every Member State what to 
do with it. At least they can agree on those principles, which will be used 
to evaluate what a product is worth and being reimbursed by the payer 
or not. (Niese 2005)
In Europe large national differences exist in the openness of both clinicians and 
regulatory or financing bodies towards novel therapies. In the US approval of 
an innovative treatment by the FDA is generally followed by a quick diffusion 
and reimbursement. Although this system provides clarity, it has major 
drawbacks for manufacturers in terms of high-cost, long lead-times and a strict 
approach. Commercial providers are pressing for possible reimbursement of 
the manufacturing costs of products while in the clinical trials stage, which 
would especially benefit the many small companies that lack the means and 
resources for long-term investment.
But larger companies in the field, familiar with a longer term ‘pharmaceutical’ 
type of investment and return model, are also affected by the current gap in 
regulation and reimbursement strategies. Lack of general reimbursement was 
one of the main reasons for the exit from the European market by the biggest 
commercial provider of tissue engineered cartilage repair treatment (ACI), 
Genzyme. Some national health systems only reimburse part of the treatment, 
or have a case by case procedure, while under other schemes the treatment is 
only available on the private market.44
Developers have become creative in finding solutions to market their products. 
Some products are made available as part of a clinical trial, and as such ‘on the 
market’. The treatments as part of clinical research are usually small and of
44 For example, the clinic in Sweden, where ACI was originally developed, has agreements with 
the Swedish and Norwegian state, so that patients with a referral from a Head of a Department 
of Orthopaedics can get the treatment under the national social welfare systems. According to 
one clinician in this clinic “probably fifty percent of the patients have a referral for cartilage. And 
then we have foreigners... W e have a lot of patients from different countries but of course they 
have to pay themselves” (CL-EU3, 2003). Some national health systems only reimburse part of 
the treatment, or have a case by case procedure. For example in Germany most public and 
private insurance systems do provide coverage for the surgical procedure for ACI and aftercare 
such as physiotherapy, but not for the laboratory work needed to culture the cartilage cells, 
which is where profit is made for companies. As a manufacturer of ACI explains, this means 
that: “Either the patient is paying himself or he has to ask the insurance company for every 
single treatment if they are going to pay for it or not. So every single patient means that the 
doctor needs to write a letter to the insurance, the insurance answers five weeks later: no.” (M- 
EU10, 2003).
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limited duration and are not or only partially funded via national healthcare 
systems (S4, 2003). Also, applications in an experimental setting are generally 
not being reimbursed. Thus ‘one could perform clinical trials indefinitely, but 
you are not reimbursed for the material used in the clinical trials, so we need to 
have a situation where we know how we can access the market with these 
products’ (M-EU8, 2003).
6.2 Effects of the fourth hurdle on innovation and public 
health
This section demonstrates how fourth hurdle strategies affect manufacturers in 
their search for profit and innovation, while high cost and lack of reimbursement 
have the potential for creating or widening health inequalities by limiting the 
availability of this technology to patients.
6.2.1 Effects on commercial development and innovation
Also in tissue engineering the fourth hurdle is ‘real’ and getting closer. Many 
interviewees express concerns with an increasingly demanding climate of cost, 
in combination with clinical evaluation of new medical interventions. They frame 
this as representing a form of commercial risk that in the first instance affects 
manufacturers. In tissue engineering cost-effectiveness is becoming a 
significant barrier to market to sit alongside safety, efficacy and quality. The 
rationale behind fourth hurdle strategies relates to the distribution of scarce 
resources to obtain maximum health gain - for a certain price:
This requirement [to demonstrate economic efficiency] challenges the 
wealth creation ethic of industry (money) with the population health ethic 
of public health and health economics (your life). Despite practical and 
methodological obstacles to the use of economic evidence in decisions, 
the logic of this development is evident: in order to maximise 
improvements in population health, scarce resources must be targeted 
towards developing and applying technologies that deliver the greatest 
health gains per unit cost. The impact of this policy change on industry 
practice and profits will be considerable, and companies that fail to 
demonstrate the economic efficiency of their products will stumble at the 
fourth hurdle (Maynard and Cookson 2001).
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Some speculation exists about effects of the fourth hurdle on reimbursement 
policies, but also on the price of interventions or products. In the 
pharmaceuticals market for example it has been reported that fourth hurdle 
policies have contributed to more cost-effective use of drugs (Taylor et al.
2004). Because of the less stabilised and more marginal position of tissue 
engineered products in the European market, it is difficult to extrapolate these 
suggestions and predict the beneficial effects of cost-effectiveness 
requirements. Currently most interviewees underline their awareness of the 
need for economic evaluation -  although there is discussion about the specific 
models and data requirements that would apply to tissue engineering. The 
dominant discourse then relates to the negative impact of cost-effectiveness 
requirements on the innovation process, where (especially small) 
manufacturers are unable to recoup cost and make profit. As such, this would 
in the first place affect the position of commercial developers.
Another layer in the construction of commercial risk puts strong emphasis on 
the link between regulation and reimbursement, where it is argued that the 
current lack of pan-European controls for tissue engineering undermines the 
grounds for consideration of reimbursement by health authorities and insurance 
companies. An added difficulty is the localised and fragmented nature of 
reimbursement policies in Europe. Whereas regulatory controls can and 
currently are being negotiated at European level, decisions about 
reimbursement are left to national or local authorities within Member States. 
This is especially problematic in the face of a growing need for cost- 
effectiveness data that are measurable, comparable and transferable across 
countries and local healthcare situations (Pang 2002: 76).45 Although pan- 
European regulation of tissue engineered products does not guarantee general 
reimbursement by national systems, currently there is wide variety in both 
regulatory and reimbursement policies within and between different countries in
45 As has been pointed out by several authors (e.g. Pang, 2002), there is a growing need for 
cost-effectiveness data globally. For pharmaceuticals it is increasingly common for economic 
evaluations to be conducted on an international or at least pan-European scale, for example as 
part of randomised controlled trials. In tissue engineering though the set-up is much smaller 
(and often the means are lacking to collect these data, as discussed in the chapter on clinical 
risk). Thus while often the collection of economic data is being piggy-backed on to phase III 
randomised controlled clinical trials, where the effectiveness of the treatment is tested in a large 
population and compared to other available treatments, this format is problematic in tissue 
engineering.
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Europe. Also the weight attached to economic evaluations, either as part of or 
as separate track in marketing approval and reimbursement strategies, differs 
per country.
On the one hand industry pleads for European guidance on general principles 
for reimbursement of tissue engineering technologies, while on the other hand 
debate exists on the specific economic evaluation models to be used and how 
these often narrowly defined cost-effective ness data are to be interpreted for 
decision making purposes. This is part of a larger discussion on the use of 
economic models in healthcare evaluations. Here the need for including cost 
containment measures has not been questioned. However, the methodology of 
evaluation and the exclusive focus on cost-effective ness of medical 
interventions in health-care decisions is seen as problematic, especially in its 
use for determining reimbursement policy decisions (Drummond 2003).
6.2.2 Implications for patient access
Issues of cost and reimbursement are, according to the interviewees in this 
sample, first and foremost problematic for commercial developers of tissue 
engineering technology. But while it seems like manufacturers are the most 
affected by fourth hurdle policies, implications for patients are limited availability 
of potentially beneficial technology. Patient access to tissue engineering 
technology thus depends on more than just product availability, with 
reimbursement policies being of particular significance (Bock et al. 2005: 10). 
But reimbursement relates to use in public markets. Some private insurance 
companies cover (part of) the treatment with tissue engineered products. 
Current diversity in reimbursement strategies highlights issues of accessibility 
and affordability to the population at large. This touches upon the relation 
between cost and patient access, as also demonstrated by the scientist below:
The big difficulty all health care systems are facing, with these new 
technologies, that you can do so much. And who's the patient that you 
want to save? It's sort of a fundamental question. And we don't have 
enough money to save everyone but ethically we should save everyone. 
If you're a medical doctor you should save the patient that you have, but 
someone has to pay for it.
(Academic scientist based in clinical setting S-EU2, 2003)
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As argued throughout this section, high cost has been framed as problematic 
for commercial developers of tissue engineered products, especially in the face 
of an unknown market. But cost also has socio-political implications in terms of 
availability of novel therapies to the public and access of patients to technology, 
and as such affects end-users as well as developers. As the interviewees 
below explain, the high cost of tissue engineered technology limits the 
availability of products to the patient in a healthcare system based on public 
markets:
The risks, the risk are perhaps more commercial, that it’s going to take a 
lot of money to get some of these products. So one of the risks could be 
that tissue engineering products may only be available to those who can 
afford them.
(Academic research scientist in UK tissue engineering lab S1, 2003)
There’s issues relating to cost because I suspect the NHS will never be 
able to afford the people to be able to have tissue engineering 
procedures done on them. We’re already seeing this with drug treatment 
from the point of view that you get this postcode lottery on certain 
expensive drugs. I think it will be very difficult to imagine a situation 
whereby the NHS pays for a lot of the treatments.
(Academic research scientist in UK tissue engineering lab S7, 2003)
This [technology] is expensive. It’s just possible that a significant number 
of Americans might be able to afford it and a few Europeans, but 
basically you’re inventing a technology which is not going to be available 
to most of the world.
(Clinical scientist in academic centre for health services research CM,
2003)
Lack of reimbursement is an economic risk for commercial developers, but the 
limited uptake by national health service systems has broader implications in 
the potential for social and health inequalities. Furthermore, cost and cost- 
effectiveness criteria pose one barrier in the successful transition to the market. 
The next section places these issues in the context of the broader economic 
climate. Here commercial risk is not just about expensive technologies only 
available to the lucky few. Several other factors have an impact on the 
commercial performance of tissue engineered products, some of them inherent 
to the industrial setting and configuration of the innovation process, with many 
small companies entering and exiting the competitive arena of tissue 
engineering R&D. The next section provides the socio-economic background of 
product development in this highly dynamic field.
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6.3 Commercialisation and the industrial setting
Commercial risks in terms of the high cost of the technology, lack of data on 
cost-effectiveness and problems with getting products reimbursed by national 
healthcare systems must be considered in a broader framework of 
commercialisation of tissue engineering and the economic climate in which 
current innovation takes place. This section focuses in more detail on the 
commercial environment in tissue engineering R&D, to gain insight into some of 
the hurdles en route to getting marketing approval for products and 
successfully launch products in the market.
6.3.1 Promises and bubbles
I suppose perhaps my naive view is that there’s been too much pressure 
on getting products to market, to recover the investments that have been 
made by venture capital, without perhaps doing the underpinning 
science properly. I think there’s a really good analogy here with the 
biotechnology industry. When the bio-technology started and then 
genetic engineering... everyone said this is the future for mankind, you 
know, we can cure all the world’s ills. And investments by venture capital 
companies were stupendous. I mean there’s so many biotech firms but 
now, twenty or thirty years later, there’s only really a few or a handful 
that have actually made it. And tissue engineering is at that stage now; 
that the hype at the beginning of tissue engineering was, that we’re 
going to, you know, new livers, new brain, we’re going to solve the 
problem. And in reality, first of all, it’s much more complex than that 
scientifically, and as you are identifying the regulatory hurdles, are 
completely new, sort of... products that are falling between regulatory 
stools. And then there’s the cost implication...
(Academic research scientist in UK tissue engineering lab S1, 2003)
Attention for tissue engineering reached its height in the mid 1990s, with 
popular media describing the immense potential of the technology, venture 
capitalists queuing to invest and start-up companies mushrooming. Tissue 
engineering was placed at similar height as genetics to be labelled the ‘greatest 
scientific achievements of the twentieth century’. A career in this field was seen 
as one of the ’10 hottest jobs of the future’, and tissue engineering was well on 
its way to become an estimated $100 billion industry (Lysaght and Hazlehurst
2004).
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As such, tissue engineering can be considered as a typical example of a 
technology surrounded by ‘potentiality’ (Ganchoff 2004). This potentiality is 
translated into hopes for an imagined therapeutic intervention on behalf of 
patients and developers, but also refers to a commercial hype generated by 
those with investments in the technology.
But this picture only partially reflected the R&D status at the time, with a limited 
amount of products on the market or awaiting approval, and many 
technological and regulatory problems to tackle. More recently tissue 
engineering is referred to in terms of ‘disappointing product launches’ in an 
economic unstable climate, with limited regulatory approval and issues of cost 
and reimbursement - and with some products under clinical trial, but none to be 
considered commercially successful. Notwithstanding optimistic future 
scenarios by market analysts, it has been argued that tissue engineering is 
having difficulty transitioning from a development stage industry to one with a 
successful product portfolio (Lysaght and Hazlehurst 2004). As the experience 
of this commercial developer reflects:
You don't see any of these products taking up well. There is not any 
tissue engineering technology that shows some success today in the 
market. And it will come, for sure it will come, but nobody foresees it. 
The technology is complex, the costs are high, convincing people high, 
people are scared or reluctant to give you approvals and then 
reimbursement agencies don't want to wait five years before they see an 
effect in money. So today you have not seen any tissue engineering 
product...
(Regulatory affairs specialist in company M-EU4, 2003)
The commercial environment for tissue engineering R&D is unstable and 
surrounded by uncertainty. The current tissue engineering activity takes place 
on a very small and developmental scale, with many biotech companies formed 
as university spin-offs, and markets that are nowhere near the order of 
magnitude as those for pharmaceutical products. To date, only a small number 
of tissue engineered products has entered the market, but none are considered 
commercially successful. According to interviewees in the inner circle of tissue 
engineering R&D, it is exactly the step from early innovation to commercial 
development that has proven problematic. The next section discusses the 
views and experiences of these respondents in more detail.
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6.3.2 From early innovation to commercialisation
If you looked at it in purely commercial terms, you could say maybe the 
tissue engineering commercial development bubble has already burst. 
But if you stand back from it and look at it in terms of research and 
product development, ignore the financial side, then I think more things 
are going on. (Academic scientist S5, 2003)
6.3.2.1 Limited markets and major funding streams
Disappointment has been expressed over the limited number of tissue
engineered products currently on the market, and the poor market acceptance 
of products that have been introduced so far. The fate of the first firms offering 
tissue engineered products has been discouraging, with bankruptcies, 
discontinuation of operations or considerable downsizing, sometimes after 
mergers and take-overs.46 It has been pointed out how the initial sales of these 
new products did not live up to expectations, because they generally did not 
attract large enough numbers of customers or because the improvements over 
existing therapies were limited to small subsets of patients.
The first generation of tissue engineering products actually entering the market 
included skin products and cartilage applications. These products were the 
most technically feasible ones, and by many developers considered as a 
stepping stone to more lucrative areas, such as orthopaedic and cardiovascular 
applications - and hopefully, one day, whole organs to replace heart valves, 
blood vessels, kidney, liver and pancreas etc. Here the real market potential 
was envisaged, with vast markets that lack effective alternatives and where 
shortage is most acute. But these applications are still in the category of early 
scientific exploration and far away from entering the clinic (Petit-Zeman 2001). 
As also pointed out by the European Commission:
The current commercialised products focus on comparatively simple 
tissues such as skin, cartilage and bone. Researchers have not yet 
developed tissue-engineered products with unique life saving functions 
or outstanding comparative advantages regarding effectiveness or
46 During the poor economic climate of the past few years, many tissue engineering companies 
had to downsize or restructure their businesses. Two prominent tissue engineering firms in the 
US, Organogenesis and Advanced Tissue Sciences, went bankrupt before the turn of the 
century (Bouchie 2002). The financial difficulties of pioneering companies adversely affects 
follow on companies.
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treatment costs. Alternative conventional treatments exist, which are 
firmly rooted in the market. (European Commission (EC) 2004)
Furthermore, the current R&D efforts are said to be imbalanced. For example 
many companies have focused on developing skin replacement products, thus 
‘overserving’ the wound care market. Consolidation would be needed to reduce 
the number of low-profit ‘me-too’ products, especially in the face of uncertainty 
around precise market size and target population for these products.
The global tissue engineering market to date is modest and smaller than 
originally envisaged, although great variability exists in estimations. Latest 
figures on the global market for tissue engineered products are estimated at up 
to 400 billion euro per year, but this is an estimation only found in industrial 
reports (EUCOMED 2006). Worldwide the US represents the largest and most 
advanced market.47 The European Union market has been estimated in the 
region of 50 to 100 million euros (Schutte 2003) although also more modest 
estimates have been mentioned, in the order of only several million a year 
(Husing et al. 2003: 84). A study carried out by the Commission’s research 
centre IPTS speaks of current sales not exceeding 60 million euros per year 
worldwide, which is a modest figure, but estimates a substantial future market 
growth with a global potential of roughly 100 billion euros (DG Enterprise 
2005d).
Until recently there was only a very rough idea of the actual size of the market 
and sales revenues of individual products. One much quoted study identified 89 
firms active in tissue engineering R&D over the year 2002, spread over 15 
countries and employing some 2611 FTEs, while global annual spending for 
that year was estimated at US$ 487 million (Lysaght and Hazlehurst 2004:
47 Commercialisation of tissue engineering started earlier in the States than in Europe, arguably 
because of the more favourable general climate of start-up companies and the availability of 
more venture capital. But this advantage over the rest of the world is changing. In 2001 ‘an 
interesting recent trend’ was observed with the emergence of significant activity in tissue 
engineering outside the United States, with at least 15 European companies being active in the 
field (2003). As later confirmed by Lysaght (2004), in the year 2000 about 80% of employees in 
tissue engineering were located in the US, while two years later this was only 54%, as opposed 
to 46%  workforce in the rest of the world. These percentages relate to stationing of employees 
rather than location of firms. Possible explanations for this shift include that the two main tissue 
engineering companies that went bankrupt, Organogenesis and Advanced Tissue Sciences, 
counted exclusively towards the US situation. Also the US policy on the use of stem cells and 
therapeutic cloning has possibly affected companies’ strategies for locating their business 
within or rather outside US borders.
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311). In the US markets have been identified and described since the mid 
1990s (see reports in: Lysaght 1995; Lysaght and Hazlehurst 2004; Lysaght et 
al. 1998; Lysaght and Reyes 2001). In contrast, data on markets, business 
developments and product output in Europe are patchy. A survey of regulatory 
authorities of European member states found that most were unable to list 
products currently available in their countries, highlighting the lack of 
information available here on the commercial aspects of the technology (TERG 
2003). Thus the availability of tissue engineered products in the EU is difficult to 
assess, and surrounded by uncertainty. A study for the European Commission 
identified about 35 products on the European market, mainly skin 
replacements, cartilage repair and some bone products. The European market 
is very fragmented and localised, with most products available on the home 
markets of companies, but no product available in all EU Member States (Bock 
et al. 2005).
Interviewees have expressed various rationales on the current poor market 
performance and availability of tissue engineering technologies. Most notably, 
as the following spokesperson of a European trade organisation demonstrates, 
there is an underlying framework where the innovation and funding model for 
biotechnologies such as tissue engineering is being questioned, if not blamed.
Well, what do we want? We want patients to have access to that 
innovation. Research has to continue. But the problem is: how much do 
you invest into research if you don’t know how to put the product on the 
market? It’s the chicken and egg syndrome... If the product doesn’t 
come on the market, you stop the research... In big companies the 
product disappears; in small companies the company disappears. And 
that is dramatic. We have to be aware that young innovative companies 
live on borrowed money. They live on money from venture capitalists... 
they want to have a return. And that return, we fail to explain to them, 
will take ten years to come (Vanhemelrijck 2005).
An overall characteristic is that the investment in R&D and market development 
cannot be covered by the current product sales: product revenues do not cover 
operating costs such as the high costs for production, maintenance and 
shipping of products, the high investments in R&D and budgets needed for 
marketing development (Husing et al. 2003: 83).
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The economic circumstances of tissue engineering companies are thought to 
be similar to those affecting the biotechnology industry as a whole (see Alper 
(2002) on bioentrepreneurship). The tissue engineering sector has relied 
heavily on investment capital rather than sales as a source of funds, and 
although perceived to be comparable to other high-tech sectors such as 
biotech and dot.com, it is exactly in these areas that the investors’ appetite has 
declined. Especially amongst scientists and manufacturers there is a strong 
discourse of pointing the finger to the investors’ climate and discussing the 
current poor uptake of these products in economical terms -  rather than for 
example safety or efficacy concerns, according to this scientist:
If you look at it in commercial terms, I think it looks pretty hiccuppy 
because a lot of the good products that have been developed on a 
commercial basis belong to companies that have gone bankrupt 
recently. Now these are good folk and they are doing good things, so 
research-wise and clinically it is not that their products are rubbish, far 
from it; they haven’t got fast enough revenue stream to keep them afloat 
on a commercial basis.
(Academic research scientist S5, 2003)
Despite the economic instability of the technology, tissue engineering R&D has 
been a major area for investment from both public and private sources (Lysaght 
and Reyes 2001 ).48 So far, tissue engineering is primarily funded by the private 
sector in the US, while federal funding has traditionally been more predominant 
in Europe (Mclntire et al. 2002: ii). These different funding strategies are 
reflected in the R&D of the technology, where academic research groups tend 
to benefit from government funding for their basic research, while industry is 
more focussed on technology-based product development. Especially in 
Europe a large number of companies was formed in the late 1990s, partly with 
government and university funding, while industrial support was sought during 
later stages of development. But this trend is shifting towards more public 
investment, where the US government follows initiatives in Europe and Japan 
in initiating major programmes of government-sponsored support for new 
research.49 Recent European Framework Programmes have reserved
48 In a little over a decade, more than US$3.5 billion has been invested in worldwide research 
and development in tissue engineering. Over 90% of this financial investment has been from 
the private sector (Lysaght and Reyes 2001)
49 For example US federal institutes such as the National Institutes of Health (NIH), National 
Science Foundation (NSF) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) have all taken steps to 
support the field by rewarding research grants (NIH) and establishing regulatory structures for
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considerable research funds for tissue engineering applications and for specific 
support of SMEs in this field (Hogan 2005). As an interesting aside, there is 
also another reason for the more recent change in US funding priorities, as one 
interviewee explains:
It has changed in the US too. It has changed and strangely due to the 
Iraq war. The army said: we want now that the whole research be 
organised, we want to have skin replacement on the battlefields. And 
they are pushing. And they said to the Pittsburgh group [the main 
research centre]: you co-ordinate all the effort inside the United Sates for 
making that we get what we want where we want. So the military in the 
United States have decided to take the leadership in these things... So 
they are trying to bring altogether the research all over the place 
because it’s evident that - you know the two biggest companies doing 
tissue engineering went bankrupt... it could be a dangerous business. 
(EC official in DG Enterprise A-EU3, 2003)50
Another effect of the financial difficulties of many pioneering tissue engineering 
companies is visible in the increasing number of mergers and partnerships over 
the last few years. Many companies are small start ups that lack financial 
backing to further develop their research and product portfolio, which has led 
some companies to merge in response to market pressures. But as one 
possible explanation for limited market impact of tissue engineering to date, 
critics point at the lack of collaborations between the relative small biotech 
companies in tissue engineering and the much larger and more profitable 
pharmaceutical industry. Instead of partnering up with the pharmaceutical 
industry, and follow the ‘big pharma’ path of commercialisation, many tissue 
engineering companies looked for connections with the much smaller and more 
specialised medical device sector, for example in the orthopaedics field.
The current commercial set-up of the tissue engineering sector has been 
mentioned as potential stumbling block towards commercialisation and is 
discussed next.
the specific control over combination products being developed via tissue engineering 
approaches (FDA).
This military involvement is not entirely new though. For example the multinational company 
Advanced Tissue Sciences got funding by the US Army Institute of Chemical Defence for a 
clinical trial for their human skin equivalent Dermagraft, to test it for the treatment of chemical 
burns (Persidis 1999: 508).
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6.3.2.2 Sector dynamics: small companies and high stakes
The European tissue engineering sector is characterised as ‘y°un9> small,
research-based and technology-oriented’ (DG Enterprise European 
Commission (EC) 2004: see also IPTS study 2003). The main players in this 
domain include commercial companies, followed by academic laboratories and 
specialist research hospitals. Tissue banks and clinics are active in the field as 
well, although these tend to operate on a very local level (Bock et al. 2005).
Main geographical centres of innovation and commercialisation include the 
United States, Europe and Japan. The commercial tissue engineering sector in 
Europe is currently concentrated in the old (EU-15) Member States, with 
Germany and the UK in leading positions.
Typically the core tissue engineering companies are small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs), with in most cases less than 50 FTEs (Bock et al. 2003; 
Hiising et al. 2003). Some medical device companies participate in tissue 
engineering R&D activities, and to a lesser extent the usually larger and 
multinational pharmaceutical companies, but most of these companies are 
university spin-offs with a background in biotechnology. These companies have 
a strong scientific basis rather than a commercial eye for manufacturing 
products at low cost:
But you see they are all small [companies], all spin offs of universities 
and this is where the danger is. They have learnt something in the 
university, they have found something in the university and they say: 
now we will do a company. They don’t think they have to sell. To have a 
product is not the only thing, you have to sell!
(EC official DG Enterprise A-EU3, 2003)
The tissue engineering sector is clustered into small companies, many of which 
are focusing exclusively on for example cell culturing, biomaterial development 
or stem cells, which also means that intellectual property is scattered around 
and fragmented. While most start-up companies have a narrow techno- 
scientific focus on just one part of the technology, they lack know-how or 
access to wider aspects of the clinical and production process, such as 
expertise on quality control, marketing and regulatory affairs. Thus while most 
have a strong scientific and pre-clinical knowledge base, the next steps to 
make the transition from scientific exploration to adapt clinical research into
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marketable products is often problematic. Furthermore the tissue engineering 
sector is a very interdisciplinary one, requiring specific expertise on both 
research and development aspects in different areas. Whereas specialised 
start-up companies might be too small or inexperienced, also established 
industry moving into this new field is ‘at risk’:
If you’re realistic, when companies move into new areas there’s an 
inherent risk. If a device company whose core R&D skills are 
engineering, moves into an area where you need more knowledge on 
pharmaceuticals or biological materials, yes there’s more potential for 
misunderstandings and accidents. Everybody who invents or develops 
something is convinced it’s safe and great, that’s human nature. So 
companies developing new technologies are always to some extent a 
risk. (Clinical scientist in industrial setting M-EU1, 2003).
A lack of specific expertise and experience is not just playing up during the 
early R&D stages. An important factor brought up by many interviewees is the 
marketing process and regulatory approval phase. Several smaller companies 
have marketing agreements with larger commercial providers in medical 
devices or the pharmaceuticals sector, but it has been argued that marketing 
strategies need to be more tailored to cover the specific characteristics of 
tissue engineered products (Hiising et al. 2003: 87-89).
Manufacturers and regulatory bodies alike have been juggling with the 
particular approval route for tissue engineered products, where dominant 
models for pharmaceuticals or medical devices did not or only partially apply to 
these combination products, with large variety in approach between countries. 
Also the fact that many tissue engineering firms do not have clear 
reimbursement strategies for their products has created uncertainty over for 
example the potential willingness of patients to pay for the treatments 
themselves. Furthermore, as also stressed by the interviewee below, the 
marketing trajectory is long and expensive -  often beyond initial expectations.
So the regulatory process... it basically imposes certain standards to 
things like clinical trials. And as we know from the pharmaceutical 
industry, the amount of money that you have to spend on regulation in 
clinical trials is much greater often than the amount of money you spend 
on research and development of the initial drug molecule. It’s okay for 
the pharmaceutical industry, the pharmaceutical industry can deal with 
that because it has close on 100 years worth of profit and shareholder 
returns, and people will accept the fact that it has to spend 100 million
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pounds getting its new drug through clinical trials and through the 
regulatory process. In tissue engineering there is no product on the 
market that has made anything like that amount of money, so therefore 
people aren’t willing to risk their investments on the clinical trials. And 
worse still, when a drug company goes for regulatory approval it quite 
often has a simple drug molecule, so you can tell the regulatory 
authorities everything they want to know about it. Whereas tissue 
engineering products are based on cells which by their very nature are 
very heterogeneous... The products tend to be very, very complex. 
(Academic research scientist in UK tissue engineering lab S7, 2003)
Overall most companies have not been prepared for the long and costly 
process of regulatory approval,51 slowing down returns on their product 
investment (Lysaght and Hazlehurst 2004). Thus a tension exists between 
short term biotech type high investment and long term returns on these 
products, and several interviewees have argued that the lead times for 
regulatory approval, and then reimbursement, resemble pharmaceutical type of 
products, ‘so you’ve got to be in it for the long term’ (M2, 2003).
Some have argued that instead of following scientific curiosity, tissue 
engineering companies have to put more effort into communicating with the 
clinical community to gain insight in the needs and practical aspects of product 
application, and that customer needs have to be addressed more seriously as 
part of a broader market orientation (Hiising et al. 2003). As analysed in the 
next section, tissue engineering technology is not just a risk capital category in 
the books of investors.
6.3.2.3 Public concerns over controversial therapies
The current fading investors’ confidence can be placed in a social-political
climate where the public domain has had to deal with ‘similar’ high-tech novel 
products, such as genetically modified foods that have stirred controversy, and 
recent public health scares that have called for stricter controls over 
biotechnology products more general. Public concern over for example BSE 
has been a major influence on governance and regulation of new products
51 Furthermore, this overall long trajectory of commercialisation also has implications for 
intellectual property. With a long and costly R&D process that can take up several years 
including regulation and reimbursement clearance, “by the time it’s ready to market your 
product you are left with a few years before the patent expires. And it doesn’t make good 
business sense for a lot of people to have, say, if it takes such a long time and then you have a 
few years left to have market exclusivity for your patent right.” (Legal professional in regulation 
of biotechnology 0 2 , 2003)
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entering the European market. The interviewee below explains the commercial 
effects of that as follows:
But as things have developed and obviously within the scenario BSE 
and TSEs, the concerns maybe over using biological material at all, the 
demand for more regulation has increased. And I think then that the cost 
element involved in meeting all these additional requirements are such 
that a lot of industries, or a lot of companies, haven’t been able to meet 
that. And basically they’ve run into a cash flow situation. So a lot of 
these capital venture based companies, they went through a lot of 
money, they would hope to have their products on the market, they 
looked at it pretty optimistically. And then as more and more demands 
are made on them in terms of extra testing or requirements then you 
know, unless they’re associated with a partner like [a large multinational] 
who have been willing to keep funding these unanticipated extra costs... 
(Scientific manager corporate product safety assurance for multinational 
company M2, 2003)
Safety concerns or technological risks are associated with a public climate in 
which (potentially) controversial therapies are subject to increased regulatory 
controls, which affects the commercial status and performance of products. It is 
also in this context that commercial risk is related to a particular safety issue in 
tissue engineering, namely the inclusion of animal derived material. In 
commercial terms, this implies liability issues on behalf of companies trying to 
market these products:
If there are alternatives where there is no risk for a company, if you have 
a synthetic product, they're not liable for bio contaminations so the 
market is wide open if you come with something that is safe. (...) So as 
soon as you go away from the animal derived products and you come 
with something that has similar performance, that's the way for success. 
(Academic research scientist S-EU2, 2003)
To sum up, several factors have been brought forward by interviewees to 
explain the current lack of commercial success of tissue engineered 
applications - ranging from small inexperienced start-ups with business models 
that are too dependant on venture capital and short term returns to stricter 
controls in an increasingly risk-aware social-political climate. Some see the 
initial poor sales of some of these early products as part of a common process 
for medical products, reflecting the ‘incubation period’ they have to go through 
before clinical use and commercial success (Lysaght and Hazlehurst 2004: 
313-314).
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But another dominant model in explaining marketing struggles, especially for 
the European situation, concerns the production system of different tissue 
engineering applications. As discussed under technological risk, particular 
perceptions of risk are attached to either the autologous route of engineering or 
the use of donor material. As demonstrated in the next section, these 
technological risks also have implications for the commercialisation process 
and the types of organisations competing in tissue engineering R&D.
6.3.2.4 Production systems and scaling up issues
Two basic models of tissue engineering technology have been developed:
autologous applications and allogeneic products. As discussed earlier, this 
distinction plays an important role in the construction and perception of safety 
issues of particular tissue engineering applications. Here it is argued that this 
distinction is also closely tied into the processing and manufacturing process, 
with implications for the timing and general availability of products, and for their 
market potential.
Autologous applications necessarily need time for the cells to be removed, 
cultured and implanted back into the patient, while the donor cells may be 
stored in a tissue bank or as a cultured cell line, thus providing a basis for off 
the shelf availability. The preservation and storage of live engineered tissues is 
considered a major obstacle for commercialisation. One of the key issues for 
tissue engineered applications is maintaining product viability: to keep the cells 
alive following transportation and storage. Most tissue engineered products 
have a limited shelf life. More important in terms of commercialisation, this 
means impractical scheduling restraints for both the manufacturer and the 
clinician (and ultimately the patient) of these tissue engineered products, and 
added costs that come with overproduction, changed demand, unplanned 
losses and the management of patient scheduling (Naughton 2002).
Thus the production mode dictates availability of these products within a certain 
time window and over geographical space. For example for acute medical 
conditions time is too short to culture patient-own material and indulge in 
complicated and expensive logistic processes. Equally important from a
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commercial perspective is the fact that the autologous engineering route offers 
an individualised and customised treatment; an inherent system of production 
which is more problematic in terms of ‘scaling up’ for purposes of 
commercialisation (Mclntire et al. 2002: X). As explained by one of the pioneers 
in the field:
The challenge of imitating nature does not stop with the design and 
engineering of a specific tissuelike construct or substitute. This is 
because the patient need that exists cannot be met by making one 
construct at a time on a bench top in some research laboratory. 
Accepting the challenge of imitating nature must include the 
development of cost-effective manufacturing processes. These must 
allow for a scale-up from making one at a time to a production quantity 
of 100 or 1000 constructs per week. Anything significantly less would not 
be cost-effective, and if a product cannot be manufactured in large 
quantities and cost-effectively, then it will not be widely available for 
routine use. (Nerem 2000: 13)
Scale-up for clinical use, where not just one but hundreds or thousands of 
tissues must be grown and cryopreserved under sterile conditions, is a critical 
factor in tissue engineering (Griffith and Naughton 2002). Tissue culture is a 
labour-intensive and time consuming process, and because of their laboratory 
environment many tissue engineering processes use manual procedures which 
do not always provide optimal quality control. The product quality is important 
for the scale-up process of tissue engineering, which in turn is needed for 
commercialisation of the technology. Various processes have been developed 
to support the manufacture of a uniform, reproducible tissue, for example with 
the use of closed systems such as bioreactors.
We also witness an interesting shift of boundaries here. The scientist below 
feels that the autologous route might be preferable from a health and safety 
perspective, but in commercial terms it is problematic:
Using autologous cells strips away a lot of the potential risks of the 
technique as long as getting those cells doesn’t damage the patient. You 
eliminate most of the risks but unfortunately it’s very difficult to think of 
how you’re going to do autologous treatments for many therapies. 
There’s a commercial issue and there’s a clinical issue. Autologous 
processes can’t be scaled up. So in the case of the cartilage procedure, 
it’s autologous, the patient has to go in, have cells removed, those cells 
personally have to be expanded in culture and they have to go back into 
that patient -  it’s massively labour intensive. If you have a lab that can
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do 100 of those a year, the only way to double that capacity is to employ 
twice as many people and have twice the size of lab. So the only way 
we’re going to get the scale up is the use of allogeneic made tissue and 
then you have the problems of immune rejection of the tissue.
(Academic research scientist in UK tissue engineering lab S7, 2003)
The individualised therapy requires extensive manual handling, which is a 
costly approach that requires specialised skills and training. Furthermore the 
system of production poses limitations on logistics and transport. In the US 
both engineering routes are explored, but the donor-based products, most 
notably for woundcare applications, have attracted most attention of 
commercial developers. As also stressed by the scientist below, the divide 
between a customised service model versus an ‘off the shelf available product 
has implications for the particular type of developing organisation that is 
involved:
All of the academic groups I know are doing autologous. All of the 
commercial groups I know are doing allogeneic.
(Academic research scientist S5, 2003)
In Europe (and Japan for that matter) the R&D effort focuses primarily upon 
autologous, patient-customised applications, which is more likely to lead to a 
service industry relying on more local and regional cell banking. Thus whereas 
the allogeneic manufacturing process usually serves a more globalised market 
with higher commercial potential, autologous services are more localised and -  
according to the interviewee below -  more controlled in time and space:
That’s for allogeneic products. Obviously it can be taken in one country, 
developed as a worldwide product could be, [with] the storage 
techniques now developed here it can be stored for six months or a year 
possibly, distributed all over the place. Yeah, there are theoretical 
greater risks with that in terms of what’s happened to the materials, 
where it’s going to. Whereas with autologous you tend to be looking at it 
in say a single hospital situation. (...) It’s going to be more local 
probably. I mean, it’s not, you only look at the theoretical risk involved. 
There could be contamination depending what the laboratory procedures 
were like, for instance. But inherently it would be controlled more in time 
and location than obviously allogeneic tissue engineered products. The 
big benefit with the allogeneic side is that you have a reproducible high 
quality product effectively available off the shelf to be replenished when 
they need it. So in terms of meeting a great demand out there, 
autologous treatment is not going to do it. It’s going to be good for the 
particular individual involved but hospitals won’t be set up to do that on a 
huge scale, whereas all of the allogeneic products will be able to meet 
that need in a much better way.
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(Scientific manager corporate product safety assurance for multinational 
company M2, 2003)
Especially in Europe this configuration of commercial providers alongside local, 
often not-for-profit organisations has redefined the competitive climate of tissue 
engineering technology.52 As a representative of a large multinational company 
for autologous cartilage applications explains, there is steep competition from 
local hospitals, tissue banks and smaller companies that provide similar 
services for a lower price -  which was one of the reasons for this company’s 
withdrawal from the European market.
From a commercial perspective, it makes things a lot easier for these 
very small companies. And if you think of autologous tissue, if you were 
to be perfectly honest and frank, it’s not rocket science... it’s all pretty 
much standard techniques, techniques which can be engineered within a 
hospital tissue bank for example. So [in this country] a number of local 
groups have emerged within hospitals which do these sorts of products 
for surgeons, just covering their expenses and covering the holidays to 
Barbados with the tissue bankers. Oh God I shouldn’t have said that ‘cos 
it’s on tape. But you know what I mean. They sort of work on a very local 
basis, they may cover three or four hospitals in a local district... but it 
makes it difficult for a multinational company to get involved in that 
system. (...) why should a hospital pay a premium price... for a product 
which they can manufacture using their own little tissue bank?
Absolutely no reason whatsoever. So it kicks the bottom out of your 
commercial market from a multinational perspective.
(Regulatory affairs manager of multinational company producing 
autologous cartilage product M-EU9, 2003)
While competition from less profit-seeking providers of autologous services 
poses commercial risks for larger companies, for their local counterparts 
scaling up of technology is an essential prerequisite for commercialisation. 
Especially with respect to these smaller companies, and also local providers of 
these services that do not have routine experience, the ability to work up to 
certain quality standards, such as GLP and GMP, is sometimes questioned (M- 
EU9, 2003). A problematic part of this process, it has been added, is the
52 The European Commission has taken into consideration the different models for production 
and commercialisation, including mechanisms for the regulation of European trade and 
exchange of these products within the internal market. It is argued that while ‘small business 
operators, hospitals and tissue banks often produce autologous products for local or “in-house” 
use... This does not mean that autologous products are produced exclusively for the local 
market or for internal use: tissues may be treated outside the donor’s country and should 
therefore be able to circulate within the Community... Allogeneic products are more likely to be 
produced in batch and marketed in different Member States, but single applications remain 
possible.’ (DG Enterprise 2004b)
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current lack of automation of the quality control process by many small 
providers. Controlling the production process -  ‘to have these batteries of 
tissue engineering all controlled by computer permanently’ (A-EU3, 2003) -  
would lead to cost reduction of a procedure which is currently still labour- 
intense and subject to human error because of the extensive handling. 
Economies of large-scale production are important from a commercial 
perspective, while standardisation of manufacturing and quality control 
standards is also important in obtaining marketing approval for products. Some 
European providers are now working on so-called ‘mass-customisation 
technologies’ to offer individualised treatment on a mass-produced scale that 
can be standardised and that is hoped to provide the reproducible quality 
desired by many regulatory authorities (Bader 2005).
6.4 Reconstructing boundaries for commercial risk
Representing the last tier in the risk classification as outlined before, 
commercial risk has been used in this chapter as a term to describe the issues 
that commercial providers face in bringing tissue engineered products to the 
market. Whereas technological risk is mainly concerned with quality and safety, 
and clinical risk with therapeutic effectiveness, commercial risk relates to the 
final stages of the innovation cycle including commercialisation of the 
technology.
As demonstrated so far, commercial risk is interrelated with clinical risk, most 
notably with the increasing need to obtain long-term data on both clinical 
performance and cost effectiveness of treatments in order to obtain regulatory 
approval and to get product reimbursement. With tissue engineering entering 
the fourth hurdle domain, companies are struggling to market their products in 
Europe due to high cost, low risk-benefit ratio, and lack of reimbursement in 
public markets. As also described in this chapter, these developments need to 
be placed in the context of an unstable commercial environment of 
predominantly small start-up biotech companies that do not have the means or 
expertise to successfully commercialise and launch products in a climate of
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fading investors’ confidence and lack of regulatory controls. This is especially 
pressing in the case of autologous applications, the main focus of R&D efforts 
by European developers, where issues around scaling up and a complicated 
competitive environment have led to disappointment over commercial potential 
and market performance. Furthermore these developments are taking place 
against a socio-political background of diminishing public confidence in biotech 
more general. Especially in Europe concerns over controversial technologies 
such as GMOs and health scares such as BSE have led to a risk-aware (if not 
risk-averse) climate with increasing safety controls, for example over the use of 
animal-derived material, thus also pointing out the ways in which technological 
risk is tied in with commercial risk. In this way interviewees redefine the level of 
risk of products based on different cell sources, by drawing boundaries around 
the safety of these biological materials in lab and clinic, but by reconstructing 
and revising these boundaries when it concerns commercialisation. We return 
to these notions in the next chapter.
Finally it has been argued that while commercial risk is in the first place 
problematic for commercial developers of tissue engineering technology in their 
search for profitable markets, including effects on innovation in this dynamic 
field, also patients are affected by limited access to and diminishing availability 
of potentially beneficial treatments. Thus commercial risk affects both 
production and consumption.
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7 Ranking and balancing risk
The literature on risks related to tissue engineering is scarce and often 
incomplete. One study identified ‘the risk of transmitting infectious diseases 
from donor to recipient, the risk of inducing bioincompatibility and the risk of 
lack of clinical efficacy’ as the most serious concerns for these products. 
However, at the same time it is acknowledged that ‘given the novelty of these 
products, their hazards and associated potential harm have not yet been clearly 
identified’ (Tienhoven et al. 2001: 8). Furthermore, the few studies available 
have focused exclusively on narrow technological definitions of risk 
(Wassenaar et al. 2001).
In the previous three chapters I discussed the differentiated views on tissue 
engineering risk including and beyond these limited technological 
understandings. The main conceptual assumption is that risks in tissue 
engineering technology are socially constructed and framed by professional 
actors involved in the frond-end of tissue engineering R&D, namely scientists, 
clinicians and manufacturers. I use a tripartite typology of risk as analytical tool 
to throw light on risk perceptions. The next part of this thesis discusses how 
these risk frames translate into (debates on) regulatory policy in tissue 
engineering.
My typology is based on three general categories of risk: technological risk, 
clinical risk and commercial risk. Technological risk to covers concerns related 
to the processing and manufacturing of human tissue and cells, and reflects an 
overall concern with safety. Clinical risk is about perceptions of risk related to 
clinical evidence available for these products, with therapeutic effectiveness as 
key word. Commercial risk concerns the market and business climate for tissue 
engineering, and includes factors such as cost-efficacy, reimbursement and 
general marketability of tissue engineered products. Thus this typology is a 
reflection of the innovation process from lab to clinic to market. It covers the 
different phases in the R&D process with a focus on primary scientific work and 
basic research in the lab (technological risk), to the clinical phase in which the 
constructs are translated into initial clinical testing in humans (clinical risk), as a
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first transition into the market place, where the products enter the commercial 
cycle (commercial risk).
As argued throughout, these frames are (re)defined by interviewees in terms of 
quality and safety, therapeutic effectiveness and cost efficacy and in terms of 
marketability of products. As demonstrated in the preceding chapters, there are 
two general engineering routes on the basis of which interviewees define the 
level of risk: autologous versus allogeneic tissue constructs. These pathways 
are associated with particular but often debated values or levels of risk that cut 
across the three domains of the risk classification. Thus risks have different 
meanings per risk domain, and the value attached to each differs and changes. 
As discussed in more detail in this section, the ‘risk hierarchy’ represents a 
ranking and revaluation of risk based on the particular source material used for 
tissue engineered construct.
Furthermore, professional R&D groups in tissue engineering show wide 
variability in their perceptions of the (un)acceptability of risk, the level of risk (in 
terms of individual versus collective) and over short term versus long-term 
effects. Thus the levels of aggregation and the time-scale involved are critical. I 
use the concept of a ‘risk balance’ to demonstrate different perceptions of 
(levels of) acceptable risk in a given context at one point in time and for 
particular groups affected. Thus the risk balance determines the level of risk 
and benefits for particular receivers, but also takes into account acceptability 
over time. As a wider perspective on these particular constructions it is argued 
how tissue engineering as a new medical technology is situated in a complex 
society troubled by uncertainty about outcomes and consequences, and as 
such constituting uncertain risks. Before turning to these issues, some general 
observations can be made of the risk typology as related to professional R&D 
groups.
7.1 Risk frames compared
Risk domains are interrelated and connected in several ways, and the values 
attached to each component differ per professional and -  to an extent -  per
197
profession. An analysis based on absolute segregation per professional group 
does not hold, not the least because of the multidisciplinary background and 
hybrid careers of most interviewees, and the relationships they maintain across 
settings. As discussed in the methodological section (chapter 3), the revolving 
door is very active in tissue engineering, and strategic links between scientists, 
industrial partners and clinical collaborators are commonplace. Thus while the 
respective domains of this typology are not exclusively related to particular 
professional actors or interest groups, some general observations can be 
made.
First and foremost, although interviewees have drawn upon risk frames broadly 
across the three-way classification, technological risks represent a dominant 
discourse. But more specific frames are also called upon. Perhaps not 
surprisingly most scientists bring up issues related to safety and quality -  which 
are labelled technological risk in this study. These issues are expressed as 
technological rather than social or public concerns, for example by elaborating 
on the scientific stumbling blocks that have to be overcome in terms of 
producing high quantities of high quality living cells, preventing uncontrolled cell 
growth or by finding ways to sterilise final products. Whereas scientists tend to 
interpret these as ‘lab problems’, thereby demarcating the professional domain, 
manufacturers have a stronger focus on maintaining cell and product quality 
during the full product cycle, for example also during transport. Furthermore, 
especially amongst manufacturers a strong belief exists in controlling these 
risks by putting in place quality assurance systems such as Good Laboratory 
Practice (GLP) and Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP). Working in a 
controlled environment would minimise technological risks such as 
contamination and infection or the mixing up of cells. In this way these actors 
create particular ‘safe heavens’ which make risks controllable and overseeable.
Clinical risk then, the lack of long term clinical evidence of effectiveness, is 
mostly addressed by clinicians and other health professionals, but largely 
overlooked by scientists. Most scientists frame this issue in techno-scientific 
terms of cell behaviour and cell viability, arguing how a large enough amount of 
quality cells is needed to ‘make it work’, rather than looking at the performance 
of the complete intervention in the clinic. Clinicians in their turn have more
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elaborate views on the need for clinical effectiveness, and what the safety 
concerns are for the final recipient of a tissue engineered construct: the patient. 
Furthermore clinicians in this sample have more defined perceptions of 
comparative treatment options, what specific kind of clinical evidence is 
needed, and of course in the end: is the tissue engineered product not only 
safe but also a better treatment alternative for the patient?
While for clinicians patient safety is the main driver of concerns in this area, 
manufacturers share an interest in clinical risk for the implied economic effects. 
Manufacturers tend to address this issue in relation to commercialisation of 
technology: lack of data on long-term effectiveness of an expensive technology 
such as tissue engineering, also generated by the high cost of setting up multi­
centre controlled clinical trials to get these data, means that eventually 
regulatory bodies will not be satisfied. Not being able to get marketing approval 
for products has implications for reimbursement by health insurance companies 
and adoption into national health systems. Thus for manufacturers clinical risk 
means commercial risk.
Commercial risk, then, is addressed to some extent by all interviewees. But 
while scientists express this predominantly in terms of high product cost that 
comes with highly innovative technology, and clinicians frame this as a low 
cost-benefit ratio in relation to therapeutic effectiveness, manufacturers make a 
direct connection between high cost, limited availability of clinical data and lack 
of reimbursement. Thus for manufacturers commercial risk is a combination of 
technological and clinical risk.
In this way respondents have defined what is problematic in the respective risk 
domains, but also framed the ways in which issues have a different value and 
meaning across settings. As also discussed next, boundary objects are fluent 
and hybrid entities that can move between different social worlds (here: risk 
domains) without necessarily threatening the borders of these domains.
We also need to take note here of ‘boundary people’ as particular exponents in 
this process. A comparison of risk frames per professional group reveals only 
part of the story: interviewees have shown a remarkable capacity to move and
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switch between categories, while at the same time recognising the connection 
between these domains.
Moreover, two specific dynamics have arisen in relation to risk perceptions by 
interviewees in this sample. One of these dimensions I have labelled the ‘risk 
hierarchy’, which is a reclassification of risk in terms of the particular source 
material used for tissue engineered constructs. It is here that biological 
materials as most important boundary objects travel between different risk 
domains. For the second dimension I have used the concept of the ‘risk 
balance’ to illustrate the different levels of acceptable risk as considered by 
these interviewees. Finally these perceptions of risk should be understood in a 
climate of huge technological uncertainty and complexity, which has 
implications for risk management and control strategies in tissue engineering.
7.2 The risk hierarchy
As argued throughout, different risk frames are defined and redefined by 
interviewees in terms of quality and safety, therapeutic effectiveness and in 
relation to cost efficacy and marketability of products. But risks have different 
meanings per tier of the risk classification, and the value attached to each 
differs and changes. The ‘risk hierarchy’ refers to the reclassification and 
revaluation of risk based on the particular source material used for a tissue 
engineered construct. As discussed for technological risk, autologous 
applications are generally considered ‘less risky’ than products based on 
allogeneic material. But the hierarchy of risk does not just apply to safety 
concerns in technological terms, as the use of a particular cell source 
determines not only scientific endeavours but also drives clinical concerns and 
commercial strategies. This reveals a slightly different dynamic. For example, 
while the use of autologous cells is considered ‘less risky’ from a scientific point 
of view, and arguably from a clinical perspective, it poses substantial risks to 
manufacturers in the commercialisation cycle, as these products are usually 
locally produced and require extensive handling and complicated logistics, 
adding to cost and labour-intensity. Most notably, because of the customised 
nature of autologous applications scaling up is problematic -  while this is
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considered a major condition for market success. Vice versa, allogeneic 
applications are considered more desirable from a commercial perspective, 
because of their ‘off the shelf availability, while safety concerns are placed on a 
higher level by interviewees in this sample.
As such, it was observed that particular risk vectors and perceptions of safety 
can be translated from the science-based domain to areas of health and 
economy. Furthermore it is argued here that cell source is a determinant for 
perception of risk level along a low to high continuum -  as also demonstrated in 
the taxonomy below:
ClinicalTechnoloc
Autologous
Allogeneic
Xenogeneic
Cell source
i
As also discussed though, this picture is troubled by the inclusion of animal 
derived (bovine, mice) material in the processing of tissue engineering 
constructs via both the autologous and allogeneic engineering routes. Thus the 
perception of autologous material being safer from a scientific perspective 
clashes with the dominant discourse of technological but also, most notably, 
commercial risks associated with animal derived material. Although many 
manufacturers and scientists have expressed a certain acceptability and 
‘unavoidableness’ of xenogeneic sources, the use of this material is 
controversial in a socio-political context, thus affecting risk control strategies 
and general (current and future) availability of these products on the market.
In other words risks have a different meaning and value per domain, 
underlining the social constructive character of risk perceptions. Furthermore 
the hierarchy of risk depicts a differentiated and arguably inconsistent
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discourse of risk ranking, given that xenogeneic materials are integral part of 
tissue engineered constructs.
Two observations can be made in this respect, both of a methodological nature. 
First of all it can be argued that interviewees use different rhetoric repertoires in 
framing and communicating risk. This possibility has been discussed in STS 
literature, most notably by Gilbert and Mulkay in their studies of the social world 
of biochemists (Gilbert and Mulkay 1984). They demonstrate how scientists use 
two different interpretative repertoires in giving accounts for their activities. In 
formal contexts (academic articles, conferences) they described their work 
different than in informal settings (such as during interviews with the 
researchers). Translated to the tissue engineering context, this could point 
towards different accounts of risk ‘on paper’ (although formal accounts are 
scarce in this area) and in interview interactions. However, this would not 
explain any variability within the interview context. The use of rhetorics in this 
context is not to be underestimated though, especially amongst respondents 
with large experience in communicating their work outside their field of 
expertise.
The second observation, arguably more valid, refers to weaknesses in the 
model that I developed to capture these perceptions of risk. As such, the 
hierarchy of risk (represented in the vertical safety bar in this model) is based 
on perceptions of technological risk, as presented by interviewees. The role of 
the social scientist would ideally be to unravel the complex data dimensions 
and interpretations. After analysis of interviewees’ accounts, then, a more 
dynamic model can be developed. This would take into account the level of risk 
from a ‘zero’ or low to high continuum, based on interviewees’ perceptions, but 
in a less static way.
A matrix version of this model could have the following values:
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autologous Z L
allogeneic H H L
xenogeneic ? H H
Z = ‘zero risk’
L = low risk 
H = high risk
In this way the ‘consensus’ values of risk levels as associated with cell sources 
can be depicted, although it does not allow for any conflicting views or nuance. 
For example the use of xenogeneic material is described by some interviewees 
as highly problematic, while others marginalise the potential harmful effects in 
the science domain. Thus any ranking is an exercise in reductionism, but also 
problematic in the face of another dominant, though less explicit discourse in 
tissue engineering, which links risk with uncertainty and complexity. This is 
discussed later. In the section below it is argued that the level of risk and the 
balance between risks and benefits is of key concern in deciding on the 
acceptability of risks.
7.3 The risk balance
In addition to a hierarchy of risk, which covers the ranking of risks on a low to 
high continuum, another dimension of risk is described in what I have called the 
‘risk balance’. The risk balance is about acceptability of risk and for whom, 
where perceived risks of tissue engineering are differentiated into levels and 
degrees of risk for particular applications, subsets of populations, and the 
envisaged effects over time. The risk balance thus takes into account the 
specific therapeutic purpose of the tissue engineering application, across 
stages of the innovation process (e.g. lab, clinic and market), and is concerned 
with both risks and benefits of the technology and the trade-off between the two 
in determining acceptability of risk. The content of the balance of risk and the
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hierarchy of risk provide the context for risk management approaches, which is 
the concern of later chapters.
7.3.1 The risk balance: it is different if you are going to die
It’s all about risk, isn’t it? (...) If you’re going to have a treatment which is 
not - either cosmetic or it’s not life threatening, you might be more 
concerned about the origins of the material than if you knew you had to 
have it because you knew you were going to die.
So, I think, what I’m really getting at, I think, there are so, so many 
variants of tissue engineering here, I think, you’ve almost got to, not look 
at them individual because that wouldn’t be very helpful but when we 
start to classify them to a stage where that either the treatment or the 
aspect of the patient who is having the treatment has to be taken into 
account and will vary from somebody with a different experience. 
(Academic research scientist in UK tissue engineering lab S1, 2003).
This interview fragment highlights two important issues. First, there is talk of 
‘the patient’, recognising the diversity in meanings and experiences of the final 
receivers of tissue engineered products. Second, a particular dominant 
discourse in assessing the risk-benefit ratio (e.g. the risk to individual patients 
in relation to the potential benefits of the technology) concerns the condition 
being treated. Many interviewees have argued how both the desired 
therapeutic effect and condition at which the tissue engineering product is 
targeted are part of a wide spectrum ranging from seriously life-threatening 
disease to mere elective interventions:
If for, particularly for a TE application, it’s not a life threatening condition, 
so the risk benefit is not, a different balance and if the benefit is going to 
improve the quality of life but not save the life it’s very different weighting 
compared with something that’s going to save a life. So the equation is 
rather different. (Academic research scientist in UK tissue engineering 
centre S3, 2003)
If I have a spinal cord injury and I’m going to face the rest of my life 
paralysed, the benefit of injecting a stem cell into my spinal cord, and 
getting repair is massive. At the moment I think the risk is also quite high 
that that cell will cause a bad effect. But that risk-benefit probably works 
for most people. Most people would probably want to give that a try. If 
you’re talking for example about cartilage degeneration from someone 
aged 70, when it has worn out cartilage in their knee, the risk-benefit is 
totally different. The benefit is good but probably not good enough to 
justify taking any sort of risk with transfer of infection or major rejections. 
(Academic research scientist in UK tissue engineering lab S7, 2003)
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I wouldn’t do it, I mean if I was a patient I would not accept donor cells 
from another patient at this stage. (...) When you’re dealing with a non 
terminal disease you want to be more cautious than you would if you 
had cancer or something. (Academic research scientist in clinical care 
S4, 2003)
Thus the risk-benefit ratio may differ depending on the condition being treated. 
Furthermore, as underlined by respondent S7, also the health condition and 
age of the patient are important factors in determining whether it is ‘worth 
taking the risk’. Also other interviewees have expressed the importance of age 
of the recipient, especially in the absence of longer term evidence on the 
performance of tissue engineered applications in the patient in combination 
with the intended permanent character of implantation, while at the same time it 
is pointed out that many medical implant technologies do not last for a lifetime 
in most cases.
In addition, as also pointed out by interviewee S4, who would be reluctant to 
use allogeneic tissue engineered products on himself with the current risk 
profile attached to it, there is the notion of ‘developing technology’. The 
interviewee below, working in industry, would be confident in using tissue 
engineering technologies as a patient, but also talks of a ‘moving target’ in 
relation to risks and benefits: with scientific advances and developing insights 
in the technology over time, the ratio might change.
Personally I suppose I’m a little bit biased having worked with tissue 
engineering products for as long as I have and seeing the evidence of 
effectiveness I would have no qualms about using tissue engineering 
myself as a patient. How I personally perceive that risk-benefit? It is of 
course a moving target because your risk-benefit can only be as 
accurate as the current state of the art. So you can for example 
characterise a product now but in three, four years’ time if you’ve been a 
recipient of a tissue engineered product and a new test comes out which 
is more accurate, more sensitive to the material or contaminants that 
could be in that product or introduced into that product then the risk- 
benefit changes as you go along. (Regulatory affairs professional in 
multinational industry M-EU9, 2003)
Thus the perceived risk-benefit ratio is dependant on factors such as 
therapeutic indication, health condition and age of the patient, and status of the 
technology, stressing the developing character of the innovation. Although 
these factors cannot be considered exclusive for tissue engineering technology 
-  or in other words are rather typical for innovative medical technologies -
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these are important considerations in determining acceptability of risks but also 
of uncertainties surrounding this particular domain. Furthermore and of major 
relevance, this diversity has implications for the regulatory reach of these 
products (Welsh 2000).
7.3.2 From risk assessment to management
The assessment of risk informs the management of these risks, where a main 
concern is how to incorporate diverging and different risk perceptions into 
regulatory policy. As such, tissue engineering is typically treated as a generic 
technology for regulatory purposes. But many interviewees have argued how a 
specific and alternative type of risk assessment is needed for new technological 
applications such as tissue engineered products, to take into account both the 
developing character of the technology and the associated (unknown) risks, 
with its diverse current and future applications. One such argument is provided 
by a prominent scientist of a UK tissue engineering lab:
Tissue engineering, xenotransplantation, gene and cell therapy and 
other emerging products and processes are altering the way in which 
risks can be assessed and are bringing new challenges to product 
demarcation (Williams 2001: 12).
Tissue engineering is perceived as one of a range of novel technologies that 
could change the way in which risks are assessed and managed. This is also 
reflected in interviewees’ accounts. Many argue how tissue engineering cannot 
be considered as a one-dimensional technology creating generic risks, and as 
such regulatory activities should focus on the different dimensions and 
classifications of risk. Risk assessment procedures should include such notions 
as cell source, functionality, type of application and therapeutic goal of 
products.
And then also you get the risk profile of these products, because not all 
of these products have the same risks. Based on the risk you should be 
able to sort of maybe have a different barrier and different assessment. 
(Regulatory affairs professional in industry M-EU3, 2003)
Furthermore, and in line with the risk hierarchy as discussed, several 
interviewees have argued that based on a differentiation of cell sources,
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accordingly less stringent controls should be attached to autologous 
applications. The interview fragment below is from a scientist, who explains the 
need for differentiating between allogeneic and autologous cell sources in risk 
analysis:
I think one needs a regulatory framework for a tissue engineering 
product which says how risky it is, and part of that assessment should 
be infection risk from donor cells, or risk of immune rejection. (...) it 
could be incorporated into one’s general risk assessment and then for 
autologous cells it’s simply a tick in the box saying “no risk because”. 
(Academic research scientist S4, 2003)
In the fragment below, from a regulatory affairs professional in a large 
commercial firm, beyond the risk divide of autologous and allogeneic 
applications also a risk-based approach applies to specific products within the 
range:
As with all products... risks must be balanced by benefits, and this 
should be reflected in the applicable regulations. In this context, it would 
seem that a range of tissue products does not warrant a blanket 'high- 
risk' label. For example, autologous tissue-based products have far 
different risks and requirements from those originating from allogeneic 
tissue. Also, application of certain allogeneic tissue (such as cartilage or 
bone) will pose significantly less risk than tissue derived from the central 
nervous system (Brown et al. 2001: 296)
Thus one of the main arguments of interviewees is in favour of a product-based 
risk assessment, where control measures could be specified for particular 
product subgroups that are stratified according to increasing risk. In this respect 
also other criteria are mentioned as relevant. According to the following 
interviewee, these criteria could include the route of administration, the tissue 
type and the degree of processing of tissue engineered products:
One has to look at the hierarchy of risks and also depending on how 
you’re going to administer or implant the products. The route of 
administration will be a determining factor. It’s very difficult for me to 
generalise it because I think that is not the approach of risk assessment. 
You have to look at various factors. Factors like route administration, the 
type of tissues will be relevant, and how the tissues are processed will 
be relevant. (Legal professional in regulation of biotechnology 02, 2003)
An underlying motivation for a product-based risk approach is the large 
standard deviation in the range of current and experimental applications in 
tissue engineering. The interview fragment below illustrates this variety:
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There’s quite an extreme. When you think of the technologies involved 
you go from anything from irradiated bone which is used for packing 
materials in orthopaedic surgery or dental surgery or whatever right up 
to incredibly sophisticated cells that have been manipulated and grown 
into very specific shapes and are on scaffolds, they may be three 
dimensional tissues that have different structures within them and so on 
and so on. You can have... each product is quite unique and has to be 
evaluated in that way.
(Regulatory affairs manager of multinational company M-EU9, 2003)
Many interviewees have commented on the need for accounting for variety in 
risk assessment in order to cover this very broad set of current and potential 
applications of the technology, with corresponding different levels of risk.
I think in a lot of the new technology products you have to do that, you 
have to look at each particular product on its own merit. It’s not a case of 
one size fits all.
(Product safety assurance manager in multinational company M2, 2003)
Thus one of the criteria for risk analysis in this domain is the assessment of 
individual products. Indeed, this is backed by one of the few risk management 
documents that have been published, in which it was stated that ‘different 
TEMPs [tissue engineered medical products] will certainly carry various 
combinations of risks, each varying in character and magnitude. Classification 
of products into risk groups can help in designing efficient control measures’ 
(Wassenaar et al. 2001: 33). An influential expert opinion on risk factors in 
tissue engineering makes a similar distinction between high risk applications 
that address important clinical conditions (heart valves) and low risk ones 
aimed at non-life threatening conditions for which alternatives exist (cosmetic 
surgery). With varying degrees of risk and benefit, it was argued that regulatory 
procedures for tissue engineering may not have to be uniformly applied:
In consideration of the wide range of risks inherent in tissue engineering, 
tissue engineered products and processes should be classified 
according to the level of risk to the patient. The process of categorisation 
needs to be developed but in the first instance this should be confined to 
levels of low risk and high risk (DG SANCO: SCMPMD 2001: 9).
A risk-based approach in tissue engineering is problematic though for policy 
purposes, pointing towards large heterogeneity of tissue engineered 
applications currently on the market and in experimental stages of
208
development. Regulatory policy has to balance between covering the current 
product portfolio, of applications ‘out there’ at this moment in time, and of 
envisaged products potentially entering the market in the near future. This is a 
complicated task given the current developing status of the technology, where 
relatively simple applications such as skin and cartilage have been available for 
some years, but with more complex and arguably much more risky outputs of 
current R&D efforts in the pipeline. Risk assessments require looking at the 
range of future options, and the potential benefits and risks of each. Regulation 
has to be able to incorporate the diverse and innovative nature of products, and 
be flexible enough to adapt to technological progress to prevent itself from 
running out of date. As a developing innovation, tissue engineering is an 
interesting case for the conflict between the level of certainty that industry 
needs in terms of consistent rules and predictable evaluation, while at the same 
time flexibility is needed in the evaluation of safety and efficacy of these 
products, given their complexity and broad range of applications (Bartlett Foote 
2002). Therefore one particular concern in the development of a regulatory 
framework is the difficulty of foreseeing the consequences of a technology 
during early stages of development, and designing control mechanisms for 
when the potential harmful consequences of the technological innovation 
become visible for society. This is furthermore complicated by the fact that 
significant risks might develop that have not been seen in healthcare before. 
Thus notions of uncertainty and complexity pose difficulties to regulators trying 
to cover future outcomes of innovative therapies.
Before discussing this in more detail, the next sections give an impression of 
how to differentiate between the levels of risk in the risk balance.
7.3.3 Residual risks and the zero risk society
As discussed in the last section, the acceptability of risk depends on several 
factors. For most interviewees this is based on the general assumption that 
there will always be some level of risk involved:
At the end of the day you may have a certain level of residual risk left 
with any product. It may be a lower risk or it may be a higher risk but you 
have to balance that then against the benefit to the patient. Now if the
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patient is in a very serious state, you may be willing to accept a slightly 
higher risk product. If the patient is going for elective surgery for 
cosmetic reasons or something like that, there may be no grounds 
whatsoever to accept a high risk at all.
(European trade body representative M-EU2, 2003)
Thus some degree of risk is ‘part of the game’. Especially manufacturers have 
stressed how demands for a ‘zero risk society’ are idle and simply impossible in 
the light of uncertainties surrounding medical technologies. Furthermore one 
should not outweigh the potential benefits to patients:
All life is a risk and you cannot guarantee or make any product 100% 
safe. I think sometimes there is a tendency to think that the product 
should be 100% safe and I know it must be very difficult for those users 
and patients who perhaps do not enjoy the benefit of the product, but 
say the vast majority of people will. You have two options: you either 
produce a product which has got profound benefits but with certain risks 
or if you want a zero risk society, well you don’t have the product and lot 
of people will suffer. So these are profound debates, aren’t they? 
(Industry consultant and representative national healthcare industry 
body M3, 2003)
As these fragments demonstrate, a strong rhetoric exists in stressing benefits 
of the technology rather than focusing on ‘just the risks’. But in addition to 
perceived risks that would affect the population at large, specific nuances and 
hesitations are expressed when it concerns specific groups in society. Thus the 
definition of the population at risk is another important factor in framing the 
acceptability of risk and making up the risk balance:
I think some level of risk is justified but if you have someone say has 
superficial burns injury and it’s not that very extensive, what’s the risk of 
using donor skin from skin banks or mouse cells or foetal calf serum. 
Most of the surgeons, especially where [it involves] children, they look at 
that and say: no I’d rather not. We are going to be able to manage fine. 
We don’t have to go near tissue engineering products with whatever 
risks. So we live with these equations all the time.
(Academic research scientist in wound healing and clinical management 
S5, 2003)
With the example of clinicians being reluctant to apply tissue engineered 
applications to children as a particular vulnerable group, the question arises of 
who is actually affected by particular risks and how to define the at-risk- 
population. While the benefits to individual patients can be considered clear 
and visible at one point in time for a given application, the same can not be said
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of the distribution of risk. The section below discusses this issue in terms of 
individual versus collective risk.
7.3.4 Collective versus individual risk
This section focuses on another dimension of risk, namely the distributive 
character of risk in relation to the acceptability of tissue engineered 
applications. Determining the level of risk is important for a number of reasons, 
one of them concerning the question of who bears responsibility for controlling 
these risks. This relates in particular to the role of the state vis-a-vis other 
actors involved in regulatory decision making and control. Thus the definition of 
the level of risk dictates the responsibility of particular actors to manage these 
risks, but also implies judgements about the acceptability of risk. Furthermore, 
tissue engineering is an interesting case because it is presented as a medical 
technology. Technologies in the healthcare domain are usually considered as 
applicable to individual patients -  unlike environmental risks which are seen as 
impacting on a societal level via public health. Thus whereas public health risks 
can be considered as collective risks, most medical applications are typically 
perceived as a form of individual risk (see also: Welsh and Evans 1999).
Initially this is also the response of many interviewees in this sample, asked 
about whether the perceived risks of tissue engineering would be potential 
threats to public health:
I think most of the risks are borne by the patients themselves. If there’s 
rejection of inflammation. If you have a new piece of cartilage in and it 
causes a big inflammation you’re going to be in a lot of pain and you’re 
going to have that removed but it doesn’t actually affect anyone else... 
yeah public health isn’t affected.
(Academic research scientist in UK tissue engineering lab S7, 2003)
Obviously the level of risk is related to the perception of what is considered a 
risk and the value attached to that. This scientist talks about individual risk in 
terms of side effects referring to autologous applications. Other examples of 
this patient-centred individual form of (technological) risk are allergies, tumour 
formation, or ineffective treatment. But as discussed earlier, the transfer of 
infectious disease is a prominent safety concern and mentioned as the main 
technological risk. Asked about the use of donor cells in tissue engineered
211
applications, and the effects for the population at large, the following scientist 
responds:
So if you mean is there a risk to the general public? I don’t think that is a 
major risk. You would have to have people take the laboratory side of 
things. (Academic research scientist S5, 2003)
What follows is a description of the lab safety procedures and how all possible 
quality control measures are taken to prevent tissues and cells from being 
infected or contaminated. In other words there is, again, a strong belief in 
‘controlling’ technological risk. Another scientist explains how even with human 
donor cells the impacts of ‘anything going wrong’ are limited to a small pool of 
individuals rather than affecting the collective:
If they were xenogeneic then there are huge public health issues, but not 
with allogeneic. These are largely risks which are almost customised to 
the individual. I think it’s actually, it’s an important issue because 
generally speaking the risks, it depends who the donor is. Generally 
speaking the risks are going to be confined really to a very, very small 
number of people. If you had a donor source and the issues here are: is 
the donor carrying any disease, is it detectable and is there any 
possibility of infectivity arising from some, let’s say infected or 
contaminated donor? The chance of that getting to a large number of 
recipients is very small. It’s not like having a medical device or drug 
where there has been, as we’ve seen several times, there has been a 
problem with production where tens of thousands devices come out and 
suddenly you find ten thousand people have your device and it’s going 
to go wrong. In tissue engineering that’s not, that wouldn’t happen I don’t 
think. Although having said that some of the existing products such as 
Dermagraft [a tissue engineering skin product] and so on that, they are 
manufactured from one, largely from one cell source but I think that is 
now so well characterised that there’s not going to be an infectivity from 
the source. There could be contamination in the way, and that’s a 
secondary issue I think, process contamination.
(Scientists, head of UK tissue engineering centre, expert advisor in EU 
policy A-EU6, 2003)
But, most importantly, this quote also mentions the use of xenogeneic cells, 
and it is here where the potential lies for earlier expressed concerns about 
introducing novel diseases (zoonoses) into the human population. While the 
incorporation of living tissues or cells from human donors into tissue 
engineered constructs might, at least according to the interviewee above, only 
affect a small number of individuals at risk, the use of viable or non-viable 
animal derived material could open the door to large scale disease 
transmission. Thus the issue of including animal (cell) sources, although
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downplayed by many interviewees as being ‘safe enough’ for current purposes, 
would potentially extend the level of risk over time and generation, thus 
creating a form of inter-generational risk. Potentially, because not a lot is known 
about the risks and effects.
7.4 Uncertain risks and complexity
... How are we going to know because we don’t know how cells react at 
that level - we don’t know, and that would be the risks...
(Industrial scientist at consultancy agency M-EU8, 2003)
An underlying perspective in the evaluation of perceptions of risk in tissue 
engineering concerns the unknown character of many of these risks. While it 
has been demonstrated that many interviewees express views about the ability 
of controlling risk, for example via the implementation of quality control systems 
and safety standards in labs and manufacturing units, tissue engineering is an 
example par excellence of a technology with many ‘unknown unknowns’.
It has been argued in the literature how risk and uncertainty are intermingled, 
and how risks cannot any longer be seen as controllable or calculable entities. 
Uncertainty and risk cannot be easily distinguished and mutually constitute 
each other (Asselt and Vos XX). With progressing innovation and change in 
Western society, new forms of uncertainty are created, and with them uncertain 
risks (Nowotny et al. 2001). Thus uncertain risks spring from the inherent 
unpredictability due to complexity.
Tissue engineering can be considered a good example of the introduction of an 
innovative technology where uncertainties exist about the complex relation 
between cause and effect, and other underlying processes that make it hard to 
predict what will happen in the long run. Both risk and uncertainty are central 
notions in the complex risk management strategies for this technology.
In tissue engineering two domains have been identified where particular forms 
of uncertainty persist, which are interrelated. One of these concerns the 
potential for disease transfer, and the fear that new viruses pop up that can not 
be tested for with the current means and state-of-the-art in science and 
technology:
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I mean there’s always a potential risk. The thing is you can’t ever protect 
yourself against something you don’t know about. So if you went back to 
the time before HIV, before it happened no one could have predicted it 
or tested for it. So people won’t ever be able to stop from some virus 
getting into the process. But I think if you tend to grow the cells from 
donors now, I mean we’re talking about nearly ten years time now that a 
virus comes on the scene, if we were using cell banks that were made 
today, it would have been produced, I mean the serum would never 
have been produced like it is. I mean you can never safeguard against 
those kinds of things happening in the future, but once you know what to 
test for it becomes pretty safe.
(UK manufacturer in tissue engineering M1, 2003)
A related concern is expressed by the scientist below, who identifies several 
areas of uncertainty but feels the risk of disease transfer is the most pressing:
How we going to know, how are we going to ensure that those cells do 
not transmit... and the concern is that transmittable disease really. How 
do we know that they’re not going attract some nasty virus? Viruses are 
coming out of everywhere. How do we know that we’re not going to give 
them some kind of carcinogenic element? (...)
Nevertheless how do we know? And those are the kinds of questions 
that could keep you awake at night. It really is the transmitted disease, I 
think, because if you put a cell into somebody it’s either going to die, it’s 
not really going to kill them, is it? Do you know what I mean? You can 
give somebody an overdose of morphine and it will kill them. The 
chances of killing somebody with an overdose of cells, is slightly, this is 
a completely different parameter. (...) The ultimate thing is to keep 
records on donors and any possible risk that they might have particular 
viruses or you know, CJD exposure and things like that. I think ultimately 
you can test the blood all you want but it’s very difficult to know about 
the viruses we don’t know about, so...
(Industrial scientist at multinational consultancy company M-EU8, 2003)
As also illustrated in the above quote, many of these uncertain risks are of a 
technological nature, where it is uncertain what effects and potential harm can 
be expected from, in this case, the use of donor cells. This is related to a 
second and underlying main area of uncertainty in tissue engineering, namely 
the starting components used; the behaviour of living cells in the body and of 
biological materials in general are difficult to estimate:
Dealing with biological materials is always much more complicated and 
unpredictable than dealing with the types of materials that engineers 
deal with. Controlling biological materials is difficult. Batch control is 
difficult so anything you do with biological materials is more 
unpredictable. An engineer would probably kill me for saying this but I 
guess there’s a limited quantity of knowledge on steel or plastic: you can 
get to know all there is to know about steel. But it’ll be a long, long time
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before you get to know everything about even fairly purified biological 
materials. So I think there’s an inherent -  a definite -  increased 
unpredictability which is a potential risk.
(Clinical scientist in multinational industrial setting M-EU1, 2003)
And as the interviewee below explains, this has implications for the risk 
management process, where uncertainty has to be translated in ways of at 
least predicting ‘reasonable foreseeable risks’:
In this kind of area with a biological system you are always dealing to a 
certain extent with the unknown as well, and one of the things one does 
in risk management is also to try and identify reasonably foreseeable 
risks which I think is quite an important principle. So you look beyond the 
obvious into even slightly beyond that into what could be some of the 
other things [that] could conceivably go wrong and you try and predict 
this as far as possible
(European trade body representative M-EU2, 2003)
Thus uncertain risks are not or only partially calculable and controllable, 
because the probability of occurrence or the potential damage and harmful 
effects are difficult to estimate. In policy circles an often heard argument is that 
uncertainty is a matter of limited knowledge (so called epistemic uncertainty), or 
the result of variability in natural systems behaviour, human behaviour, socio­
economic and cultural dynamics or technological surprises (variability 
uncertainty). But as argued by Van Asselt and Vos, uncertainty is not simply 
caused by lack of knowledge:
Experts and scientists often have quite informed ideas on which 
uncertainties may be important and why, what are underlying sources of 
uncertainty, whether and how uncertainties may be reduced or at least 
better understood, which interpretations of uncertainty seem valid and 
which contradict the established state-of-the-art. This whole of answers 
and insights can be referred to as ‘uncertainty information’. Experts can 
provide such uncertainty information, but they cannot provide certainty 
about uncertain risks (Asselt and Vos XX: 5).
As discussed in this section, interviewees in tissue engineering have adopted 
certain frames of what the areas of uncertainty are, such as viral transfer and 
controlling biological material, and why they matter. Furthermore strong 
suggestions have been expressed on how to reduce these uncertainties, for 
example via screening of donors and testing of products:
I think there is a great deal of awareness of a whole range of routes of 
possible risk that those developing are trying to be aware of possible risk
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and trying to understand how you can minimise them, how you would try 
and test for them... I’m not sure that there is... nothing can be entirely 
safe, but all the perceived risks - to keep them to a minimum, to try and 
ensure that...Many straightforward applications may not be difficult to try 
and ensure there are reasonable levels of low risk. (Academic research 
scientist in UK tissue engineering centre S3, 2003)
Thus the uncertainty information is to some extent available, but this does not 
change the suggestion one has to deal with certain uncertain risks. Thus 
uncertainty functions as underlying framework and backdrop for analysing risks 
of tissue engineering technology. We will come back to this issue in discussing 
ways and means into how to manage risk in a situation of uncertainty.
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7.5 Transgressing boundaries: deconstructing and reframing 
risk
The purpose of this part of my thesis has been to analyse the socially 
constructed or framed nature of risk in tissue engineering. The main research 
question addressed concerns how and to which extent expert definitions of risk 
are articulated in tissue engineering R&D and in which ways they are framed 
and differentiated. My research has sought to unravel the dimensions of 
different types of risk as perceived by professional actors involved in the early 
research and development stages of tissue engineering, thus representing a 
model of the early innovation process or front-end stage where products 
emerge from lab to clinic into the commercial cycle. Furthermore, attention was 
focussed on the framing of these issues according to different categories and 
levels of risk and uncertainty as defined by these actors. Insight into these 
issues is needed to analyse how different discourses on risk translate into 
regulatory policy making in this area, and what the implications are for the 
shaping of a regulatory regime in tissue engineering, which is the broader 
concern of my research and the subject of the next part of this thesis.
7.5.1 Revisiting risk
To analytically approach different risk frames I have developed a tripartite 
classification to discriminate between risks in the different phases of the 
innovation process from lab to clinic to market. It has been demonstrated how 
different risk frames are defined and redefined by professional R&D groups in 
this domain in terms of quality and safety, therapeutic effectiveness and in 
relation to cost efficacy and marketability of products. Whereas variability in the 
framing of risk has been described in the literature, my study is a confirmation 
of how the debate on risk reveals broad variability in perception and 
assessment of risk within and, to a certain extent, between different 
professional groups involved in R&D in this technological domain. But risks 
have different meanings per tier of the risk classification, and the value 
attached to each differs and changes, thus underlining the social constructive 
character of risk.
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Furthermore I have outlined cross cutting dimensions of risk, which I have 
labelled the risk hierarchy and the risk balance. The ‘risk hierarchy’ contains a 
reclassification and revaluation of risk on a low to high continuum based on the 
particular source material used for tissue engineered construct. This model was 
based on initial presentations of risk by interviewees, but appeared too static to 
explain the differentiated and inconsistent discourse of risk ranking, surrounded 
by uncertainty. Risks related to particular cell sources have led to different 
regulatory scenarios, where initially a distinction was made between autologous 
and allogeneic cell sources in regulatory controls, while subsequently this 
distinction was abandoned. In order words the ambiguity in this particular risk 
frame resounds in the regulatory debate and policy shaping around tissue 
engineering.
But in addition to risk variability per domain, interviewees take into account the 
population affected and the short term versus long-term effects in both 
perceived risks and benefits of these applications, underlining the importance 
of the levels of aggregation and the time-scale involved. A second dimension of 
risk is described in what I have called the ‘risk balance’. The risk balance is 
about acceptability of risk, where perceived risks of tissue engineering are 
differentiated into levels and degrees of risk for particular applications, subsets 
of populations, and the envisaged effects over time. The risk balance thus 
takes into account the specific therapeutic purpose of the tissue engineering 
application (over a spectrum from life saving till merely cosmetic) across stages 
of the innovation process, and is concerned with both risks and benefits of the 
technology and the trade-off between the two in determining acceptability of 
risk. It has been argued how tissue engineering technology will always imply a 
certain level of ‘residual risk’ as demands for a zero risk society are considered 
unrealistic. But this residual risk is not a generic category, as the risk balance 
also looks at the population at risk and the final risk-receiver, where 
acceptability is dependant on whether potentially harmful effects are limited to 
individuals or the society as a whole (e.g. individual versus collective risk) and 
in how far these risk are extended over time (inter-generational risk). Thus also 
the risk balance is a socially constructed notion.
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The content of the risk hierarchy and the risk balance provide the context for 
risk management approaches, which are troubled by large heterogeneity in 
product categories and associated risks of current and future applications.
As also discussed, these perceptions of risks need to be understood against a 
background of large technological uncertainty and complexity in this domain, 
where outcomes or possibly harmful effects are difficult to estimate and predict, 
effectively creating uncertain risks.
Thus these different frameworks are important because they dictate which 
issues are seen as problematic and which ‘solutions’ are constructed in the 
policy process, e.g. which risk management strategies are considered valuable 
and feasible, and what information is needed and useful in reaching a decision. 
It also has implications for the legitimacy of different viewpoints in the policy 
process. The construction of risk discourses is tied in with the expression of a 
technological, political or social acceptable solution. Thus the definition of risk 
is at the same time the definition of a solution.
By making the transition form risk assessment to risk management, one could 
argue that some consensus is needed on the definition of risk, as this dictates 
policy solutions to risk-based problems. In other words, some negotiated 
common framework is to be articulated, in which interested individuals and 
institutions adopt a similar or at least compatible conceptualisation of the risk 
issue in question. The next part of this thesis departs from a potentially 
problematic understanding of divergent perceptions and constructions of risk, 
and the question how this diversity can be incorporated into the policy domain.
In other words, claims can be made about the policy implications of different 
risk discourses. As pointed out by Vaughan & Seifert, ‘variability in the framing 
of risk issues can exacerbate conflict, leading to differences in which 
perspectives are judged legitimate or valid, what solutions are seen as 
reasonable, and what type of information is seen as useful or relevant’ 
(Vaughan and Seifert 1992: 119). Understanding how different actors structure 
or frame complex risk issues can thus provide insight into the basis of policy 
disagreement. This is a two-way system, where the framing of a risk issue -  the 
conceptualisation of a problem -  amplifies certain values and beliefs, but also
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where these values play a role in how individuals frame the decision elements 
to be considered in a risk situation (Dietz et al. 1989).
The remaining part of this thesis will analyse these professional risk frames in 
the light of regulatory policy making and in particular take into account the 
different subsets and constructions of risk as put forward by a category of 
experts and professionals further down in the innovation chain, namely 
regulators, scientific experts and policy advisors involved in regulatory activity. 
Here alternative risk frames are called upon for the purpose of risk 
management and control, where risks have to manageable and ‘regulatable’ in 
order to enter the policy domain. In this process particular risk frames and 
definitions are adopted for inclusion in policy and practice, while others are 
neglected or downplayed as not being suitable for control and management.
Before analysing this process in more detail, it is important to consider the 
frames that are left out or marginalised in accounts of interviewees. One of the 
main contrasts between R&D risks and regulatory risks is the different values 
attached to social and ethical considerations by different sets of actors in these 
domains. The next part of this thesis analyses how arguments of a less 
narrowly defined techno-scientific frame are intertwined with discussions on the 
scope of regulatory policy, and how boundaries are drawn around the social 
acceptability of tissue engineering technology. To put this regulatory debate in 
perspective, insight is needed into the ways in which R&D actors deal with 
social and ethical concerns.
7.5.2 Moral considerations in different risk domains
The focus so far has been on R&D expert definitions of risk which have been 
framed in a rather crude three-way of scientific, clinical and commercial 
discourses. An important notion largely underdeveloped so far concerns the 
inclusion and implications of dealing with socio-political and ethical concerns 
related to tissue engineering technology. These concerns have been largely 
deprived of in current accounts of interviewees in this sample. This is not to 
imply that these issues are absent:
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Tissue engineering involves more than scientific or medical issues.
Many people voice concerns about the ethical issues raised by 
experimenting on animals or humans, cloning, using fetal tissues in 
research and treatments, and creating cutting-edge treatments that 
might only be available to people of certain economic classes 
(Hypertech Online, 2001).
The discussion of moral dilemmas and ‘ethical aspects’ of tissue engineering 
has entered authoritative writing about the technology, arguing how other than 
purely techno-scientific issues need to be addressed in order to create a 
societal beneficiary solution. The issues referred to differ. While the quote 
above considers tissue engineering on a similar level as potentially more 
controversial technologies such as cloning, some of the early pioneers in the 
field touch upon issues of funding, regulation, clinical testing and proprietary 
implications, and how these issues affect the institutional structure:
If tissue engineering is to play an important role in human therapy, in 
addition to scientific issues, fundamental issues that are economic, 
social and ethical in nature will arise. Something as simple as a new 
vocabulary will need to be developed and uniformly applied. A universal 
problem is funding. Can philanthropic dollars be accessed for the 
purposes of potential new human therapies? Will industry recognize the 
potential for commercialization and invest heavily? If this occurs, will the 
focus be changed from that of a purely academic endeavour? What role 
will governmental agencies play as the field develops? How will the field 
be regulated to ensure its safety and efficacy prior to human application? 
Is the new tissue to be considered transplanted tissue and, therefore, 
not subject to regulation, or is it a pharmaceutical that must be subjected 
to the closest scrutiny by regulatory agencies? If lifesaving, should the 
track be accelerated toward human trials? There are legal ramifications 
of this emerging technology as new knowledge is gained. What 
becomes proprietary through patents? Who owns the cells that will be 
sourced to provide the living part of tissue fabrication? (Vacanti and 
Vacanti 2000: 6-7).
Interestingly, these issues are phrased in terms of the need for advancement of 
the field, considered from a developers’ or insiders’ perspective, where ethical 
concerns are translated as problems belonging to the domains of science or 
commerce. Furthermore, what these fragments have in common is an 
understanding that ethical concerns are a problem of ‘other people’, e.g. the 
public or ‘society’ that needs to be convinced or even educated about the 
therapeutic benefits, which would subsequently lead to smooth adoption of the 
technology. This demarcation is also visible when asking interviewees involved 
in tissue engineering R&D activities about potential ethical concerns. It is
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generally argued that tissue engineering is uncontroversial, given the current 
state of technology, or at least external to the technology itself. Thus while 
handbooks and overview articles on the technology do not linger on expressing 
various ethical concerns, or at least referring to various concerns under this 
heading, these do not play a dominant role in interviewees’ accounts.
But risk can be considered integral part of this reflection. Or more specific, the 
balance of risk or the weighting of risks against benefits poses questions of a 
moral and political nature. The general understanding is that a certain amount 
of risk is acceptable when it is balanced by a specific amount of benefit. But the 
question is whose risks are weighed against whose benefits. As described 
earlier, risks can be defined by different criteria, and different actors attach 
different values to particular risks, which also has implications for risk 
assessment strategies, as these can not be restricted to narrow techno- 
scientific or medical frames. Similarly, the assessment of benefits is troubled by 
different definitions and whether the benefits are to be gained on individual or 
collective level; for example for the patient or for public health, for the individual 
scientist or the research community, for commercial developers of these 
products or national economies. Thus the very notion of risk perception and 
acceptability is fraught with moral implications about the receivers of risks and 
benefits and the distribution of the risk balance. More specific, concepts of both 
risk and safety have become matters of moral concern by raising questions 
about responsibility, accountability and justifiability (Reiss and Straughan 1996) 
and the assessment of risk includes ethical considerations, thus underlining the 
interrelatedness of risk and ethics in modern technology.
This section discusses emerging ethical and social concerns which can be 
brought back to specific phases in the innovation cycle and the corresponding 
broad typology of technological, clinical and commercial risk. These issues 
range from general safety concerns and risks of ineffectiveness to implications 
of commercialisation and ownership of innovations. Partly drawing on 
documentary sources, also the limited interviewees’ accounts of specific ethical 
dilemmas are presented in relation to tissue engineering technology, 
investigating in how far we can consider these discourses as external or
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internalised accounts, and with which implications for regulatory policymaking 
in this domain.
Of conceptual relevance in this respect is that ethical concerns can be 
considered as transgressing boundaries of risk domains, while also shaping the 
regulatory domain. Moral issues are not fixed but fluent and hybrid, not static 
but permeable; they remain open for negotiation and reconsideration, and as 
such for continuous boundary drawing. As discussed later it is particularly 
difficult to achieve closure in this process, and ethical arguments are powerful 
boundary objects in regulatory policy shaping, where organised interests are 
gathered around specific ethical objections and legal possibilities.
7.5.2.1 Technological concerns
Technological concerns relate to the early stages of sourcing, donating and 
processing human tissues and cells to create tissue engineered products. 
Some of these issues are considered to apply more generally to donor and 
organ donation and tissue banking activities, for example in relation to gaining 
informed consent, the nature of donation, traceability of donors and overall 
safety concerns. Others can be regarded more specific for tissue engineering 
technology, such as debates on the meaning of ‘engineered’ and ‘manipulated’ 
human material and concerns around specific cell sources used in the 
construction of these products.
To produce tissue engineered products, tissues and cells can be sourced from 
living or deceased donors, cell lines, (aborted) foetuses and human embryos. 
Each of these cell sources is associated with quite different ranges of ethical 
questions, also depending on the conditions of use -  most notably for research 
versus therapeutic purposes and in terms of whether the intended use is 
medical or cosmetic. In this respect the risk balance as discussed earlier 
reflects these concerns. For example, some have expressed concerns that 
tissue engineered products might be developed that are not just aimed at 
restoring human tissue but also improving bodily functions, creating the 
potential for enhancing performance of human beings (Bock et al. 2005).
223
First of all, a whole set of concerns relates to the donation of human tissues 
and cells. Especially in Europe a strong tradition exists of altruistic donation (as 
opposed to commercialisation of human tissue, as also discussed later) where 
the procurement of human tissues requires prior informed and free consent of 
the person concerned. Comparable to organ donation, donating tissues or cells 
is seen as a voluntary act of solidarity. Connected to this free donation frame 
are ideas about ensuring bodily integrity when procuring tissue or cells from 
both living and dead donors, and with taking into account certain health safety 
measures to control and test, as far as possible, the potential of disease 
transmission. This includes checking the donors’ personal and medical history 
to detect transmissible diseases, but also making sure a system is in place for 
surveillance and traceability of both donors and recipients. But part of the 
informed consent agreement, at least ideally, covers the extent of anonymity of 
the donor, conditions of database registration and protection of private life and 
medical confidentiality. The sourcing and donation stage, but also subsequent 
handling and use of human tissues and cells requires the acquisition of 
personal data by companies or biobanks and storage of these data for 
prolonged periods of time in order to trace back the tissues for safeguarding 
patient safety. Especially these traceability requirements for tissue engineered 
products and patients could potentially clash with issues of privacy, data 
protection, confidentiality and anonymity of patients. We will return to these 
issues in the discussion on developing regulatory policy, where especially the 
Tissue and Cells Directive by DG SANCO takes into account these concerns.
Other social and ethical concerns around tissue engineering relate to the use of 
other cell sources, where most notably the use of human embryos for 
derivation of embryonic stem cells has stirred controversy. Ethical issues 
underlying debates about the generation and use of human embryonic stem 
cells are well documented (Cogle et al. 2003; Colman and Burley 2001; Denker 
1999; Dresser 2001; Gottweis 2002; Henon 2003; Holm 2002, 2003a, 2003b, 
2004; Romeo-Casabona 2002; Stock 2003; Sutherland and Mayer 2003; 
Sylvester and Longaker 2004; Zwanziger 2003). While proponents point at the 
growing evidence that embryonic stem cell research will enable the cure and 
treatment of a wide range of diseases and conditions, for some of which no 
current treatment exists, opponents worry about the use of early embryos for
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utilitarian purposes. As embryonic stem cells are often derived from excess IVF 
embryos and terminated pregnancies (abortion), questions are raised regarding 
the moral status of this embryonic material and its human dignity. Interestingly 
though, as also discussed in the next section, tissue engineering is often 
described as ‘a less conflicting alternative for the future of regenerative 
medicine’ given its current focus on adult stem cells rather than embryonic 
ones (Henon 2003: 27).
Related concerns about cell source include the use of animal-derived material 
in tissue engineering, reviving issues from the xenotransplantation debate such 
as the breeding of animals solely for human benefit and animal welfare issues 
more generally (Frey 2002). The use of xenogeneic material also illuminates 
critical concerns such as pathogens posing safety risks for the treated 
individual but also for the public in general. The risk of potential retroviral 
contagion thus calls for a need for balancing individual treatment benefits 
versus collective risks (Bach et al. 2002; Welsh and Evans 1999). Furthermore, 
the use of animal (derived) material raises issues of identity and personality on 
behalf of the recipient of these tissues or cells, and on the relationship between 
humans and animals, not to mention possible religious concerns regarding the 
material composition of these products. The ways in which interviewees regard 
these issues in relation to drafting regulation are discussed in chapters to 
come.
7.5.2.2 Clinical concerns
Also in the phase of therapeutic application, in an experimental setting or as 
part of more routine clinical use, diverse ethical concerns have been raised. As 
discussed under the heading of clinical risk, lack of clinical evidence and 
debated therapeutic effectiveness also have a socio-political component in that 
it is considered unethical to offer treatments against high cost for which no or 
insufficient long-term evidence exists of therapeutic benefit. Two issues are 
dominant here, one relating to the set-up of clinical trials and the other to 
patient access to potentially beneficial technology.
In the absence of unified standards and regulation, it has been argued that 
clinical trials are the best alternative currently available to test the general
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safety and efficacy of products. As with many medical interventions and 
research involving human subjects more generally, these clinical studies pose 
restrictions on design and conduct, in particular in relation to concerns about 
the protection of health of participants, the overall balance between risks and 
benefits, issues of data protecting, traceability and privacy and the notion of 
obtaining proper free and informed consent of participants. Fundamental ethical 
principles include respecting the moral agency of subjects (including protection 
for those with diminished autonomy), fostering the best interests of subjects 
while avoiding unnecessary harm, and promoting principles of justice and 
equity between those who benefit from and those who bear the burdens of 
research. With respect to informed consent clear and sufficient information 
should be provided about risks and benefits, and making sure people enrolled 
in the trial are competent to participate and do so without coercion (Brannigan
2001). This can be problematic though when vulnerable groups are involved 
such as children (see for example trials for tissue engineered heart muscle) or 
mentally less able patients (e.g. trials for Alzheimer). Most notably it has been 
argued that true informed consent is debatable in the case of tissue 
engineering, where many risks are uncertain and long-term consequences 
unknown in terms of effectiveness and sustainability. In addition, it has been 
demonstrated how many health professionals are not aware of the precise 
material composition of tissue engineered skin products and dressings, thus 
being unable to provide full information to patients about the treatment and 
unaware of possible cultural or religious sensitivities around the use of these 
products (Enoch et al. 2005).
In addition to the ethical conduct of clinical trials, issues have been raised 
about the provision of equal access to tissue engineering treatments in the 
context of limited resources of health care systems (Bock et al. 2005). As 
discussed earlier under clinical and commercial risk, many tissue engineered 
products are not currently reimbursed by national healthcare systems in 
Europe, also due to high cost of these applications, thus creating a potential for 
social and health inequalities. The principle of distributive justice requires 
equity, so that all potential patients have reasonable access to treatments, but 
this principle can be seriously challenged when only the more affluent patients 
can benefit (Brannigan 2001). Especially given the substantial amount of public
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funds into this area of research, one could question the legitimacy of a structure 
where only privileged parties can benefit from tissue engineered applications.
7.5.2.3 Commercial concerns
An extensive set of moral dilemmas with human tissues and cells relates to the 
commercialisation aspects of the technology and use. One concern addresses 
the motivation of people involved in tissue engineering research and 
development, more specifically when working under pressure of expectations 
for commercial success and profit. Especially given the close ties between 
science and business in this field, conflicts of interest could trouble the view of 
patient and public health, where one could question the priority strategies for 
developing treatments that might be more profitable than medically urgent. 
Related to this is the issue of patenting of tissues and cells that have potential 
commercial value, and whether or not the donors of these cells have patent 
rights when their tissues and cells reap financial gain for (commercial) product 
developers.
Commercialisation of human tissue furthermore links in with discussions about 
the nature of donation, where in Europe strong belief exists in voluntary and 
unpaid donation as an act of solidarity. While commercial use of biotechnology 
products is often considered ethically legitimate on the condition of full informed 
consent of the donor, and as such the tissues and cells become company’s 
property, commercial benefit for donors is to be avoided on the basis that it 
could stimulate commercial exploitation of the human body, foster notions of 
the human being as an object or harvesting source of organs and tissues, and 
undermine solidarity. Altruistic unpaid donation is also favoured to avoid 
exploitation of the most vulnerable social economic groups to donate primarily 
for financial reasons. But a strong tension exists between the non-commercial 
nature of donation and the commercial use of the resultant products - including 
the profit aims of its developers (Furness 2004). As discussed later in the 
analysis of the SANCO Directive, the nature of donation was one of the most 
debated issues.
Most notably in this respect, the commodification of body parts in novel 
therapeutic applications has been discussed (Dickenson 2002; Lock 2001;
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Rajan 2003; Sharp 2000; Wilkinson 2000). When human tissues and cells are 
processed and manufactured some amount of value is added that translates 
them into tradable entities or commodities for exchange on the market place. 
Acknowledging the growing capital value of biological fragments, some have 
argued how a margin of ‘biovalue’ is being created by engineering tissues and 
cells (Waldby 2002).
As also discussed under regulatory efforts in this field, debate exists about the 
degree of manipulation of tissues and cells, thus drawing boundaries between 
more traditional tissue banking activities and commercial endeavours to create 
these products. This institutional divide also highlights different value systems 
and cultural connotations between for profit and not-for-profit models of 
providing these services and products to patients. Furthermore, the tension 
between unpaid donation and commodification of tissues and cells has 
refuelled the discussion about the basic act and nature of donation.
So far, documented ethical dimensions have been discussed over different risk 
domains. Within the different risk domains it can be argued that the origin of 
cells is the most dominant issue of technological risk, while proper clinical trials 
design and consent are most pressing in the category of clinical risk. 
Commercially related issues such as commodification are reflected in 
commercial risk. Added to this three-way classification could be conflicting 
ideas about identity and personhood, of what it means to be human in the 
context of implanting tissues and cells from different sources, and in how far 
the body can be seen as both object and subject (Kent 2005). The conception 
of oneself and of being human might change if the body consists of 
replacement parts and is considered ‘renewable’ (Bock et al. 2003: Satava,
2002).
The notion of risk is intrinsically connected to moral concerns of tissue 
engineering technology, as it incorporates diverging views about acceptability 
and the distribution of risk over different levels, and raises questions about 
accountability and responsibility and about what is justifiable. Especially in the 
face of uncertainty about implications and long term risks and safety, ethical 
considerations around tissue engineering technology are paramount.
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Interestingly though, only a small but narrowly defined selection of issues 
features in interviewees’ accounts. When asked about potential ethical 
concerns around use or implications of tissue engineering technology, the 
majority of core R&D constituencies expresses how in their view tissue 
engineering largely stays clear from ethical or moral dilemmas. Some 
interviewees, mostly clinicians, have expressed the problematic nature of 
clinical trial design and gaining proper informed consent. Others have referred 
to possible religious concerns, but this was phrased in relation to 
xenotransplants rather than the inclusion of animal derived material in tissue 
engineered applications. There is one large domain though over which 
interviewees do worry: the potential use of embryonic stem cells in (future) 
tissue engineered applications. Although scientifically largely uncontroversial, 
according to these interviewees, the impact of embryonic stem cells therapies 
in the public eyes is fore grounded as shared concern. It is to these perceptions 
that we will turn next, because these provide the backdrop for interpreting the 
shaping of EU regulatory policymaking, where the value of these particular 
concerns has followed different tracks.
7.5.3 Interviewees’ accounts: moral concerns in tissue engineering
I don’t see perhaps to such a great extent the ethics around tissue
engineering... I see that string of people in the clinic in the morning, you
know, waiting for this answer that [they] think medicine can give them.
(Clinician in wound healing Co2, 2003)
Overall it can be argued that ethical issues have been largely overlooked by 
interviewees in this sample, with minor exceptions.53 For example some 
respondents have pointed out the problematic design of clinical trials. The 
interviewee below (M-EU1) is based in a commercial setting, and explains the 
main dilemmas:
531 appreciate the extensive discussion on definitions of ‘morality’ and ‘ethics’. Here I will treat 
this as a largely linguistic issue, thus ignoring philosophical traditions and bypassing political 
thinking about precise meanings and connotations. Worse still, I use ‘moral’ and ‘ethical’ 
concerns as interchangeable terms - and for those interested refer to Reiss and Straughan 
(1996) or even Habermas (2003).
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Well, any medical product, there’s always medical issues. I mean the 
clinical trial is an exercise in ethics. We spend a lot of time worrying 
about that. (...) any clinical trial is an experiment on people. So how 
much evidence do you have before you start, how many people do you 
involve, what stage do you go to the market, what clinical trials do you 
do after you’re on the market, what claims do you do in clinical trials and 
how do you develop those? Because obviously within a new technology 
the first patients would probably be the ones -  the aim is to use it in the 
patients without other choices, if the risks are to some extent unknown. 
Yes any new technology, there are huge ethical questions in medicine. 
(Clinical scientist in multinational industrial setting M-EU1, 2003)
In other words tissue engineering poses similar ethical concerns as any other 
innovative medical technology which enters the experimental clinical phase. 
Thus there is a strong discourse of ‘in-exclusiveness’ in considering this 
particular technology, arguing how ethical considerations are not connected 
uniquely to tissue engineering but part of the common medical innovation cycle 
with all its usual considerations and limitations. Furthermore the proper design 
of clinical trials is conceived here as mainly a scientific or commercial issue, 
without any reference to social or political implications or potential different 
views of patients. In a similar vein, concepts of a more moral nature remain 
unquestioned by most interviewees, and views are dominant that controversy is 
absent as long as the usual procedure of good practice is taken into account -  
for example in relation to informed consent as part of proper trial design:
If it’s done properly... if there’s consent between people, I don’t see a 
problem with using cells from another individual. (UK academic clinician 
CI5, 2003)
The interview fragment below addresses the issue of providing the patient with 
full information, which is an especially strong principle amongst clinicians, while 
also pointing out how it would be unethical to not provide patients with access 
to new technology -  in this case according to a reversed burden of proof of 
clinical effectiveness:
You have to be upfront and say: this is what the product is. This is how it 
was produced. Do you want it used on you? But I think it’s wrong not to 
make them available unless we have got absolutely no proof that they 
work at all and then, you know, that would be wrong.
(UK clinician in wound healing Co2, 2003)
This view is backed by many other R&D actors, especially those in clinical 
practice, stating how the use of different cell sources is unproblematic as long
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as the patient gives full informed consent -  so in other words is aware of the 
procedure and the risks involved. But as the following scientist explains, 
patients or ‘the lay public’ have different perceptions of risk compared to 
(medical) professionals. In addition, true informed consent is problematic in the 
absence of certainty of both short and long-term outcomes of tissue 
engineering therapies:
Communicating the uncertainties to the lay public is one of the major 
problems, because an individual that is in pain or immobile doesn’t want 
to make a decision based upon statistics or probabilities. They want to 
make it based upon: Am I going to be better or not? And so the short 
term decision is often driven by the magnitude of suffering. The longer 
term consequences can be easily overlooked and informed consent 
requires both the decision to be made on both those standpoints, both 
short term and long term. The medical community often does not have 
the information available to present this information of long term 
consequences completely enough to for the decision to be based on 
truly informed consent.
(UK academic research scientist S6, 2003)
Thus, again, the perception of unknown risks is important. As has been argued 
extensively in the literature, perceptions of the public about risk are different 
from expert views. Thus one issue is that risk can mean very different things to 
different constituencies, the other is uncertainty. In this case uncertainty exists 
over the risk of, amongst others, transmission of infection from donors to 
recipients, so no accurate assessment of the level of such risks can be made.
In addition to issues around experimental design of studies, a small number of 
interviewees have expressed how religious or cultural concerns can ‘interfere’ 
with the use of donor material, especially when xenogeneic sources are 
involved. For example, one scientist based at a UK university explains his work 
on engineered vascular grafts, and the experimental use of porcine arteries, 
adding how he was told after a lecture on this subject that ‘this would be no 
good for a Muslim patient because of use of porcine tissue’ (S1, 2003). 
Similarly, one clinician talks about his confusion regarding the exclusion of 
porcine material in wound healing applications in certain cultures, questioning 
why pig skin is not allowed in Israel (CI-EU4, 2003).
These are considered ‘typical tissue banking’ issues though, echoing classical 
discussions about cultural and religious sensitivities in relation to cell sources
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and donation. At the same time there is a strong awareness of what is 
considered a more controversial technology: xenotransplantation. The 
implantation of animal tissues or cells into humans is used as an extreme 
example of what tissue engineering is not about. In other words, R&D actors go 
a long way in explaining how clear boundaries need to be drawn between the 
‘separate technologies’ of xenotransplantation and tissue engineering. 
Remarkably, these actors do not see significant ethical issues around the use 
of bovine or other animal-derived material, an integral part of the processing of 
most tissue engineered constructs.
A similar if not stronger discourse is found in relation to embryonic stem cells 
(ESCs). The main argument put forward by interviewees is that tissue 
engineering is relatively uncontroversial as long as it does not involve or is not 
associated with embryonic stem cell research. An interesting way of bracketing 
out is evident in this domain, where a sharp distinction is made between the 
scientific potential of ESCs and the public perception of these cells.
Furthermore both within and outside the scientific community two opposing 
discourses are presented: one that stresses the potentiality of this cell source, 
and another which tempers the excitement by pointing out the risks of the 
technology and need for further research before clinical applications are in 
sight. The following interview extracts demonstrate this tension.
The first two quotes refer to the need for precaution and warn against too high 
expectations on the short term. The third one (S1) speaks of a near future 
scenario where ESCs will at some point enter the clinic. The last quotes (S4 
and A-EU6) represents the view that tissue engineering will involve embryonic 
sources at some point, and that these will be controversial in the public eye, but 
that continued research efforts are legitimate:
If we were going to introduce embryonic stem cells for example, that 
would be much more complicated. I mean that technology is not that 
advanced yet to be used.
(Academic clinician in vascular surgery CI-EU2, 2003)
Well embryonic stem cell research, at this moment everybody’s scared 
of it. And not without reason you know. We have injected these cells and 
tumour formation is part of the game you know. So embryonic stem cells 
you have to do quite some science.
(European clinician involved in start-up company CL-EU5, 2003)
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I mean, I guess, the whole thing about embryonic stem cells, growing 
embryonic stem cells and cloning will cause both social and ethical 
reasons but the kind of tissue engineering products I’m thinking of, the 
ones that are most likely to succeed are not those - those are going to 
be, sort of, second and third, fourth generation products, in my view. 
(Academic research scientist in UK tissue engineering lab S1, 2003)
I think understanding how to use stem cells is critical. Fortunately or 
unfortunately, depending on your perspective, I think that inevitably 
moves us towards the question of embryonic stem cells and whether in 
the future the tissue engineering world should go down the route of 
embryonic stem cells to repair all sorts of tissues which gets us into all 
sorts of ethical nightmares... Embryonic stem cells has all the obvious 
ethical issues but I think we shouldn’t duck those, we should tackle 
them... if collectively on the whole we feel it’s appropriate that we should 
explore embryonic stem cells then I think we should go ahead and do 
that and if they reach clinical use in some years’ time then those who are 
ethically opposed should simply not allow those therapies to be used for 
themselves.
(Academic research scientist in clinical care S4, 2003)
There is no doubt that embryonic stem cells probably, leaving ethical 
issues apart, probably represent the best source of stem cells for tissue 
engineering and regenerative medicine. And there’s an awful lot known 
now about the use [of] stem cells but they can’t be used yet.
(Scientist and European expert advisor A-EU6, 2003)
The discussion on ESCs in relation to tissue engineering is double-edged. On 
the one hand tissue engineering is portrayed as a technology that is much less 
controversial, because currently the science and technology behind 
engineering human tissues and cells largely draws upon the less contested 
adult cell sources. As such tissue engineering does not involve embryonic or 
foetal sources, which would make it a socially acceptable solution. On the other 
hand within the scientific community large debate takes place over the potential 
usefulness of ESCs and whether tissue engineering ‘should go down that path’. 
According to many scientists this is an inevitable next step in the innovation 
process, but at the same time great awareness exists of the risk and safety 
concerns but most notably the contested nature of these cells in the public 
opinion. Thus an interesting form of boundary drawing takes place here, where 
tissue engineering is presented as a separate technology, not to be 
misunderstood as or confused with ESC research, while at the same time it 
holds the scientific promise of more and better therapeutic applications which 
should be pursued. From a regulatory perspective this ambiguity is problematic 
though, because legislative efforts focus on current application areas of the
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technology while also necessarily have to provide flexibility in order to keep up 
with technological innovation and to avoid a regulatory lag.
As a last observation, it can be argued that the hierarchy of risk as discussed 
earlier in relation to the different cell sources also applies to ethical dimensions. 
Many interviewees link the degree of (potential or perceived) moral controversy 
with the particular cell source used, where autologous sources represent the 
least contested category and embryonic ones the highest. Thus a parallel can 
be dawn between risk and safety concerns according to interviewees and the 
‘ethical nightmare’ grade attached to these sources. Put simply: safer cells 
sources are also less controversial. Or as the following interviewee explains:
Scientifically, especially from the immunological point of view,
autologous is better. And from the ethical point of view autologous is far,
far better I think.
(Scientist and European expert advisor A-EU6, 2003)
There is one exception in this respect, which concerns the question whether 
embryonic stem cells are rated as more controversial, and higher in the ethical 
risk hierarchy, than xenogeneic cells. This notion is also relevant in relation to 
the regulatory debates around tissue engineering. Interviewees in the R&D part 
of the innovation cycle have expressed concerns over xenotransplants, but 
they do not include animal-derived material in this definition. For these 
respondents embryonic sources rate top in the moral controversy ladder. As 
discussed in the next part of this thesis, concerns over including most notably 
ESCs (and cloning techniques to derive these cells) in the scope of the SANCO 
Directive on human tissues and cells have influenced the direction but also 
timeframe of this regulation. The main reason for the delay of this Directive 
relates to the long and controversial discussions over in- or excluding ESCs 
under its scope. But also the use of xenogeneic cells has stirred debate within 
EU regulatory bodies and beyond, again affecting the course of legislative 
events. Discussion over these cell sources became more prominent in the 
tissue engineering product regulation by DG Enterprise. This illustrates the 
dynamic relationship between risks of technology and ethical considerations 
surrounding its potential use.
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The remaining part of this thesis analyses risk regulation in tissue engineering, 
where also issues of a moral order are foregrounded. In contrast to the limited 
awareness of R&D actors, during the policy shaping process many concerns 
have been expressed over the ethical and health implications of the use of 
human tissues and cells, and of its manufactured offspring. These concerns are 
part of a broader risk assessment and risk management frame, with organised 
interests around including or excluding particular items and selective agenda- 
setting, thus entering the politicised domain of risk regulation of tissue 
engineering in Europe and of drawing boundaries around the social and 
political acceptability of the technology.
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8 Constructing regulatory boundaries
This chapter marks the transition from risk to regulation. It presents my 
conceptual concern with notions of ‘regulatable risk’ and uncertainty in a 
regulatory society. I describe the implications of this ‘shift’ from risk to 
regulation in analytical terms, while the second part of this chapter contains a 
short empirical introduction to the specific legislations that I cover in this 
research. The last section gives an overview of what to expect next and how I 
conceptually approach these themes.
8.1 From risk to regulation: conceptual concerns
In the last few chapters attention was focussed on the framing of risk issues by 
core R&D actors in the early innovation process of tissue engineering, and how 
boundaries are drawn and reconstructed within and across risk domains. The 
dynamic nature of risk is reproduced and frames are redefined yet again when 
risk becomes the subject of regulatory controls. The purpose of this part of the 
thesis is to analyse how different discourses on risk translate into regulatory 
policy making, and what the implications are for the shaping of a regulatory 
regime in tissue engineering. Therefore this chapter makes the transition from 
perceptions of risk by core R&D constituencies to regulatory policy shaping and 
making at EU level. This shift of attention has several implications, which are 
discussed below.
8.1.1 Regulatable risk
First of all, moving from perceptions of risk to risk regulation implies a different 
concept and scope, and involving a different set of actors. Risks are redefined 
and attributed a different value when entering the policy domain. Typically, risks 
are characterised in terms of probability, as the possibility of unwanted or 
adverse effects occurring. As such, risk includes three elements: an 
undesirable outcome, probability of occurrence and the state of reality (Renn
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1992). Deeply rooted in this concept of risk is the understanding of a causal 
relationship between action and effect, and the need and indeed ability to avoid 
or modify undesirable outcomes, which discriminates risk from danger (Vos 
1999). Risk is thus both a descriptive and normative concept. Furthermore, 
risks can not be separated from the contexts in which they occur. Thus rather 
than treating it as an almost ‘stand alone’ or independent concept, the meaning 
of risk takes a different form and shape in a regulatory context, where 
perceptions of risk have to be translated into systematic means of risk 
assessment for regulatory purposes. Most notably, when risk forms the basis of 
regulation the notion of acceptable risk is becoming increasingly important. This 
is also where a new set of actors comes in, as regulatory risk is the domain of 
regulators, policy advisors and experts. These actors are faced with particular 
difficulties in interpreting risk and determining the level of acceptable risk -  not 
the least because of ambiguity about the definition of acceptable risk.
Defining the very meaning of risk is furthermore complicated by the particular 
context in which regulators find themselves, where some consensus or 
common understanding is needed on the definition of risk, as this dictates 
policy solutions to risk-based problems. In other words, some negotiated 
common framework is to be articulated, in which interested individuals and 
institutions adopt a similar or at least compatible conceptualisation of the risk 
issue at stake. Given the diversity of risk frames as expressed in the last part, 
and the added complication of finding a single definition of risk for policy 
purposes, the question how this diversity can be incorporated into the policy 
domain is a difficult one.
Analysed here are professional risk frames in the light of regulatory policy 
making and in particular taking into account the different subsets and 
constructions of risk as put forward by a category of experts and professionals 
further down in the innovation chain, namely regulators, scientific experts and 
policy advisors involved in regulatory activity. Data are presented on how these 
professional groups have partly overlapping, but mostly alternative risk frames 
for the purpose of risk management and control. It is argued how for regulators 
and policymakers risks have to manageable and ‘regulatable’ in order to enter 
the policy domain. I demonstrate how particular risk frames and definitions are
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adopted for inclusion in policy and practice, while others are neglected or 
downplayed as not being suitable for control and management. In this way the 
transition - and often taken for granted fluent cause or linear logic - from risk 
assessment to risk management is redefined. I consider this in terms of 
boundary drawing and the articulation of particular powerful or dominant risk 
discourses, where certain arguments are fore grounded and others ‘boxed out’ 
in favour of what is perceived to be belonging to the regulatable domain -  and 
more generally how in this process translation the risk boundaries that are 
formalised are different from those acted upon in the shaping of regulatory 
policy.
Thus an important shift is that from ‘isolated’ risk to ‘acceptable’ risk for policy 
purposes. In the regulatory process scientific data are gathered, and systems 
and procedures designed to assess and manage risk. Built into this is the 
understanding that risk is not an abstract notion of probability of harm anymore, 
but related to specific processes and products that are considered ‘safe’ when 
its associated risks are judged to be acceptable. The regulation of risk, 
especially in the health and safety domain, encompasses estimations of both a 
scientific and social value, both of which are subject to ongoing change and 
adaptation. Furthermore, as also outlined earlier, risk assessment is 
complicated by factors of uncertainty and controversy, where outcomes or 
possibly harmful effects are difficult to estimate and predict, effectively creating 
uncertain risks. The implications of controlling risk in times of uncertainty and 
complexity are also subject of investigation in this part.
8.1.2 Uncertainties in the regulatory society
With the proclaimed ‘risk society’ (Beck 1992) new kinds of risks, created by 
modern industrial society, came under the attention of sociologists: risks that 
are catastrophic in effect, unknowable in advance and collective in their 
incidence. These risks are more difficult to control on individual level, and 
perceptions of increasing risk have called for more elaborate regulation to 
maximise safety and protect consumers and citizens against potentially risky 
substances.
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In the risk society risks have become more global. Rather than representing 
some simple reality, risks have become a type of ‘virtuality’ which leaves 
society to deal with probabilities and potentialities (see also Ganchoff (2004) in 
this respect) of risks that might become disasters at some point in the future. 
Furthermore these risks are no objective and quantifiable entities, but risk 
calculations entail values. Another feature of the globalised risk society is that 
rational attempts to control risk are overshadowed by a broadening range of 
uncertainties. Finally the globalised character of these uncertain risks means 
that nation states are no longer perceived to be the best risk managers (Irwin 
and Michael 2003).
Thus the risk society has created a regulatory society, where regulatory action 
involves the assessment of risks associated with specific substances or 
products and based on this are regulatory decisions on how to manage these 
risks. While adopting a framework of risk as the basis for regulatory action has 
remained largely unquestioned, the type of risk to take into account for these 
provisions has stirred debate (Newell 2002a, 2002b). Risk is not a generic 
category, and some have argued how the selection of particular risk issues 
reflects the willingness of the state to accept responsibility for certain problems 
(Levidow et al. 1996). The level of acceptable risk forms a typical basis for 
regulatory action, but it also constitutes a very difficult notion to translate into 
policy because of the social constructive and dynamic character of what is 
perceived as acceptable risk at one point in time and space. Thus acceptable 
risk is both a political and regulatory tool, both a scientific concept and a policy 
objective, belonging to the domains of both risk assessment and risk 
management. The acceptability of risk then becomes a regulatory instrument in 
determining which risks society can take on, and which as such implicitly 
harbours a ranking of norms and values (Vos 1999). In this way, risks cannot 
be isolated from social and political questions about acceptable levels of risk 
and uncertainty.
Central to regulatory frameworks are standardised approaches to assessing 
potential risks to human health (and the environment). The development of 
simple and standardised procedures in order to create uniform and harmonised 
regulatory policy can be considered part of a narrow form of technically based
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risk assessment (Scoones 2001). For regulators standardised regulatory 
approaches are handy tools, as they save time and trouble in avoiding 
duplication across countries, where regulatory officials can rely on mutually 
agreed best practices and consensus over data. Standardisation is also 
supposed to reduce opportunities for arbitrary regulatory discretion. For 
industry, as also outlined later, harmonisation provides clarity and access to a 
single market for their tissue engineered products. The promotion of global 
trade is one strong imperative for standardisation approaches, and especially 
the WTO has been influential in lobbying the case for universally agreed 
regulatory policies. Finally, and this has also been used as rhetoric device in 
tissue engineering, investment in technology might be encouraged when 
standardised regulatory procedures are in place, as these limit ambiguity and 
uncertainty. As pointed out in this respect, ‘with uncertainty surrounding 
regulatory policy making, investors may shy away from the necessary up-front 
investments in technologies if there is a chance of no payback following 
regulatory approval.’ (Scoones 2001: 26).
Different risk assessment approaches have been called upon for regulatory 
purposes. Whereas risk assessment, as a way to identify and measure the 
actual extent of risk, is usually seen as an endeavour in the science domain, 
risk management is considered a tool for policy makers in the process of 
deciding on measures to reduce risk. Regulatory policy includes both, though 
the distinction and boundaries between risk assessment and management are 
often blurred. Most notably, the exact means and tools for both the assessment 
and management of risk are under constant debate, which the case of tissue 
engineering regulation clearly demonstrates.
One observation also highlighted in accounts on the risk society, is that 
technological risks have become more difficult to assess. From a technical risk 
assessment point of view risks are defined as the probabilities of physical harm 
due to given technological or other processes. But risk is more than merely 
probability times the magnitude of the hazard (Krimsky and Golding 1992). Risk 
has many dimensions, including immediacy, severity, reversibility and spatial 
and temporal distribution (Stirling et al. 1999). This makes a single 
measurement of risk problematic, especially where it concerns modern
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technologies (Scoones 2001). Modern technology has created risks that are 
more complicated and uncertain, more far reaching and invisible, more intense 
and uncontrollable. Furthermore, risks can not always be articulated (Krimsky 
1991: 212). Risk as related to modern technologies needs to take into account 
the complexity, uncertainty and ambiguity inherent in the interaction of modern 
technology, society and the environment. Risk analysis of these technologies, it 
is argued, should not just aim to quantify undesirable consequences of 
technologies, as done in standard risk assessments, but also evaluate 
unintended impacts. In a similar vein, risk management strategies should not 
be limited to applying a set of universal rules and principles but encompass 
contextual or situational aspects in order to take account of degrees of 
uncertainty and ambiguity.
Yet many conventional risk assessment strategies are ill-equipped to take into 
account these diverse criteria in the face of uncertainty and indeterminacy, as 
they are usually based on the assessment of a limited number of criteria where 
technical assessments are seen to be sufficient (Krimsky and Golding 1992). In 
other words, more complex types of risk assessment are required (Krimsky 
2000). In this context also the need has been expressed for an extension of 
technocratic risk assessment to encompass the broader societal concerns 
raised by the far-reaching effects of technological risk and uncertainty 
(Scoones 2001). Society requires a ‘broader’ socio-political and economic 
assessment of the risk of its technologies.
But in the regulatory reality of limited time, budget and expertise to develop 
policy, a narrowing of scope is considered inevitable to get things done; “The 
consequence, of course, is that more complex criteria are left out of the 
equation, uncertainties are ‘black boxed’, and areas of ignorance avoided ‘
(Sahl and Bernstein 1995 in: Scoones 2001: 18-19).
This is also where the relationship with broader questions of norms, ethics and 
values come into play. An important notion concerns the inclusion and 
implications of dealing with socio-political and ethical concerns related to tissue 
engineering technology. As we have seen, these concerns have been largely 
deprived of in accounts of R&D actors. But social and ethical dimensions are
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paramount and form an intrinsic part of not just the construction of 
technological, clinical and commercial risk frames but also of managing 
uncertainty and complexity in this domain. These socio-political and ethical 
issues are relevant in the face of policy shaping, where the main concern is 
with delivering implementable solutions to narrowly defined science-based 
problems (judicial default mode). As demonstrated in the next chapters, also in 
tissue engineering a technical rather than ethical framework is called upon in 
attempts to reduce uncertainty and complexity in this domain, although large 
variability exists in the ways in which ‘ethics induced’ ambiguity is managed 
institutionally across the different regulatory initiatives. Most notably attempts 
are undertaken to exclude ethical concerns from ‘science-based’ regulation.
But as also illustrated, these debates represent a complex mix of arguments 
where technical and ethical considerations of risk and safety are intimately 
connected. This research departs from the assumption that ethical 
considerations cannot be segregated from techno-scientific assessments for 
regulatory purposes, thus questioning the current institutional set-up of tissue 
engineering regulation in the EU.
This is not a straightforward assumption though. As has also been 
demonstrated for other innovative technologies (see for example: Levidow and 
Carr 1997; Salter and Jones 2002b), the regulatory process of tissue 
engineering swings between technical and social concerns. This development 
is also echoed in the institutional management of risk, where technical risk 
assessment is treated as a separate task from socio-economic or ethical 
analyses. In order to institutionally manage complexity and uncertainty in 
technological risk assessment, responsibilities for policy and regulatory choices 
are often divided up, ‘with environmental and health appraisal seen as the 
domain of scientific assessment, while ethical and moral considerations are 
allocated to other areas of professional expertise and social and economic 
issues are deemed best dealt with by consumer choice and market response’ 
(Scoones 2001:19). By separating technical assessment from socio-political 
and ethical dimensions, the role of the independent and objective expert advice 
becomes more prominent.
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8.1.3 Translating risk into regulation
To sum up, this part of the thesis has three conceptual concerns. First of all, I 
am interested in the ways in which the transition is made from perceptions of 
risk to the regulation of risk. How do risk discourses translate into regulatory 
policy making in tissue engineering? In what ways is a ‘fit’ created to make 
risks ‘regulatable’ and manageable? Which boundaries are drawn around the 
regulatory domain? And what are the implications of these boundaries for 
incorporating risk concerns?
Thus from perceptions of risk we move to the assessment and management of 
risk for regulatory purposes. This introduces a new set of actors; a shift from 
core R&D actors to those individuals and groups in charge of agenda setting 
and policy shaping for regulatory decision making. This includes regulatory 
professionals and advisors, plus other actors actively involved in this part of the 
innovation cycle, such as scientific experts, manufacturers and tissue banks. 
With these new players, also new interests are represented and new agendas 
introduced, and with them different values about what risks should be regulated 
and the very meaning of the aim of regulation.
My second conceptual concern encompasses a political analysis of who is 
involved in regulatory decision making, and what this means for representation 
of interests, and also refers to broader concerns that enter the debate on tissue 
engineering regulation. Most notably this relates to the role of socio-political 
and ethical arguments vis-a-vis technical concerns in regulatory policymaking. 
This is placed in the perspective of the translation of technological, clinical and 
commercial risks as described in the last part. Focusing on actors in regulatory 
decision-making means analysing a process where different subjects are being 
prioritised in terms of risk and safety, where underlying value systems are 
made explicit and where diverse institutional tensions exist between these 
different actors and what they represent. Discussions about acceptable levels 
of risk and uncertainty, and of the trade-off between risk and benefit, positions 
regulation in the heart of a domain where technical issues are intertwined with 
socio-political and ethical dimensions. This is about entering the politicised 
domain of risk regulation of tissue engineering in Europe, with organised 
interests around including or excluding particular items and selective agenda-
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setting, and of drawing boundaries around the social and political acceptability 
of the technology.
To unravel these dimensions I analyse the two key regulatory initiatives at EU 
level: the SANCO Directive on quality and safety of human tissues and cells, 
and the Tissue Engineering Regulation by DG Enterprise. In other words I am 
interested in the ‘politicalisation’ of risk for regulatory purposes, and in the 
tensions that arise between different agendas and views on how to go about 
regulating risks of tissue engineering technology. This is based in the context of 
a need for broader risk assessment and management strategies in attempts to 
deal with risk and uncertainty of tissue engineering technology in a policy 
context.
This leads to my final and more encompassing concern, which is that with 
regulatory science as a way to look at science and policy as separate but 
intertwined domains and with the role of expertise in regulatory decision 
making. The EU system is mainly based on scientific and technical advice, and 
tissue engineering is a prime example of where scientists are called upon to 
provide advice or an expert opinion in all kind of committees or commissions. 
But also the influence of ethical advisory groups, such as the European Group 
on Ethics (EGE), on European governance of health technologies is significant. 
Some speak of bioethicists as the new regulatory ‘experts’ in this respect 
(Salter and Jones 2002b: 325). My analysis includes an account of this 
alternative format of expert knowledge.
8.2 In short: the SANCO Directive and Enterprise Regulation
In this context, the next chapters discuss the two EU initiatives that lie at the 
heart of the making of a regulatory regime for tissue engineering. The first one 
concerns European regulation on quality and safety of human tissues (SANCO 
Directive), while the second is a product based approach for the marketing of 
tissue engineered products in the EU (Enterprise Regulation). These 
legislations cannot be seen as independent of the broader regulatory 
framework and debate on innovative biotechnology. The introduction has
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focused on the dual role of the European Commission in both promoting and 
regulating European biotech, while chapter 2 illustrated the tensions between 
health protection and fostering competitiveness and trade in regulatory policy. 
These developments provide the context for ‘the making of of the respective 
regulatory initiatives.
These legislations are not described in chronological detail, which is why the 
next section gives a brief outline of timelines and main steps in the respective 
legislative cycles. A more detailed account of this is provided in appendix 2. 
The SANCO Directive and the Enterprise Regulation are in different stages of 
the legislative procedure, which has implications for the data coverage and for 
the scope of discussion in this thesis.
8.2.1 The SANCO Directive 2002-2004
The first main legislation is “Directive 2004/23/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on setting standards of quality and safety 
for the donation, procurement, testing, processing, preservation, storage and 
distribution of human tissues and cells”, also known as the Tissues and Cells 
Directive’ or TCD (DG SANCO 2004). In this research I refer to this as the 
SANCO Directive, by its initiator DG SANCO, the Health and Consumer 
Protection Directorate General of the European Commission. The Directive 
covers all tissues and cells of human origin intended for application in the 
human body, and introduces quality and safety standards across the European 
Union.
The initial proposal for this Directive was published in June 2002. This 
document was forwarded to the European Parliament (EP), which had two 
readings over the proposal. Early 2003 two public hearings took place, led by 
Peter Liese, who was appointed rapporteur. The first discussion of the final 
report took place during a plenary session of the Parliament in April 2003, after 
which the Commission had to modify the proposal over a number of 
amendments. In July that year the Council formulated its common position, to 
which the Commission responded in a Communication. On 16 December 2003 
the second reading in the European Parliament took place, in which again a 
number of amendments were made before the proposal was adopted. The
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European Council adopted the proposal on 3 March 2004, with all the revised 
amendments proposed by the European Parliament in second reading, while 
also the Commission accepted the amended version. The final act was tabled 
on 31 March 2004, with publication in the Official Journal of the European 
Union on the 7th of April 2004. From this date Member States have two years 
time to implement the Directive in national policy and legislation. Thus on 7 
April 2006 the Directive is to be operational in all 25 Member States. There is 
one exception to this implementation date, as the Directive contains a provision 
that allows Member States to not apply the Directive until April 2007 if they 
already have national regulations in place (with the UK being an example in 
place).
While the SANCO Directive has completed its legislative cycle, regulatory 
activity continues over the details. In addition to this general framework of 
principles, the Commission provides further technical requirements during the 
comitology procedure, for which consultation rounds are organised. This 
concerns two Commission Directives, the so called Technical Annexes, which 
outline detailed standards that organisations working in the field need to take 
into account and that apply to quality and safety aspects of all human tissues 
and cells. The first Technical Annex was adopted in February 2006 and covers 
technical requirements for the first phase of the donation and procurement 
process. A proposal for the second set of technical requirements is expected to 
be adopted around the summer of 2006, and will cover the second phase, 
including storage, processing and preservation criteria for tissues and cells.
In this research I focus mainly on the later stages of legislative development, 
taking the proposed Commission Directive of June 2002 as starting point and 
analysing the debates in the European Parliament and Council running until 
April 2004. I furthermore briefly consider the comitology procedure that followed 
upon adoption of the Directive, in which experts define the technical details of 
the main legislative framework. Given that implementation of this Directive is a 
future exercise, my research is necessary limited to an analysis of the 
policymaking process.
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8.2.2 The DG Enterprise Regulation 2002-2006
The SANCO Directive covers everything to do with the process of getting the 
tissues and cells that then become starting materials for tissue engineered 
products. The second significant initiative concerns the placing on the market of 
tissue engineered products in EU Member States. In June 2002, 
simultaneously with the initial SANCO proposal, DG Enterprise, with its aim to 
promote completion of the single market and competitiveness in the EU, issued 
a public web consultation document which discussed the means and scope of 
legislation covering tissue engineering products. A summary of responses was 
published in January 2003. A good year later a second consultation round 
followed, requesting input on a specific future regulatory framework for human 
tissue engineered products, which closed in April 2004. The outcome of this 
consultation exercise led to a first draft regulatory framework, which was 
presented on 6 April 2004 in Brussels: a Regulation rather than a Directive (as 
was anticipated) or any other legal instrument. In July 2004 the summary of 
responses was published, and then it went quiet for a while.
Another year later, on 4 May 2005, DG Enterprise published a third 
consultation document, a ‘proposal for a community regulatory framework on 
advanced therapies’, together with the details of the full proposal for a 
Regulation, outlining the regulatory strategy. Following the regulatory regime 
already in place for pharmaceuticals, tissue engineered products were now part 
of a group of technologies called ‘advanced therapies’, which also include gene 
therapy and somatic cell therapy. Until 20 June 2005 the public was invited to 
comment on this draft proposal, and in the meantime several stakeholder 
meetings were organised with representatives from industry, Member States 
and national experts. Also a general stakeholders meeting was held in Brussels 
on June 7 that year.
In addition to these three consultation rounds an impact assessment study was 
conducted, and two supporting studies from the Joint Research Centre of the 
European Commission were carried out to assess the potential impact of the 
proposal on the tissue engineering market. The diverse initiatives led to the 
presentation of the final ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on advanced therapy medicinal products and amending 
Directive 2001/83/EC and Regulation (EC) No 726/2004’ (DG Enterprise
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2005f). This proposal was adopted on 16 November 2005. In this study I refer 
to this as the Enterprise Regulation, although the proposal has not reached the 
end of the legislative cycle yet.
Currently, the proposal goes through the so called ‘co-decision’ procedure, 
where it is delivered to the European Parliament and to the Council. It will also 
be transmitted to the European Economic and Social Committee and to the 
Committee of the Regions, for consultation. Although hopes are expressed that 
this process will be finalised by the end of 2006, it is unclear when the 
Regulation is adopted to become law.
In the meantime some preparatory work is done, most notably in relation to a 
new expert Committee to be installed to evaluate tissue engineered products 
and other advanced therapies (the CAT) and to advice on marketing 
authorisation. The first meeting of this Committee is currently scheduled for 
July 2006. Also already in December 2005 a rapporteur was appointed to 
prepare a report for discussion in the European Parliament, the Slovakian 
Mikolasik Miroslav from the Christian Democrats (PPE-DE), while the co­
rapporteur is Locatelli Pia Elda (PSE). A public hearing in Parliament was 
organised in May, while the forecast is that the first debate in the Council takes 
place in June 2006. The report for adoption in the standing committee in the 
Parliament is scheduled for 13 September, with a session for first reading on 
the 24th of October 2006.
In terms of data capture I am mainly concerned with the earlier phase of policy 
shaping, looking at the different consultation exercises and draft proposals. My 
main concern here is with the definition and scope of tissue engineering 
technology. The point of exit is the final Proposal for a Regulation that the 
Commission issued in November 2005, and which currently goes through co­
decision in the European Parliament and Council.
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8.3 Overview
This chapter serves as background for subsequent chapters (9-11) where I turn 
to two specific legislative initiatives that shape the EU regulatory domain of 
tissue engineering: the SANCO Directive and the Enterprise Regulation. I 
analyse how particular forms of boundary drawing take place over the scope of 
these legislations, focusing on how interested parties negotiate the conditions 
of their interactions. This reveals several tensions: amongst institutional players 
and professional stakeholders, between technical and ethical values they 
represent, in commercial and public health objectives, and last but not least 
between risk perceptions and what is considered to be belonging to the 
regulatable domain. Thus these chapters are concerned with the main 
participants in regulatory science and their conflicting views on how to shape 
regulation. Here boundaries are drawn between different value and belief 
systems (such as public health and commercial concerns -  tissue banking and 
industry) as represented by these interest groups. It becomes clear how 
interested parties draw boundaries around the regulatory world itself, thereby 
excluding certain risks, while also within the regulatory domain boundary 
demarcation takes place in negotiating the scope of the legislation. In the 
SANCO Directive this is witnessed in attempts to establish fixed boundaries 
around the legal remits of the EU in regulating tissues and cells, thereby ruling 
out ethical concerns. In the Enterprise Regulation an opposite trend is visible. 
Here the scope of the legislation is not narrowed down to purely ‘technical’ 
matters (versus socio-political and ethical stances) but are technical definitions 
of the technology extended in order to accommodate more recent innovation, 
including tissue engineered products based on animal cells. Thereby the 
legislative scope is widened to allow potentially controversial cell sources 
entering the European market.
Thus my analysis of these two EU legislative initiatives focuses on two 
particular forms of boundary drawing: one over the role of ethical arguments in 
shaping this legislation, and the other over the definitions and scope of the 
Directive. The next chapter (9) discusses ethical concerns, and how 
participants in the policy shaping stage of the SANCO Directive have
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systematically renegotiated the legal and practical boundaries of the legislation 
over ethical considerations. This chapter also demonstrates a change in focus 
of the Directive, under influence of industrial interest groups, thereby 
connecting the SANCO initiative with the product Regulation by DG Enterprise. 
Chapter 10 takes up ethical considerations again, this time by focusing on 
contested cell sources under the Enterprise Regulation, analysing how these 
are dealt with differently from SANCO. The last and brief chapter (11) reflects 
on these developments and discusses implications for the future regulation of 
tissue engineering in Europe.
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9 The SANCO Directive: Regulating ethics
It’s really a question of whether you want to bring ethics into it or not 
(S4, 2003).
Analysis of the legislative cycle of the SANCO Directive has brought to the fore 
two key concerns that have dominated the debate: the scope of the Directive 
and the role of ethical principles. These dominate the drafting of legislation and 
rules for implementation. This chapter first discusses ethical concerns, and how 
participants in the policy shaping stage of the Directive have systematically 
renegotiated the legal and practical boundaries of the legislation over ethical 
considerations. The last section looks at interest representation in relation to 
the changing scope of the SANCO Directive, while in the next chapter I return 
to these issues in discussing the Enterprise Regulation.
9.1 The subsidiarity excuse
An important starting point for a discussion on ‘regulating ethics’ is the initial 
phrasing, in the proposal for a Directive that the Commission adopted in June 
2002, of the remit and responsibilities of the EU in regulating human tissues 
and cells at Community level. The proposal explicitly refers to the legislative 
basis of this Directive, Treaty article 152 for public health, where the role of the 
Commission vis-a-vis national Member States is clarified: the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality are maintained, which means that for health 
related matters the responsibility of Member States is fully respected. Because 
of the trans-national dimension of the use of human tissue and cells within the 
Community, a common approach was developed. This does not prevent 
Member States from maintaining or introducing more stringent protective 
measures (DG SANCO 2002). This is an important principle as it gives Member 
States a possibility to diverge from the Directive, based on public health and 
safety considerations. However, as analysed below, resort to the subsidiarity
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principle was part of an attempt by national governments to ban contested cell 
sources from entering their territories.
In the scope of the proposed Directive it is defined that, apart from some 
exclusions as also discussed later (see under scope), ‘all other types of tissues 
and cells are covered.’ This means that the provisions of the Directive apply to 
all cell types, including germ cells, foetal tissues and cells and embryonic stem 
cells. The Commission is also explicit in its view that some of these cells pose 
ethical concerns in Member States. A memorandum attached to the proposal 
states how ‘to date, there is no consensus among Member States upon which 
basic harmonized decisions at EU level can be taken with regards to their use 
or prohibition’ (DG SANCO 2002: 5). In other words the Commission does not 
prescribe any rules for the use or non-use of controversial human cell types, 
other than that they would be subject to the Directive when Member States 
choose to authorise these applications. This section demonstrates the 
implications of this provision.
9.1.1 Ethics on stage
The first time ethical concerns were openly expressed was during a set of 
public hearings that the European Parliament organised early 2003. Here the 
Commission's proposal was discussed with representatives from the European 
institutions, industry associations, NGOs and the scientific community, as well 
as the audience (EurActiv 2003c). Especially government officials flagged up 
issues around informed consent and donation, which the Commission 
proposed to be voluntary and unpaid. Extensive discussion took place over 
financial compensation of donors: whether donation should be considered an 
act of altruism (Christian Action Research and Education) or if donors should 
receive a payment (trade body EuropaBio). During a subsequent hearing 
patient representatives questioned the basis of some of the ethical 
considerations underlying the Directive. One speaker brought up whether 
technical aspects can be completely held separate from associated ethical 
issues, strongly disagreeing with ‘the idea of leaving them simply untouched 
only because no consensus can be reached easily’. This patient representative 
continued to argue how harmonising technical requirements while localising
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ethical problems would ‘eventually jeopardise the validity of the basic right of 
physical integrity in all European societies’ (Kruip 2003). This is an interesting 
notion, and a fierce critique towards the Commission, that has only focused on 
provisions to harmonise technical aspects of human tissues and cells, without 
addressing any ethical problems associated with these materials.
These ethical concerns dominated debate during the first reading of the 
Commission proposal in Parliament, in March 2003. The responsible standing 
Committee -  the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer 
Policy -  tabled 159 amendments on the proposal, mostly concerning the scope, 
nature of donations, traceability and anonymity, donor consent and ethical 
issues (EurActiv 2003b).
During this passage through Parliament ethical issues caused most discontent. 
The key phrase ‘respect for fundamental ethical principles’ was a recurring 
addition to many of the original articles in the proposed Directive. A broad set of 
amendments was accompanied by a call on Member States to prohibit 
research on human reproductive cloning and on research designed to create 
human embryos solely for research purposes or to supply stem cells, including 
by means of the transfer of somatic cell nuclei. Moreover MEPs stated that no 
tissues or cells derived from human embryos should be used for 
transplantation: cloned human embryos, and human/animal hybrid embryos 
produced by cloning, including cells and tissues derived from them, should be 
excluded as sources of material for transplant. These statements are repeated 
in different forms and filter through in several amendments.
Other articles give Member States the right to prohibit use of ‘cells of a certain 
origin’ and to ban the import of cells or products derived from them, based on 
the subsidiarity principle. Amendment 30, on prohibiting research on human 
reproductive cloning and on the creation of embryos as stem cell suppliers, 
gives the following justification, which illustrates the underlying rationale of 
many others:
The European Union like the Member States should regulate and focus 
research efforts on techniques that do not undermine respect for life and 
human dignity and should prohibit any technique involving the use of 
human beings as a material, even at the embryo stage.
(European Parliament (EP) 2003c: 23)
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In other words the MEPs designed a long list of amendments that addressed 
ethically sensitive cell sources and techniques. Arguable the role of the 
rapporteur, the German MEP Peter Liese from the Christian Democrats (EPP- 
ED), was decisive in foregrounding these ethical issues. In an explanatory 
statement that was attached to the report for discussion in Parliament, 
rapporteur Liese made a strong plea for incorporating these principles in the 
Directive by referring to the legal possibilities to do so based on other 
Community legislation (‘case law’):
The view is expressed that it is not appropriate to regulate ethical issues 
such as informed consent or voluntary unpaid donations under a 
European directive. Your rapporteur firmly rejects this view. Discussion 
at European level, e.g. within the context of the Biopatent Directive, 
show that it is not possible to take a decision on regulating genetic and 
biotechnology without duly taking account of the ethical aspects. It is 
argued that this is not possible on legal grounds. However, the Directive 
on blood products, the Directive on clinical testing and the Biopatent 
Directive are unequivocal evidence that matters which are generally 
regarded as ethical issues can be regulated by the European Union on 
the basis of various articles of the Treaty. In addition, in the case of the 
present proposal, blood safety and quality of cells and tissues cannot be 
considered irrespective of the ethical issues, such as voluntary unpaid 
donations and informed consent, as it is obvious that the manner in 
which cells and tissue are obtained have an effect on quality and safety. 
(European Parliament (EP) 2003c: 55)
This statement reveals the problematic nature of regulating ethics, given the 
legal limitations in incorporating these diverse concerns in Community law.
Here this issue is only addressed in relation to the nature of donation (voluntary 
unpaid) and the conditions for informed consent. It was only later in the 
explanatory statement that the use of human embryonic stem cells (ESCs) and 
cloning of embryos were discussed. The rapporteur reminded his fellow MEPs 
of the majority vote in Parliament against producing embryos for research 
purposes, while recognising how more disagreement exists over the use of 
ESCs in labs.
During the plenary discussion and Parliament vote in April 2003 some 
consensus was reached over excluding human reproductive cloning from the 
Directive, but strongly opposing views were expressed over the use of ESCs. 
Below are two extracts from MEPs illustrating these positions:
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While the European Union has no competence to ban the therapeutic 
use of embryos or embryonic stem cells, it certainly has no obligation to 
okay this kind of use by establishing safety and quality standards for 
embryonic stem cells. (European Parliament (EP) 2003a: 27)
I cannot entirely support all the amendments tabled by some of my 
colleagues. Those amendments seeking, for example, to ban or restrict 
the use of embryonic stem cells totally are doing the European public no 
favours. They are not protecting human health, nor are they protecting 
the vulnerable (EP news 2003).
Furthermore, large discussion took place over whether it was possible to make 
these ethical statements at all in this particular legal way. During the Parliament 
debate MEP John Purvis of the Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party 
delivered a speech arguing how the amendments and report are lacking the 
legal basis to cover ethical considerations:
There are technical difficulties concerned with consent by donors and 
anonymity of donors. There are highly questionable forays into areas of 
ethics which are irrelevant to the purpose and legal basis of this 
directive. Even the Legal Affairs Committee has seen fit to insert the 
legally undefinable term "fundamental ethical principles" into what 
purports to be a legal legislative text. Very importantly there are attempts 
to impose European prohibitions on ethical aspects of research and 
therapy which are clearly the subject of the subsidiarity principle and 
must remain the right of Member States to decide (Purvis 2003).
This legal basis was indeed problematic. In May 2003 the Commission 
presented the revised text of the proposal for a Directive, after consideration of 
the various changes and EP amendments suggested (COM (2003) 0340). Here 
it was stated how:
The Commission can accept provisions related to the anonymity of 
donors and/or non-profit procurement. Other provisions, however, 
cannot be accepted as they fall outside the scope of Article 152 of the 
Treaty, which provides for public health protection and not for the 
implementation of ethical objectives (DG SANCO 2003).
Thus a substantial number of EP amendments were ruled out, most notably 
those which contained the phrase ‘fundamental ethical principles’. Later that 
year, in July 2003, the Council came to the same verdict in its common position 
on the proposed Directive (Council of the European Union 2003: (EC) No 
50/2003). The Council rejected the majority of the EP's amendments dealing 
with ethics, arguing that the legal basis for these in article 152 was lacking 
(EurActiv 2003a).
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Legal principles were thus used to box out many of the EP amendments, 
including calls on the prohibition of certain types of tissues and cells or of 
processes to create these cells (i.e. embryo cloning) and ethical issues such as 
voluntary or unpaid donation, non-profit procurement, and consent. This 
provoked a strong reaction from several Member States; during a Council 
meeting two countries in particular, Germany and Italy, declared to reserve the 
right to lay down more stringent protection measures when the Directive is 
transposed into national law, under the subsidiarity approach and as provided 
for in the Directive. In other words unanimity was reached in formulating a 
common position in the Council, but several national delegations expressed 
their intention to find other legislative ways to prohibit use of specific cell 
sources.
9.2 Inside and outside views
The strong focus on ESCs and cloning during this part of the legislative cycle 
was viewed by ‘outsiders’ with a mix of surprise and awkwardness. An 
industrial developer explains how this turn of events was not entirely 
anticipated:
With the SANCO Directive for example we thought that we had a pretty 
good view on how the vote was going to in Parliament... And the whole 
discussion, the whole vote was overwhelmed by a discussion on 
inclusion or not of R&D cells - which came out of, all the rest didn’t seem 
important anymore, it was just that discussion, one point... And cells, 
when you speak about cells and tissues the debate was very easily into 
stem cells, very easily. And stem cells are of course embryonic stem 
cells, nobody seems to be knowing of different kinds of stem cells. 
(Corporate affairs manager in multinational company M-EU5, 2003)
In the meantime, behind Commission doors an ongoing discussion had taken 
place over the legal basis of certain cell sources, and in what ways the concern 
of several Member States could be accommodated. An EC official explains the 
problematic nature of dealing with ethics at EU level:
Of course one of the issues, the ongoing discussion now between 
Parliament and Council, and the Commission, is the ethical issues... The
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idea is that Article 152 gives to the commission and to the European 
Union the power to make legislation on quality and safety. But we cannot 
impose member states ethical imperatives as such. So the directive 
covers a number of ethical principles that we consider that are the same 
by all the member states. Of course principles of ethics who are linked in 
a way with the quality and safety. But there are some ethical principles 
who the directive cannot go further because we have no legal basis to 
do that. The European Union cannot impose voluntary and unpaid 
donation unless we can prove with evidence that the voluntary and 
unpaid donation have a related link with the quality and safety. And there 
are a number of more principles like this. For example, consent. We can 
go in the consent until a certain limit and what is related with the 
protection of the donor. For example, use or not use of different types of 
tissues and cells. The classic example of embryonic stem cells. We 
cannot impose the prohibition or authorisation of the use of tissues and 
cells; that is in the hands of the member states. And of course 
Parliament sometimes has or would like to impose other use in the 
Directive but we are trying to explain what are the limits of the Treaty 
and what we can do or not.
(Official at DG SANCO A-EU5, 2003)
Therefore the discussion on ethical principles was legally bound by Treaty 
objectives and the subsidiarity principle, which dictates that Member States 
have a final say in prohibiting or authorising certain cell sources on their 
national markets, if based on public health and safety concerns, while the EU 
has no mandate to interfere with these decisions (unless they pose trade 
barriers and disrupt the single market). This also applies to other ethical 
principles, implying that the Commission and Council, even if they had wished 
to adopt the amendments based on ethical positions, did not have a possibility 
to do so. Not the validity but legality of principles was at play.
But also the need for consensus and harmonisation on this controversial topic 
was problematic, as was hinted at in the Commission’s reply to the Council’s 
adoption. In August 2003 the Commission responded to the Council with a 
‘communication on the common position’ (COD/2002/0128). In relation to 
therapeutic cloning, one of the key amendments rejected by both Commission 
and Council, the Commission stated that it aimed to prohibit the use of cells 
derived from cloned embryos for transplantation purposes, but because of the 
controversy around these applications it would be impossible to get a 
consistent opinion in Member States (European Commission (EC) 2003a).
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While the Commission was largely entranced with the common position, 
industry was less so. The industry response to the Council common position, 
communicated via its trade associations EuropaBio and EUCOMED, was 
welcoming on some aspects but critical of many others. In relation to the use of 
ESCs industry was in favour of the subsidiarity approach, but ‘in the case 
where Member States decide to prohibit the use of specific cell(s), industry 
calls for transparency and requires that the reasons for prohibition are made 
public’ (EuropaBio 2003: 1). One of the European trade associations was very 
explicit in its position towards ESCs:
[We are] of course very, very aware of the ethical issues... From 
EUCOMED’s point of view what we have proposed is to exclude things 
like embryonic cells and embryos from the scope of the Directive 
because there is no need, indeed no need at this time to go into these 
ethically contentious issues. You can get perfectly good stem cells from 
adult sources - this is the general consensus of most researchers at the 
moment. So there is no need to enter into this ethically contentious area 
which should simplify the process of getting legislation we hope. 
(Representative of European industry association for medical devices M- 
EU2, 2003)
And as a manufacturer expresses the considerations of industry in a similar 
vein:
There is clearly an ethical debate which has [to] be had because I guess 
tissue engineering in the future will include all manner of things. It will 
include stem cell research ... and there has to be an ethical debate to it. 
However it would be not necessarily, in my view, a good idea to include 
ethics within a regulatory classification come approval process because 
you will always have different views on ethics whereas you can only 
have one real way of proving your product’s safety and efficacy. Ethics is 
a very personal thing whereas science is very defined in many ways. 
(Regulatory affairs manager of multinational company M-EU9, 2003)
From these fragments it is clear that also commercial providers draw strict 
boundaries around the scope of the Directive, but from an alternative frame 
with different underlying values. Not ethical concerns as such are problematic, 
but their role in complicating and slowing down a much needed legislation.
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9.3 Trading ethics for consensus
The legislative procedure continued, and in November 2003 the amended 
proposal came back to the European Parliament for second reading. The 
course of events in Parliament was anticipated with some excitement, because 
it could make or break the Directive to some extent.
Rapporteur Liese produced a new report for this second Parliament reading 
and in preparation for the vote on the Commission proposal for a Directive, to 
take place in December 2003 (European Parliament (EP) 2003d). This report 
reflected a remarkable change: it still referred to aspects of donation (where it 
was argued that Member States should ‘ensure’, rather than merely 
‘encourage’ voluntary and unpaid donations), but the original amendments on 
ethical aspects were absent. The only amendment that survived the previous 
version of the report was that cloned human embryos should be excluded as 
sources of material for transplantation.
Finally, and this is important for the later stages of the Directive, there was 
discussion over which topics were to be referred to comitology. As also 
discussed later in more detail, comitology is the EU committee system where 
experts fill in the technical and detailed requirements of the Directive. The 
comitology committee is made up of civil servants representing the Member 
States, and is often used as a shortcut procedure to adapt technical 
requirements (which are laid down in the technical annex to the Directive and 
not the main text) to accommodate fast changing technological developments 
and new scientific insights. In other words it creates flexibility to keep the 
technical requirements up to date. But this also means that the long legislative 
procedure under co-decision is avoided, because the Parliament and Council 
are not involved in comitology. It is for this reason that MEPs were opposed to 
the comitology procedure being used to decide on the conditions for donor 
selection, evaluation and procurement in the case of cells used for reproduction 
purposes. They argued that Parliament should be able to scrutinise any rules 
proposed in this very sensitive area. We will come back to this comitology 
procedure later.
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During the second reading in Parliament the amendments relating to the ethical 
aspects were largely withdrawn or rejected, in line with the Council's common 
position and the Commission's assessment of this common position. In other 
words the MEPs dropped the most sensitive ethical aspects from their position 
on the SANCO Directive (EurActiv 2003d).
This was a pragmatic solution though. In the meantime a turn of events had 
taken place, which prevented the Directive from a legalistic impasse. With the 
support of other political groups, the rapporteur had started negotiations with 
the Council. In his address to the Parliament, rapporteur Liese explained how 
over the last week an agreement was reached with the Italian Presidency of the 
Council on a whole range of amendments, most notably around donation. This 
meant that the MEPs are voting over a ‘package of compromises’ to which the 
Council had already agreed with the permanent representatives. Most 
importantly this would imply that a conciliation procedure could be avoided if 
the Parliament adopts the deal.54
During the debate Liese made his final plea for what had become the last 
hiccup in ethical terms, namely to prevent the commercialisation of tissue and 
cell donation. Under the fresh agreement with the Council clearer rules were 
set over the prohibition of any direct payment for donation, and the permission 
of compensation of costs incurred by a donor. Under this agreement donors 
may receive compensation, which is strictly limited to making good the 
expenses and inconveniences related to the donation, while leaving it to 
Member States to define the conditions under which compensation may be 
paid. As Liese argued in his speech to Parliament:
It was at this point that great controversy erupted, with the Council and 
the Commission initially contending that Parliament’s demands lacked 
any basis in law. We were, however, able to persuade them both that a
54 If no agreement is reached in this stage, a so called conciliation procedure starts in order to 
formulate a compromise between the Council and Parliament. To this effect a conciliation 
committee is convened, which is composed of members of the Council or their representatives 
and an equal number of representatives from the European Parliament, which has to reach an 
agreement on a compromise text within the very short time-span of six weeks. The Commission 
is also represented in the conciliation committee where its role is circumscribed, however, as it 
can no longer withdraw its proposals and prevent an agreement between EP and Council 
(EIPA 2000).
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non-commercial approach was called for not only in terms of 
considerations of ethics, but also of health protection.
(European Parliament (EP) 2003b: rapporteur address)
The health element is that medical risks could be concealed when money is 
being paid for donation, which could pose safety threats to both donor and 
recipient. Thus a ban on commercialisation is necessary to avoid trade in 
human tissues and cells, but to accommodate industry there is no objection to 
trading medical products manufactured from them.
The rapporteur also addressed that other main concern of Parliament during 
first reading, a call for a comprehensive ban on the cloning of human beings.
As Liese explained, consequently...
...in the negotiations, I no longer insisted on it in order to avoid the need 
for a conciliation procedure. This does not, however, mean that 
Parliament has changed its opinion about this. I believe this to be 
another area in which safety considerations demand that we be very 
careful, and we will continue to keep a watchful eye on this in the future. 
(European Parliament (EP) 2003b: rapporteur address)
The agreement with the Council encompassed that existing legislation in the 
Member States should remain into force regarding cloned human embryos. The 
Directive does not interfere with their decisions to prohibit or authorise any 
specific type of human cells, including germ cells and embryonic stem cells, as 
long as such use is in line with all the provisions in the Directive ‘necessary to 
protect public health, given the specific risks of these cells based on the 
scientific knowledge and their particular nature, and guarantee respect for 
fundamental rights’ (European Parliament (EP) 2003d).
Thus in order to prevent the Directive from stalling, in the package of 
compromises with the Council the cloning ban was traded for the non­
commercialisation provision around donation. But not entirely on Parliament’s 
terms, as also the Commission had a say in this case. David Byrne, 
commissioner of DG SANCO, expressed the need ‘to make it clear that this 
compromise solution goes to the very limit of what the Commission believes to 
be legally acceptable, given the restrictions of the Treaty.’ (European 
Parliament (EP) 2003b: Commission reply)
261
While the Rapporteur and his Committee had come to agreement with the 
Council, and also the Commission expressed its willingness in reaching a 
solution, not all MEPs were impressed with the political pressure imposed on 
them to reach consensus. The debate in Parliament continued. The first extract 
below is from an MEP of the Christian Democrats, arguing how ethical 
considerations are part and parcel of Community values, while the second 
response is from a socialist MEP who feels the maximum has been reached 
already in this respect:
It would be a big mistake to exclude ethical issues from EU decision­
making, especially when we talk about a Community which likes to call 
itself a community of values. Besides, ethical issues rarely arise in 
isolation in some moral vacuum. They are ethical for the very reason 
that they have an effect on people’s health, for example, as in this case 
(European Parliament (EP) 2003b: reply Korhola, PPE-DE).
New technologies, such as embryo stem cell research, cannot be ruled 
out as sources of future therapies for either medical or ethical reasons. 
We have gone as far as we can to satisfy those people with specific 
ethical concerns on those issues and with regard to other new 
technologies. We must recognise that our primary duty here today is to 
ensure the quality and safety of tissues and cells that are going to be 
used for the relief of human suffering, as they move around the single 
market to various destinations (European Parliament (EP) 2003b: reply 
Bowe, PSE).
Therefore the rapporteur and his Committee had reached agreement behind 
closed doors in a get-together with the Council, but opposing views were 
persistent amongst individual MEPs. Notwithstanding opposition, in the end the 
Parliament adopted the proposed Directive in a majority vote just before the 
Christmas break (European Parliament (EP) 2003d).
The legislative final act, as the Directive was now officially coined, appeared on 
31 March 2004. It was published in the Official Journal of the European 
Communities on 7 April 2004 as ‘Directive 2004/23/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on setting standards of quality 
and safety for the donation, procurement, testing, processing, preservation, 
storage and distribution of human tissues and cells’ (DG SANCO 2004). This is 
the official date of entry into force of the Directive, while the date of 
transposition is 7 April 2006. Thus Member States have two years to implement 
the provisions of the Directive into national law.
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A quick word search learns that the term ‘embryonic stem cells’ appears in two 
places: once under article 7, which lists all the particular cell sources which are 
covered under the scope of the Directive; and on another occasion in article 12, 
which states how the Directive should not interfere with decisions made by 
Member States concerning the use or non-use of any specific type of human 
cells, including germ cells and embryonic stem cells (DG SANCO 2004). The 
word ‘cloning’ is nowhere to be found in the text, nor is the term ‘ethical’.
9.4 Inclusive and exclusive ethics
In the course of the policy cycle ‘ethics’ has become a ‘political toy’ that was 
tossed from one corner to the other. The EU trading zone for ethical 
considerations was enlarged in an attempt to unite (national represented) moral 
concerns with socio-political considerations and pragmatic policymaking, 
resembling tensions between cultural biopolitics and the moral bio-economy. 
The main ethical concerns were over the use of ESCs and of therapeutic 
cloning techniques in order to retrieve these cells, while during the comitology 
procedure also reproductive cells stirred debate. It can be argued that one 
reason for the delay of this Directive was exactly over these cells sources, as 
the Parliament tried to use the Directive as a tool to prohibit embryonic stem 
cell research and therapeutic cloning (Liddell and Wallace 2005). When these 
provisions were discarded, because the Commission felt it was not competent 
to legislate upon ethical matters, the focus of MEP attention shifted towards at 
least making sure that the Directive would include principles of voluntary unpaid 
donation. This was another ethically fuelled issue, where again matters of 
safety had to prevail over ethical considerations. This time the Parliament 
‘won’, as the final Directive stipulates how donors should not be paid (although 
some room was left to Member States to decide upon ‘compensation’ for 
donation), but this victory was part of a package deal between Parliament and 
Council in order to move the much needed Directive forward, rather than 
stalling the legislation and playing it high up by going into a conciliation 
procedure. As one interviewee commented:
263
It wasn’t made by the people who prepared the first draft of the DG 
SANCO Directive. It was made maybe at political level.
(Quality controller multinational tissue engineering company M-EU3, 
2004)
Thus the main ethical pot hangers during the SANCO debate were over the 
inclusion or exclusion of specific cell sources, and over the nature of donation. 
Interestingly, one of the areas not discussed into any length concerns the role 
of xenogeneic material as another potentially contested cell source. Early on 
during the legislative cycle, in the first proposal on the SANCO Directive, 
reference was made to xenotransplantation, where it was argued how ‘organs, 
tissues, and cells of animal origin for human therapy are still in the research 
phase, but nevertheless pose different regulatory problems that will need to be 
addressed in due course.’ (DG SANCO 2002: 5). No reference was made to so 
called non-viable animal sources, such as the bovine serum used during cell 
culturing. Nor were these animal-derived substances put on the agenda at any 
point during the debate. A similar silence was witnessed over genetically 
modified tissues or cells, where the Commission felt it was too early to consider 
this material, or the techniques used to engineer particular cell sources, as a 
realistic clinical option that had to be addressed at this stage. In other words, 
while ESCs and therapeutic cloning, and to some extent reproductive cells, 
were at centre stage during the debate, other potentially controversial cell 
sources and techniques did not enter the discussion at all. That is, so far. In the 
proposal building stages of the Enterprise Regulation, analysed in later 
chapters, the focus of attention changes slightly, where in addition to embryonic 
material also xenogeneic and other cell sources enter the debate.
Thus so far the discussion on ethical considerations has been very narrowly 
focused. Especially given the safety considerations of different cell sources, it is 
remarkable to note the limited discussion over whether for example autologous 
and allogeneic cells should be regulated differently. As discussed in the part on 
risk perceptions by R&D actors, many of these interviewees make a distinction 
between these cells sources, which rank differently in terms of safety, and 
arguably also in terms of potential moral controversy. In the SANCO debate 
this distinction played a minor part. Only during the early stages this issue was 
addressed, where the initial proposal envisaged excluding ‘tissues and cells
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used as an autologous graft within the same surgical procedure’ from the first 
steps of use and stating how ‘autologous cells used for medicinal products are 
not covered by this Directive’ (DG SANCO 2002: 4). While the Commission in 
its early wisdom felt that a different regulatory approach was needed for 
products based on autologous cells, especially industrial developers opposed 
to this provision. Also the advisory Committee EESC argued for clearer 
definitions to lessen confusion between allogeneic and autologous cell sources. 
During the Parliament reading the exclusion of autologous cells used for the 
manufacturing of medicinal products in the proposal was deleted (amendment 
21), and also the Council wanted to extent the scope of the Directive to include 
these cells. In the end the Commission surrendered on this point. The reason 
why this provision was abandoned was not directly based on considerations of 
different safety though, but to reduce complexity and provide coherence. An EC 
official stated that ‘they [Council and Parliament] couldn’t find enough reasons 
why we should exclude autologous cells from the procurement and testing if we 
are including all of the rest of the cells in the Directive. So at the end the 
commission agreed that it really was a more coherent approach to have all 
tissues and cells covered in the first few steps in our Directive’ (A-EU5, 2003). 
With respect to the next steps in the process, such as processing and 
distribution, these cells were excluded though.
So while R&D actors applied a hierarchy of risk in which autologous cells were 
considered safer than their allogeneic counterparts, this perception was in the 
end not translated into regulatory policy. Furthermore, no different safety labels 
were attached to these respective cell sources, and more so, no debate existed 
over different ethical stances towards them. This is interesting from more than 
one angle, as discussed below.
According to one manufacturer with advisory involvement in regulatory policy, 
the limited focus on the distinction between autologous and allogeneic cells is 
that the former do not pose any moral dilemmas, and that the provisions in the 
SANCO Directive would be mostly relevant to allogeneic cells of different origin. 
Furthermore the debate did not focus on different cell sources used within 
tissue engineering, but on a comparison with other technologies of cell 
manipulation:
There was a big ethical debate at the beginning of this whole saga and 
there was clearly a demarcation between what you saw as tissues and 
cells which you would use for the benefit of patients, which were more of 
an altruistic type donation, to those and the ethics that are involved for 
example that you find now with stem cell research, genetics and all 
those sorts of things. There’s a clear difference. When you’re working 
with tissue engineering, with autologous products, there’s no real ethical 
debate as far as I’m concerned because all you’re doing is consenting 
as a patient to have your own cells taken away from you and given 
back... ultimately there’s no real ethical debate, it’s just whether you 
consent to have the operation or not.
With allogeneic tissue, yes there are ethics of donation; there are ethics 
of consent from that perspective. There’s also ethics as well and 
debates have been taking place about donation of tissue and whether or 
not you should be donating tissue for nothing or whether you should be 
[paid] and that’s why tissue banks work on a non-profit basis. But then if 
as a company you’re taking cells and applying the manufacturing 
process... surely as an industrial company it would be unethical for you 
not to be able to charge money for them. Why would you develop such a 
process if you are not going to make any financial gain from it? Then you 
would stop any piece of research. You wouldn’t get anything at all and 
that would be probably detrimental to the public.
(Regulatory affairs manager of multinational company M-EU9, 2003)
This interviewee also refers to ‘the ethics’ around commercial use of tissues 
and cells, which is discussed later. The following fragment is from a scientist 
with large involvement in developing the SANCO Directive as expert advisor, 
sharing the belief in the uncontroversial nature of autologous cell use, but 
pointing out some other ethical considerations:
I think the ethical issues are immensely important here. And I used the 
phrase that autologous tissue engineering is an ethics free zone. There 
is an ethical issue there if you are taking the patient’s own cells and 
using those cells to generate the patient’s own tissue - the only time 
ethics would really come in is if you’re using gene transfer in that 
process. But even then I don’t think that’s a big issue. If you’re using 
allogeneic sources, you have to, obviously there are scientific issues and 
then you have to ask the question then where are the cells coming from, 
who’s intellectual property is it, who’s cells are they? Did the donor know 
that they were actually donating those cells? And the answer is in most 
cases, no they had no idea. And I think that those are issues which have 
to be very, very carefully answered. There are a whole lot of issues 
down that path. (European expert advisor and scientist A-EU6, 2003)
This interviewee makes a sharp distinction between autologous cells, which are 
‘an ethics free zone’, and refers to gene transfer as one technique which would
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make this particular tissue engineering route controversial. In contrast, the use 
of allogeneic or donor cells raises questions of ownership and property right, 
and of informed consent around donation. If we translate these concerns to 
what the SANCO Directive covers, and what was brought up during the 
shaping of this legislation, only the issue of informed consent has been taken 
up. While an original first amendment from the European Parliament addressed 
ownership of bodily material - stating how the human body is in inviolable and 
inalienable and cannot be the subject of property rights - this provision was 
discarded in later versions. And with that the agenda was set. Thus with the 
exclusive focus during especially the Parliament debate on ESCs, and later on 
donation, other potential controversial issues with an ethical undertone were 
left out of the equation.
For industry this focus on ESCs is problematic in wishing to present tissue 
engineering as a less contested technology, and some have argued how still a 
lot of education needs to be done in order to convince ‘the public’ of the 
beneficial rather than controversial outputs envisaged. In order to secure a 
future for other tissue and cell based technologies, distancing is needed from 
the contested embryonic sources:
It is important to highlight when speaking about this kind of technologies 
that there is a huge variety things which enter into the definition of tissue 
engineering. The problem we face and I think we will face for a long time 
is that on the regulatory scenario, is that when ever we speak about 
human tissue engineering, immediately the lay person, politician, the - 
some groups of religious convincement immediately think to work made 
on foetus or embryos or these sorts of things which puts the entire, the 
entire sector under a different light.
(Representative of European industry association for medical devices M- 
EU2, 2003)
An EC official involved in drafting the SANCO Directive recalls how stem cells 
were at the heart of the debate from early on, while at the same time 
expressing how in his view this topic was not actual yet. Furthermore he refers 
to an important issue by implying how the boundary drawing around tissue 
engineering has extended the scope to embryonic material:
I suppose the first time that we were going to present our [SANCO] 
Directive that is focusing on other things and then the people are only 
interested in stem cells though, who is future anyway... and even more
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they are talking about the cloning, trying to find the use of cells that you 
get from cloning for transplantation. This is a possibility so remote I think 
it’s... For me, I have a clear range of things that I consider are tissue 
engineering... But again there are some boundaries who are not easy to 
define.
(Official at European Commission DG SANCO A-EU5, 2003)
According to this interviewee the rather exclusive focus on ESCs in Parliament 
could also be explained by the echo of another influential policy development: 
the discussion that took place around the same time on funding research in this 
domain under the 6th Framework Programme.55 Thus against the background 
of the SANCO debate, Member States were also confronted with the question 
of future research efforts into human ESCs, again creating agitation and 
diverging views.
Finally the debate on ethical considerations has always centred on article 152 
of the Amsterdam Treaty, which not only outlines the need for regulation but 
also refers to the subsidiarity principle. As discussed, it was this principle that 
led the Commission and Council to conclude that the decision on prohibition or 
authorisation of specific cell sources was left to the national level, with the 
option to impose stricter safety rules. But there is also another provision in this 
Treaty, article 30, which gives Member States the right to prohibit or bind the 
use of certain source materials from abroad for ethical reasons. The exact 
applicability of this principle is as yet unknown though (A-EU5, 2003). At no 
point during the debate the possibility of retreat to this article was made.
9.5 ‘Representative ethics’: the role of EGE
So far the discussion on ethical principles has focused on the role of the 
European Commission, Council and Parliament as representatives of the main 
legislative bodies in the EU. Not discussed in too much detail yet is the position 
of ethical advisory bodies in this debate. The most important of these is the 
European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies (EGE), an
55 A moratorium to fund embryonic stem cell derivation for research was in place till the end of 
2003, but in July that year the Commission submitted a proposal to the Council and Parliament 
for establishing detailed guidelines for EU funding of research involving human embryos and 
human embryonic stem cells, to be implemented by the end of 2003.
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influential specialist advisory body reporting directly to the President of the 
European Commission.56
The group has issued several opinions with relevance to tissue engineering. 
Most notably, the EGE gave the creation of tissue engineering regulation a 
significant push by stating in their 1998 expert opinion that there was an ‘urgent 
need to regulate the conditions under which human tissues circulate within the 
European Market’ (EGE 1998). In its Opinion on ethical aspects of tissue 
banking the EGE addressed a range of ethical considerations, including 
commercialisation and the need to keep the tissue domain under control of 
public health institutions and non profit-making organisations. This Opinion was 
influential in steering the policy debate.57 However, the EGE’s principle on the 
non-profit character of tissue establishments was controversial, and the 
Commission diverged from this advice in the SANCO Directive. As discussed 
later, the extension of tissue banking activities to those of tissue establishments 
was highly debated, given this opened up the market for commercial providers 
operating in the field.
But the most specific Opinion from the EGE came after the final SANCO 
Directive was published. In April 2004 the President of the Commission 
requested the EGE to prepare a report on the ethical aspects of human tissue 
engineering. The Opinion on this topic was published in June 2004 (EGE 
2004).
56 The EGE was created by the Commission in 1997 as ‘a neutral, independent, pluralist and 
multidisciplinary body which advises the European Commission on ethical aspects of science 
and new technologies in connection with the preparation and implementation of Community 
legislation or policies’ (EGE 2006). On request by the Commission or on its own initiative the 
group writes reports and publishes so called Opinions. The EGE was the successor of the 
Group of Advisers on the Ethical Implications of Biotechnology (GAEIB 1991-1997), initially set 
up by Jacques Delores.
5 Some of its ethical principles are quoted in the explanatory memorandum prefacing the 
SANCO Directive. These include the ethical imperative to protect human health, including 
testing standards for prevention of disease transmission; ensuring the integrity of the human 
body in procurement of living and dead donors; prior, informed and free consent of donors; and 
the protection of identity, including anonymity of both donor and recipient to prevent possible 
discrimination (DG SANCO 2002). Furthermore the SANCO Directive refers to the EGE  
Opinion in its discussion of role and responsibilities of tissue banks (and their profit or non-profit 
character); equitable access to the therapeutic opportunities afforded by the use of human 
tissues; and the need for tissue imports from third countries to be subject to at least equivalent 
ethical and health requirements (2002: 3).
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The advice takes the SANCO Directive as starting point, but points out the 
limitations of this legislation by only setting quality and safety standards. This 
means a high and same level of protection of human health throughout the EU 
is ensured. Not covered by this Directive though are the products resulting of 
substantial modification or manipulations of tissues and cells. Against the 
background of a rapidly developing tissue engineering sector, the EGE notes 
the lack of European legislation on specifically controlling the marketing 
authorisation for products. Thus the Opinion is mainly concerned with the 
ethical aspects around production and marketing of products, and fits in with 
the efforts by DG Enterprise in preparing specific regulation to this effect.58 
While the details of this regulation are discussed later, here the main issues 
brought up in the EGE Opinion are critically reviewed.
The tissue engineering Opinion is a rather peculiar document consisting of a 
long list of references to previous Opinions of the group on related issues, such 
as tissue banking (EGE 1998), stem cell research and use (EGE 2000), and 
patenting of stem cells (EGE 2002). While the scope of the Opinion is rather 
limited, and is mostly interesting for what it leaves out, the document does point 
out some itchy ethical considerations which also put the SANCO Directive in a 
different light.
The document first addresses general ethical questions related to tissues and 
cells, and continues to describe three areas of specific concern for tissue 
engineered products. Under the first heading ethical concerns are listed around 
information and consent, donation, privacy and data protection, traceability, 
safety, priorities of access, and finally research and clinical trials. While many 
of these issues have been discussed already in relation to the SANCO 
Directive, EGE made some interesting observations about their (in)applicability 
to tissue engineering. For example the group notes how donor consent can be 
problematic in some cases, notably when tissues have been stored for a long 
time, where the donor was not informed of potential future use of the donated 
tissue for producing tissue engineered products. Traceability of these tissues
58 So far, the influence of EGE opinions on the Enterprise Regulation has not been clearly 
visible, but based on the experience with the SANCO Directive this may change with the 
passage of the proposed Regulation through co-decision (which falls beyond the scope of this 
research).
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can be complicated, especially if stored anonymously. Furthermore the 
informed consent notion of so called ‘foreseeable use’ of the tissues, where the 
ethical principle dictates that the donor may withdraw his or her consent at any 
time, needs clarification by providing an exit point of where withdrawing 
consent is not possible anymore (plus the option to refuse specific future use). 
The main underlying question here is in how far the donor has control over 
future use of his or her donated material, and as such addresses ownership 
issues, which is currently subject to different standards and values in countries 
worldwide. A final note on informing the donor reads that consent is necessary 
in any context of procurement, also when it concerns the collection of surgical 
waste. This refers to a critical notion, although not addressed in the Opinion, 
where some manufacturers have claimed that donor consent is not needed, or 
indeed impossible, when the products are based on discarded clinical waste, 
such as the circumcised foreskins which form the basis of several tissue 
engineered skin products currently commercially available.
Finally, and only briefly, the Opinion turns to what the EGE considers ‘specific 
ethical questions’ in relation to tissue engineering. Summed up here are the 
distinction between medical and cosmetic use, the use of embryonic stem cells 
and patenting. The first one is a remarkable issue to point out, also because it 
was not previously debated during any point in the legislative cycle of the 
SANCO Directive.59 The EGE comments that the distinction between 
therapeutic uses and cosmetics uses may sometimes be difficult to state, 
referring to cases when the definition of health is not only related to 
pathological features but also to quality of life. Ethical issues around ESCs are 
not properly addressed (only mentioned here is that some EGE members have 
strong ethical reservations regarding their use), while patenting is discussed in 
relation to concerns with profit obtained with an invention resulting of the use of 
donated tissues (EGE 2004). Of all the ethical concerns brought to the fore, it is 
interesting to note that the SANCO Directive does not address patentability of 
tissues and cells.
59 Article 10 of this Directive states that: This Directive covers tissues and cells intended for 
human applications, including human tissues and cells used for the preparation of cosmetic 
products. However, in view of the risk of transmission of communicable diseases, the use of 
human cells, tissues and products in cosmetic products is prohibited by the Cosmetic Products 
Directive’ (DG SANCO 2004: 2).
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While the EGE Opinion highlighted some relevant ethical considerations in 
relation to the SANCO Directive and the product side of tissue engineering, it 
was summary in scope. In none of the Opinions reference is made to 
xenogeneic cells or animal-derived material. Also potential concern around 
therapeutic effectiveness and how to go about collecting clinical evidence in 
this field is not addressed, nor the issue of equal access to an expensive 
technology for which generally no reimbursement exists. While these can be 
considered general concerns in innovative medicine, the small selection of 
arguments that EGE developed as specifically relating to tissue engineering is 
in a sense exotic and -  apart obviously from the ESC case - not reflected in 
any of the debates so far.
As conceptual reflection, it becomes clear in this context how the boundaries 
around specific ethical concerns are expressed differently by an 
institutionalised expert body such as EGE.
9,6 From bio-society to bio-economy
The foregrounding of ethical issues and social impact of tissue engineering 
technology, as witnessed in this chapter, could indicate a silent move towards 
notions of the bio-society. The debate in Parliament over ethical concerns 
reflects varying democratic positions in Member States, which is problematic at 
European level given the lack of consensus. This points towards an underlying 
notion; the inability of the EU to deal with the impact of contested technologies. 
Regulating ethics at this level has proved difficult and is bound by legal 
constraints as formulated in Treaties. As such, the European regulatory state 
(Majone 1994) is not a state of European values. This threatens the bio-society, 
where different stances towards the desirability and impact of tissue 
engineering result in boxing out these concerns altogether. This chapter has 
demonstrated this point by analysing the debate on ESCs and the incorporation 
of ‘less controversial’ ethical concerns around donation into the final version of 
the SANCO Directive. As such, this episode of the regulatory cycle resembles 
biotechnological developments that have been described in terms of ‘cultural 
biopolitics’ in parallel to ‘moral economies’ (Salter 2006). Dynamic discourses
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of cultural values about the desirability of techno-scientific innovations (in this 
case a role played by embryonic stem cells) are accompanied by a moral 
economy in which these values can be traded and exchanged. As such, the 
trading of values facilitates negotiation and facilitates achieving a political 
compromise.
The bio-society also becomes problematic under the influence of a second 
main development during the policy shaping process of the SANCO Directive, 
namely a shift in stakeholder participation. The next section demonstrates how 
gradually during this process the role and influence of commercial developers 
increased. This created friction over the scope of the Directive. Here, conflicting 
views between the tissue banking community and industrial players became 
visible. These different groups, both operating in the tissue and cell domain, 
represent different value systems. Tissue banks have been involved in 
procurement, storage and distribution of tissue and cells for a long time. 
Typically they work on a not-for-profit basis (although exceptions exist). This 
resounds in debates on, most notably, the nature of donation, where Europe 
has a long tradition of unpaid and voluntary donation of bodily material based 
on free and informed consent. With the growing international trade in human 
tissues and cells and the increased activity of (multinational) commercial 
providers in this field, discussion arose over the nature of donation and the 
commodification of bodily material. The main question was not only if donors 
should be paid for donation, but also whether it was kosher for companies to 
make profit over freely donated tissues and cells that form the basis of tissue 
engineered products. These issues have been touched upon in this chapter in 
the analysis of the Parliament debate. The next section discusses this 
configuration of players in more detail, speculating on the implications of a 
possible extension of boundaries from bio-society type of actors (tissue banks) 
to bio-economic players (industry). As such, the concerns with ethical 
considerations can be placed in a larger context of EU policy and trends. 
Discussions over the scope further support this statement.
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9.7 Opening up the Directive
A second major strain in the analysis of the SANCO Directive, in addition to 
ethical considerations, is the gradual broadening of the scope. Two interrelated 
trends are visible here; one from regulating traditional tissue banking activities 
to also include manufactured products based on human tissues and cells, while 
the other focuses on the relation between the SANCO Directive on quality and 
safety and the new Regulation that was being developed around the same time 
by DG Enterprise, and which covers the marketing of these products. These 
trends imply a shift in the involvement of different stakeholder groups in the 
policy shaping process. This had a direct influence on ‘opening up’ a Directive 
that was originally developed to just accommodate traditional tissues and cells. 
Conflicts of interests become visible between actors in traditional tissue 
banking culture, which has typically been associated with local and hospital 
based practices on a national level, versus commercial developers in an 
increasingly multinational tissue engineering sector. This can be considered in 
the light of a growing regulatory reach (Welsh and Evans 1999) and stronger 
move towards Europeanisation of tissue and cell regulation, where the SANCO 
Directive represents the shift from local production to commercialisation on 
trans-national scale. Also it underlines the tensions between public health and 
competitiveness agendas. This is furthermore complicated by internal politics 
and bureaucratic competition within the Commission, which has also shaped 
the scope and means of the SANCO Directive.
The original aim of the SANCO Directive was to regulate non-manipulated or 
traditional tissues and cells and to safeguard the use of tissues preserved in 
tissue banks by requiring binding measures on quality and safety (Elmalem 
2002). It focused on activities of procurement and processing in the tissue 
banking sector. This was evident from the first proposals for a Directive and 
from the expertise drawn upon to advise the Commission, which included 
specialists from transplantation medicine and tissue banks in Europe. 
Involvement of industrial players was limited during these early stages. During 
the transition of the proposal through Parliament and Council, when also other 
stakeholders where invited to present their positions, the reach of the Directive
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was broadened. Industry expressed concern that the proposal for the Directive 
only covered tissue banks, and not commercial providers (Schutte 2003). They 
lobbied for a ‘level playing field’ with the then dominant tissue banking sector 
(Luyten 2003), which allowed companies to have direct involvement in the 
procurement of tissues and cells, rather than having to access their starting 
materials via tissue banks. According to a commercial provider the SANCO 
proposal was for a long time unclear in how to deal with both not-for-profit and 
commercial providers:
You end up with two different rules for the different players in the market. 
I think what industry is saying is that there should be the same rules for 
everyone whether they’re tissue banks, whether they’re a commercial 
company or whoever. The same rules, whether you’re going sourcing or 
whether you’re going into processing and modifying into a product. And 
that was not clear from the SANCO directive. And apparently now 
they’ve changed tissue banking to tissue establishment, meaning 
anybody that is working. But it was still very unclear... That’s why 
someone used the word ‘mess’ because it’s just so unclear of where we 
are going.
(Corporate affairs manager in multinational company M-EU5, 2003)
The influence of commercial providers is witnessed in the amended version of 
the proposed Directive, which the Commission presented in May 2003 (DG 
SANCO 2003). While the original proposal promoted not-for-profit procurement 
institutions60 (basically public sector tissue banks, though this was not phrased 
like this), the revised proposal coined the new concept of ‘tissue establishment’. 
This change of definition had far-reaching consequences, because it meant 
that the original scope of transplantation, and as such of traditional tissue 
banks as institutional actors, was broadened to include all establishments 
where activities take place related to the application of human tissues and cells. 
Therefore companies could also get involved in the procurement of tissue, and 
were subject to similar rules as tissue banks for the later steps of processing 
and distribution.
Thus while the original SANCO proposal was very tissue bank oriented, this 
changed into incorporating more and more provisions that reflect the increased
60 In addition to procurement activities, the original article 6 of the Directive stated that “Member 
States shall ensure that all activities relating to the processing, preservation, storage, and 
distribution of human tissues and cells for human transplantation are undertaken only by tissue 
banks that have been accredited by a competent authority for that purpose” (DG SANCO 2002: 
article 6).
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activity of tissue engineering companies in the sector. But the meaning and 
context of this change of focus was also coloured by the fact that the Enterprise 
product legislation was still in preparation. This regulation would focus 
specifically on marketing of tissue engineered products but it was as yet 
unclear in what way, and most notably how long it would take to be effective. 
This caused confusion in the field, where many companies were afraid they 
would be subject to different sets of regulations that were not compatible, or 
with clashing provisions of different sets of Community legislation.
It’s knowing where the boundaries are, so I guess ideally would say: 
right OK the DG SANCO Directive is useful particularly for tissue banks 
and the sourcing of materials and that’s fine. But really we’d want to be 
controlled under the DG Enterprise Directive that specifically covers all 
the issues of producing these high technology products and actually 
placing products on the market.
(Product safety manager for multinational company M2, 2003)
In the absence of further product legislation, it also becomes clearer why there 
was another remarkable change in the wording and intention of the SANCO 
Directive: from only including traditional tissues to covering all tissue and cell 
based products for which no other Community legislation exists. This had 
important implications for the way tissue engineering was treated, and in how 
far it would be covered by the provisions of the SANCO Directive. A SANCO 
official explains:
In the first version of the Directive we cover full transplantation. Now we 
cover everything which is not covered by other Community Directives. 
This is a slight change... that we will not cover tissue engineering 
products when the Directive of tissue engineering products, the new 
directive, the new proposal will be in place. But in the meantime when 
there is nothing in place for these... It’s a drastic change in scope, I 
mean now we cover... tissue engineering has to comply also with the 
basic requirements of our Directive, also for their steps. Everything of 
this taken into account that the Commission is really under the idea that 
we need a specific regulation or specific framework for tissue 
engineering products. And this is entering a period... waiting for these 
further regulations.
(Official at European Commission DG SANCO A-EU5, 2003)
In other words the SANCO Directive became an ‘in between solution’ for tissue 
engineered products, until the DG Enterprise Regulation, which was under 
preparation but delayed, would be effective.
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The lack of clarity between the two legislations also pointed towards another 
development, namely one of competition between the different Directorates in 
question: DG SANCO and DG Enterprise. Interviewees have described their 
astonishment with ‘the sudden pop up’ of the SANCO Directive (M-EU4, 2003), 
which was developed ‘almost in isolation to Enterprise’ (M-EU9, 2003). They 
describe how the SANCO proposal, while already in advanced stages of 
preparation, came not only as a surprise to industry, but also to DG Enterprise, 
which was just about to launch its first consultation round to inquire about the 
need for a specific legislative framework for tissue engineering. Asked about 
the internal politics behind this state of affairs, one interviewee’s view is as 
follows:
I think it’s a mixture of both [politics between and within DGs] in that if 
you see the way the DG SANCO Directive was produced, it was almost - 
obviously a lot of work had been happening quietly in the background. I 
think when they produced it was: hang on, here’s suddenly a fifty page 
document which they felt was then ready for public scrutiny. I think DG 
Enterprise were taken aback but I got the impression there hasn’t been a 
great deal of communication between the different DGs on that. So it’s 
almost as though DG SANCO were like whoa, they’ve got their house in 
order and suddenly whoa there’s a document and DG Enterprise was 
left trailing is this getting into what their strategy was as they were 
developing one. But I think there’s a lot of politics too within DG 
Enterprise ‘cos obviously you’ve got the medical device groups and 
medicinal product groups within DG Enterprise and so there’s concerns 
there, certainly the feeling that medicinal products group would certainly 
like to control all this if they could.
(Product safety manager for multinational company M2, 2003)
Therefore tensions arose not only between DG SANCO and the industry 
sector, but also between Directorates. And within the different divisions of the 
Enterprise DG, which is responsible for both medical device and 
pharmaceutical regulation.
The change of focus in the SANCO Directive was perceived differently by 
traditional tissue banking communities and commercial providers, where 
arguably tensions between the different approaches were at their sharpest. 
One manufacturer recalls a meeting with some experts involved in preparing a 
draft proposal, stating how DG SANCO only wanted to cover the donation and 
procurement side, but not the application of products based on tissues and 
cells, nor any tissues or cells with extensive manipulation:
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I think that the last version was far from what they wanted to happen... It 
was different. They wanted to regulate classical tissues, and that’s all. 
Donor skin, corneas, bone, bone chips... And what is currently provided 
by tissue banks in Europe. They didn’t want to have inside tissue 
engineering products. But at the end, someone decided that since there 
was no regulation for them, they started asking for a regulation for tissue 
engineering products. DG Enterprise didn’t react very quickly, so DG 
SANCO became one of the pieces of the regulation.
(Scientist quality controller in multinational tissue engineering company 
M-EU3, 2004)
The statement that the SANCO Directive would only temporarily cover tissue 
engineered products until a specific legislation is issued, did not make it to the 
final text though (Elmalem 2002). In the revised version of the SANCO 
proposal, article 2 on the scope was altered in the following way:
The provisions of this Directive shall apply to the donation, procurement, 
testing of human- tissues and cells for application to the human body.
The-provisions of this Directive shall also apply to the processing, 
preservation, storage and distribution of human tissues and cells when 
thev-afe to be used for human transplantation intended for human 
application and of manufactured products intended for human 
application derived from human tissues and cells.
Where the processing, preservation, storage and distribution of those le 
the case of such industrially manufactured products is regulated covered 
bv other Community legislation provisions derived from tissues and cells, 
this Directive shall apply applies only to donation, procurement and 
testing. (DG SANCO 2003: article 2)
This was the text that made it to the final Directive of 2004 (DG SANCO 2004). 
This provided some clarity as to which extent tissue engineered products were 
covered, namely only for the quality and safety aspects around donation, 
procurement and testing of the human tissues and cells that are used as 
starting materials for these products. The subsequent steps of processing, 
preservation, storage and distribution are covered by other Community 
legislation. We will discuss the specifics of this ‘other Community legislation’ in 
the next chapter.
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Recap
This section has described how industrial representatives successfully lobbied 
for a ‘level playing field’ with other parties in the tissue domain, thereby 
widening the scope of the Directive from traditional tissue banking activities to 
also allow other institutions in procurement activities. This was important for 
companies in order to directly access their starting materials for product 
manufacturing. With this the tissue banking monopoly was broken down. The 
industry involvement also had other implications, as it opened up discussion 
about ‘tissue banking values’ over the nature of donation, which had always 
been linked to arguments of non-profit. This also explains the discussions in 
Parliament over ethical considerations, as these were mostly based on 
perspectives of public-health protection and patient safety -  the very aim and 
legal basis of the SANCO Directive. These traditional values were called into 
question by the arrival of profit-seeking actors. At the same time, it was during 
these debates that conflicting values between non-profit and commercial 
players were extrapolated. In addition to tensions between players in the tissue 
engineering field, also institutional conflict within the Commission affected the 
course of events with the SANCO Directive, and its relation with the Enterprise 
regulation. The latter is discussed in the next chapter. Two critical 
developments should be noted here that form the analytical backdrop for 
understanding the institutional tensions between these players. One refers to 
the role of the European Commission vis-a-vis the European Parliament. As 
has been analysed before in relation to human genetics (see Salter & Jones
2002), the stance of the European Parliament has consistently been more 
sceptical towards new technological developments, reflected in its positioning 
in regulatory decision-making. For example EP resolutions on ethical and legal 
grounds date back to the early 1990s, with several attempts to introduce a 
legally binding ban on the cloning of human beings. Unlike Commission 
officials, MEPs are ‘naturally sensitive to the cultural response of their national 
constituencies’ (2002: 332). A second institutional and political context is 
provided by neighbouring policy areas at EU level, and more specific the EU’s 
research funding programmes. The debate on funding research on human 
embryonic stem cells under Framework Programme 6 for example (see for 
more on this Salter 2005b, 2006) is of paramount importance in reflecting on 
the tissue engineering case in the broader policy context. Here bio-economic
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parameters come to the fore again. As has been argued, the EU’s struggle over 
the future of contested therapies in regenerative medicine, including tissue 
engineering and stem cell science, can be considered part of a global contest 
for national and EU advantage. As such a wedge is created between ambitions 
of science and cultural values, creating ‘cultural biopolitics’ (Salter 2006) in 
which the operation of biopower is targeted at the control of the values that 
permit or proscribe the development of health technologies.
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10 The Enterprise regulation 
reconstructing ethics
This section makes the transition from the SANCO Directive to the Enterprise 
Regulation. As an opening note it should be emphasised that the legislative 
instrument for the marketing of tissue engineered products was altered during 
the policy shaping process. Instead of a Directive, as was broadly anticipated, 
the Commission chose a Regulation as more appropriate tool. This was a 
reflection of the need for a quick but uniform solution for the regulatory gap left 
behind by the SANCO Directive.
The SANCO legislation is very clear in its legislative basis, stating explicitly that 
the aim of this Directive is quality and safety standards, whereas ‘this Directive 
does not have as its primary objective the placing on the market of tissues and 
cells of human origin.’ (DG SANCO 2004).
While the SANCO Directive is based on the public health article (art 152) of the 
Amsterdam Treaty, the initiative by DG Enterprise has the promotion of the 
single market as main aim (art 95). One important concern for industry is the 
particularities of this health article, as it implies that Member States are not 
prevented from ‘maintaining or introducing more stringent protective measures’ 
(European Commission (EC) 1997: art 152, al 4(a)). In other words the 
Directive prescribes basic safety criteria, while any Member State can adopt 
more protective measures and install higher safety standards on the use of 
human tissues and cells when they feel the need to. This means that this health 
article does not provide for harmonisation across Member States (A-EU5,
2003). Commercial developers have expressed concerns over this legal basis, 
as they fear that Member States will indeed raise their safety controls in order 
to exclude certain products from entering their national markets:
The article I think under which DG SANCO operates only sets minimum 
criteria and so the risk gets from industry’s point of view that each 
country could say: yeah, yeah, we’ll work with the minimum but we also 
want to put additional controls for our country in there. And so you could
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end up with, again, you wouldn’t have a pan European system... It just 
means you don’t really have a free market anymore.
(Product safety manager for multinational company M2, 2003)
In this situation commercial developers, and other actors active in the tissue 
engineering sector, have to comply with the quality and safety requirements 
under the SANCO Directive, but are confronted with a regulatory lag in relation 
to authorisation for commercialisation of their products in Europe.
To ‘correct’ this regulatory ambiguity, DG Enterprise is preparing regulation that 
defines the process of authorisation for tissue engineered products, with 
requirements for obtaining manufacturing license, scientific assessment of new 
products, and post-marketing surveillance to keep track of possible adverse 
effects of these products. While tissue engineered products can only be placed 
on the market after fulfilling the quality and safety requirements under the 
SANCO Directive, the Enterprise regulation aims to guarantee free movement 
of products within the single market by harmonising the rules for authorisation.
In this respect DG Enterprise has to work with a dual objective, where first and 
foremost the highest level of safety protection for patients has to be guaranteed 
before an effective internal market can be created.61
While the Enterprise legislation is still under development, and final outcomes 
are as yet unknown, some emerging themes can be observed. One notable 
trend is the increased role of commercial developers in shaping the legislation. 
DG Enterprise has traditionally been ‘close’ to industry because of its mandate 
and objective in promoting trade. In the health domain a longstanding relation 
was established with companies and trade associations, in the context of DG 
Enterprise’s involvement in controlling medical devices and pharmaceuticals in 
the EU.
Focusing on the legislative documents and proposals issued so far, several 
other observations can be made. One of these is the highly debated question of 
the very definition of tissue engineering, which is discussed here in relation to
61 As later expressed in the final legislative document by DG Enterprise: ‘While taking account 
of the fact that any regulation on the manufacture and distribution of medicinal products must 
be fundamentally aimed at safeguarding public health, this aim must be achieved by means 
that do not impede the free movement of medicinal products within the Community’ (DG 
Enterprise 2005: 4).
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the in- or exclusion of animal cells. This definition issue is related to the scope 
of the legislation, and in how far tissue engineered product should be part of a 
medicinal product approach. As we have seen in chapter 2, regulatory policy 
development in this field is shaped by continuous debate over the most 
appropriate approval route for these products, with medical devices and 
medicinal product Directives considered the most viable Community options. 
The final proposal for the Enterprise Regulation, adopted by the Commission in 
November 2005, places tissue engineering under the medicines umbrella, 
where the EMEA deals with authorisation of these products for the single 
European market. In this task the agency is assisted by a new expert 
Committee for Advanced Therapies (CAT) with specific expertise to evaluate 
tissue engineered products. The early development of the Enterprise 
Regulation is dominated by discussions over whether this is the most 
appropriate construction, what exact expertise is needed to evaluate the 
technology, and what the practical implications are of this centralised system 
(especially for the many SMEs in the sector). However, these issues are not 
further explored in this chapter. Instead, I focus on the drawing of boundaries 
around the definition of tissue engineering, which highlights significant 
divergence from the SANCO debate in relation to ethical considerations.
This chapter explores in how far the highly contested role of ethical 
considerations, and with that the regulatory scope, during the SANCO debate 
are influential in the way the Enterprise Regulation was build, or which 
alternative frames are called upon in this specific initiative. I empirically 
approach this by analysing the diverse consultation rounds and expertise calls 
that led to the final proposal for a Regulation in November 2005, analysing the 
role of the key players in this exercise, and discussing how the boundaries are 
constituted around drawing this Regulation against the backdrop of the SANCO 
debate.
The last section of this chapter gives a reflective account of the implications of 
‘regulating ethics’ in comparing the two legislative initiatives, thereby also 
drawing conclusions about the viability of the bio-society.
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10.1 Shifting frames: on animai ceils
The emerging debate on xenogeneic tissues and cells is vibrant and relevant. 
The potential authorisation of animal material for circulation on the single 
European market has far reaching implications for the health and safety of 
European citizens, for risk management approaches in the EU, and for ‘public 
trust’ in products as well as the Commission’s competence in European 
governance of innovative technologies.
This discussion starts with the observation that the SANCO Directive does not 
address animal sources in any sense. Although this Directive covers the 
procurement stage, this concerns human tissues and cells. Community 
legislation for the procurement of animal cells is currently absent. In the 
legislation currently in development for the marketing of tissue engineered 
products, the Enterprise Regulation, animal cells do play a role. This section 
provides further details by focusing on the different consultation rounds that the 
Commission organised over the last years. Here a remarkable change in focus 
has taken place in stakeholders’ stances towards these cells, where different 
boundaries are drawn around the desirability of their inclusion in Community 
legislation.
10.1.1 Strict exclusions and ‘realpolitik’
In June 2002, DG Enterprise launched a web-based consultation entitled 
‘Consultation document: Need for a legislative framework for human tissue 
engineering and tissue-engineered products’ (DG Enterprise 2002). With this 
document stakeholder input was sought on a future regulatory framework to 
cover the marketing procedure for tissue engineered products. One main issue 
addressed was the definition and scope of tissue engineering, pointing out the 
need to produce ‘a scientifically valid and legally sustainable definition of tissue 
engineering, and tissue engineered products, in order to underpin a legislative 
framework and to provide a sound basis for demarcation between tissue 
engineered products on the one hand and medical devices, pharmaceutical 
products and cell therapy on the other’ (DG Enterprise 2002: 2). More specific
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at this stage the Commission suggested excluding xenogeneic organs, tissues 
and cells from the tissue engineering domain.
Stakeholders were divided over the question whether xenogeneic tissues and 
cells should be covered under the new legislation. Some government officials 
were in favour, arguing how largely the same issues (most notably with respect 
to risk) were at stake in comparing tissue engineering with xenogeneic 
products, while others opposed on the basis that it would add additional 
complexity to an already complex subject. Some respondents felt that it was 
simply too early for xenogeneic products to contemplate regulation. An 
interviewee who took part in this consultation exercise explained how a 
pragmatic view had to be taken, where it was a question of ‘realpolitik’ to move 
the regulation forward:
I think what we’ve said mainly for UK at the present moment is that 
because there is a need to make progress here, let us leave 
xenotransplantation out of this, that was our response on there [i.e. to 
the Enterprise consultation] because if you bring xenotransplantation in 
we’ll spend three or four years in Europe arguing about this, and that’s a 
difficult one... And then I think the UK view there was partly pragmatic. 
We’re saying that OK there are areas there which need to be sorted out, 
but if we’re to make progress then realpolitik says we’ve got to go for the 
biggies, you know the easiest way of getting this forward. If you were to 
put xenotransplantation in then this is going to delay us for another two 
or three years. I’m not sure that the time is right yet and equally there 
may be other ways of taking this forward. So let’s separate these out. If 
you try too wide a directive you’ll just have all the problems of ’98 
repeated, so let’s go in rather narrow and focused so at least we achieve 
something.
(Regulatory professional in national government agency R2, 2003)
In contrast, most companies were largely in favour of including xenogeneic 
material. Their representatives in trade bodies on the other hand were more 
cautious, pointing out ethical sensitivity and scientific uncertainty around the 
therapeutic use of viable xenogeneic cells. On this basis they suggested to 
exclude products based of animal material, with the notable exception of animal 
derived material (‘ancillary elements’) used during culturing and processing in 
tissue engineering applications:
However, xenogeneic viable material should not be confused with 
animal derived materials currently being used as part of human tissue
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product manufacturing processes, such as mouse feeder cells in skin 
cell expansion for treating severely burned patients. In such cases, we 
would propose a certification scheme specifically focussing on safety, 
and which could be extended to include other biological materials used 
during manufacturing and not yet covered by the medical device or the 
medicinal products regulations, such as cytokines, bovine serum, etc... 
Taking this into account, the definition of tissue engineered products 
should allow for the ancillary use of animal (or theoretically also plant) 
derived material.
(EuropaBio 2002: 5).
For years the culturing of human cells had been based on using certain animal- 
derived materials, such as bovine or horse serum, bovine collagen and other 
additives or growth factors of animal origin. It was argued that these concern so 
called non-viable animal derived components. Thus the definitions under which 
the proposed Regulation excluded animal material mainly referred to 
xenotransplants; living animal organs, tissues or cells.
10.1.2 ‘In principle’ exclusions
Two years later a second consultation round took place (DG Enterprise 2004b). 
Again matters of definition and scope were addressed. The most striking 
difference in this document concerned the use of animal material. Similar to the 
earlier consultation document, the Commission proposed that ‘in principle’ 
xenogeneic tissues and cells should be excluded from the tissue engineering 
Regulation. However a change in wording and intention was witnessed here: 
the Commission stated that xenogeneic tissue engineered products may be 
developed in the future, implying that there could be a need to regulate this 
more complex category of products. Because of safety and ethical issues 
surrounding this material, and the still early stages of development, ‘for the time 
being’ an exclusion should remain in force. The proposal is explicit though in 
that ‘this would not exclude the use of xenogeneic cells or tissues used for the 
production of human tissue engineered products, as long as these xenogeneic 
materials are not present in the final product.’ (DG Enterprise 2004b: 6). This 
final product clause was highly debated. Many respondents highlighted that 
unintentionally traces of animal-derived material (bovine serum, collagen, or via 
the use of xenogeneic scaffolds) could be left behind in the final product. Thus 
in practice this provision would not work. Some respondents suggested in this
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respect that legislation should ensure that any xenogeneic materials present in 
the final product are not viable (DG Enterprise 2004a).
Furthermore the proposal mentioned the need to accommodate future 
developments in the tissue engineering sector, including reassessment of the 
scope of application, where it was concluded that ‘the opportunity to include 
xenogeneic tissues within the scope of the Regulation could thus be re­
examined some time after its entry into force, based on a reassessment of the 
market situation’ (DG Enterprise 2004b: 6).
In a ‘joint industry comments’ document issued in August 2004, it became clear 
that industry was less than impressed with the latest proposal. It questioned the 
definition of ‘material of animal origin’ and alerted the Commission to not 
exclude tissue engineered products for which certain manufacturing steps 
involve the use of viable material of animal origin (such as murine 3T3 
fibroblasts for skin cell cultures). Industry continued to argue that ‘in fact, many 
human tissue engineered products are produced using some viable animal 
material during the production and have a long history of safety’ (EUCOMED et 
al. 2004: 2).
Still the Commission was of the view that ‘in principle’ xenogeneic material 
should be excluded from the scope of the legislation.
10.1.3 Complicated exclusions
In May 2005, DG Enterprise published a third and final web-based consultation 
paper, together with the details of the full proposal for a Regulation, outlining 
the regulatory strategy (DG Enterprise 2005f). As in previous proposals, 
xenogeneic materials were out of the scope of legislation, although in this 
version a subtle alteration was added: excluded were ‘tissue engineered 
products derived exclusively from cells or tissues of animal origin’, whereas it 
was subsequently stated that ‘nonetheless, this Regulation should apply to 
human tissue engineered products for which tissues and cells of animal origin 
are used in the manufacture without being present in the final product, or, if 
present, only in trace amounts and without being viable.’ (DG Enterprise 2005c:
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9). Note here how the last part of the sentence on non-living ‘trace amounts’ 
was added in accordance with industry concerns over the difficulties in 
excluding the presence of animal material altogether.
10.1.4 Animal cells in -  embryonic stem cells out
A major shift occurred in respondents’ views on this Commission position, as 
can be read from the responses to this consultation round in summer 2005 (DG 
Enterprise 2005b). Two main points are worth illustrating here, both related to 
how the proposed Regulation deals with different cell sources. One concerned 
the use of animal cells, while the other addressed embryonic stem cells.
Arguably the most striking set of responses concerned the exclusion of 
xenogeneic products. Earlier consultation rounds had generally led to the 
conclusion that it was too early and too controversial to consider regulating 
xenogeneic tissue engineered products, although some hints were made over 
the years towards less rigid definitions and restrictions. This consultation 
revealed a rather more extreme step, where a majority of the respondents 
challenged the exclusion of this material on a number of grounds. First it was 
argued that several products based on animal material are already covered 
under Community legislation, such as cell therapy medicinal products based on 
animal cells by the legislation on medicinal products (since 2003) and medical 
devices incorporating (non viable) animal cells by the legislation on medical 
devices (already since 1993). On this basis it would not make sense to make 
an exception for xenogeneic cells under the proposed regulation. Furthermore 
respondents pointed out that xenogeneic tissue engineered products are 
already in clinical development in Europe, with more applications in the 
pipeline, and excluding these from the proposed regulation would have a 
negative impact on innovation in this field. Next it was brought up how it may be 
difficult to argue that xenogeneic tissue engineered products are totally 
excluded from the Regulation, while arguably even more controversial products 
(e.g. based on embryonic stem cells) are not. Finally by excluding these 
products, no Community legislation at all would apply to xenogeneic tissue 
engineered products, meaning that harmonisation would not be achieved, with 
a fragmented market as likely result (DG Enterprise 2005g: 4-5). Based on
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these arguments, it was suggested to include xenogeneic tissue engineered 
products in the scope of the proposal.
The second main issue concerned embryonic stem cells. Several respondents 
called for a complete ban on the use of embryonic sources for the 
manufacturing of advanced therapies. They argued how the Regulation should 
be unambiguous that Member States are not forced to accept products which 
contradict their ethical position. The response of the Commission to this issue 
was extremely defensive. At the same time the responsibility for this sensitive 
domain was passed on to the SANCO Directive which had addressed 
embryonic stem cell use more than once in the preceding years. The 
Commission reply read:
The Commission takes due note of this concern on such an important 
issue. However, it should be borne in mind that this matter was 
extensively debated during the adoption of the European Directive on 
the quality and safety of human tissues and cells. In this context, the 
European Parliament, representing citizens, and the Council of the 
European Union, representing Member States, have recognised that 
there is, to date, no consensus in Europe upon which harmonised 
decisions could be taken on the use or prohibition of embryonic stem 
cells. Thus, decisions on such use or prohibition should, and will remain, 
a national responsibility (DG Enterprise 2005g: 3).
Furthermore it was repeated, ‘to avoid any misunderstanding’, that the 
Regulation would not interfere with decisions made by Member States on the 
use or prohibition of any specific type of cells.
It was remarkable that the embryonic stem cell issue was only brought up 
during the third consultation stage, just before final adoption of the proposal. 
According to some, it was a well-maintained strategy of DG Enterprise to avoid 
this contested issue, in order to not delay the legislation any further - also given 
the earlier experience and repetitious debate during the SANCO Directive. An 
EC official within DG Enterprise who was involved in the earlier stages of the 
proposal indeed admitted that all effort was undertaken to prevent the 
embryonic stem cell debate from reviving. The main argument put forward was 
that the SANCO Directive already deals with this issue, which would imply that 
DG Enterprise could stay clear of this ethically charged domain. During the time
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of interviewing this respondent, the plan was still to have a Directive on tissue 
engineered products:
If we develop tissue engineered product on the basis of embryonic stem 
cells then we will have some problems [laugh]... I refuse to mention this 
in my [Enterprise] Directive. But somebody may raise the finger and say. 
And my point is very simple on this. It’s to say: OK, we take the Directive 
from SANCO... on procurement etcetera. We say the procurement is 
done by them. So give them the problem. If they solve the problem 
there, then it’s over for us.
(EC official in DG Enterprise A-EU3, 2003)
This line of argument was also communicated in the stakeholders’ consultation 
responses, though perhaps in less explicit terms, where ‘the problem of 
embryonic stem cells’ was referred to the SANCO domain that manages the 
procurement of cells, rather than considering it part of the remit of the product 
legislation under DG Enterprise. As such, the boundary drawing around the 
scope of the regulation was aimed at boxing out ethically contested elements.
More than three years after the first consultation round was organised, the 
Commission presented the final ‘Proposal fora Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on advanced therapy medicinal products and 
amending Directive 2001/83/EC and Regulation (EC) No 726/2004’. This 
proposal was adopted on 16 November 2005 (DG Enterprise 2005e).
In this proposed Regulation also ethical aspects are mentioned. At first reading 
these do not seem to include anything new, compared to the provisions of the 
SANCO Directive. Along the lines of this Directive the Commission is of the 
opinion that products based on human tissues and cells should be founded on 
the philosophy of voluntary and unpaid donation, anonymity of both donor and 
recipient, altruism of the donor and solidarity between donor and recipient. 
Respect for fundamental human rights is mentioned, followed by citing the 
subsidiarity principle where the use or non-use of specific cell sources remains 
Member States decision. But whereas the SANCO Directive explicitly stated 
how this also applies to the use of embryonic stem cells, the Enterprise 
Regulation is phrased in a slightly different way:
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I
The proposed Regulation does not interfere with national legislation 
prohibiting or restricting the use of any specific type of human or animal 
cells, or the sale, supply or use of medicinal products based on such 
cells (DG Enterprise 2005f: 10).
The explicit mention of any specific type of human or animal cells reflects the 
recent debate on including xenogeneic sources under the heading of tissue 
engineering. Furthermore the reference to sale or supply of products based on 
these cells is interesting in the context of the Enterprise aim, based on Treaty 
article 95, to promote a single European market. Thus harmonisation of 
regulation and the common market objective are threatened by the subsidiarity 
principle which leaves the use of contested cell sources to national level 
decision-making. This means that a marketing authorisation granted for a 
xenogeneic tissue engineered product would be valid only in the Member 
States where this authorisation does not contradict national legislation.
In this respect there was also another notable change in comparison to earlier 
drafts. In the final proposal the definition of ‘tissue engineered product’ was 
extended to now also include animal tissues and cells:
Article 2: Definitions
Tissue engineered product means a product that:
-  contains or consists of engineered cells or tissues; and
-  is presented as having properties for, or is used in or administered to 
human beings with a view to, regenerating, repairing or replacing a 
human tissue;
A tissue engineered product may contain cells or tissues of human or 
animal origin, or both. The cells or tissues may be viable or non-viable. It 
may also contain additional substances, such as cellular products, bio­
molecules, bio-materials, chemical substances, scaffolds or matrices. 
(DG Enterprise 2005f)
In the week before the final proposal went public, trade association EuropaBio 
convened an industry meeting as a last lobbying opportunity and to discuss the 
proposed Regulation (Geesink 2005). Members of the Commission and 
Parliament and several research and industrial representatives presented their 
views on the proposal issued earlier that year. An official from DG Enterprise 
explained the general outline of the Regulation. MEP Liese, rapporteur for the 
SANCO Directive, gave his vision on possible issues for discussion in
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Parliament. This meeting gave some preliminary insights on what was to be 
expected next with the Regulation entering the co-decision procedure. Most 
relevant was the discussion on ethical considerations in relation to different cell 
sources.
DG Enterprise official Rossignol first addressed ‘the embryonic stem cell issue’ 
which was also brought up during the last consultation round:
It is clear for us that, first, this debate already took place in the context of 
the adoption of the Tissue and Cells Directive, which will apply to the 
donation and procurement of cells used in these products. It is very clear 
that the competence on the use or non-use of any type of cells, including 
the use of embryonic stem cells, for ethical reasons is a national 
responsibility. This proposal should by no means and will not interfere 
this national competence. So this proposal is, to sum it up, neutral 
related to these stem cells or issues (Rossignol 2005).
Thus a discourse was presented where the responsibility for embryonic stem 
cells lies with the SANCO Directive that deals with procurement, while national 
Member States have a final say in authorising or banning products based on 
these cells. Slightly more complicated is the use of xenogeneic cells and 
materials in tissue engineered products. The EC official refers to the different 
consultation rounds, where respondent of the last one were most explicit in 
their plea for inclusion, based on already existing legal provisions and on their 
current use across Europe:
Xenogeneic tissue engineered products are already, according to 
experts, in clinical development in several parts of the EU. So there’s 
also the issue of why to exclude these products in a proposal which, as I 
said, is neutral towards more controversial products like embryonic stem 
cells. So there was also a question of logic. So we discussed the need to 
re-include these products (Rossignol 2005).
MEP Liese, rapporteur of the SANCO Directive, agreed with this position, but 
also pointed out how the European Parliament, whose turn it will be next, might 
have a different opinion:
I share the view that it was very illogical to say that xenotransplantation, 
that xenogeneic therapies are excluded from the scope, but to be not so 
clear in the embryonic stem cells. You can have different opinions on 
xenotransplantation, and I anticipate some problems with agreement 
there with the group in Parliament -  maybe they want to ban it or so -
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but I think you cannot ignore that there are already scientists doing 
clinical trials with animal cells transplanting to human beings... With 
embryonic stem cells we are not yet in the state of clinical trials, which is 
why I think the industry could be more relaxed if it’s covered or not, and 
the Parliament will definitely look at this in detail (Liese 2005).
In the discussion session at the end of this meeting the responsible EC official 
expressed that ‘we should not underestimate the political debate on the use of 
animal cells’ (Rossignol 2005).
10.2 The final downfall of the bio-society
As demonstrated so far, gradually the boundaries around the definition and 
scope of tissue engineering were expanded, where the final Commission 
proposal considers animal cells part of tissue engineering, and hence of the 
scope of the legislation. What did not change though were the risk 
management requirements as set out in the proposal. Here there is talk of long­
term patient monitoring and traceability of donors, products and starting 
materials on which these products are based. But it is well recognised that the 
use of xenogeneic material does not only pose risks to the individual patient but 
to society at large by the potential for disease transmission. The proposal does 
not mention any impacts on the environment or for public health at large.
Interestingly in this respect, an impact assessment study carried out for the 
Commission in relation to the proposed Regulation dedicates a paragraph to 
‘potential environmental impacts’. Tissue engineered products could have such 
an impact through their production process or use. Human cells are considered 
‘low risk’ in this study, but special attention is given to ‘ancillary reagents’, such 
as growth media, growth factors, hormones or antibiotics used during the 
culturing or production process. It is discussed here how ‘contamination with 
higher risk organisms than the human cells used might occur during the 
production process’ (Bock et al. 2005: 53). Given these circumstances, the 
study states:
Currently there are no data on potential hazards of hTEPs [human tissue 
engineered products] to the environment. Due to low production volumes 
and the rather structural than metabolically mode of action of hTEPs it
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can be assumed that risks will be low. However, these assumptions 
need to be assessed thoroughly and the inclusion of environmental risk 
assessment in the proposed regulatory options should be considered on 
that basis (Bock et al. 2005: 53).
Although the impact study argues that ‘environmental risks are considered to 
be relatively low, because of the low production volume, the use of readily 
biodegradable substances, the very limited survival of human cells outside 
controlled laboratory conditions, and strict production conditions’ (2005: 53), an 
environmental risk assessment would have to give more clarity on the potential 
hazards of tissue engineered products.
The proposed inclusion of animal cells in tissue engineering technologies puts 
this need in a different context, both in terms of safety and ethical 
considerations. As also expressed by Glasner and Rothman:
How would potential benefits and risks of harms be conveyed to subjects 
when it comes to what is known and unknown regarding transgenic 
applications, such as the possible introduction of animal pathogens into 
humans? (Glasner and Rothman 2001)
Lifting tissue engineering from the medical domain into an environmental 
context presumes different requirements for risk management. An influential 
approach in this respect is that of precaution, which also relates to uncertainty 
of risks and effects. The precautionary principle covers ‘those specific 
circumstances where scientific evidence is insufficient, inconclusive or 
uncertain and there are indications through preliminary objective scientific 
evaluation that there are reasonable grounds for concern that the potentially 
dangerous effects on the environment, human, animal or plant health may be 
inconsistent with the chosen level of protection’ (Commission of the European 
Communities (CEC) 2000: 9-10). Although originally only mentioned in relation 
to environmental issues in the Treaty, the precautionary principle covers a 
broader range of circumstances to be covered by EU policy. Precaution as risk 
management tool for tissue engineering has been suggested by one 
interviewee as possible approach:
So while we may say, in the short term, a particular piece of tissue 
manipulation has worked, in terms of some outcome measures, what we 
just don’t know in the longer term is whether that reconnection actually
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causes other problems. And you’re then into a decision as to whether 
the risks are outweighed by the benefits and for a short-term benefit 
from a patients, in terms of solving their disease, the fact that may cause 
cancer, five, ten, fifteen years down the line, for example, because 
you’ve upset a gene regulatory mechanism. It’s a difficult one to answer 
as to whether it’s worth while. You know you can take up precautionary 
line and say: well we shouldn’t do anything until we know for certain 
what the benefits and the harms are, but I figure on an individual level 
and there’s potential for an individual to consent... although it’s, you 
know, it’s very difficult for them to actually know what they are 
presenting to, but we don’t know what the potential harms are and 
there’s lot of ambiguity about what those risks are.
(Academic scientist in public health involved in clinical ethics committee 
03, 2003)
Still the assumption here is that of risk for the individual patient, where public 
health is not (directly) affected. This notion becomes problematic when tissue 
engineered products contain animal material.
The inclusion of xenogeneic material in tissue engineering constructs poses 
several questions of an ethical nature. One of these concerns the level of risk. 
The trade-off of individual benefit against societal risk is problematic in this 
domain, as it has implications for the ways in which new medical technologies 
are evaluated (Welsh and Evans 1999). Whereas the assessment of medical 
therapies is usually based on considerations of individual risk and benefit, 
rather than implications for public health and society at large, the use of 
xenogeneic sources changes this balance towards a broader type of risk 
assessment needed to encompass the level and extent of both risk and 
uncertainty. More specific, ethical considerations underlie thinking about 
unknown risks of a public character and how to assess and manage these 
risks. One of the implications of dealing with infectious risk to the public, is that 
the acceptability of risk has to be determined via a public mechanism, rather 
than on individual patient basis. Furthermore the classical model for informed 
consent, which is currently based on individual consent for medical 
interventions, needs to encompass third parties that could be affected. It also 
requires monitoring and surveillance of not just individual patients but also their 
close contacts, which raises moral issues about the processes of informed 
consent (most notably the option to ‘drop out’ at any point in time) and medical 
confidentiality (Vanderpool 2002). In addition, this will extend the individual life 
span, as this type of risk is not a one-off event, thus creating intergenerational
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risk and effects over time. In terms of risk management and regulation this 
means that iterative strategies have to be developed, also to control effects of 
cross-species mutations and the introduction of new infectious diseases in the 
human population over time (Bach et al. 2002). Thus the focus of decision­
making and regulatory policy changes alongside the shift from individual to 
collective risk. Also, rather than focusing on a regulatory framework driven by 
technical considerations, more broad types of risk assessment are needed to 
accommodate the ethical and social implications of this technology.
As discussed previously, technological risks have become more difficult to 
assess. Modern technology has created risks that are more complicated and 
uncertain, more far reaching and invisible, more intense and uncontrollable. To 
capture these dimensions, more complex types of risk assessment are required 
(Krimsky 2000). Technocratic risk assessment needs to be extended to 
encompass the broader societal concerns raised by the far-reaching effects of 
technological risk and uncertainty (Scoones 2001). In this context, scientific 
expert knowledge is not sufficient anymore to inform and legitimise regulatory 
policy, especially in highly contested technological domains. It has been argued 
that political decisions should be based on expert knowledge and social 
judgement.
This is also where the relationship with broader questions of norms, ethics and 
values comes to the fore. An important notion concerns the management of 
socio-political and ethical concerns related to tissue engineering technology. As 
discussed, these concerns have been largely deprived of in accounts of R&D 
actors. In contrast, the debate on the SANCO Directive was dominated by 
ethical concerns. But policy shaping is typically concerned with delivering 
implementable solutions to narrowly defined science-based problems (judicial 
default mode). As has also been demonstrated in relation to other innovative 
technologies, most notably in dealing with GMOs and human genetics, in the 
institutional management of risk often a functional separation is made between 
technical assessment versus socio-political and ethical dimensions. In order to 
institutionally manage complexity and uncertainty in technological risk 
assessment, responsibilities for policy and regulatory choices are divided up 
between different expert bodies, while ‘moral considerations are allocated to
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other areas of professional expertise and social and economic issues are 
deemed best dealt with by consumer choice and market response’ (Scoones 
2001:19).
Two observations can be made here. One relates to the role of ‘ethical 
expertise’ in Community policy making, while the other concerns the current 
inability of the EU to manage ethical concerns in the context of regulatory 
policy.
As discussed in relation to the SANCO Directive, advisory group EGE was to 
some extend influential in shaping the legislation on human tissues and cells. 
While the Commission diverged from the Group’s advice to limit tissue 
procurement to public sector institutes, this only happened after prolonged 
lobby-work by industrial players wanting to establish a level playing field with 
tissue banks. A subsequent Opinion specifically focused on tissue engineering 
was rather exotic though, where for example the use of animal cells was not 
addressed, nor any social impacts of the technology on patient access or 
availability of products. This chapter has outlined the problematic nature of 
including animal cells in the current legislative format. As discussed in earlier 
chapters, under clinical and commercial risk, issues around cost-effectiveness 
and lack of reimbursement have been mentioned as important stumbling blocks 
for further development of the technology, affecting both producers and 
consumers. As such these issues have a large impact on society and economy, 
and on how the bio-society and bio-economy deal with innovative technology.
On the other hand the EGE Opinion did emphasise areas of potential future 
concern, such as patentability of starting materials for tissue engineered 
products. So far this issue has not been taken up in either of the two legislative 
initiatives. Given EGE’s mandate as the official representative of bioethical 
values at EU level, and aim to take on the role of guardian of the civil rights 
society (see also: Salter and Jones 2002a) in expressing EU citizen’s concerns, 
perhaps this is more indicative of the technocratic stance of the Commission in 
relation to these issues than reflecting lack of public concern.
A second notion concerns the way in which the EU treats ethics. In the debate 
on the SANCO Directive we have seen the continuous boundary-work over
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11 Regulating tissue engineering futures?
Sometimes we try to regulate the future and it’s complicated.
(Official at European Commission DG SANCO A-EU5, 2003)
The problem - very acutely for the industry and the regulators, is that this 
field is a field where the science has progressed faster than the 
legislation and I suspect that’s a truism across technical, social and 
ethical aspects of this field.
(Industrial scientist at multinational consultancy company M-EU8, 2003)
This previous chapters have focused on the policy shaping and decision­
making process of the SANCO Directive and the Enterprise Regulation. In 
earlier chapters the complexity and uncertainty around risks of the technology 
were emphasised, and the problematic nature of regulating risk in this context. 
Not discussed so far is how the Commission attempts to deal with this 
uncertainty and complexity in its regulatory policies. An underlying framework 
for considering this ambiguity is by analysing the two legislative initiatives in 
terms of tensions between clarity and flexibility.
It can be argued that both the SANCO Directive and the Enterprise Regulation 
had to juggle between clarity and flexibility. Clarity was needed over which 
regulatory approach would be appropriate for tissue engineering, where 
decades of debate focused on whether this technology could be integrated with 
existing legislative frameworks on medical devices and pharmaceuticals or if a 
specific legal framework was needed. The proposed and, respectively, adopted 
legislations so far give clarity for manufactures and their invested interests in 
providing a strict but unified framework for tissue engineering, covering quality 
and safety aspects of starting materials and the marketing authorisation of 
products. Clarity is also needed for patients in order to provide equal access to 
treatments. Finally regulators are helped with a classification system that is less 
ambiguous than in the previous situation. On the other hand flexibility is needed 
and a tailored approach because of the specific nature of tissue engineered 
products. Also flexibility is needed to keep up to date with the fast moving 
scientific and technological developments in this field. But related to flexibility in 
order to catch up with the rapid evolvement is the need to cope with the
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exploring the margins of what is legally possible in terms of incorporating 
ethical concerns in Community regulation. This has been shown to be an 
elaborate and complicated affair, which significantly shaped the content and 
progress of the Directive -  with risks of stalling in the final stages in Parliament. 
A trading zone was created in which cultural values have to compete with a 
moral economy in which ‘ethics’ has become subject to trade in exchange for 
political consensus.
In the light of the proclaimed need to also take normative, political and ethical 
considerations into account when deciding on the social acceptability of risks, it 
has been proven impossible to define uniform decisions that are acceptable 
within the whole Community. Given the diverging positions of Member States 
on the authorisation or prohibition of embryonic cell sources, consensus at EU 
level, and thereby the possibility for governance, is lacking. The EU has to 
balance here between universal European-wide agreed criteria and national 
concerns. Values are generally locally produced and maintained, and the 
European regulatory state is not equipped, nor mandated, to manage this 
diversity and interfere with decisions at this level (subsidiarity). Regulating 
ethics at this level is thus a socio-political oxymoron.
To sum up, my case study of tissue engineering regulation by and in the EU 
adds to an understanding of the limitations of the institutional governance of 
risk and the complexity in managing moral dilemmas at this level. As such the 
bio-society has to look for alternative models in order to become a reality.
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different risks associated with the diverse types of tissue engineered products. 
As a Commission official explains this dilemma in relation to the SANCO 
Directive:
So there is the concern that how fast is moving the advances in tissue 
engineering. So when we consult and create a new regulation of tissue 
engineering you have to consider that from year to year things are 
moving very fast... we should have to find a more flexible way for it. 
Flexible way, but from the other side have to ensure to the population 
the basic criteria of quality and safety. So I think that in the definition of 
tissue engineering everybody has to take into account all these 
principles. So it’s not only a question of scientific definition but also a 
question of other interests because we cannot forget one thing where we 
talk about regulation; that we are not working with scientific definitions. 
We are working with legal definitions who have practical consequences. 
(EC official in DG SANCO A-EU5, 2003)
Balancing between clarity and flexibility is furthermore complicated by the 
inevitable regulatory lag. In the light of the Enterprise Regulation, which 
became part of the strictly controlled medicinal product approach, this 
Commission official explains:
There are many, many other things that I cannot plan at this moment. So 
the idea is to have a legislation that is quite flexible. And this goes 
against the spirit of the pharmacy, where... you have the tendency to 
want to fix all the details of the rules of what has to be done for checking, 
etcetera - where at this moment I am not able to describe what will be in 
ten years from now necessary. And don’t forget that a directive - if you 
want to change it you need at least three years of working on it. So we 
will be always running after, if we try to be precise, we will always be 
running after the development and impairing the development 
(EC official in DG Enterprise A-EU3, 2003)
In order to provide flexibility, the comitology procedure became integral part of 
both legislative initiatives. Comitology is a peculiar instrument, and an often 
overlooked exponent of the EU expert system. ‘Comitology committees’ are 
made up of civil servants as experts representing the Member States, and 
assist the Commission in exercising its implementing functions. After it has 
been decided what should be legislated (so after the Parliament and Council 
have adopted legislation), the Commission is authorised to work out how this 
should be done, with a mandate to fill in technical and detailed requirements. 
The work of the comitology committee includes taking decisions on the detail of 
the implementation of Community laws and the adaptation or updating of
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Community legislation in order to take account of technical developments 
(European Institute of Public Administration (EIPA) 2000). This procedure is 
used for measures relating to protection of the health or safety of persons, 
animals and plants. It also plays a decisive role in shaping the implementation 
phase of tissue engineering regulation.
Taking up detailed rules in a central Directive or Regulation reduces the 
flexibility needed to adapt regulatory requirements. Both the SANCO and 
Enterprise legislations are limited to fundamental issues and basic 
requirements, with additional instruments of technical requirements via 
comitology and standard development or guidelines for the more specific 
aspects - for example in relation to safety testing. The main reason for recourse 
to comitology in the SANCO Directive was to act quickly upon new scientific 
insights, most notably in the face of emerging risks of transmission of 
communicable diseases.
The decision on what to include under the basic framework of the legislation 
and what goes to comitology, is a very political one. As the following 
interviewee explains, involved as advisor in the draft SANCO Directive and 
future member of the comitology committee:
The problem with the Directive is that one never knows if you have a 
Directive. I think that the first message is that the Directive is a good 
move... to have minimum regulations... so a very important document 
for starting towards this. The second point is this will be out of 
importance if afterwards the comitology developing the technical 
annexes does not do a very good job. So the secret lies both in the main 
text of the Directive but also from the work that will be done in committee 
in the comitology process, in setting up the technical annexes which are 
the core of the safety and quality of the products.
(Director national transplantation agency and advisor SANCO R-EU6, 
2003)
But while the regulatory lag in tissue engineering might be eased by 
arrangements for a flexible regulatory approach, this flexibility also constitutes 
uncertainty.
Furthermore, what is subject to comitology is not uncontroversial. During the 
debate on the SANCO Directive MEPs fought over which provisions would
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remain in the main legislative text, which is dealt with under co-decision, and 
what is left to Member States representatives under comitology. This mainly 
concerned issues around donation. This points towards another problematic 
notion, which is that comitology is not a very democratic procedure.
The comitology procedure has been criticised over the years, most notably over 
the issue of what should be decided in a legislative or implementation 
procedure, and where to draw the line between the two. Furthermore the 
complexity of the system and lack of transparency of the committee structure 
has fuelled fears of these committees as a Trojan horse, by which national 
interests are carried into the implementation process of Community law 
(Neuhold 2001). The two extracts below reflect some of the concerns:
Committees are seen as embodying the most opaque and even secret 
part of EC decision making. They are considered to be the most 
intransparent aspect of the EC system of governance (European 
Institute of Public Administration (EIPA) 2000: 94).
Comitology: short hand for national bureaucratic influence, lack of 
transparency and accountability of industry, academic and bureaucratic 
experts (Altenstetter 2004: 12).
The ‘comitology debate’ concentrates on the question in how far comitology 
committees affect the EC implementation process, how they are controlled and 
by whom (Neuhold 2001). Some speak of ‘government by committee’ in this 
respect (European Institute of Public Administration (EIPA) 2000: 75).
Concerns are expressed that comitology procedures give extensive law-making 
powers to invisible and largely unaccountable committees made up of 
Commission officials and civil servants from Member States (EurActiv 2006).
As a system, the comitology procedure has raised issues of democratic 
legitimacy of the EC policy process, with the committees reflecting the 
‘democratic deficit’ and ‘bureaucratic and technocratic bias’ of the EC system, 
given the committee members are not elected on a democratic basis and the 
meetings are not open to the public.62 Yet others see institutional conflict 
between different EU institutions. As also visible in discussions on the SANCO 
Directive, especially the European Parliament (EP) has expressed critiques that
62 Although it should be noted that public access to documents has improved since the revised 
comitology decision of 1999 (EFTA, 2002).
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comitology is used as a strategy of the Council to circumcise the participation of 
the EP within decisions (Neuhold 2001).
Opposed to viewing comitology as democratic deficit, it has also been argued 
that these fora mainly deal with technical issues, retaining their legitimacy by 
efficiently producing quality output (Majone 1994). One study demonstrated 
that these committees mainly manage routine matters (European Institute of 
Public Administration (EIPA) 2000). Still, some are concerned that the 
members of comitology committees are involved in more than technical issues 
and also find politically sensitive subjects on their way (notable examples being 
biotech regulation and BSE). A provisional statement in my study is that in the 
case of the SANCO Directive strongly opposing views became explicit between 
the Parliament and Council over the question what is considered ‘technical 
detail’ suitable for comitology versus what are the politically sensitive issues 
that need to be dealt with under the democratic scrutiny of co-decision. The 
explosive discussion on embryonic stem cells demonstrates that the 
demarcation between ‘technical’ and ‘ethical’ detail is difficult to achieve.
During the co-decision procedure it is decided which provisions are suitable for 
a comitology approach. With the innovative character of tissue engineering it 
can be argued though whether comitology is the most appropriate tool to deal 
with new insights. The innovative character of tissue engineering, but with that 
the associated risks, determines in how far new developments can be suited 
under this approach. There is a thin line between adjusting technical 
requirements and using comitology as a backdoor for accommodating 
potentially more risky and more controversial developments in this domain. For 
example, the current Enterprise proposal includes xenogeneic cells, with the 
argument of legalistic consistency and current (though experimental) practice. 
Interviewees have pointed out how in the future tissue engineering can include 
a much more diverse range of products than currently on the market. From 
currently available and relatively simple applications of tissue engineered skin, 
cartilage and bone, a ‘slippery slope’ could lead to including potentially more 
risky future applications under the tissue engineering heading. Embryonic stem 
cells and animal cells have already been addressed in this respect.
Furthermore, ‘to complicate matters further, it is quite likely that some TEPs
303
[tissue engineered products] might be used as vehicles for gene therapy, or 
cells in the product might have been genetically engineered.’ (Lloyd-Evans 
2004: 54). By extending the definition of tissue engineering, as witnessed in the 
Enterprise Regulation, it becomes difficult to control potentially controversial 
applications.
In other words, while the comitology procedure has been developed as a tool to 
manage complexity and uncertain risks, which became especially relevant in 
the post-BSE era, this same procedure raises questions about the legitimacy of 
the current regulatory system in the EU, technocratic versus democratic 
principles, and the difficulties in drawing boundaries between technical details 
and ethical concerns.
In this context it is important to further analyse the comitology developments for 
the SANCO Directive and Enterprise Regulation, which are currently being 
negotiated. Future research should address this matter.
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Conclusion: boundaries of risk and 
regulation in a political economy of 
medicine
The political economy of tissue engineering regulation is crucial to 
understanding technological innovation in the EU. This research analyses 
these developments in terms of a tension between the bio-society and bio­
economy. It addresses questions on risk and safety, clinical application and 
commercial activities, and relates these themes to social and ethical 
considerations in policymaking. Such matters are central to discussions about 
the development and regulation of European biotechnology. To open up these 
questions requires addressing the risk domains of such technologies. At 
present, as shown, there is a risk gap that is not met by EU regulation. The 
research concludes that the ethical questions raised by tissue engineering 
cannot be answered at an EU level, for reasons of realpolitik.
This thesis started with the introduction of two guiding concepts, bio-economy 
and bio-society, which are key to understanding the shaping of a regulatory 
regime in tissue engineering. I have argued how economic imperatives and 
ambitions to drive the EU further towards a global competitive player in the 
‘knowledge-based bio-economy’ created a strong underlying framework for 
stimulating biotechnological innovation and the life sciences. Tissue 
engineering became a significant component in this ambition. Since the 1980s 
this economic paradigm has created tensions with quests for bio-societal 
values such as sustainability, leading to calls for awareness of social as well as 
technological aspects of the applied life sciences. In this pre-genomic era, a 
model was presented based on the assumption it was indeed possible and 
desirable to create ‘a society based on the conscious management of self- 
organising systems for the sustenance and enrichment of human life and 
purposes’ (Green 1984: 9).
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However, social demands were overshadowed by enthusiasm for 
biotechnological solutions by most European governments, with increasing 
amounts of budget and political willpower dedicated to expanding the new life 
sciences as guardians of the global economy and world well-being.
While public concern over biotech applications increased, the EU’s technology 
policy only started to change after the BSE crisis, the controversy over GMOs 
and the discussion on biotechnology patents (Borras 2003). During the last 
decade the innovation agenda has opened up to include questions of risk and 
social sustainability. Social and ethical considerations became instrumental in 
creating a common vision; science had to deliver what ‘the people’ need in 
compliance with an acceptable ethical consensus. This setting provides a 
backdrop for analysing the demands for technological innovation as well as 
socio-political and ethical considerations to be taken into account in the 
development of regulatory policy for tissue engineering. The example of a 
typical tissue engineering product cycle (Apligraf) as discussed in chapter 1 
gives a flavour of the diverse technoscientific, clinical, commercial, regulatory, 
social and ethical aspects of biotechnological innovation in this domain.
But as also described, the European Commission, as main legislative body at 
this level, played a dual role in both stimulating biotechnological innovation and 
in regulating the field. This led to frictions in institutional and ideological aims. 
Whereas the promotion of trade is considered a long-term strategic goal of the 
EU, health and safety regulation is a rather novel challenge.
Until recently health policy was a matter of exclusive member state autonomy 
and concern. The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) was the first piece of communal 
legislation that made public health protection a formal Community objective in 
its own right. More specifically it expressed the need for community wide 
legislation on human tissues and cells, which provided a starting point for 
further policy developments as discussed in this thesis. At the same time this 
Treaty reflects the dual legal basis of Community action, where article 152 on 
public health had to be integrated with the one covering completion of a single 
European market (article 95).
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The Community is now one of the key actors in European health and safety 
regulation, as also witnessed in the case of tissue engineering, and funding is 
secured in support of the explicit significance of biotechnology applications in 
the health domain. For example in the latest Framework Programme (FP7) the 
healthcare market was declared a strategic part of the bio-economy.
These developments are partly covered in social scientific discussions about 
the impact of the life sciences and the dynamics of health technology 
innovations at European level and scale. In addition to an extensive body of 
knowledge on agricultural biotechnology applications, some social scientific 
literature has focussed on more recent policy developments in the EU health 
domain. For example the rise of a European regulatory state has been 
described for pharmaceuticals (Abraham and Lewis 2000, 2002) while 
processes of Europeanisation have also been analysed for medical devices 
(Altenstetter 1996, 2004). Also the EU management of human genetic 
technologies has gained scholarly attention (Salter and Jones 2002) and more 
recently several studies have been published on the role of human embryonic 
stem cells in developing European policy (Salter 2005, 2006). My case study of 
tissue engineering regulation adds to the increasing understanding of health 
technology applications in multilevel governance. By drawing on 
understandings in the political economy of medicine, and analysing implications 
for conceptual discussion within science and technology studies (STS) about 
boundary work and regulatory science, this thesis has focused on elements of 
risk and regulation, and on the shaping of a regulatory regime in tissue 
engineering. The main set of findings can be summarised under general 
headings reflecting differentiated notions of risk; the reproduction of perceived 
risk, uncertainty and the translation from risk to regulation; negotiations over 
the boundaries between techno-science and socio-politics, including the role of 
moral arguments in EU regulatory policy; stakeholder participation in regulatory 
science; and finally the overall implications of these developments for 
reconfiguration of understandings in the social scientific and STS literature.
Below I revisit these main findings and outline the implications and value of my 
approach for fellow academics and policymakers wanting to understand the 
dynamics of novel health technologies at EU level.
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Differentiated notions of risk
Exemplified by developments in genetics and the creation of the human 
genome project, risk has become a key focus of attention, where the human 
body has been redefined as a field of risk (see also: Gabe 1995; Rose 2001). 
Risk has also entered political debate in the EU, and represents in many ways 
the much wider political and social concern about the governance of science in 
the EU (Borras 2003). Political discourse has centred on risks associated with 
new biomedical technologies, with various strategies developed to control risk. 
Here regulatory efforts were targeted at potential hazards while at the same 
time problems arose of lack of scientific knowledge about these new sciences 
and technologies.
An important starting notion that has informed my analysis in this context 
includes the notion of ‘risk’, which is operationalised in the following way.
First of all, a main concern for the conceptual use of the term ‘risk’ in my study 
relates to the understanding of risk perception as a socially constructed 
concept. My notion of risk departs from the politics of risk definition, based on 
the assumption that ‘whoever controls the definition of risk controls the rational 
solution to the problem at hand ’(Slovic 1999: 689). In tissue engineering there 
is no such thing as ‘the definition of risk’ though, as broad variability exists 
between different professional groups on how to frame risk issues, highlighting 
‘the contested nature of who is defining what as risk and how’ (Adam et al. 
2000: 4). These different frameworks of risk are important because they dictate 
which ‘solutions’ are constructed in the policy process, e.g. which risk 
management strategies are considered valuable and feasible, and what 
information is needed and useful in reaching a decision. It also has implications 
for the legitimacy of different viewpoints in the policy process. By analysing the 
key dimensions of the construction of risk in tissue engineering, and the 
different dimensions and values attached to variations in risk, risk framing is 
linked to policy implications. The construction of risk discourses is tied in with 
the expression of a technological, political or social acceptable solution. Thus 
the definition of risk is at the same time the definition of a solution.
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Second, and in contrast with many traditional approaches in risk analysis, my 
understanding of ‘risk’ is not limited to narrow techno-scientific parameters. A 
technical approach of risk does not take into account the complex and socio­
political nature of phenomena, including political dimensions (such as conflict or 
discrepancy over definition of what risks are and how they should be managed) 
or ethical concerns (including values in judgement of risk). By focusing on 
underlying values in risk assessment and risk decisions, the starting point of 
analysis is a concern with the perceiver of risk, rather than with risk as a 
phenomenon in itself (which, in technical terms, is usually expressed as 
probability in one way or another).
Moreover, in this thesis I have demonstrated the interrelations between 
conventional notions of risk -  often expressed in safety terms, ‘from the 
laboratory side of things’ - to the broader arena of innovation where also clinical 
and commercial concerns determine the perception of risk. By tying together 
these three distinct domains of laboratory, clinic and market practice I underline 
the significance of studying risk within a broader framework. This has 
implications for risk assessment and risk management studies of innovative 
technologies, as these tend to fail to take into account both the contingency 
and uncertainty around ‘the definition of risk’ and the differentiation in risk 
perceptions underlying these analyses.
The main research question addressed here concerns how and to what extent 
expert definitions of risk are articulated in tissue engineering R&D and in which 
ways they are framed and differentiated. My research has sought to unravel the 
dimensions of different types of risk as perceived by professional actors 
(scientists, clinicians and manufacturers) involved in the research and 
development stages of tissue engineering, thus representing a model of the 
early innovation process or front-end stage where products emerge from 
laboratory to clinic into the commercial cycle. Based on these accounts I 
developed a three-tier typology of risk around domains of laboratory, clinic and 
market, which I labelled technological, clinical and commercial risk. These 
different risk domains were described in chapters 4 to 6.
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Technological risk covers concerns related to the processing and 
manufacturing of human tissue and cells, and reflects an overall concern with 
safety (chapter 4). The first main set of technological risks are related to cell 
sourcing and handling, including disease transmission, contamination and 
infection. Disease transmission refers to the transmission of (infectious) 
diseases between humans (such as HIV and hepatitis), but also potential 
transgenic transfer and the introduction of novel human and animal viruses 
(zoonoses) into the human population. Contamination and infection of the 
tissues and cells can take place during the production and manufacturing 
process, and can include contamination of the source material.
Both disease transmission and infection are mentioned as dominant 
technological risks, especially, and initially, in relation to the use of donor 
material. Autologous applications, on the other hand, are seen as relatively 
safe and ‘risk-free’ and as such unproblematic from both a technological and 
patient perspective. But closer inspection of the cell culturing process reveals 
how autologous cell sources also inhibit a problematic frame, most notably by 
the inclusion of xenogeneic material.
A broad second category of safety concerns is related to the cell behaviour 
during the processing and manufacturing of tissue engineered constructs, and 
after implantation in the human body. This includes (immune) rejection by the 
body, but also problems with controlling the cell growth (unwanted cells, cell 
modification, uncontrolled cell proliferation and differentiation) to prevent 
tumour formation or other unwanted effects such as the ‘travelling’ of cells 
through the body to places where they can cause harm. Also the interplay 
between cells and their supporting materials, so-called cell-scaffold 
interactions, and bio-incompatibility are issues addressed under this heading. 
Furthermore there are concerns with the limited shelf-life of many of these 
products and both the quality and quantity of cells needed to be effective, e.g. 
to produce a sufficient amount of quality living cells for transplantation into the 
patient (cell viability). Other factors include toxicity of processing materials, 
such as growth factors and antibiotics added during the culturing process and 
to support the cells during transport, and problems with the sterility and final 
testing of the product.
310
Whereas technological risk is mainly concerned with the safety of tissue 
engineered products, clinical risk considers safety as part of a more complex 
and elaborate trajectory of performance testing, taking into account the efficacy 
of these products over a longer period of time. Clinical risk is about 
perceptions of risk related to clinical evidence available for these products 
(chapter 5). The main issues under this heading are the question of efficacy of 
tissue engineered applications (if they actually ‘work’), what clinical evidence is 
available and how to interpret this, and what tools are needed to evaluate the 
efficacy and safety of the technology on the long-term.
Chapter 5 started with the perceived lack of clinical evidence currently available 
for most advanced tissue engineered products that have entered the clinic. 
Clinical efficacy is relevant in the final stages of the innovation process, in 
getting marketing approval or reimbursement for products, but also earlier in 
the trajectory. Assessment of these products is problematic already in the pre- 
clinical stage, where new therapies are tested in the laboratory and in animal 
studies to determine their safety (and toxicology) before entering human trials. 
Especially the relevance of animal models has been questioned, because of 
the dependence of tissue engineering technology on the performance of cells 
and tissues in the human body. A case study of one particular advanced tissue 
engineering application, autologous chondrocyte implantation (ACI), illustrates 
many elements of the debate on efficacy and safety testing in this area. One of 
the main conclusions here, which also affects clinical practice and policy 
development, is that the existing models for assessing efficacy and safety -  
most notably the golden standard of the randomised controlled trial -  are not 
adequate to evaluate experimental therapies such as tissue engineering. 
Furthermore, and this connects to the third category in the risk typology, issues 
around clinical efficacy also translate into cost- and reimbursement trouble. The 
development costs for tissue engineered products are generally high. For 
example tissue engineered applications in wound care (for the treatment of 
diabetic ulcers or burns) have to compete with a variety of clinical alternatives, 
some of which have an established safety profile, and most of which are 
generally cheaper and/or easier in use. Thus in addition to safety and efficacy, 
cost-efficacy plays a more prominent role in the evaluation of this particular 
technology. Cost - rather than value for money, as advertised by many 
developers - becomes an ‘added’ stumbling block for the introduction of these
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products into the clinic and marketplace, but also in gaining long-term 
experience and gathering outcome data on clinical efficacy. Most notably, 
demonstration of efficacy is needed in some countries to get marketing 
approval for tissue engineered applications, depending on the regulatory 
framework, which puts pressure on developers to collect efficacy data and 
conduct cost-benefit studies. But marketing authorisation is not sufficient, and 
regulation is only a stepping stone to gaining reimbursement for these products 
by national insurance and healthcare providers. While regulatory initiatives can 
be set and negotiated at European level, the health insurance system in 
Europe is not standardised: Individual EU Member States have separate 
national arrangements for their respective health care systems, whether public 
or private, leading to a wide array of care and reimbursement options. To date, 
tissue engineered products are not generally reimbursed in any European 
country, mainly due to lack of cost-effectiveness data. Many of the tissue 
engineered products are still in early stages of development and the small 
biotech companies involved do not have the resources for large, long-term 
clinical trials to provide information on the cost-effectiveness of the treatment 
compared to conventional alternatives (EC 2004).
This brings us to commercial risk, which refers to concerns about the market 
and business climate for tissue engineering, and includes factors to do with 
cost and marketability of tissue engineered products (chapter 6). A main 
commercial risk is cost and cost effectiveness, to be understood as part of 
‘fourth hurdle’ strategies representing the increasing need for manufacturers to 
demonstrate the economic value of their product before they are able to obtain 
marketing approval and reimbursement. Lack of reimbursement is an economic 
risk for commercial developers, but the limited uptake by national health service 
systems has broader implications in the potential for social and health 
inequalities. While it seems like manufacturers are most affected by fourth 
hurdle policies, implications for patients include the limited availability of 
potentially beneficial technology. As such commercial risk affects both 
producers and consumers. These issues have a large impact on society and 
economy, and on how the bio-society and bio-economy deal with innovative 
technology.
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But commercial risk also has a broader connotation. These developments need 
to be placed in the context of an unstable and vulnerable commercial 
environment of predominantly small start-up biotech companies that do not 
have the means or expertise to successfully commercialise and launch 
products in a climate of fading investors’ confidence and lack of regulatory 
controls. This is especially pressing in the case of autologous applications, the 
main focus of R&D efforts by European developers, where issues around 
scaling up and a complicated competitive environment have led to 
disappointment over commercial potential and market performance. 
Furthermore these developments are taking place against a socio-political 
background of diminishing public confidence in biotech more general.
Especially in Europe concerns over controversial technologies such as GMOs 
and health scares such as BSE have led to a risk-aware (if not risk-averse) 
climate with increasing safety controls.
In chapters 4 to 6 it was demonstrated how different risk frames are defined 
and redefined by professional R&D groups in this domain in terms of quality 
and safety, therapeutic effectiveness and in relation to cost efficacy and 
marketability of products. Whereas these chapters discussed the three 
branches of the risk typology in relatively segregated format, in chapter 7 the 
risk perceptions across these different domains are reviewed in order to 
accommodate the constitution of different values attached to the risk objects 
and to elicit alternative dimensions in the perception and acceptability of risk. 
The biological components that become starting materials for tissue engineered 
products serve as powerful boundary objects in this respect. Thus I have 
interpreted the classifications of risk with the introduction of a ‘risk hierarchy’ 
and ‘risk balance’. The risk hierarchy is a reclassification of risk in terms of the 
particular source material used for tissue engineered constructs. More specific, 
autologous applications are generally considered ‘less risky’ than products 
based on allogeneic material. As demonstrated though, this perception 
becomes problematic with the inclusion of xenogeneic material in the cell 
culturing and manufacturing process for both the autologous and allogeneic 
engineering routes. Furthermore I have argued how the particular cell source 
determines not only scientific endeavours but also drives clinical concerns and 
commercial strategies. It is here that the risk hierarchy becomes a more
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dynamic model, where risk in techno-scientific terms takes on a different 
meaning and value in clinical and commercial domains. Furthermore, risks 
related to particular cell sources have led to different regulatory scenarios, 
where initially a distinction was made between autologous and allogeneic cell 
sources in regulatory controls, while subsequently this distinction was 
abandoned. In order words the ambiguity in this particular risk frame resounds 
in the regulatory debate and policy shaping around tissue engineering.
But in addition to risk variability per domain, interviewees took into account the 
population affected and the short versus long-term effects in both perceived 
risks and benefits of these applications, underlining the importance of the levels 
of aggregation and the time-scale involved. A second dimension of risk 
described in chapter 7 is what I have called the ‘risk balance’. The risk balance 
is about acceptability of risk, where perceived risks of tissue engineering are 
differentiated into levels and degrees of risk for particular applications, subsets 
of populations, and the envisaged effects over time. The risk balance thus 
takes into account the specific therapeutic purpose of the tissue engineering 
application (over a spectrum from life saving to merely cosmetic) across stages 
of the innovation process, and is concerned with both risks and benefits of the 
technology - and the trade-off between the two in determining acceptability of 
risk. It has been argued that tissue engineering technology will always imply a 
certain level of ‘residual risk’ as demands for a zero risk society are considered 
unrealistic. But this residual risk is not a generic category, as the risk balance 
also looks at the population at risk and the final risk-receiver, where 
acceptability is dependant on whether potentially harmful effects are limited to 
individuals or the society as a whole (e.g. individual versus collective risk) and 
in how far these risk are extended over time (inter-generational risk). Thus also 
the risk balance is a socially constructed notion.
The content of the balance of risk and the hierarchy of risk provide the context 
for risk management approaches, making the transition to the social world of 
regulation as discussed in subsequent chapters. But by making the transition 
from risk assessment to risk management, one could argue that some 
consensus is needed on the definition of risk, as this dictates policy solutions to 
risk-based problems. In other words, some negotiated common framework was
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to be articulated, in which interested individuals and institutions adopt a similar 
or at least compatible conceptualisation of the risk issue in question. As such, 
tissue engineering is typically treated as a generic technology for regulatory 
purposes. But many interviewees have argued how a specific and alternative 
type of risk assessment is needed, to accommodate both the developing 
character of the technology and the associated (unknown) risks, with its diverse 
current and future applications.
A risk-based approach in tissue engineering is problematic for policy purposes 
given the large heterogeneity of applications currently on the market and in 
experimental stages of development. Regulatory policy has to balance between 
covering the current product portfolio, of applications ‘out there’ at this moment 
in time, and of envisaged products potentially entering the market in the near 
future. Risk assessments require looking at the range of future options, and the 
potential benefits and risks of each. Regulation has to be able to incorporate 
the diverse and innovative nature of products, and be flexible enough to adapt 
to technological progress to prevent itself from running out of date. As a 
developing innovation, tissue engineering is an interesting case for the conflict 
between the level of certainty that industry needs in terms of consistent rules 
and predictable evaluation, while at the same time flexibility is needed in the 
evaluation of safety and efficacy of these products, given their complexity and 
broad range of applications (Bartlett Foote 2002). Therefore one particular 
concern in the development of a regulatory framework is the difficulty of 
foreseeing the consequences of a technology during early stages of 
development, and designing control mechanisms for when the potential harmful 
consequences of the technological innovation become visible for society. This 
is furthermore complicated by the fact that significant risks might develop that 
have not been seen in healthcare before. Here notions of uncertainty and 
complexity pose difficulties to regulators trying to cover future outcomes of 
innovative therapies.
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The reproduction of perceived risk, notions of uncertainty and the 
‘translation’ from risk to regulation
An underlying perspective in the evaluation of perceptions of risk in tissue 
engineering concerns the unknown character of many of these risks. With 
progressing innovation and change in Western society, new forms of 
uncertainty are created, and with them uncertain risks (Nowotny et al. 2001). 
While it has been demonstrated that many interviewees express views about 
the ability of controlling risk, for example via the implementation of quality 
control systems and safety standards in laboratories and manufacturing units, 
tissue engineering is an example par excellence of a technology with many 
‘unknown unknowns’. Uncertain risks spring from the inherent unpredictability 
due to complexity.
Many of these uncertain risks are of a technological nature, where it is 
unknown what effects and potential harm can be expected from, for example, 
the use of donor cells in terms of disease transfer. Interviewees have stressed 
how the behaviour of living cells in the body and of biological materials in 
general are difficult to estimate. But this technological uncertainty also 
constitutes socio-political and institutional ambivalence.
Tissue engineering technology is indicative of the emergence of a new 
discourse of both scientific and political uncertainty. Political and institutional 
strategies in this context have focused on risk as dominant discourse, where 
expert knowledge and scientific rationality would overcome the various 
challenges of the technology and its diverse applications in terms of safety and 
socio-political controversy. At the same time a political and regulatory discourse 
has arisen which had to deal with ethical ambivalence and moral dilemmas 
created by tissue engineering technology. The notion of risk was for a long time 
based on probabilities and associated with rational decisions. This study has 
underlined the social constructive character and ‘plural rationalities’ of risk, 
where different actors draw overlapping but also competing boundaries around 
the diverse risk domains and around what is considered ‘regulatable’. 
Furthermore the notion of uncertain risks has drawn attention to the ‘puzzling 
lack of sureness’ that has become dominant in so many contemporary techno-
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scientific domains. But tissue engineering is not just a case of scientific 
uncertainty which complicates regulatory policymaking; it also shows overlap 
with political and, arguably, social uneasiness on how to go about assessing 
this novel technology. Where uncertainty has been described as arising from a 
situation of incomplete scientific information, which has constituted 
precautionary approaches in diverse (environmental) policy domains, socio­
political uncertainty was witnessed in the analysis of the regulatory debate on 
tissue engineering. This uncertainty was driven by different boundary drawing 
exercises around moral dilemmas regarding cell sources; a situation which was 
‘solved’ in the case of the SANCO Directive by recourse to a legal framing of 
ethical concerns around embryonic stem cells via the subsidiarity approach. 
Uncertainty as such relates to boundary drawing in domains of risk, although it 
can be argued that risk and uncertainty can be considered separate 
dimensions in a spectrum, with the notion of uncertain risk as more appropriate 
depiction in the case of tissue engineering. This uncertainty relates to science 
and technology, and extends to the political and social (Gottweis 2005).
The question of dealing with complexity and uncertain risk at EU level is 
pervasive. The precautionary principle has been used in this respect as one 
pragmatic but highly criticised approach in biotech governance of several 
agricultural applications. The case of tissue engineering added an additional -  
and equally controversial -  solution by means of the comitology system, which 
has gained considerably less scholarly attention in the social scientific 
literature. The management of uncertainty in EU policy as such has been 
problematised broadly, but the discussion about this uncertainty takes place far 
away from the EU stage. The notion of uncertain risk as described in this thesis 
- reflecting concerns by scientific, clinical and commercial stakeholders alike -  
has not entered the policymaking circles and public debate about risk 
management approaches for tissue engineering applications, which is a missed 
opportunity in the context of future development of highly innovative but 
contested health technologies.
But pragmatic approaches provide only part of the solution. An equally strong 
interpretation informing my analysis is the problematic nature of EU 
governance and the questionability of the very notion of risk regulation.
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First of all, moving from perceptions of risk to risk regulation implies a different 
concept and scope, and involves a different set of actors. Risks are redefined 
and attributed a different value when entering the policy domain. Typically, risks 
are characterised in terms of probability, as the possibility of unwanted or 
adverse effects occurring. Deeply rooted in this concept of risk is the 
understanding of a causal relationship between action and effect, and the need 
and indeed ability to avoid or modify undesirable outcomes, which 
discriminates risk from danger (Vos 1999). Risk is thus both a descriptive and 
normative concept. Furthermore, risks can not be separated from the contexts 
in which they occur. Thus rather than treating it as an almost ‘stand alone’ or 
independent concept, the meaning of risk takes a different form and shape in a 
regulatory context, where perceptions of risk have to be translated into 
systematic means of risk assessment for regulatory purposes. Most notably, 
when risk forms the basis of regulation the notion of acceptable risk is 
becoming increasingly important. This is also where a new set of actors comes 
in, as regulatory risk is the domain of regulators, policy advisors and experts. 
These actors are faced with particular difficulties in interpreting risk and 
determining the level of acceptable risk -  not the least because of ambiguity 
about the definition of acceptable risk.
Regulation, then, is often understood as a fundamentally political-economic 
concept, interpreted as a way in which governments attempt to manage the 
tension between protecting the public and allowing producers to trade and 
make their products profitable. My research has discussed regulation from a 
multilevel governance perspective, where tensions became visible between 
different institutional actors interacting in a highly complex environment; the 
socio-political context (‘bio-politics’) and the strong economic undercurrent 
have been analysed in this respect.
These developments are set in a risk society (Beck 1992) where risks have 
become more global, unknowable in advance and collective in their incidence. 
Perceptions of increasing risk have called for more elaborate regulation to 
maximise safety and protect consumers and citizens against potentially risky 
substances. The globalised character of increasingly uncertain risks also
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means that nation states are no longer perceived to be the best risk managers 
(Irwin and Michael 2003).
With the increased interference in health and safety regulation, EU institutions 
are faced with conducting risk assessment and risk management tasks that 
were previously decided upon in the national context. This poses several 
regulatory difficulties, most notably in the relationship with individual Member 
States. One such issue concerns the impact of regulation in the light of the 
transfer of powers from national to European level, and the EU competence in 
dealing with risk and safety of innovative technologies. This includes legal 
questions about rule implementation and highlights most notably the principles 
of subsidiarity and proportionality, which have been particularly influential in 
tissue engineering regulation.
The risk society has created a regulatory society, where regulatory action 
involves the assessment of risks associated with specific substances or 
products and based on this are regulatory decisions on how to manage these 
risks. While adopting a framework of risk as the basis for regulatory action has 
remained largely unquestioned, the type of risk involved in these provisions has 
stirred debate (Newell 2002a, 2002b). Risk is not a generic category, and some 
have argued that the selection of particular risk issues reflects the willingness 
of the state to accept responsibility for certain problems (Levidow et al. 1996). 
The level of acceptable risk forms a typical basis for regulatory action, but it 
also constitutes a very difficult notion to translate into policy because of the 
social constructive and dynamic character of what is perceived as acceptable 
risk at one point in time and space. Thus acceptable risk is both a political and 
regulatory tool, both a scientific concept and a policy objective, belonging to the 
domains of both risk assessment and risk management. The acceptability of 
risk then becomes a regulatory instrument in determining which risks society 
can take on, and which as such implicitly harbours a ranking of norms and 
values (Vos 1999). In this way, risks cannot be isolated from social and political 
questions about acceptable levels of risk and uncertainty.
In this thesis I have discussed how the regulation of risk, especially in the 
health and safety domain, encompasses estimations of both a scientific and
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social value, both of which are subject to ongoing change and adaptation. I 
have also questioned the conventional approaches in risk analysis, pleading for 
a rethinking of existing models and assumptions in this field based on my tissue 
engineering case study.
First of all, risk as related to modern technologies needs to consider the 
complexity, uncertainty and ambiguity inherent in the interaction of modern 
technology, society and the environment. Yet many conventional risk 
assessment strategies are ill-equipped to take into account these diverse 
criteria in the face of uncertainty and indeterminacy, as they are usually based 
on the assessment of a limited number of criteria where technical assessments 
are seen to be sufficient (Krimsky and Golding 1992). In other words, more 
complex types of risk assessment are required (Krimsky 2000). Further, in this 
context the need has been expressed for an extension of technocratic risk 
assessment to encompass the broader societal concerns raised by the far- 
reaching effects of technological risk and uncertainty (Scoones 2001). Society 
requires a ‘broader’ socio-political and economic assessment of the risk of its 
technologies.
A second set of understandings that my case study adds to existing literature 
relates to the assumed linear relation between risk and regulation. Many 
theories on risk regulation follow a science-based approach. Also 
interpretations that question the politicised nature of risk regulation, and/or the 
functional distinction between risk assessment and risk management (as many 
‘regulatory science’ theorists claim), are based on the assumption of a linear 
relation between risk and regulation. In this context, the ‘regulatory regime’ 
concept is too reductionist and one-dimensional. It fails to enable an 
understanding of the more complex dynamics of tissue engineering technology. 
More in particular, I argue in this thesis that the identification of risks does not 
lead to straightforward solutions in the regulatory domain. My study has 
demonstrated the problematic nature of this assumption by focusing on risk 
domains as constructed by R&D actors, while subsequently analysing the 
regulatory ‘transfer’. Here it becomes clear that many risks are not ‘regulatable’. 
Put simply: on the way from risk to regulatory policy certain risks get lost in 
translation, thereby leaving behind a ‘risk gap’. Resembling notions of a
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regulatory lag, there is a gap between the expression of technological, clinical 
and commercial risks and a regulatory solution. I make this argument more 
explicit by briefly rehearsing the developments around the two regulatory 
initiatives analysed in this research: the SANCO Directive and Enterprise 
Regulation.
The objective of the SANCO Directive is to cover quality and safety aspects of 
human tissues and cells, thereby taking technological risk as the focal point of 
departure. The Enterprise Regulation covers the marketing of products, but not 
the commercial risks associated with their therapeutic use. While introducing 
opportunities for commercialisation of products in the single European market, 
the main commercial risk concerns of cost-effective ness and reimbursement 
are excluded from the EU policy domain. Decisions on the organisation of 
healthcare systems are left to Member State level in accordance with the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. Furthermore, in the latest proposal 
for a Regulation by DG Enterprise, decisions on the criteria for clinical efficacy 
(in this study described under clinical risk) were referred to comitology. The 
implications of this construction are as yet unknown.
These examples imply that technological risk is to some extent addressed in 
the EU regulatory domain. However, EU policy does not tackle the particular 
boundary objects within this domain (the different biological materials), in part 
because it does not disaggregate the risk hierarchy. An early proposal for the 
Enterprise Regulation discussed the possibility of a two-tier approach for 
autologous and allogeneic cell sources, based on the perceived diverging 
levels of risk. This proposal was fiercely criticised by stakeholders on the basis 
of its inconsistency. For reasons of ‘regulatability’ this two-tier model was 
abandoned in favour of an ‘all cell sources count’ approach. Therefore, 
limitations exist in translating ‘R&D risks’ into regulatory policy.
To get to grips with these developments I used the notion of ‘regulatable risk’ 
in this thesis, arguing that for regulators and policymakers risks have to be 
manageable and ‘regulatable’ in order to enter the policy domain. I demonstrate 
how particular risk frames and definitions are adopted for inclusion in policy and 
practice, while others are neglected or downplayed as not being suitable for
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control and management. In this way the transition - and often taken for 
granted fluent cause or linear logic - from risk assessment to risk management 
is redefined. I consider this in terms of boundary drawing and the articulation of 
particular powerful or dominant risk discourses, where certain arguments are 
fore grounded and others ‘boxed out’ in favour of what is perceived to be 
belonging to the ‘regulatable’ domain. The notion of political culture is invasive 
in this context, where I used the case of tissue engineering as example of the 
evolution of a regulatory object through several passages.
Negotiated boundaries between techno-science and socio-politics, and 
the role of moral arguments in EU regulatory policymaking
My concern with perceptions of risk can be understood as an early 
manifestation, where I argue that a broader conceptual approach towards ‘risk’ 
is needed to encompass political implications and the mobilisation of policy 
networks in understanding dynamics between risk and regulation.
In the proclaimed ‘risk society’, and following from this my suggested entrance 
of the ‘regulatory society’, technological risks have become more difficult to 
assess. To this effect calls were made for broader types of risk assessment, to 
encompass the broader societal concerns raised by the far-reaching effects of 
technological risk and uncertainty. More participative styles of governance 
would be needed, where expert knowledge and social judgements go hand in 
hand. In this research I have outlined how technological and ethical frames are 
part of the same package of arrangements. In this section I recapitulate the 
main developments in relation to the role of ethical imperatives.
An important notion addressed in this thesis concerns the inclusion of (and 
implications of dealing with) socio-political and ethical concerns related to 
tissue engineering technology. Risk is intrinsically connected to moral concerns 
of tissue engineering technology, as it incorporates diverging views about 
acceptability and the distribution of risk over different levels; it raises questions 
about accountability and responsibility and about what is justifiable. Especially 
in the face of uncertainty about implications and long term risks and safety, 
ethical considerations around tissue engineering technology are paramount.
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Interestingly though, as made explicit in chapter 7, only a small but narrowly 
defined selection of issues featured in interviewees’ accounts. When asked 
about potential ethical concerns around use or implications of tissue 
engineering technology, the majority of core R&D constituencies expresses 
how in their view tissue engineering largely stays clear from ethical or moral 
dilemmas. Some interviewees, mostly clinicians, have discussed the 
problematic nature of clinical trial design and gaining proper informed consent. 
Others have referred to possible religious concerns, but this was phrased in 
relation to xenotransplants rather than the inclusion of animal derived material 
in tissue engineered applications. There is one large domain though over which 
interviewees do worry: the use of human embryonic stem cells in (future) tissue 
engineered applications. Although scientifically largely uncontroversial, 
according to these interviewees, the impact of embryonic stem cells therapies 
in the public eyes is foregrounded as shared concern. These considerations 
provide the backdrop for interpreting the shaping of EU regulatory 
policymaking, where the value of these particular concerns has followed 
different tracks.
Socio-political and ethical issues are relevant in the face of policy shaping, 
where the main concern is with delivering implementable solutions to narrowly 
defined science-based problems (judicial default mode). Also in tissue 
engineering a technical rather than ethical framework is called upon in attempts 
to reduce uncertainty and complexity in this domain, although large variability 
exists in the ways in which ‘ethics induced’ ambiguity is managed institutionally 
across the different regulatory initiatives. Thus attempts are undertaken to 
exclude ethical concerns from ‘science-based’ regulation. But as also illustrated 
in this research, these debates represent a complex mix of arguments where 
technical and ethical considerations of risk and safety are intimately connected. 
This research departs from the assumption that ethical considerations cannot 
be segregated from techno-scientific assessments for regulatory purposes, 
thus questioning the current institutional set-up of tissue engineering regulation 
in the EU.
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This is not a straightforward assumption though. As has also been 
demonstrated for other innovative technologies (see for example: Levidow and 
Carr 1997; Salter and Jones 2002b), the regulatory process of tissue 
engineering swings between technical and social concerns. This development 
is also echoed in the institutional management of risk, where technical risk 
assessment is treated as a separate task from socio-economic or ethical 
analyses. By separating these dimensions, the role of the independent and 
objective expert advice becomes more prominent.
Of conceptual relevance in this respect is the point that ethical concerns can be 
considered as transgressing boundaries of risk domains, while also shaping the 
regulatory domain. Moral issues are not fixed but fluid and hybrid, not static but 
permeable; they remain open for negotiation and reconsideration, and as such 
for continuous boundary drawing. In this situation it is particularly difficult to 
achieve closure, and ethical arguments are powerful boundary objects in 
regulatory policy shaping, where organised interests are gathered around 
specific ethical objections and legal possibilities. This is accomplished by 
including or excluding particular items and selective agenda-setting, thus 
entering the politicised domain of risk regulation of tissue engineering in the EU 
and of drawing boundaries around the social and political acceptability of the 
technology.
In contrast to the limited awareness of R&D actors, during the policy shaping 
process many concerns have been expressed over the ethical and health 
implications of the use of human tissues and cells, and of its manufactured 
offspring. In the debate on the SANCO Directive we have seen the continuous 
boundary-work over exploring the margins of what is legally possible in terms of 
incorporating ethical concerns in EU regulation. This has been shown to be an 
elaborate and complicated affair, which significantly shaped the content and 
progress of the Directive -  with risks of stalling in the final stages in Parliament.
A trading zone was created in which cultural values have to compete with a 
moral economy in which ‘ethics’ has become subject to trade in exchange for 
political consensus. Reflecting on this course of events, I have argued how 
ethics has become a ‘political toy’ that was tossed from one corner to the other.
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The EU trading zone for ethical considerations was enlarged in an attempt to 
unite (national represented) moral concerns with socio-political considerations 
and pragmatic policymaking, resembling tensions between cultural biopolitics 
and the moral bio-economy.
The main ethical concerns were over the use of embryonic stem cells (ESCs) 
and of therapeutic cloning techniques in order to retrieve these cells, while 
during the comitology procedure also reproductive cells stirred debate. It can 
be argued that one reason for the delay of this Directive was exactly over these 
cells sources, as the Parliament tried to use the Directive as a tool to prohibit 
embryonic stem cell research and therapeutic cloning (Liddell and Wallace 
2005). When these provisions were discarded, because the Commission felt it 
was not competent to legislate upon ethical matters, the focus of attention in 
the Parliament shifted towards making sure that at least the Directive would 
include principles of voluntary unpaid donation. This was another ethically 
fuelled issue, where again matters of safety had to prevail over ethical 
considerations. This time the Parliament ‘won’, as the final Directive stipulates 
how donors should not be paid (although some room was left to Member States 
to decide upon ‘compensation’ for donation), but this victory was part of a 
package deal between Parliament and Council in order to move the much 
needed Directive forward, rather than stalling the legislation and going into a 
conciliation procedure.
Thus the main ethical issues during the SANCO debate concerned the 
inclusion or exclusion of specific cell sources, and the nature of donation. 
Interestingly, one of the areas not discussed in any length concerns the role of 
xenogeneic material as another potentially contested cell source. While 
xenotransplantation was mentioned in the initial proposal for the Directive, no 
reference was made to so called non-viable animal sources, such as the bovine 
serum used during cell culturing. Nor were these animal-derived substances 
put on the agenda at any point during the debate. A similar silence occurred 
over genetically modified tissues or cells, where the Commission felt it was too 
early to consider this material, or the techniques used to engineer particular cell 
sources, as a realistic clinical option that should be addressed at this stage. In 
other words, while ESCs and therapeutic cloning, and to some extent
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reproductive cells, were at centre stage during the debate, other potentially 
controversial cell sources and techniques did not enter the discussion at all. 
That is, so far. In the proposal building stages of the Enterprise Regulation, 
analysed in chapter 10, the focus of attention changes slightly, where in 
addition to embryonic material also xenogeneic and other cell sources enter the 
debate.
Furthermore, in this context I have addressed the role and position of ethical 
advisory bodies. The most important of these is the European Group on Ethics 
in Science and New Technologies (EGE), an influential specialist advisory body 
reporting directly to the President of the European Commission. This group has 
issued several opinions with relevance to tissue engineering. Most notably, the 
EGE gave the creation of tissue engineering regulation a significant push by 
stating in their 1998 expert Opinion that there was an ‘urgent need to regulate 
the conditions under which human tissues circulate within the European 
Market’ (EGE 1998). In its Opinion on ethical aspects of tissue banking the 
EGE addressed a range of ethical considerations, including commercialisation 
and the need to keep the tissue domain under control of public health 
institutions and non profit-making organisations. This Opinion was influential in 
initiating and to some extent steering the policy debate. However, the EGE’s 
principle on the non-profit character of tissue establishments was controversial, 
and the Commission diverged from this advice in drafting the SANCO Directive. 
This only happened after prolonged lobby-work by industrial players wanting to 
establish a level playing field with tissue banks. Furthermore, the most specific 
Opinion from the EGE came after the final SANCO Directive was published: a 
report on the ethical aspects of human tissue engineering (EGE 2004). While 
this Opinion specifically focused on tissue engineering technologies, it was 
rather exotic. For example the use of animal cells was not addressed, nor any 
social impacts of the technology on patient access or availability of products.
On the other hand this EGE Opinion did emphasise areas of potential future 
concern, such as patentability of starting materials for tissue engineered 
products. So far this issue has not been taken up in either of the two legislative 
initiatives. Given EGE’s mandate as the official representative of bioethical 
values at EU level, and aim to take on the role of guardian of the civil rights 
society in expressing EU citizen’s concerns (see also: Salter and Jones 2002a),
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perhaps this is more indicative of the technocratic stance of the Commission in 
relation to these issues than reflecting lack of public concern.
I have considered these developments in the context of a shuffle from bio­
society to bio-economy. The foregrounding of ethical issues and social impact 
of tissue engineering technology could indicate a silent move towards notions 
of the bio-society. The debate in Parliament over ethical concerns reflects 
varying democratic positions in Member States, which is problematic at EU 
level. This points towards an underlying notion; the inability of the EU to deal 
with the impact of contested technologies. Regulating ethics at this level has 
proved difficult and is bound by legal constraints as formulated in Treaties. As 
such, the EU as a European regulatory state (Majone 1994) is not a state of 
European values. This threatens the bio-society, where different stances 
towards the desirability and impact of tissue engineering result in boxing out 
these concerns altogether. I demonstrated this point by analysing the debate 
on ESCs and the incorporation of ‘less controversial’ ethical concerns around 
donation into the final version of the SANCO Directive. I discussed how ‘ethics’ 
have become part of a significant trading zone in the EU regulatory cycle, 
where cultural values and (national) norms compete with economic imperatives 
and other represented interests. As such, this episode of the regulatory cycle 
resembles biotechnological developments that have been described in terms of 
‘cultural biopolitics’ in parallel to ‘moral economies’ (Salter 2006). In the new 
global knowledge economy of tissue engineering dynamic discourses of 
cultural values about the desirability of techno-scientific innovations are 
accompanied by a moral economy in which these values can be traded and 
exchanged. As such, the trading of values facilitates negotiation and the 
achievement of a political compromise.
As a conclusion in this context I have set out the limitations of ‘regulating ethics’ 
at EU level in my particular case study of tissue engineering. In the light of the 
proclaimed need to also take normative, political and ethical considerations into 
account when deciding on the social acceptability of risks, it has been proven 
impossible to define uniform decisions that are acceptable within the whole 
Community. Given the diverging positions of Member States on the 
authorisation or prohibition of embryonic cell sources, consensus at EU level,
327
and thereby the possibility for governance, is lacking. The EU has to balance 
here between universal European-wide agreed criteria and national concerns. 
Values are generally locally produced and maintained, and the European 
regulatory state is not equipped, nor mandated, to manage this diversity and 
interfere with decisions at this level. Encompassing ethics is problematic in the 
absence of a ‘European moral state’. Regulating ethics at an EU level, I have 
argued, is a socio-political oxymoron.
These findings can be extrapolated to other settings, as tissue engineering is 
but one example of a contested innovative technology entering the European 
stage. The problematic notion of moral arguments and European values has 
been addressed in relation to other technologies, most notably in relation to 
human embryonic stem cells (Salter 2005, 2006) and genetically modified 
crops (Welsh 2005). In the context of the latter, it is argued that the biotech 
revolution challenges established ethical systems and principles. My analysis 
adds to this discussion by pointing out the problematic nature of ‘regulating 
ethics’ in a multilevel governance environment, where the political economy of 
tissue engineering science has important implications for continued and future 
applications. Some have argued in this respect that the boundaries between 
politics and science are less well defined than assumed, whilst the 
science/commerce boundary becomes increasingly important (Welsh et al 
2005). Analysing how this market context became a primary concern in my 
study brings an additional dynamic into existing understandings in the social 
scientific literature that have mostly focused on the relation between science 
and politics, thereby downplaying the problematic consequences of the 
relationships between neo-liberal capitalism and science.
Thus this thesis analysed the strong economic imperative underlying these 
developments and the mechanisms of a neo-liberal market in an increasingly 
global setting. In this context regulation is only a partial solution, where for 
commercial developers product reimbursement is the main concern. But also 
described in this thesis is the vulnerability of an upcoming industry in the 
context of fourth hurdle policies, which so far has failed to market profitable 
products. As such, technologies spill across fields and markets. I have 
discussed several policy implications in this context, such as the quest for new
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business models (based on value for money rather than cost, a desire mostly 
expressed by commercial developers). Related to this are the need for novel 
methods to evaluate clinical efficacy and the issue of access to potentially 
beneficial but safe and acceptable technological innovations. In terms of safety 
considerations, one element is worth reiterating here for its far reaching 
implications for the management of technological risk. This concerns the 
distributive character of risk in relation to the acceptability of tissue engineered 
applications, and the question of who bears responsibility for controlling these 
risks. This relates in particular to the role of ‘the state’ vis-a-vis other actors 
involved in regulatory decision making and control. The case of tissue 
engineering has demonstrated that ‘the state’ (in the multilevel governance 
notion also including the European representation of the nation-state) only 
takes partial responsibility for the risks associated with tissue engineered 
products. Furthermore the control mechanisms currently being developed are 
not up to standard to accommodate the diversity in uncertain risks associated 
with this technology, nor do they reflect the potential level and scale of these 
risks. This became most explicit in the way in which the Commission tried to 
manage concerns around the use of xenogeneic material in tissue engineered 
applications.
As demonstrated in chapter 10, the boundaries around the definition and scope 
of tissue engineering were gradually expanded, where the final Commission 
proposal considers animal cells part of tissue engineering - and hence of the 
scope of the legislation and legal remit of Community action. What did not 
change though were the risk management requirements as set out in the 
proposal. These describe long-term patient monitoring and criteria for 
traceability of donors, products and starting materials on which these products 
are based. But it is well recognised that the use of xenogeneic material does 
not only pose risks to the individual patient but to society at large by the 
potential for disease transmission. The proposal does not mention any impacts 
on the environment or for public health at large (forms of collective risk), 
effectively presenting tissue engineering as medical technology which applies 
to individual patients. As discussed, this notion becomes problematic when 
tissue engineered products contain animal material; lifting tissue engineering 
from the medical domain into an environmental context presumes different
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requirements for risk management and has implications for the ways in which 
new medical technologies are evaluated (Welsh and Evans 1999).
One of the implications of dealing with infectious risk to the public, is that the 
acceptability of risk has to be determined via a public mechanism, rather than 
on an individual patient basis. The classical model for informed consent, which 
is currently based on individual consent for medical interventions, needs to 
encompass third parties that could be affected. It also requires monitoring and 
surveillance of not just individual patients but also their close contacts, which 
raises moral issues about the processes of informed consent (most notably the 
option to ‘drop out’ at any point in time) and medical confidentiality (Vanderpool 
2002). In addition, this will extend the individual life span, as this type of risk is 
not a one-off event, thus creating intergenerational risk and effects over time. In 
terms of risk management and regulation this means that iterative strategies 
have to be developed, also to control effects of cross-species mutations and 
the introduction of new infectious diseases in the human population over time 
(Bach et al. 2002). Thus the focus of decision-making and regulatory policy 
changes alongside the shift from individual to collective risk. Lack of 
acknowledgement of this issue in current regulatory efforts is highly problematic 
and should be addressed in future evaluations.
Stakeholder participation in regulatory science
An underlying conceptual concern in this thesis encompasses a political 
analysis of who is involved in regulatory decision making, and what this means 
for representation of interests in relation to broader concerns that enter the 
debate on tissue engineering regulation. This relates to the role of socio­
political and ethical arguments vis-a-vis technical concerns in regulatory 
policymaking, but more specific to the configuration of actors involved in this 
exercise. Focusing on participants in regulatory decision-making gives insight 
into the ways in which different subjects are being prioritised in terms of risk 
and safety, where underlying value systems are made explicit and where 
diverse institutional tensions exist between these different actors and what they 
represent. These tensions occurred for example amongst institutional players
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and professional stakeholders, between technical and ethical values they 
represent, in commercial and public health objectives, and last but not least 
between risk perceptions and what is considered as belonging to the 
regulatable domain.
I have studied stakeholder participation in reference to the gradual broadening 
of the scope of legislation. Two interrelated trends are visible here: one from 
regulating traditional tissue banking activities to also include manufactured 
products based on human tissues and cells, while the other focuses on the 
relation between the SANCO Directive on quality and safety and the new 
Regulation that was being developed around the same time by DG Enterprise, 
and which covers the marketing of these products. These trends imply a shift in 
the involvement of different stakeholder groups in the policy shaping process. 
This had a direct influence on ‘opening up’ a Directive that was originally 
developed to just accommodate traditional tissues and cells.
During the development of the SANCO Directive conflicts of interests were 
most visible between actors in traditional tissue banking culture, which has 
typically been associated with local and hospital based practices on a national 
level, versus commercial developers in an increasingly multinational tissue 
engineering sector. This can be considered in the light of a growing regulatory 
reach (Welsh and Evans 1999) and stronger move towards Europeanisation of 
tissue and cell regulation, where the SANCO Directive represents the shift from 
local production to commercialisation on trans-national scale. Also it underlines 
the tensions between public health and competitiveness agendas. This is 
furthermore complicated by internal politics and bureaucratic competition within 
the Commission, which has also shaped the scope and means of the SANCO 
Directive.
In the chapters on regulation (9 and 10) I described how industrial 
representatives successfully lobbied for a ‘level playing field’ with other parties 
in the tissue domain, thereby widening the scope of the Directive from 
traditional tissue banking activities to also allow other institutions in 
procurement activities. This was important for companies in order to directly 
access their starting materials for product manufacturing. With this the tissue
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banking monopoly was broken down. The industry involvement also had other 
implications, as it opened up discussion about ‘tissue banking values’ over the 
nature of donation, which had always been linked to arguments of non-profit. 
This also explains the discussions in Parliament over ethical considerations, as 
these were mostly based on perspectives of public-health protection and 
patient safety -  the very aim and legal basis of the SANCO Directive. These 
traditional values were called into question by the arrival of profit-seeking 
actors. At the same time, it was during these debates that conflicting values 
between non-profit and commercial players were extrapolated. In addition also 
institutional conflict within the Commission affected the course of events with 
the SANCO Directive, and its relation with the Enterprise regulation.
Two critical developments should be noted here that form the analytical 
backdrop for understanding the institutional tensions between these players. 
One refers to the role of the European Commission vis-a-vis the European 
Parliament. As has been analysed before in relation to human genetics (see 
Salter & Jones 2002), the stance of the European Parliament has consistently 
been more sceptical towards new technological developments, reflected in its 
approach to regulatory decision-making. A second institutional and political 
context is provided by neighbouring policy areas at EU level, and more specific 
the EU’s research funding programmes. The debate on funding research on 
human embryonic stem cells under Framework Programme 6 for example (see 
for more on this Salter 2005b, 2006) is of paramount importance in reflecting on 
the tissue engineering case in the broader policy context. Here bio-economic 
parameters come to the fore again. As has been argued, the EU’s struggle over 
the future of contested therapies in regenerative medicine, including tissue 
engineering and stem cell science, can be considered part of a global contest 
for national and EU advantage. As such a wedge is created between ambitions 
of science and cultural values where the operation of biopower is targeted at 
the control of the values that permit or proscribe the development of health 
technologies.
Thus the participants in regulatory science are involved in continuous boundary 
drawing between different value and belief systems (such as public health and 
commercial concerns — tissue banking and industry). Boundaries are
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constructed around the regulatory world itself, thereby excluding certain risks, 
while also within the regulatory domain boundary demarcation takes place in 
negotiating the scope of the legislation. In the SANCO Directive this is 
witnessed in attempts to establish fixed boundaries around the legal remits of 
the EU in regulating tissues and cells, thereby ruling out ethical concerns. In 
the Enterprise Regulation an opposite trend is visible. Here the scope of the 
legislation is not narrowed down to purely ‘technical’ matters (versus socio­
political and ethical stances) but are technical definitions of the technology 
extended in order to accommodate more recent innovation, including tissue 
engineered products based on animal cells. Thereby the legislative scope is 
widened to allow potentially controversial cell sources entering the European 
market.
Implications for the reconfiguration of understandings in the social 
scientific and STS literature
Overall, my case study of tissue engineering regulation by and in the EU adds 
to an understanding of the limitations of the institutional governance of risk and 
the complexity in managing moral dilemmas at this level. As such the bio­
society has to look for alternative models in order to become a reality.
On a policy level I have outlined the need for alternative models in the 
assessment and management of risk, for new means of clinical evaluation, for 
informed consent at collective scale and the voiced desire for business models 
that reflect the innovative character of tissue engineering technologies. Also 
diversity and uncertainty in risk regulation have been critically reviewed, where 
the relevance was expressed of an integrated approach in styles of European 
governance to include social and ethical considerations alongside techno- 
scientific dimensions.
Boundary work has been used as conceptual framework in this research to 
understand the role of techno-scientific actors and knowledge in policy advice, 
and as tool to gain insight in demarcating domains of risk and regulation. The 
boundaries of these domains, as I have demonstrated, are flexible and
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contingent, and continuously negotiated and reproduced in the political and 
institutional context of determining what is considered regulatable at EU level. 
Changing mechanisms of in- and exclusion are paramount, as became clear 
from my analysis of risk perceptions across different domains and of the role of 
ethical principles in regulatory policy-shaping of tissue engineering, and it is at 
these cross-sections where boundaries become fluid and permeable, rather 
than fixed.
My study has revealed several additions to the boundary work approach as 
originally put forward by Gieryn (1983, 1995). While traditional notions have 
focused on the construction of boundaries in the science domain, in my 
analysis I have extended this notion beyond demarcations of science from 
‘non-science’ as spatial markers for cognitive authority. In this research I am 
concerned with the ‘narrow’ techno-scientific actors, but also with clinicians, 
manufacturers, regulators, politicians, patient groups, advisors and other 
experts with a stake in tissue engineering. This means I move away from 
Gieryn (and other)’s exclusive focus on science as domain of demarcation.
It has been recognised how the boundaries of science are ambiguous, and its 
borders flexible and contextually contingent. However, negotiations over these 
borders do not limit themselves to the dichotomy of science versus such non­
sciences as technology, policy, politics and regulation. My aim in this research 
has not been to determine if tissue engineering is a science, or what kind of 
science. Rather, I am concerned with the perceptions of professional actors 
(the ‘inhabitants’ of the social world of tissue engineering) on demarcating the 
domain over several important issues including risk, regulation, expertise and 
ethical concerns. I demonstrated how ‘the science’ of tissue engineering 
constitutes many differentiated boundaries within and across each of these 
domains, most notably in relation to ambiguous definitions of risk, negotiated 
boundaries of uncertainty and in carving out what is considered the regulatable 
domain. The boundaries of tissue engineering are not just ambiguous, flexible 
and dynamic -  as argued in Gieryn’s original account -  but also continuously 
reconstructed by different actors, often inconsistent and heavily contested.
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A useful vehicle to analyse these interactions is provided by Star and 
Griesemer (1989) with their notion of ‘boundary objects’. I used boundary 
objects in my work to underline the importance of different organised interests 
between domains of risk and regulation, thereby extending the limited social 
world concept of ‘pure’ science in itself and focusing on professional spheres of 
interaction that are not wrapped up in traditional disciplinary thinking. The social 
worlds and sub-worlds as defined in my research are understood in terms of 
practices and shared beliefs between actors within and between different 
stages of innovation. For example R&D actors constitute one such social world, 
further differentiated in technological, clinical and commercial ‘subworlds’, while 
regulatory policy activity can be conceived as another dominant social world, 
where technical and ethical frames represent different ideologies and activities 
that it is made up of. The boundaries of these social worlds are set by 
temporary and thus fluid or hybrid understandings of the issues at stake, and 
are negotiated and at many times contested. For example I have demonstrated 
how ‘trading zones’ (or ‘pidgin zones’) are created in professional group 
alliances during the discussion of ethical principles in regulation.
In addition to my attempt to overcome the ‘science versus non-science’ 
limitations of many current approaches, a second main addition to existing 
literature concerns the complex institutionalised character of boundary 
work. Studying the institutional context of EU decision making adds complexity 
to the environment in which boundary work takes place, mainly driven by the 
many uncertainties at this level. The tissue engineering domain is surrounded 
by technological, clinical, commercial, political and social uncertainty, which is 
reflected in boundary drawing exercises in these respected areas. In this 
context Shackly and Wynne (1996) have introduced the concept of a ‘boundary 
ordering device’ to allow actors to negotiate uncertainty across social worlds. 
This proved useful for my study, also in relation to the role of authority of 
scientists as policy advisors, which connects boundary work to regulatory 
science. Thus my research extends this approach by pointing out the 
problematic nature of the broader socio-political and institutional setting at 
multi-level governance.
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By focusing on the complex dynamics of EU policymaking interactions become 
explicit between different heterogeneous professional groups with their own 
institutional affiliations, practices and ambitions. Here decision-making and 
policy outcomes are troubled by political and social uncertainty, and by a 
‘regulatory science’ that thrives on value-laden rather than the ideal typical 
science-based mode of action. In this highly fluid institutional and epistemic 
sets of relations that forms the backdrop for a context-bound negotiated 
regulatory science, the relationship between science and politics is once again 
challenged and notions of what is considered problematic (e.g. how issues are 
framed, as moral or technical; in terms of defining risk and acceptability, what is 
subject to regulation, etc) remain open to debate. The involvement of diverse 
interest groups as described in this thesis gives boundary work a temporal 
dimension, where most notably risks associated with boundary transgression 
are a feature of society in late modernity (as described in extensis by Giddens 
1990 and Beck 1992). As Glasner (1998) argued, the boundary between 
laboratory and society is necessarily transgressed when the risks of new 
technologies only become knowable in the future.
A third consideration in my adaptation of boundary work approaches concerns 
the dominant preoccupation with ‘the politics’ versus ‘the science’ 
demarcation, and how science and policy are defined and distinguished. The 
boundaries between these domains are important because whether a question 
is classified as scientific or political shapes judgements about who should 
resolve it (Hilgartner 2000). Some critical reflection is in place here though.
One observation here relates to framing technology in terms of moral 
controversy, which is a particular interesting site for social scientific 
investigations of boundary work as it is at these crossroads of conflict that 
assumptions about the characteristics of science are articulated and 
reconstructed. But when science controversies are framed as a moral dispute, 
rather than ‘merely’ technical or political, the boundaries between science and 
politics are subject to different forms of boundary-work: ‘where disputes critical 
to science lie outside its domain of authority, scientists may seek to blur rather 
than demarcate boundaries among political, ethical and scientific spaces’ (Kelly 
2003: 344). The claiming of territories and conflict over boundaries between
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most notably technical versus ethical stances are important drivers for the 
debate on tissue engineering regulation, and has been empirically addressed in 
this research.
A second observation in this politically charged notion of boundary work reflects 
my concern with ‘what’s left out’. In addition to the science/politics boundary 
which has traditionally gained substantial scholarly attention (see for example 
Guston 1999) I have pointed out the value of studying economic imperatives 
and the context of innovation in a neo-liberal market environment. Rethinking 
the boundaries between science and capital/commerce and studying these 
developments from a political economy perspective in medicine adds another 
dynamic to the abundant literature that takes the science/politics boundary as 
focal point of analysis.
Thus my analysis on the shaping of a regulatory regime has added a political 
economy component to STS studies on boundary-work, and has used 
elements of governance theories in order to understand stakeholder positions 
and interest representation at EU level. Complex configurations between 
national and supra-national players, within and between different EU level 
institutions and their representatives demand an analysis which puts emphasis 
on long-term tensions between bio-economy and bio-society and the ways in 
which these are interwoven with more recent responsibilities of the Commission 
for public health protection.
This brings us to the notion of regulatory science, where again the boundaries 
between science and politics, or of academic science versus regulatory science 
(Jasanoff 1990), are problematised. Regulatory science refers to ‘forms of 
knowledge and understanding developed in response to the requirements of 
government and industry in the context of the regulatory process’ (Irwin and 
Michael 2003: 45). It brings together the relation between regulatory policy and 
scientific expertise, and the role of scientific evidence and uncertainty in 
decision making. Also the relation between innovation and regulation, and the 
operation of science in ‘separate’ areas of academic, government and industry 
activity are implications of regulatory science (Leydesdorff 2001).
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Expertise is a key notion in accounts of regulatory science, which I have 
addressed in several ways. I have discussed the role of scientists as prominent 
actors in providing knowledge and input into the policy process, resembling 
notions of scientific experts as a fifth branch of government (Jasanoff 1990). I 
have also considered scientific expertise as problematic in terms of 
accountability and credibility, where an increasing part of government is 
conducted by technical experts, who are contrary to their political executives 
not elected. This is especially pressing when it concerns supranational 
regulatory institutions in the EU that operate on an even more distant level of 
democratic participation (Abraham and Lewis 2000). While recognising the 
importance of expert knowledge in policymaking, especially in complex science 
domains, at the same time these bodies have been criticised for their 
‘closedness’, shielding them from external scrutiny (Irwin and Michael 2003). 
Furthermore my study supports existing understandings that expert knowledge 
is not value-free but conditioned by the social context of research that gives 
limitations in their technical assessment (Krimsky and Golding 1992). Scientists 
do not limit their judgements to purely scientific matter and the case study of 
tissue engineering adds to the body of knowledge stating how especially 
biotechnology has raised moral and ethical issues which call for more than 
purely scientific understanding (see for example Levidow and Carr 2005). 
Controversy and disagreement amongst scientists have demonstrated not just 
the contested nature of objective science, but also the normative assessments 
in which scientists engage.
Regulatory science is a restricted domain where wider public groups are 
effectively excluded from discussion (Rothstein et al 1999). Many scholars in 
this tradition have called for more participatory styles of governance, stemming 
from the assumption that broadening the circle of participants in European 
governance (NGO’s, ‘the public’) will lead to inclusion of (more) social and 
ethical concerns on the agenda and new methods of engagement by 
institutions of the EU. Also the role of institutionalised ethical advisory bodies 
such as EGE is relevant in this respect. While recognising the limited 
participation in the regulatory science of tissue engineering (which is mainly 
driven by scientific experts, industrial representatives and technocratic 
networks of Brussels-based regulators), my study has also expressed the need
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to look beyond the usual processes of decision-making by the grand institutions 
of the EU (Council, Commission and Parliament).
Whereas many academics have focused on expert authority as part of the 
policy cycle, I have drawn attention to an often overlooked exponent of the EU 
expert system, namely comitology. Comitology is a peculiar system of EU 
expert committees made up of civil servants that represent Member States and 
Commission officials. These committees assist the European Commission in 
working out the technical details for implementation of new legislation. This 
provides flexibility in regulatory approach, as new insights can be included in 
implementation measures via these committees, rather than changing the main 
text of Directives via the co-decision procedure. This is relevant for a complex 
and novel technology such as tissue engineering, where, for example, 
requirements for new safety tests can be incorporated more easily in risk 
management approaches (see chapter 11).
Comitology is also a highly criticised system. One critical issue reflects 
concerns over what should be decided in a legislative or implementation 
procedure, and where to draw the line between the two. Furthermore the 
complexity of the system and lack of transparency of the committee structure 
has fuelled fears of these committees as a Trojan horse, by which national 
interests are carried into the implementation process of Community law 
(Neuhold 2001).
Thus the comitology procedure has raised issues of democratic legitimacy of 
the EC policy process, with the committees reflecting the ‘democratic deficit’ 
and ‘bureaucratic and technocratic bias’ of the EC system, given the committee 
members are not elected on a democratic basis and the meetings are not open 
to the public. Yet others see institutional conflict between different EU 
institutions. Also visible in discussions on the SANCO Directive, MEPs have 
continuously expressed dissatisfaction that comitology is used as a strategy of 
the Council to circumcise the participation of the European Parliament within 
decisions.
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In other words, while the comitology procedure has been developed as a tool to 
manage complexity and uncertain risks, which became especially relevant in 
the post-BSE era, this same procedure raises questions about the legitimacy of 
the current regulatory system in the EU, technocratic versus democratic 
principles, and the difficulties in drawing boundaries between technical details 
and ethical concerns. In this context it is important to further analyse the 
comitology developments for the SANCO Directive and Enterprise Regulation, 
which are currently being negotiated. Future research should address this 
matter. For scholars interested in the problematic relation between EU expert 
systems and democratic participation, the comitology system provides an 
excellent and as yet under-explored area of investigation.
A final conceptual implication of my study worth reiterating here concerns 
notions of regulation and innovation. An important observation in this respect 
is the increasingly global character of regulation and innovation (Irwin and 
Michael 2003). Regulatory requirements are not limited to national boundaries, 
and as also demonstrated in the case of tissue engineering, national 
governments have to harmonise their frameworks in line with EU level 
regulation. With companies targeting global rather than local markets for their 
products, national governments become part of a larger and international 
network of trade and exchange, which means that also regulatory systems 
become globalised. This affects the content and level of expertise needed, and 
the scientific evidence to underpin regulatory decisions.
This development puts pressure on traditional notions of innovation, which are 
generally based on commercial and economic output. Successful innovation, in 
these terms, is expressed as the marketing of products. Arguably a difference 
exists though between innovation on the one hand and scientific and 
therapeutic progress on the other. Also the link between innovation, progress 
and regulation is much more contingent. As demonstrated with the international 
development of pharmaceuticals, the relationships between innovation, 
regulatory science and progress may be more complex and controversial than 
often assumed (Abraham and Reed 2002). In a discourse of technological 
innovation and scientific progress promises are often created which translate 
into beneficial treatment for patients - an assumption on which also regulators
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base their evaluation. Tissue engineering is illustrative for a technological 
development which is presented as highly innovative, but which so far has 
failed to successfully commercialise and deliver profitable and beneficial 
therapeutic alternatives. As such neo-liberal market science does not translate 
easily into products - in the same way that big science did not translate into big 
products. Furthermore the accessibility of these novel constructs for (future) 
generations of patients is at best unknown. As such a gap exists between the 
optimistic visions of science and the more uncertain and unstable market 
environment in which the fruits of scientific enterprise have to perform. In a 
similar way the boundaries between research and treatment are reconstructed, 
which has policy implications in a global setting. In the context of the 
construction of an ‘economy of hope’ around technological innovations, and 
more so when these innovations are linked to therapeutic promises, 
policymakers and industrial developers should be aware of the complex 
dynamics underlying the innovation process and potential negative implications 
of failing expectations for future experimental endeavours.
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Further Research Is Needed (FRIN)!
This research suggests three principal areas of future study. First, an obvious 
extension is to examine the implementation phase of the SANCO Directive and 
the further legislative development of the Enterprise Regulation. The 
importance of the comitology procedure for the implementation of these 
legislative initiatives has already been discussed. Furthermore, it would be 
valuable to research the role of the embryonic stem cell debate on the 
subsequent development of tissue engineering as technological innovation and 
in its impacts on bio-society.
Second, so far the regulatory science of tissue engineering has been limited to 
a small group of dominant interested parties (including scientific experts, policy 
advisors, regulators and commercial developers and their representatives). Of 
relevance is an analysis of ways in which this domain can become less 
exclusive. Central to this concern is the importance of participation by 
‘stakeholder groups’, such as medical professionals and patient 
representatives, in this process. Equally interesting is the monitoring of ‘public’ 
representatives such as EGE in this process.
Finally, an important theme for research is the way in which tissue engineering 
may become a ‘controversy in the making’. Manufacturers in particular have 
hinted at the risk of a controversy, which could potentially contaminate the 
tissue engineering sector as a whole. Issues of liability have been mentioned in 
this respect, where a link could be made with corporate governance strategies 
in order to control risk. Furthermore, with the SANCO Directive we have 
witnessed how ethical concerns have come to dominate the ‘democratic part’ 
(Parliament) of the legislative cycle. When the boundaries of regulatory science 
are extended to encompass techno-scientific as well as socio-political aspects, 
a possible shift from a dominant bio-economy to a bio-society may become a 
viable option.
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Appendix 1: Glossary of technical terms
Allogeneic (allogenous): taken from different individuals of the same species (donor), 
lends itself to off-the-shelf availability, but may require engineering immune 
acceptance.
Allograft (homograft): a tissue or an organ transplant between individuals of the same 
species, but genetically non-identical.
Autograft: a tissue or an organ transplanted into a new position within or on the same 
individual.
Autologous: taken from the same individual (patient’s own), immune acceptable, and 
does not lend itself to off-the-shelf availability.
Autologous somatic stem cells: cells from a site in the patient’s own body, and not 
the reproductive organs, that have the capacity to produce the different cells in a cell 
lineage.
Biocompatibility: the ability of a material or device to function with an appropriate 
host response in a specific application
Biocompatible material: a material that can function in a biologic environment without 
known or significant detrimental effects on either the material or the living system.
Biodegradable material: a material that breaks down when placed in a biologic 
environment.
Biomaterial: a substance which is compatible with the physiology of the body; 
typically designed for use in tissue engineering.
Biopsy: removal of tissue from living object.
Biomimetic: able to replicate or imitate a body structure (anatomy) or function 
(physiology).
Bone morphogenetic proteins (BMPs): important cell-cell signaling molecules first 
identified by their ability to induce cartilage and bone formation; growth factors often 
used to promote differentiation of osteogenic precursor cells into osteoblasts.
Cell lineage: all the types of cells that can develop from a single stem cell, in the 
context of one type of tissue.
Chondrocytes: cartilage cells
Collagen: Insoluble protein which accounts for 25% to 30% of the total protein in 
animal organisms; major element of skin, bone, cartilage, teeth, blood vessels, 
tendons etc.
Differentiation: the development of cells with specialized structure and function from 
unspecialized precursor cells, which occurs in embryonic development and in the 
subsequent replacement of certain types of cell from persisting unspecialized stem 
cells.
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Epidermis: scarf skin, the outer layer of the skin covering the exterior body surface
ESCs: embryonic stem cells; stem cells derived from embryos
Extracellular matrix: a material outside and between body cells which is the main 
mediator of cell-to-cell signals and which is important for effective healing of wounds.
Fibroblasts: cell shape of connective tissue, in skin equivalents fibroblasts are 
associated with the dermis (while the epithelial layer consists of keratinocytes).
Growth factors: molecules produced by cells and found in extracellular matrix that 
affect the behaviour, growth, and division of body cells; active proteins which are able 
to stimulate tissue formation.
In vivo: within the living organism (body) or natural system.
In vitro: outside of the living organism or natural system; in the test tube/laboratory, 
usually referring to artificial experimental systems such as cultures.
Keratinocytes: skin cells of the epithelial layer
Matrix: an intricate network of natural or synthetic fibres that aids in the reinforcement 
and development of tissues by supplying a scaffold on which cells may grow, migrate 
and proliferate.
Osteoblast: bone-forming cell that secretes the bone matrix.
Osteoclast: large, multinucleate cell that destroys bone or any other matrix during 
bone formation and remodelling.
Osteoinductive: promoting bone growth.
Phenotype: the expression of structure, function, or behaviour of an organism or cell.
Procurement: obtaining cells and tissues from human patients or cadavers
Scaffold: a three-dimensional biocompatible construct (may be seeded with cells) that 
serves as a temporary implantable tissue; generally fated to biodegrade and be 
replaced by natural tissue.
Stem cell: undifferentiated cell in embryo or adult which can undergo unlimited 
division and give rise to one or several different cell types. Stem cells can have 
different characteristics: totipotent means able to produce an entire being; pluripotent 
is able to produce all tissues and self-renew indefinitely (like with embryonic stem 
cells); multipotent implies the ability to produce many cell types and self-renew over 
the lifetime of the being and over many subsequent generations if transplanted (like 
with haematopoietic stem cells); and progenitor cells, like neural stem cells, are able to 
produce restricted numbers of cells and with limited to no capacity of self-renewal.
Xenogeneic: cell source from a non-human species for use in humans, requires 
engineering immune acceptance.
Xenotransplantation: Surgically removing an organ or tissue from one species and 
transplanting it into a member of a different species; a xenotransplant is cultured in a 
(genetically changed) animal.
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Appendix 2: Timelines EU tissue engineering regulation 
Tim eline SA N C O  D irective  
Key dates in the developm ent o f D irective 2004/23/EC
2 Oct. 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam: article 152
21 Jul. 1998 EGE opinion on ethical aspects of human tissue banking
June 2000 Porto expert meeting
1 Oct. 2001 SCMPMD state of the art Opinion on tissue engineering
6-7 Feb. 2002 Malaga expert and national representatives meeting
7-8 Feb. 2002 Malaga EU Ministerial Seminar
19 Jun. 2002 Proposal for a Directive presented by Commission
1 Jul. 2002 President of Parliament refers proposal to the Committee
on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Policy in 
the European Parliament (responsible standing committee)
2 Oct. 2002 Dr Peter Liese appointed as rapporteur
11 Dec. 2002 European Economic and Social Committee (EESC)
opinion on proposal
29 Jan. 2003 Public hearing on proposal: stakeholders’ views
20 Feb. 2003 Public hearing on proposal: patient perspectives
25 Mar. 2003 European Parliament: tabled legislative report, 1st reading
or single reading
10 Apr. 2004 European Parliament: legislative opinion, 1st reading or
single reading
28 May 2003 European Commission: modified legislative proposal
2 Jun. 2003 Discussion of report in the Council
11 Jul. 2003 Council: statement on common position
22 Jul. 2003 Council: common position
11 Aug. 2003 Commission: communication on the common position
4 Nov. 2003 European Parliament: tabled legislative report, 2nd reading
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14 Nov. 2003
16 Dec. 2003 
5 Feb. 2004
3 Mar. 2004 
31 Mar. 2004
7 Apr. 2004
30 Apr. 2004 
29 Jun. 2004 
Aug -  Oct 2004 
29 Mar. 2005
June 2004 
29 Jun 2005
8 Feb. 2006 
1 Mar. 2006
7 Apr. 2006
European Parliament: draft report by the committee 
responsible
European Parliament: decision at 2nd reading
Commission: opinion on the EP amendments to the 
common position
Council adopts Directive
Legislative final act
Date of entry into force of Directive 2004/23/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 
on setting standards of quality and safety for the donation, 
procurement, testing, processing, preservation, storage 
and distribution of human tissues and cells. Publication in 
the Official Journal of the European Communities.
Expert meeting on EU Coding System for tissues and cells 
(comitology)
EGE Opinion on ethical aspects of human tissue 
engineered products
Open consultation technical requirements for Directive 
annex 1 (comitology)
Draft technical requirements (annex 1) for the coding, 
processing, preservation, storage and distribution of 
human tissues and cells (comitology)
Open consultation technical requirements for Directive 
annex 2 (comitology)
Tissues and cells Regulatory Committee - Summary 
Report (comitology)
Implementing legislative act: Commission Directive 
2006/17/EC (comitology)
Entry into force Commission Directive 2006/17/EC 
(comitology)
Transposition: 11 November 2006 
Implementation date for SANCO Directive
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Tim eline DG Enterprise Regulation  
Key dates developm ent of legislative docum ent
Jun - Sept. 2002
Feb. 2003 
13 May 2003
28 Apr. 2003 
11 Jul. 2003 
7 Aug. 2003 
9 Sept. 2003 
23 Sept. 2003
Oct. 2003 
Nov. 2003
Feb. 2004
19 Feb. 2004 
16 Apr. 2004
29 Apr. 2004
30 Apr. 2004 
23 Jun 2004 
July 2004
13 Aug 2004
4 May 2005
20 May 2005
First consultation round: Public web consultation on the 
need for Community legislation
Publication of responses to web consultation
Joint industry letter to Commissioner Liikanen (after 
industry meeting)
Report market study DG JRC-IPTS
Expert meeting Member States representatives
Expert meeting Member States representatives
Expert meeting Member States representatives
Formal consultation 25 Member States regulatory 
authorities
Final synthesis report study DG JRC-IPTS
Tissue engineering dossier moves from medical device 
section (G4) in DG Enterprise to the Biotechnology Unit
Second consultation round announced
Expert meeting Member States representatives
Multi-stakeholder meeting Brussels; Commission presents 
draft proposal for regulatory framework
Formal consultation 25 Member States regulatory 
authorities
Deadline second consultation round on draft proposal
Industry meeting with Commission
Commission publishes summary of responses second 
consultation round
Joint industry comments on Commission proposal for 
regulation
Third consultation round launched 
Industry meeting with Commission
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25 May 2005
I June 2005
7 June 2005 
20 June 2005 
9 Nov. 2005 
16 Nov. 2005
13 Dec 2005
14 Dec. 2005
I I  May 2006 
1 June 2006 
13 Sept. 2006
24 Oct. 2006
Expert meeting Member States representatives
Formal consultation 25 Member States regulatory 
authorities
General stakeholders meeting Brussels 
Deadline for input third consultation round 
EuropaBio industry hearing
Commission and Council adopt initial legislative document 
Co-rapporteur appointed: Locatelli Pia Elda (PSE) 
Rapporteur appointed: Mikolasik Miroslav (PPE-DE) 
European Parliament hearing on Advanced Therapies 
Council debate planned
European Parliament scheduled report for 1st or single 
reading by Standing Committee
European Parliament Part session scheduled for 1st or 
single reading
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Appendix 3: List of interviewees
Codes of interviewees and date of interview 
Total of 69 interviews (including follow-up).
POLICY ADVISORS and EXPERTS
A-EU1 - 131103
Conservative MEP involved in SANCO Directive 
A -EU 2-060104
Regulatory affairs professional in consultancy firm advising multinational 
industry, A-EU2, 2004
A-EU3- 110603
Official in DG Enterprise, European Commission 
A-EU4-151003
Medical director national transplantation agency in Europe, expert advisor on 
DG SANCO Directive
A-EU5 - 290803
Official in DG SANCO, European Commission 
A -E U 6-121103
European expert advisor to DG Enterprise, scientist, head of UK tissue 
engineering centre
A-EU7 -121203
Expert at European Medicines Agency 
A -EU 8-021203
Representative European Association of Tissue Banks 
A -EU 9-021203
Member European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies (EGE) 
A-EU10 - 231105
Official in DG Enterprise, European Commission 
(follow-up)
A-EU11 -241105
Official in DG SANCO, European Commission 
(follow-up)
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CLINICIANS
CI-EU1 - 101203
Clinician in trauma surgery working on autologous chondrocyte implantation 
with commercial affiliation
CI-EU2 - 251103
Academic clinician in vascular surgery 
CI-EU3 - 251103
Clinician in orthopaedic surgery and director of specialist medical centre for 
autologous chondrocyte implantation
CI-EU4- 160303
Clinician in woundcare management in burns hospital with commercial 
affiliation
CI-EU5-151203
Clinician involved in start-up company for osteoarthritis treatment with 
academic affiliation
CI-EU6- 170603
Medical specialist in woundcare management involved in quality assurance, 
academic and clinical affiliation
CM - 100203
Clinical scientist in academic centre for health services research 
CI2 - 030303
Clinician in UK academic hospital working with autologous cartilage 
implantation, with commercial affiliation
CI3 - 180303
Clinician in wound healing in UK university hospital 
CI4 - 250503
Clinician in burns unit of UK academic hospital 
CI5- 140703
UK academic clinician in autologous chondrocyte implantation, with commercial 
affiliation
C I6 -081203
UK clinician in vascular surgery
CONSUMER AND PATIENT GROUPS
Co1 - 190303
Nurse in wound care based in UK hospital, involved in professional wound care 
society
385
Co2 - 240303
UK clinician in wound healing and professional member of national consumer 
organisation for diabetes
Co3-190503
Representative and founder of consumer organisation for people with burn 
injuries
C o 4 -210503
Representative of organisation for cardiac patients 
Co5- 170603
Representative national Health Authority concerned with patient safety
MANUFACTURERS
M-EU1 -221003
Clinical scientist in multinational industrial setting involved in quality insurance 
for clinical and regulatory affairs
M-EU2- 110603
Consultant and representative of European industry association for medical 
devices EUCOMED
M -EU3-270104
Scientist in charge of quality control and process management for multinational 
tissue engineering company
M-EU4- 120603
Quality assurance and regulatory affairs manager in multinational tissue 
engineering company, involved in diverse industry representation bodies and 
regulatory policy development
M-EU5 - 120603
Corporate affairs manager in multinational company, involved in European 
biotech association and regulatory policy development
M-EU6 - 090204
Regulatory affairs manager in multinational company 
M -EU7-111103
Pharmacovigilance manager in multinational company for autologous tissue 
engineering applications (mainly cartilage)
M-EU8 - 230703
Industrial scientist at multinational consultancy company, advising industry on 
high tech and cell therapies
M-EU9- 130603
Regulatory affairs manager of multinational company producing autologous 
cartilage product
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M-EU10- 161203
Director of multinational company in Europe producing autologous tissue 
engineering applications including cartilage
M-EU11 - 130204
Regulatory affairs manager of multinational company, representative several 
industrial associations
M-EU12-251005
Spokesperson European Association for Bioindustries EuropaBio 
(follow up)
M -EU13-161105
Commercial provider of tissue engineering product in US, representative of
European trade association
(follow-up)
M-EU14-091205
CEO of multinational tissue engineering company in Europe 
(follow-up)
M1 - 170203
CEO and regulatory affairs specialist in tissue engineering company 
M2- 120303
Scientific manager corporate product safety assurance for multinational 
company, involved in EU regulatory policy
M3 - 020403
Industry consultant and representative national healthcare industry body 
M4 - 050805
Customer relations officer US-based multinational manufacturer of allogeneic 
TE woundcare products (Apligraf helpline)
REGULATORS
R-EU1 -231003
Director of national government agency for medicinal and biological products, 
involved as expert in EU regulatory activity for DG Enterprise and national 
representative in CPMP (EMEA)
R-EU2- 120603
Medical director of tissue bank involved in standard setting 
R-EU3- 130603
Scientific expert in legislation and standard setting of medical technology and 
tissue engineering, based in advisory body for national government department 
of public health, involved in EU regulatory activity
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R-EU4- 171203
Head of national regulatory agency for medicine and European policy advisor in 
regulation of human tissue.
R -EU 5-111103
Regulatory affairs professional for national government agency in medical 
devices and human tissue, background in multinational industry, involved in 
policymaking.
R -EU 6-111103
Medical director of national transplantation agency, involved in EU regulatory 
activity for SANCO Directive
R1 -111202
Representative national tissue bank association, involved in national and EU 
regulatory activity
R2 - 140503
Regulatory professional in national government agency for medical devices and 
pharmaceutical products, involved in EU and national policy
R3 - 020603
Regulatory professional for national government department of health, involved 
in national and EU policy development on tissue banking and expert SANCO 
Directive
SCIENTISTS
S1 -140103
Academic research scientist in tissue engineering lab with industrial links 
S 2 -040503
Academic scientist in lab for stem cells and biomaterials
53 - 170203
Academic research scientist in tissue engineering centre
54 - 030303
Academic research scientist in clinical care and cartilage repair
55 - 030403
Academic research scientist in wound healing and clinical management, 
professor in tissue engineering and cell therapy
56 - 200503
Academic research scientist in university centre for tissue engineering and 
biomaterials
57 - 200603
Academic research scientist in UK tissue engineering lab with industrial links
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S8- 171103
Academic research scientist in cardiovascular TE applications in hospital
S-EU1 -201103
Research scientist in connective tissue research working in university setting 
with multinational industry
S -EU 2-120104
Academic research scientist in biomaterials and tissue engineering involved in 
European tissue engineering society
01 - 200503
Policy advisor in purchase and supply office of national healthcare provider, 
involved in assessment of medical products including tissue engineering
02-170603
Legal professional in regulation of biotechnology
03-211003
Academic scientist in public health and ethics
04-281103
Clinical scientist involved in evaluation of medical technology based in 
academic department of medical school.
OTHER
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